Research › Browse › Judgment

Delhi High Court · body

1969 DIGILAW 97 (DEL)

OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR,PEOPLES INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED , (IN LIQUIDATION) v. MANGAL SINGH ETC

1969-05-15

S.K.KAPUR

body1969
S. K. Kapur, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application for execution filedby the Official Liquidator, Peoples Insurance Company limited (in liquidation) and the decree-holder claims a sum of Rs. 31. 400. 00against the estate of late S. Sardul Singh Caveeshar, now represented by his son Major K. S. Caveeshar, on the basis of theorder dated 30/08/1965, passed by the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 114 of 1962, whereby S. Sardulsingh Caveeshar was settled on the list of contributories ofpeoples Insurance Company Limited (in liquidation) (hereinafterreferred TO to as the company and a sum of Rs. 31,400. 00 determined as payable by the contributory. The company made anapplication for attachment before judgment under Order 38,rule 5, Civil Procedure Code (Petition L. M. No. 66 of 1957) onor about 14/05/1967, and an order was made attaching thecompensation payable to S. Sardul Singh Caveeshar under thedisplaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. On 16/08/1967, Jagjit Singh, J. , while issuing notice on theexecution petition to Major K. S. Caveeshar, ordered that "thechief Settlement Commissioner, New Delhi, be requested to remitthe amount to the Court which has fallen due under the attachedclaim". Various objections were taken on behalf of Major K. S. Caveeshar to the execution application and on pleadings of theparties as many as ten issues were framed. It is necessary onlyto refer to issue No. 1 as the learned counsel for Major K. S. Caveeshar confined his arguments only to that and did not touchany other issue. The said first issue reads- "can the Official Liquidator proceed against theclaims, which have been verified in the name of Shri Sardulsingh Caveeshar?" ( 2 ) THE position as to the claim has been disclosed by Shri Radhakrishan (DHW 1), a Settlement Officer since 25/08/1962. He said that the total claim verified in favour of late S. Sardulsingh Caveeshar was Rs. 5,63,596. 00; that after adjusting thepayment already made, a sum of Rs. 82. 844. 00 was payable to S. Sardul Singh Caveeshar; that because of the death of S. Sardulsingh Caveeshar the amount was payable to his estate "but inview of the directions of this Court we have taken no steps formaking payment to anyone. We will have to bring the legalrepresentatives of the deceased on record under section 9 of thedisplaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitaiion) Act,1954, before making the payment. We will have to bring the legalrepresentatives of the deceased on record under section 9 of thedisplaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitaiion) Act,1954, before making the payment. There is now no other impediment in making the payment except (1) bringing the legal representatives under section 9 on record; and (2) verifying whether ornot late Sh. Sardul Singh Caveeshar made any other commitmentwith respect to his claim by way of association before the receiptof the order of attachment from this Court"; and that the Department had no objection to the attachment "but we have to verifythe net amount due to Shri Sardul Singh Caveeshar s estate aftermeeting the commitments, if any, made by him before the receiptof the attachment order". ( 3 ) THE only point raised by Mr. Vohra, the learned counselfor Major K. S. Caveeshar, was that the compensation payableto a displaced person, not being a property, could not be attached. Section 8 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, deals with the form and manner of paymentof compensation. This section provides that "a displaced person shall be paid out of the compensation pool the amount ofnet compensation determined under sub-section (3) of section 7as being payable to him and subject to any rules that may bemade under this Act, the Settlement Commissioner or any other officer or authority authorised by the Chief Settlement Commissioner in this behalf may make such payment in any one ofthe following forms or partly in one and partly in any other form,namely. . . . . . . . . . " The section then sets out the various formsin which the payment may be made, such as, in cash or in Government bonds or by sale to the displaced person of any property from the compensation pool and setting off the purchase moneyagainst the compensation payable to him. Section 14 providesfor the constitution of a compensation pool and also about whatthe compensation pool shall consist of. Section 15 exempts theproperty in compensation pool from processes of Courts and provides- "no property which forms part of the compensationpool and which is vested in the Central Governmentunder the provisions of this Act shall be liabe to be proceeded against for any claim in any manner whatsoever inexecution of any decree or order or by other process ofany Court or other authority. " ( 4 ) MR. " ( 4 ) MR. Vohra argued that the effect of these provisions was to renderthe compensation payable to a displaced person immune fromany attachment. He said that till the mode of payment had beendetermined under section 8, there was no debt due to a displacedperson that could be attached. Reliance was placed by Mr. Vohra on Tirath Ram Lal Chand v. M/s. Mehar Chand Jagan Nath, in which K. L. Gosain, J. decided- "it cannot, therefore, be said at this stage whether thegovernment will pay any amount at all in cash nor canit be said as to what form the compensation will ultimately take. At the moment, therefore, the Government cannot be deemed to have become the debtor qua any particular sum payable by it nor can the claimants be deemedto be creditors qua the said amount. Till the Governmentmake a tender of any cash amount the money lying in thecompensation pool remains part of that pool and is in myopinion exempt from attachment under the provisionsof section 15 of the aforesaid Act. " ( 5 ) GOSAIN, J. relied on Sunder Das v. Secretary of State, and Spencev. Coleman. Mr. Vohra also depended on these two decisions. ( 6 ) MR. Raizada, the learned counsel for the decree-holder,on the other hand, REFERRED TO to Shri Thakar Dass v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, New Delhi and others, ; K. B. Cooperative Credit Bank v. S. Verma , and Harnam Singh v. K. Puri. In Thakar Dass s case, the judgment of Gosain. J. does not appear to have been placed before Mahajan, J. Mahajan, J. decided that after the determination of the amount of compensation there is no option left to the Department but to paythe same. The manner of payment has no doubt been left tothe discretion of the authority concerned but it cannot be withheld and, therefore, "the right to receive compensation is certainly property as creditor s right to recover a debt is property". The compensation due was consequently held to vest in the Official Receiver by operation of law. In Harnam Singh s case a Divisionbench of the Punjab High Court dissented from the viewtaken by Gosain, J. and approved that of the Bombay High Courtin K. B. Co-operative Credit Bank s case. The view of Mahajan, J. was also approved. The compensation due was consequently held to vest in the Official Receiver by operation of law. In Harnam Singh s case a Divisionbench of the Punjab High Court dissented from the viewtaken by Gosain, J. and approved that of the Bombay High Courtin K. B. Co-operative Credit Bank s case. The view of Mahajan, J. was also approved. In K. B. Co-operative Credit Bank s-case, Patel J. held :- "reading sections 7 and 8, it is clear that once theamount of net compensation payable to the displacedperson is determined, the Government is bound to makethe payment in accordance with the provisions of section8. How it will discharge the payment is no doubt withinthe discretion of the officer concerned, but the amountmust be paid and there cannot be any evasion of the payment. It is, therefore, clear that the Legislature intendedthat once the amount payable was determined, it becamea debt payable to the displaced person. Ordinarily a debtis payable in money and not in kind. The legislature madean exception to this ordinary rule and provided that it could be discharged in one or more of the several modesprovided in section 8. Nonetheless, in view of the obligatorynature of the duty to make the payment, it must beregarded as a debt. " ( 7 ) NOW it remains to consider the decisions relied upon by Mr. Vohra. In Sunder Das s case, the Lahore High Court decidedthat the compensation money awarded under the Land Acquisition Act could not be attached by a creditor until the amountwas tendered under section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act because money in the hands of the Collector belonged to the Government until the tender was made. As observed by Patel, J. in K. B. Co-operative Credit Bank s case, it is not possible toascertain from the statement of facts as to whether possessionhad been taken by the Collector in the acquisition proceedings. Under section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act it is open to thegovernment, except in the case provided for in section 36, towithdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possessionhas not been taken. In any case, even if section 31 be susceptibleto the construction placed by the Lahore High Court, it bearsno analogy to the provisions of the Act under consideration. The determining factor always is whether there is a debt due to theperson whose property is sought to be attached. In any case, even if section 31 be susceptibleto the construction placed by the Lahore High Court, it bearsno analogy to the provisions of the Act under consideration. The determining factor always is whether there is a debt due to theperson whose property is sought to be attached. The ratio of the Lahore High Court decision also is the same, which appearsfrom the following observation :- "the Land Acquisition Act is a complete Code initself, and until the tender is made, the person whose landhas been acquired, does not become a creditor or the Collector a debtor. " ( 8 ) THAT position does not obtain under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act. The amount of compensation determined, and which has been determined in this case,becomes, by virtue of section 8, a debt due to the displaced person. The fact that a discretion is left with the authority concerned topay it in one or other of the modes prescribed cannot affect theposition and it remains property notwithstanding the discretionas to the mode of payment. The case of Spence v. Colemanis also distinguishable on the same ground. There also thecourt decided on the construction of the relevant provisions oflaw that there was no debt due to the judgment-debtor. Patel,j. in the Bombay case has distinguished Spence s case and I am inrespectful agreement with the same. In my opinion, therefore,there is no force in Mr. Vohra s contention and the compensationpayable to the estate of late S. Sardul Singh Caveeshar is a property capable of attachment. ( 9 ) THAT leaves the question of mode of realisation. The discretion as to the mode of payment vests in the authorities concerned. I would, therefore, appoint the Official Liquidator asreceiver to realise the payment, to the extent due to the company,from the authorities under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act in the same manner as it would havebeen paid to S. Sardul Singh Caveeshar. The Receiver being theofficial Liquidator will not be entitled to any extra remunerationfor this work. ( 10 ) THE execution application is, therefore, allowed but with no order as to costs.