JUDGMENT : Acharya, J. - This appeal is against the judgment passed by Sri C. Mohapatra, District Judge, Cuttack-Dhenkanal, in Miscellaneous Case No. 29 of 1961 dismissing with costs the claim petition of the Applicant-Appellant filed under the Motor Vehicles Act on the allegation that Udia Bewa, widow of Jai Sahu, met with her death because of the fracture of the skull and multiple injuries on her body which she received on being dashed by the bus bearing the number O.R.C 2115 belonging to the three Respondents. The Applicant as the agent of Champa Dei, daughter of the deceased, claimed compensation of Rs. 48,000/- on the basis of the alleged income of Rs. 200/- per month of the deceased Udia Bewa. 2. Respondent No. 1 contested the case mainly on the ground that by the date of the alleged occurrence, this Respondent was not concerned at all with the said bus as the Orissa State Council for Child Welfare had purchased and taken delivery of the said vehicle on 2-12-1960 from this Respondent, and since then it was utilised for the Sishu Bhusan purposes; and that the aforesaid fact of transfer was duly intimated to the Superintendent of police. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 in their written objection corroborated the above fact regarding the transfer of the vehicle in favour of the Orissa State Council of Child Welfare. On the above facts, the Appellant in this Court conceded this position, and gave up his claim against Respondent No. 1. 3. The main grounds on which the other two Respondents contested the case were as follows: (i) That Champa Dei was not the daughter or the legal representative of the deceased Udia Bewa who died leaving her only son Bishnu Charan Sahu. (ii) That the Applicant Narottam Das was not the legal agent of Champa Dei and not entitled to make any such application on her behalf. (iii) That the deceased Udia Bewa was aged about 80 years and was not 52 years at the time of her death. (iv) That the deceased at the time of her death was incapable of earning anything on account extreme old age, and was dependent on her son. It was incorrect to say that she was a shop-keeper with a monthly income of Rs. 200/-. (v) The deceased din not sustain the injuries described in column II of the application. (iv) That the deceased at the time of her death was incapable of earning anything on account extreme old age, and was dependent on her son. It was incorrect to say that she was a shop-keeper with a monthly income of Rs. 200/-. (v) The deceased din not sustain the injuries described in column II of the application. (vi) That the claim of Rs. 48,000/- as compensation is illegal, exaggerated and not maintainable. (vii) That thee two Respondents were not the owners of the said vehicle, as Orissa Road transport Co. had transferred the ownership of the vehicle in favour of the Orissa State Council of Child Welfare. 4. Out of our witnesses examined on behalf of the Applicant, p.w. 1 is the doctor who held the post-mortem examination on the deceased p.w. 2 is Champa Dei herself p.w. 3 is a witness to the occurrence deposing also to the fact that Champa Dei is the daughter of deceased Udia Bewa who had a grocery shop from which she had a daily sale of about Rs. 200/- to Rs. 2501-. According to him, the deceased was about 50 to 52 years old. p.w. 4 is the Advocate's clerk of Mr. G.G. Das who is the father as well as the Advocate of Narottam Das, the Applicant in this case. The Respondents did not examine any witness. 5. The main contention of Mr. Das, the learned Counsel for the Appellant was that the learned Tribunal Judge made an incorrect appreciation of the evidence on record inasmuch as he did not take into consideration the effect of non-production of evidence by the Respondents to counteract and/or controvert the effect of the evidence adduced by the Applicant in this case. It was therefore asserted that the learned Judge, on the unchallenged and uncontroverted evidence adduced by the Applicant, should have considered the facts so alleged as proved and allowed the claim of the Applicant on such evidence. Mr. R.N. Misra, the learned Counsel for Respondent No. 2, contended at first that the claiment, on the facts alleged and evidence adduced, was not entitled-to any compensation whatsoever, there being no assertion much less proof of the essential fact that the accident was the result of negligence on the part of the owner or the driver of the vehicle. Mr. R.N. Misra, the learned Counsel for Respondent No. 2, contended at first that the claiment, on the facts alleged and evidence adduced, was not entitled-to any compensation whatsoever, there being no assertion much less proof of the essential fact that the accident was the result of negligence on the part of the owner or the driver of the vehicle. Secondly he contended that the Secretary, Orissa State Council of Child Welfare, Raj Bhavan, Puri had no legal responsibility or liability for any such damage as the ownership of the vehicle as specifically asserted in the written objection, vested only in the Orissa State Council of Child Welfare. 6. The first contention of Mr. Misra as stated above is a formidable one as it is squarely supported by the following decisions cited by him. Ram Pertap Vs. General Manager, Punjab Roadways, Ambala State of Punjall v. V.K. Kalia 1968 A.C.J. 401, and Mandi Kulya Road Transport Corporation v. Janak Raj Singh and Ors. 1968 A.C.J. 363. The above mentioned decisions deal, inter alia, with exactly the point raised by Mr. Misra, and we are in full agreement with the reasoning adopted and the analysis of law made on this point in those decisions. Agreeing with the principles enunciated therein we hold that for fixing the liability it is essential for the claimant to prove that the accident was caused by the negligence of the driver or the owner of the vehicle. Thus, negligence on the part of the owner or driver is of prime consideration in ascertaining the liability of a person in an accident of this nature. In this case we find that there is absolutely no mention of any such thing in the claim petition, though in column 22 of the prescribed application form such an averment could have been made in specific terms. There is also nothing to that effect in the evidence on record. Thus as the petition for claim and the evidence adduced on behalf of the Applicant are absolutely silent on this important aspect of the matter, which is an essential factor to be proved, we are of the opinion that the claim as laid cannot be sustained. Mr. Das made a vain attempt to meet the above contention by saying that negligence on the part of the driver could very well be assumed and gathered from the evidence on record. Mr. Das made a vain attempt to meet the above contention by saying that negligence on the part of the driver could very well be assumed and gathered from the evidence on record. We do not find any substance or force in this contention of Mr. Das. 7. In view of our finding that the claim of the Applicant as such cannot be sustained, the contention raised by Mr. Das as mentioned above is of no avail. On the same ground the second contention of Mr. Misra as also the other objections raised by Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 813 quoted above, need not also be discussed or dealt with. 8. It is however to be noted that t he application for claim has been filed in the name of Narottam Das, who is the son of Mr. Gour Gopal Das, the Advocate for the Applicant, and Mr. Das's clerk is appearing as a witness (p.w. 4) for the Applicant in this case. Champa Dei on whose behalf the claim petition has been filed, is alleged to be a co-villager of the above named clerk. Her husband who is said to be living has not been examined in this case. None of the neighbours of the deceased Udia Bewa has been examined either to prove the occurrence or to prove that this Champa Dei was really the daughter of deceased Udia Bewa. Narottam Das, who as the alleged agent of Champa Dei has filed this claim application, has not also been examined in this case. It is also significant to note that Champa Dei, who allegedly entered into an agreement with her agent Narottam Das to file this claim petition and to share the compensation as may be available, has not taken any steps either to claim or to possess the grocery shop which belonged to the deceased Udia Bewa. It is admitted by Champa that one Bishnu Charan Sahu, who according to the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 is the son of deceased Udia Bewa, is now living in her house and maintaining the shop. All' these things make the claim of Champa Dei highly suspicious. 9. In view of our findings above, we do not see any merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed with costs throughout. A. Misra, J. 10. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed