ORDER E.K. Moidu, J. 1. The main question that arises for determination in this revision petition is a correct application of the provisions of sub-section (8) of section 488 Criminal Procedure Code. 2. The facts that led to the order of the court below may be stated follows: P.W. 1 Annamma who is the 1st petitioner in court below is the wife of the respondent. They were married on 27th July 1964 at her father's residence in Vadakekaramuri in Angadikal village of the Quilon District. After the marriage, however, they shifted their residence to Kalliassery in Chengannur which is the respondent's parents' house in Alleppey District. The respondent himself is permanently employed in the Naval Base, Cochin which is in the Ernakulam District. During the 1st petitioner's stay at Kalliassery in the house of the respondent she became pregnant and her delivery was effected at her residence in the Quilon District. The 2nd petitioner in court below who at the time of the petition was 1½ years old as on 18th January 1968 is their female child. The respondent used to visit at the 1st petitioner in the week end as that was the only time he was free to go out of the Naval Base. During her stay in the respondent's house the treatment meted out to the 1st petitioner by the mother of the respondent was not cordial. In due course the mother of the respondent began to ill-treat the 1st petitioner. She has even imputed unchastity to her and went to the extent of saying that the 2nd petitioner in court below is not the child of the respondent. The 1st petitioner's life became very unhappy and often and on she had occasion to complain to the respondent about the ill-treatment. Finally it is alleged by the petitioners that on the 11th of November, 1967 the respondent took both the petitioners to their residence in Quilon District and that the respondent lived with the petitioners on the 11th and 12th of November, 1967 and on the early morning of the 13th November, 1967 the respondent left the place to which place he never came back. The petitioners allege that the respondent having lived with the petitioners in the Quilon District between 11th November 1967 and 13th November 1967, i.e., the place of their last residence within the meaning of sub-section (8) of section 488 Cr. The petitioners allege that the respondent having lived with the petitioners in the Quilon District between 11th November 1967 and 13th November 1967, i.e., the place of their last residence within the meaning of sub-section (8) of section 488 Cr. P.C. and that the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Adoor to which Court the maintenance petition in question has been filed has jurisdiction to entertain that petition being in the District of Quilon. 3. The 1st petitioner claim maintenance at the rate of Rs. 75 and the 2nd petitioner at the rate of Rs. 60 per month as according to them the respondent gets a monthly pay of Rs. 350 and annual income of Rs. 2000 from his properties. Certain other allegations are also made against the respondent. But we are not concerned by those allegations in this petition. The petition was filed as I have already stated on 18th January 1968 to get separate maintenance to the 1st petitioner with a right to live away from the respondent and also maintenance to the 2nd petitioner who according to the petitioners was not maintained by the respondent during the relevant period from 13th November 1967. 4. The respondent contended inter alia that his mother did not ill-treat her and that he did not dispute the paternity of the child much less the chastity of the 1st petitioner. He has totally denied the allegations that on 11th November 1967 he took the petitioners to their residence in Quilon District. On the contrary he maintained that the father of the 1st respondent without his knowledge removed the petitioners out of his house in his absence, that the 1st petitioner is not entitled to any separate maintenance and that he has also disputed the maintainability of the petition before the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Adoor as according to him that court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition as the place where they last lived was within the jurisdiction of Alleppey District in his father's residence. 5. On the above allegations the court below found that the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Adoor has got jurisdiction to entertain the petition as the respondent last lived with the 1st petitioner in her father's residence within the Quilon District, that the said residence will comply with the provisions of sub-section (8), of section 488 Cr. 5. On the above allegations the court below found that the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Adoor has got jurisdiction to entertain the petition as the respondent last lived with the 1st petitioner in her father's residence within the Quilon District, that the said residence will comply with the provisions of sub-section (8), of section 488 Cr. P.C., that the 1st petitioner is entitled to separate maintenance as she is living away from the respondent on account of ill-treatment by the respondent's mother and that accordingly a sum of Rs. 60 was awarded to the 1st petitioner and Rs. 30 to the 2nd petitioner as monthly maintenance. 