JUDGMENT Gyanendra Kumar, J. - All these six cases involve similar questions of fact and common questions of law, regarding the interpretation and effect of Ss. 5 and 13 of the U.P. Roadside Land Control Act X of 1945 (hereinafter called the U.P. Act) as finally amended by the U.P. Roadside Land Control Act, VI of 1965, which came into force with effect from March 20, 1965. They can, therefore, be disposed of by a single judgment. Government Appeals Nos. 593 and 594 of 1965 have been preferred by the State against the orders of acquittal passed by Sri K.D. Srivastava, Magistrate/class, Allahabad on December 31, 1964 and December 30, 1964 respectively. On the other hand, all the Criminal Revisions have been filed by the accused persons involved in four different cases. Cr. Rev. No. 329 of 1966 has been referred to a larger Bench by the order of Rajeshwari Prasad, J. dated November 27, 1967, while Cr. Revs. No. 454 and 900 of 1966 have been referred to a larger Bench by the order of J.N. Takru, J. dated November 22, 1967 and Cr. Rev. No. 1227 of 1966 has been connected with Cr. Rev. No. 900 of 1966 by the order of Tripathi, J. dated March 2, 1968. 2. All the above cases have arisen out of the alleged contravention of Section 5 of the Act and the accused of various cases have either been acquitted, punished or dealt with under Section 13 thereof, for having built upon the controlled area of the highways without the permission of the Collector. In order to appreciate the true nature of the controversy, it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions of certain sections of the impugned Act. 3. The U.P. Roadside Land Control Act, 1945 was enacted with a view to control haphazard construction of buildings along the roads, as defined in sub-section (6) of Section 2 of the Act, according to which `road' means a metalled road maintained by the State Government or by a local authority or a route demarcated by State Government or a local authority with a view to constructing along it a metalled road." 4. Section 3(1) provides that the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, declare any land within a distance of four hundred and forty yards from the centre line of any road to be a controlled area for the purposes of this Act. Section 5 lays down that "No person shall erect or re-erect any building ........ in a controlled area except with the previous permission of the Collector in writing". Section 13 relates to offences and penalties. The material portions of this section run as under: "13(1) Any person who - (a) erects or re-erects any building ... in contravention of the provisions of Section 5........ (b) .......... shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees........ (2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), the Collector may order any person who has committed a breach of the provisions of the said sub-section to restore to its original state. ........ any building or land in respect of which a contravention such as is described in the said sub-section has been committed, and if such person fails to do so within three months of the order, may himself take such measures as may appear to him to be necessary to give effect to the order, and the cost of such measures shall be recoverable from such person as arrear of land revenue." 5. With effect from April 15, 1956 came into force the National Highways Act No. 48 of 1956. Certain Highways already specified in the Schedule (Annexed to the Act) were declared to be national highways, by Section 2(1) of the Act. The two highways in question viz. the Grand Trunk Road East and the Allahabad-Rewa Road were already specified in the Schedule and were declared as highway No. 2 and highway No. 27 respectively. By virtue of Section 4 both these highways forthwith vested in the Union of India. Section 5 of the National Highways Act laid down: "5. The two highways in question viz. the Grand Trunk Road East and the Allahabad-Rewa Road were already specified in the Schedule and were declared as highway No. 2 and highway No. 27 respectively. By virtue of Section 4 both these highways forthwith vested in the Union of India. Section 5 of the National Highways Act laid down: "5. It shall be the responsibility of the Central Government to develop and maintain in proper repair all national highways; but the Central Government, may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that any function in relation to the development or maintenance of any national highway shall, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the notification, also be exercise able by the Government of the State within which the national highway 9 situated ....... " 6. Accordingly the Central Govt published the following notification in the Gazette of India on April 13, 1957:- "SRO 1181 - In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of the National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956), the Central Govt. hereby directs that the functions in relation to the execution of works pertaining to each of the national highways described in Col. 2 of the Scheme hereto annexed shall be exercisable also by the State Govt. specified in Col. 3 of the Schedule against such highway, subject to the condition that the State Govt. concerned shall, in the exercise of such functions, be bound to comply with the rules for the time being in force made under the said Act. Schedule S. No. Description of the National Highway Name of the State Govt. 13 So much of National State Govt. Highways Nos. 2 and 27 as are situated within the State of Uttar Pradesh. State of Govt. of Uttar Pradesh." 7. The result was that with effect from April 15, 1956 (when the National Highways Act came into force) the two highways in question ceased to be `road' within the meaning of the U.P. Act because, having vested forthwith in the Union of India by virtue of Section 4 of the Central Act they were no longer maintainable by the State Govt. or Local authority but had to be developed and maintained in proper repair by the Central Govt. as provided by Section 5 of the Central Act. or Local authority but had to be developed and maintained in proper repair by the Central Govt. as provided by Section 5 of the Central Act. Such state of affair continued at least till April 13, 1957 (i.e. for a year) when the Central Govt. by the above quoted notification also authorised the State Govt. to maintain in proper repair such portions of the two highways as are situated within the State of U.P. It is worth noting that the above notification does not make it obligatory on the U.P. Govt. to start maintaining these highways from the date of the notification but merely makes their maintenance `exercisable' by the State of U.P. also. Therefore, the reconversion of a national highway into a `road' would depend upon the evidence produced in each case whether at the relevant time the State of U.P. was maintaining the National Highway in question. 8. By means of notification No. 1160-LC XXIII-PWC-3 LC 59 dated April 13, 1960 the U.P. Govt. declared the adjoining land within a distance of 220 yards from the centre of National Highway No. 2 (Grand Trunk Road East) to be a controlled area (vide Section 3 of the U.P. Act). A similar Notification No. 3103-LC XXIII-PPC-3 LC 55 dated July 9, 1958 had been issued in respect of National Highway No. 27 (Allahabad-Rewa Road). Therefore, if there is evidence to prove that the two highways in question were being maintained by the State of U.P. and some person had erected any building within the controlled area of those roads, without previous permission of the Collector in writing, he would be liable to be punished under Section 13 of the U.P. Act. It is the admitted case of the parties that in none of the six cases had the accused obtained a permission of the Collector in writing before erecting his building. It has further been established by the prosecution that the unauthorised constructions were made in all the cases within the controlled areas of the two highways. In all the four Cr. Revs. the Highway in question is the National Highway No. 2 (Grand Trunk Road East) while in the case of Govt. Appeals the highway in question is the National Highway No. 27 (Allahabad-Rewa Road). In all the four Cr. Revs. the Highway in question is the National Highway No. 2 (Grand Trunk Road East) while in the case of Govt. Appeals the highway in question is the National Highway No. 27 (Allahabad-Rewa Road). In all the four revisions the accused were found guilty for the breach of Section 5 of the Act, inasmuch as they had erected their respective buildings within the controlled area of the road and were sentenced to pay various amounts of fine. In the last Revision No. 1227 of 1966 the order of conviction was upheld right upto the High Court. Therefore, the Addl. Collector by his order dated September 21, 1965 directed the accused to remove his constructions within three months, failing which the same would be demolished by police force. It is this last order of demolition and removal of the construction which is challenged in Rev. No. 1227 of 1966, while in the other three revisions the orders of conviction themselves are challenged before us. The correct way to decide these cases is to examine the prosecution evidence in each case to find out whether at the relevant time the highway in question was being actually maintained by the U.P. Govt., so as to make it fall within the definition of `road' as given in Section 2(6) of the U.P. Act, irrespective of its subsequent amendment, which will be considered a little later. Viewed in this light, we find that in all the criminal revisions, except Rev. No. 1227 of 1966, P.W. R.B. Tripathi, the then Works Agent, P.W.D., Allahabad, was produced on behalf of the prosecution. In Cr. Revs. Nos. 329 and 454 of 1966 he has clearly deposed that at the time of the erection of the unauthorised constructions, Highway No. 2 (Grand Trunk Road East) was being maintained by the State of U.P. under directions of the Central Govt. contained in their Notification No. SRO-1181 dated April 13, 1957. Hence, the Highway in question clearly fell within the definition of `road' as contained in Section 2(6) of the U.P. Act and inasmuch as the accused of these revisions had not obtained written permission of the Collector before erecting their buildings, they were clearly guilty of the breach of Section 5 and were liable to punishment under Section 13 of the U.P. Act. These revisions have, therefore, to be dismissed. 9. In Cr. Rev. These revisions have, therefore, to be dismissed. 9. In Cr. Rev. No. 900 of 1966 P.W. R.B. Tripathi has only deposed that the highway in question was being managed by the State of U. P. There is no evidence regarding its maintenance by the U.P. Govt. Therefore, this revision has to be allowed and the sentence of the accused set aside, as the highway was not proved to be a `road'. 10. In Cr. Rev. No. 1227 of 1966 the conviction of the applicant under Section 5/13 of the U.P. Act was upheld right upto the High Court. In this case, we cannot upset that judgment. Therefore, the removal of the unauthorised constructions under Section 13 of the U.P. Act was fully justified. This revision is without merit and has to be dismissed. 11. In the two Govt. Appeals P.W. Duniya Singh, the then Works Agent P.W.D., Allahabad was produced on behalf of the prosecution. He simply deposed that the U.P. Govt. managed the road under directions contained in the Notification of the Central Govt. Mere management of the highway would not convert it into a road within the meaning of Section 2(6) of the U.P. Act. It must also be maintained by the U.P. Govt., before it can be treated to be a road, as defined in Section 2 (6) of the U.P. Act. Consequently, the order of acquittal of the accused passed by the magistrate in both the cases giving rise to the two Govt. Appeals was perfectly justified. The Govt. Appeals have just to be dismissed. 12. Before parting with the case it is necessary to refer to a single Judge decision of this court which led to the enactment of the U.P. Amendment Act, VI of 1965, as well as to consider the scope and effect of certain provisions the aforesaid Amendment Act. 13. In Writ No. 447 of 1962 (Mohd. Bashir v. S.D.O. Hasanganj) by his judgment dated April 20, 1964, V. Bhargava, J., had held that the definition of `road' did not cover a national highway after the commencement of the National Highways Act. Therefore, it became necessary to amend the U.P. Road side Land Control Act X of 1945 by means of the U.P. Amendment Act No. VI of 1965, so as to prevent the unauthorised construction along the nation highways as well. Therefore, it became necessary to amend the U.P. Road side Land Control Act X of 1945 by means of the U.P. Amendment Act No. VI of 1965, so as to prevent the unauthorised construction along the nation highways as well. This Amendment Act came into force with effect from March 20, 1965. Accordingly, Section 2(6) of the principal Act was amended as under: "2(6) `road' means a metalled road maintained by the State Govt. the Govt. of India or a local authority or a route demarcated by the State. Govt., the Govt. of India or a local authority with a view to constructing along it a metalled road, and includes a national highway." 14. Section 4 of the U.P. Amendment Act No. VI of 1965 relates to validation of Notification etc. and runs thus: "4. Every Notification issued, every order or declaration made, every proceeding or other action taken under the principal Act before the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to have been issued, made or taken under the said Act as amended by this Act and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court to the contrary, shall be deemed to be, and always to have been, valid." 15. However, Section 5 of the Amendment Act relates to savings and is in the following words: "5. Nothing contained in this Act shall render any person liable to any punishment under sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the principal Act by reason of any act which was not an offence punishable under that subsection before the commencement of this Act." 16. In this connection, reference may also be made to the mandatory provision of Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India which lays down that "no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence........". 17. In this connection, reference may also be made to the mandatory provision of Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India which lays down that "no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence........". 17. The result would be that inspite of the provisions of Section 4 relating to retrospective validation an accused, who was not guilty under the unamended Act, could not have been punished or proceeded against under Section 13 of the Act, because he was protected from such punishment or demolition of his construction under the saving Section 5 of the amendment Act itself which has an overriding effect and also because of the mandatory provision in Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India, quoted above. But we find that there is clear evidence Revs. Nos. 329 and 454 of 1966 that the U.P. Government was maintaining the highway in question at the relevant time, which was, therefore, a road within the meaning of Section 2(6) even of the principal Act and, consequently, the accused were liable to be punished for their having erected buildings within the controlled area, without a previous written permission of the collector. 18. Interpreting the scope and ambit of Article 20 (1) of the Constitution of India, it was laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and another v. The State of U. P., A.I.R. 1953 SC 394 as under: "Our attention has been drawn to the fact that the U.P. Ordinance 48 of 1949 though enacted on September 11, 1949, i.e. after the alleged offences were committed, was in terms made retrospective by Section 2 of the said ordinance which says that the Act `shall be deemed to have been in force in U.P. from August 9, 1948', a date long prior to the date of the commission of the offences. It was accordingly suggested that.........since this law had the effect of bringing this Ordinance into force from August 9, 1948 it cannot be said that the convictions are not in respect of `a law in force' at the time when the offences were committed. This, however, would be to import a somewhat technical meaning into the phrase `law in force' as used in Article 20. This, however, would be to import a somewhat technical meaning into the phrase `law in force' as used in Article 20. `Law in force' referred to therein must be taken to relate not to a law `deemed' to be in force and thus brought into force, but the law factually in operation at the time or what may be called the then existing law. Otherwise, it is clear that the whole purpose of Article 20 would be completely defeated in its application even to `ex post facto' laws passed after the Constitution. Every such `ex post facto' law can be made retrospective, as it must be, if it is to regulate acts committed before the actual passing of the Act, and it can well be urged that by such retrospective operation it becomes the law in force at the time of the commencement of the Act. It is obvious that such a construction which nullifies Article 20 cannot possibly be adopted. It cannot, therefore, be doubted that the phrase `law in force' as used in Article 20 must be understood in its natural sense as being the law in fact in existence and in operation at the time of the commission of the offence as distinct from the law `deemed' to have become operative by virtue of the power of legislature to pass retrospective laws." 19. We have already found above that in two Revs. Nos. 329 and 454 of 1966 there is definite evidence to show (1) that the Central Government had delegated its power to the State Government to maintain highway No. 2 (by means of Gazette Notification dated April 13, 1957), (2) that the State Government had notified the controlled area of this highway on April 13, 1960, (3) that the accused persons had made their unauthorised constructions within the controlled area in 1964 after the Notification dated April 13, 1960 and (4) that at that time the State of U.P. was maintaining the highway. Hence highway No. 2 was clearly a road within the meaning of even unamended Section 2(6) of the U.P. Act and both these accused were liable to be convicted. Hence highway No. 2 was clearly a road within the meaning of even unamended Section 2(6) of the U.P. Act and both these accused were liable to be convicted. But if the highway in question was not `road' within the meaning of the principal Act, when the unauthorised constructions were made, it could not have retrospectively been treated as `road' by virtue of the enlargement of the definition of the word `road' by a subsequent amending Act, which came into force much later with effect from March 20, 1965, so as to attract the penal consequences contemplated under Section 13 of the principal Act. This would be so, inspite of the validation clause contained in Section 4 of the amending Act, both because of the saving clause contained in Section 5 and also because of the mandatory provisions of Article 20(1) of the Constitution. 20. After the U.P. Amendment Act No. VI of 1965 had come into force with effect from March 20, 1965, on account of the decision of V. Bhargava, J. in Mohd. Bashir's case (supra), the said judgment was itself set aside in Special Appeal by a Division Bench on September 14, 1965 vide S. D. O. Hasangunj v. Mohr. Bashir (supra). In that appeal, Desai, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Bench, found that it was on February 26, 1955 that the State Government had issued a Notification under Section 3 (1) of the Act, declaring 220 feet of land on either side of the road involved in that case as controlled area. Subsequently the National Highways Act of 1956 came into effect from April 15, 1957, declaring the road in question as national highway. Thereafter the U.P. Roadside Land Control (Amendment) Act VI of 1965 was passed which came into force from March 20, 1965. As already noticed earlier, Section 4 of the amendment Act of 1965 provides that every notification issued, every order or declaration made, every proceeding or other action taken under the principal Act, before the commencement of the Act, shall be deemed to have been issued, made or taken under the said Act, as amended by Act VI of 1965. Obviously, the learned Chief Justice had in mind the retrospective provision contained in Section 4 of the Amendment Act, when he remarked that the enlargement of the definition of the word `road' had `retrospective effect from April 15, 1957'. Obviously, the learned Chief Justice had in mind the retrospective provision contained in Section 4 of the Amendment Act, when he remarked that the enlargement of the definition of the word `road' had `retrospective effect from April 15, 1957'. And inasmuch as the notification under Section 3(1) of the Act had already been made before the passing of the National Highways Act, the same was held to have remained valid. The learned Chief Justice consequently observed, "Once the land on the sides of the road was declared to be controlled area, it remained controlled area even though the road became a national highway and ceased to be `road' ..... In any case, after the amendment of the definition by the U.P. Amendment Act of 1965 the position is left without any doubt. With effect from April 15, 1957 even a national highway is a `road' within the meaning of the U.P. Act. Therefore, a notification under Section 3(1) can be issued in respect of a national highway, and a notification validly issued in respect of a road prior to April 15, 1957 remains valid, inspite of the enforcement of the National Highways Act." 21. The saving clause contained in Section 5 of the Amendment Act VI of 1965 (quoted earlier) was evidently not brought to the notice of the Bench hearing the Special Appeal in Mohd. Bashir's case; nor does the 1953 case of the Supreme Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and another v. The State of U.P. appear to have been placed before the Special Appeal Bench. In the above ruling, the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that a person could not be convicted for the breach of a law which was not actually in force at the time when the alleged offence was committed but was only deemed to have been in force by virtue of a retrospective provision contained in a subsequent enactment. 22. In the result, we dismiss both the Government Appeals and maintain the order of acquittal passed by the Magistrate. We also dismiss Cr. Revs. Nos. 329 and 454 of 1966 and maintain the order of conviction of the accused in each case. Cr. Rev. No. 900 of 1966 is, however, allowed, the conviction and sentence of the accused being set aside. The fine, if paid, shall be refunded to the revisionist. Cr. Rev. No. 1227 of 1966 stands dismissed.