M. P. THAKKAR, J. ( 1 ) * * * * ( 2 ) THE next question that arises is as regards the resultant hardship. The trial Court has recorded a clear finding that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord by refusing a decree for eviction. The finding recorded by the lower Appellate Court to the contrary is vitiated on account of the erroneous interpretation placed by it on the stipulation contained in the partition deed. This Court is therefore obliged to record its own finding on this all important and crucial issue. Before I tackle that problem I must resolve a question of principle. When the hardship is equal on both sides contends learned Counsel for the petitioner the landlord must without anything more succeed in as much as the factum of his ownership must tilt the balance in his favour relying on a passing remark in Taherbhai Hebtullabhai and another v. Ambalal Harilal Shah and another (VII G. L. R. 981 ). Now sub-sec. (2) of sec. 13 of the Rent Act in so far as it is material reads thus:- (2) No decree for eviction shall be passed on the ground specified in clause (g) of sub-sec. (1) if the Court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. Differently stated the Legislature has enjoined by sub-sec. (2) of sec. 13 that no decree for eviction shall be passed on the ground of bona J2de and reasonable requirement of the landlord if greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing it. To be able to pass a decree for eviction the Court must therefore be in a position to affirmatively hold that greater hardship to the landlord would be the result of refusing to pass it. And the expression greater makes it explicit that it is a relative concept. It is stating the obvious to say that greater does not and cannot mean equal. If hardship on both sides is equal how can the Court hold that the hardship to the landlord will be greater the concept of ownership notwithstanding ? To do so would be to accord undeserving obeisance to the concept of ownership. It is stating the obvious to say that greater does not and cannot mean equal. If hardship on both sides is equal how can the Court hold that the hardship to the landlord will be greater the concept of ownership notwithstanding ? To do so would be to accord undeserving obeisance to the concept of ownership. The respect that the concept of ownership enjoys let it not be overlooked springs from and has its roots in the recognition accorded to it by the conscious consent of the people acting through a responsive Legislature and from no where else. If the legislature in its wisdom has enjoined that no decree for eviction can be passed unless it can be posited that greater hardship to the landlord will ensue by refusing to do so the Courts are obliged to respect the wisdom of the Legislature and hold likewise. The equation of hardship will remain what it is regardless of the fact that the landlord is the owner of the premises. What is equal cannot become greater by virtue of his ownership of the premises in question. I am therefore unable to assent to the proposition canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that even if the resultant hardship to the landlord is no greater than the hardship to the tenant and even if the hardship at both the ends is equal yet a decree for eviction should follow in favour of the landlord merely because he is the owner of the premises. Having regard to subsec. (2) of sec. 13 I am afraid the Court has no jurisdiction to do so. Application allowed. .