6. The only point which has been argued before me by the learned counsel for the respondent who is the petitioner before me is that the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Adoor has no jurisdiction to entertain the application under sub-section (8) of section 488 Cr. P.C. Answer to this question turns upon the construction of section 488 (8) Cr. P.C. The sub-section runs as follows: "Proceedings under this section may be taken against any person in any district where he resides or is or where he last resided with his wife, or as the case may be, the mother of the illegitimate child."� The definite case of the wife of the present petitioner is that they lived as husband and wife in the Quilon District which under the above sub-section is the place where he last resided with his wife. In support of the case of the wife, she is examined as P.W. 1 while two other witnesses on her side are examined as P.W 2 Yohannan and P.W. 3 Thomas. Both of them Annamma are neighbours of the wife of the petitioner. As against that evidence, counter evidence is sought trough R.W. 1 who is the present petitioner and R.WT.2 Kuruvila, R.W.3 Ansari and R.W.4 Kunchu Pillai. P.W. 1 said that on 11th November 1967 the husband took her and the child from this house at Kalliassery to Thotiyil Puthen Veedu which is in the Quilon District and lived there with husband and wife and the husband left the place on the morning of 13th of that month. P.Ws. 2 and 3 who are close neighbours have deposed that they saw P.W. 1 and R.W. 1 in the former's house on the 11th and 12th of November, 1967. P.Ws. 2 and 3 who are close neighbours have deposed that they saw P.W. 1 and R.W. 1 in the former's house on the 11th and 12th of November, 1967. P.W. 2 saw R.W. 1 and his family arriving at the house in a car on the evening of 11th November 1967 and that he met R.W. 1 in the Church on 12th November 1967 which is a Sunday. He saw also R.W. 1 leaving the place on the morning of the 13th. The fact that 12th November being a Sunday, the week end visit of R.W. 1 is quite probable. As against the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3, the oral evidence on the side of the respondent is not very satisfactory. He sought to prove by the production of Ext. P-1 letter that on the 11th and 13th of November, 1967 he was working in his office at Cochin. But Ext. P-1 is not proved in accordance with law. Even assuming that Ext. P-1 is a genuine letter, there is nothing strange in his presence in Cochin on the 11th or 13th of November, 1967 as it is the case of the wife that he took her on the evening of 11th November 1967 to Quilon District and that he left the place on the morning of 13th November 1967. So the case of the husband that he worked in his Office these two days is not a circumstance in favour of R.W. 1 to disbelieve the case of P.W. 1 that she was taken by him to her residence on the lower court has disbelieved the evidence of R.Ws. 1 to 4. R.Ws. 2 and 3 are designated as hired witnesses. On going through the evidence, I am convinced that no reliance can be placed on the same. The conclusion, therefore, is that the husband and wife lived in the Quilon District on the 11th and 12th of November, 1967. The question under these circumstances is whether the residence for two days in the Quilon District will constitute the place where they last resided within sub-section (8) of section 488 Cr. P.C. so as to give the lower court jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The case law on the point is too numerous and I endeavour to point out some of them having relevancy to the case on hand. P.C. so as to give the lower court jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The case law on the point is too numerous and I endeavour to point out some of them having relevancy to the case on hand. In a case reported in Tulsiram Dewaji v. Smt. Narbadabai, A.I.R. 1958 Madhya Pradesh 255 the following facts are stated: "The necessary averments of the petitioner contained in the petition for maintenance was that she was married to the opposite party at Nagpur on 18th May 1954, that thereafter from 23rd May 1954 up to Octobers 1954, she stayed with her husband in the house of her parents-in law in mohalla Ramnagar, Wardha, that during this period she was very cruelly treated by her husband and the reason for the aforesaid cruel treatment, was that he had been coercing her to arrange from her parents a sum of Rs. 2,000 for being paid to the husband, that on 30th October 1954, the husband and the wife came to Napier Town, Jabalpur, and started residing with her parents, that they continued to reside together at her parent's house at Jabalpur right up to 20th December 1954 that during this period the husband made visits to Katni, Agra and Dehradun for short durations and returned from those places to Jabalpur where he continued to reside with her till 20th December 1954, that thereafter he left her at Jabalpur and never came back to her nor took her to him from her parents' house."� 7. On the basis of the above facts it is held that the expression "reside" appearing in the section is wide enough to cover temporary as well as permanent residence. However, what would constitute residence within the meaning of section 488 Cr. P.C. would depend on the facts of each case. In the above case, however, it was pointed out that it could not be said that the residence of the husband in the parents' house at Jabalpur was not such a casual or flying nature as to deprive the court at Jabalpur of its jurisdiction to entertain the application under section 488 Cr. P.C. 8. In P. V. Isaac v. Mrs. Susan Isaac, A.I.R. 1957 Kerala 61 it is pointed out that mere casual visit to a place by themselves will not confer jurisdiction under section 488 Cr. P.C. 8. In P. V. Isaac v. Mrs. Susan Isaac, A.I.R. 1957 Kerala 61 it is pointed out that mere casual visit to a place by themselves will not confer jurisdiction under section 488 Cr. P.C. on a Magistrate of that place except in cases where the husband and wife having fixed or permanent place of residence. The question to be decided under this sub-section is that what is understood in the ordinary sense in which the word "reside" is used in the sub-section in that where both parties must have their joint residence prior to the initiation of proceedings under section 488. Such residence may have been temporary and only for a short period and even then the same will be sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court having territorial jurisdiction over that place to entertain an action under section 488. In the above case the temporary joint residence was found to be sufficient 'last residence' within the meaning of the above section. 9. Again in In re, Sama Jetha, A.I.R. 1930 Bombay 348 the words 'last resided' are not restricted to permanent residence, but include also a temporary residence which in that case was for a period of 2 months with his wife at the house of the parents-in-law so as to confer jurisdiction on the court of that place. 10. In Sardari Lal v. Kaushalya Devi, A.I.R. 1957 Punjab 84 it is pointed out that even a place of temporary residence is within the meaning of the word 'reside'. Though it is true that "resides"� implies something more than a mere brief or flying visit but in this case the wife was residing in the village and the husband who was employed outside used to come to that village and husband and wife lived together, that would amount to 'reside' within the meaning of the word as used in sub-section (8) of section 488 Cr. P.C. The following passage from the above decision may be quoted: "It is true that "resides"� implies something more than a mere brief or flying visit but in the case the wife was residing in the Village and the husband who was employed outside, i.e., in Meerut, used to come to the village and the husband and the wife lived together as such. In my opinion, that would amount to "resides" within the meaning of the words as used in section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code". 11. In another case Ambalal Narandas Patel, v. Dhiben Dahyabhai Patel, A.I.R. 1963 Gujarat 91, the observations are as follows:- "The idea of permanent residence and a casual or temporary residence is therefore implicit in this expression, namely, "where he resides or is", but the next expression is "where he last resided with his wife". In my humble opinion, this expression does not recognise the distinction between the permanent residence and casual residence. There can be only one permanent residence, and the words "last resided" have reference to permanent residence. The very use of the word "last" before the word "resided" would clearly show that the idea of the distinction between permanent residence and casual residence is ignored for this purpose, although this idea is taken into account at the beginning of the section. The use of the past tense, namely, "resided" also would tend to show that the word has reference to any type of residence and not necessarily to permanent residence". 12. In all these cases the point urged and established is that even a temporary residence is sufficient to constitute jurisdiction for a Magistrate to entertain the application for maintenance as if that place is within his territorial limits. The idea behind this sub-section is to give appropriate relief to the aggrieved wife and get at her husband and claim maintenance. But at the same time it may be noted that the idea is not to harass the husband by the wife. However, the well-known proposition with regard to the point involved in the case has been set out in a Supreme Court ruling Mst. Jagir Kaur and another v. Jaswant Singh, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1521. That proposition is set forth in a Kerala decision which is reported in Radhakrishna Menon v. Kamalakshi, 1965 (2) I.L.R. (Kerala) 556. At page 556 the passage from the Supreme Court decision is reproduced as stated below: "The question therefore is whether these 'visits' to his wife can be taken to mean that he 'resided' with her at Morazha. The implications of the pharse 'last resided' has been considered by the Supreme Court in Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh. At page 556 the passage from the Supreme Court decision is reproduced as stated below: "The question therefore is whether these 'visits' to his wife can be taken to mean that he 'resided' with her at Morazha. The implications of the pharse 'last resided' has been considered by the Supreme Court in Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh. The court was of the opinion that the expression 'last resided' takes colour from the word 'resides' used earlier, in the sub section and that the same meaning should be given to both the expressions; the word 'resides' was interpreted thus:- "a person resides in a place if he through choice makes it his abode permanently; whether a person has chosen to make a particular place his abode depends upon the facts of each case.... Some illustrations may make our meaning clear: (1) A, living in a village goes to a nearby town B to attend a marriage or to make purchases and stays there in a hotel for a day or two. (2) A, a tourist, goes from place to place during his peregrinations and stays for a few days in each of the places he visits. (3) A, a resident of a village, who is suffering from a chronic disease, goes along with his wife to a town for medical treatment, takes a house and lives there for about six months. (4) A, a permanent resident of a town goes to a city for higher education, takes a house and lives there, alone or with his wife, to complete his studies. In the first two cases, A makes only a flying visit and he has no intention to live either permanently or temporarily in the places he visits. It cannot, therefore be said that he 'resides' in the place she visits. In the last two illustrations though A has a permanent house else where he has a clear intention or animus manendi to make the place where he has gone for medical relief in one and studies in the other his temporary abode or residence. In the last two cases it can be said that though he is not a domicile of those places, he 'resides' in those places."" 13. In the last two cases it can be said that though he is not a domicile of those places, he 'resides' in those places."" 13. On a reading of these decisions, I am constrained to hold in the circumstances of this case that the wife has made out a case that she lived last with her husband in the Quilon District which is within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Adoor. In this regard reference may also be made, to letters which are marked as Exts. P-1 to P-3. These, letters will show that they were sent by the husband to the wife while she was living in her parents' house. Her marriage was effected at that house and she gave birth to the child also in that place. That house is, therefore, a temporary residence both for the husband and wife. It may be stated that the husband would have decided upon neglecting his wife after 13th November 1967. That, however, will not negative the contention of the wife that they had only to live temporarily at Quilon District. There is nothing in the evidence either of P.W. 1 or R.W.1 to suggest that there is anything in the mind of R.W. 1 at the time she was taken to her residence that she was to be neglected once for all by the husband. The evidence of P.W. 1 is that they were on best of terms while they were living at their residence on the 11th and 12th of November, 1967. It may be said that the wife would have the feeling that she would be neglected once for all when she was taken to her residence on the 11th November, 1967. Even if she had any such feeling that is countenanced by the fact that they lived happily together for 2 days at the residence and that both parties have chosen that place as the temporary residence. As a matter of fact, the husband in this case has no permanent residence as such. He is only a week end visitor to his own house in Alleppey District. His permanent residence is in the Ernakulam District himself working in the Naval Base, Cochin. As a matter of fact, the husband in this case has no permanent residence as such. He is only a week end visitor to his own house in Alleppey District. His permanent residence is in the Ernakulam District himself working in the Naval Base, Cochin. Whether it is his own residence or his own wife's residence, his week end visit and stay with his wife in the Quilon District is sufficient to constitute temporary residence within the meaning of subsection (8) of section 488 Cr. P.C. In this way, I am of the opinion that P.W. 1 has complied with the provisions of section 488 (8) in filing the petition before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Adoor and I hold that the said Magistrate has jurisdiction to entertain this application. That the curative effect of section 531 Cr. P.C. need not be considered in this case as there is sufficient materials to hold that the place where the parties last resided is a temporary residence so as to give the Magistrate jurisdiction to entertain that application. Therefore, I make no opinion as regards the effect of section 531 Cr. P.C. 14. In the result the petition fails and the same is dismissed.