JUDGMENT : DIVAN, J. 1. The appeal in execution proceedings arises under the following circumstances. The appellant herein is the original defendant and original judgment debtor and the respondent is the original plaintiff who thereafter became the original decree holder. Regular Civil Suit No. 59 of 1967 was filed by the present respondent against the present appellant for possession of the suit property and costs. That suit was filed on April 27, 1967. The property is situated in Anklav village of Boarsad Taluka in Kaira District and this suit for ejectment and arrears of rent and costs is filed by the plaintiff- landlord against the defendant-tenant. On July 13, 1967, by an appropriate Notification issued in that behalf, the Provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), were made applicable to Anklav Village and from that date on wards the premises in question came within the protection of the provisions of the Act. On July 27, 1967 a consent decree came to be passed in Suit No. 57 of 1957 and under the terms of the consent decree possession was to be delivered on or before November 1, 1969. There was also a provision for payment of arrears of rent-and for pays went of recurring mesne profits. The tenancy was a monthly tenancy and the recurring mesne profits were to be paid every month. As a result of the consent decree, the first payment of mesne profit was to be made on or before August 28, 1967, but nothing was paid during the month of August and during the month of September and on October 28, 1967 mesne profits for three months were paid. The consent decree contained a default clause to the effect that if there was a default In payment of mesne profits for three months' the decree for possession would be executed, forthwith. The mesne profits due in the month of November 1967 were paid on 9th December 1967 and on very day the judgment creditor, the landlord, filed the execution application, rout of which the present second Appeal arises. The mesne profits due in the month of November 1967 were paid on 9th December 1967 and on very day the judgment creditor, the landlord, filed the execution application, rout of which the present second Appeal arises. On December 19, 1967, the judgment.debtor, the present appellant, filed his written statement in execution proceedings and in that written statement he took contentions, viz., that he had not committed any default, and that he was entitled to the benefit of section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. On December 26, 1967, a further written statement was filed by the judgment debtor. The question that I have to consider in the present Second Appeal Is whether the decree passed by the trial Court was a nullity. 2. It is clear that by virtue of section 50 of the Act, pending suits and proceedings between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery of possession of any premises to which the provisions of Part II apply are to be governed by the provisions of the Act. Therefore, after July 13, 1967, the provisions, of the Act would apply to the present case. Under section 12 (1) of the Act, a landlord, is not entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so, long as the tenant pays or Is ready and willing to pay the amount of standard rent or permitted Increase, if any, and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of the Act. To this rule laid in section 21 (1) an exemption is provided by section 13 (1) and the opening words of section 13 (1) are: "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of section 15 a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied..." and then various grounds from (a) to (1) are set out In sub-section (1) and if the Court is satisfied about the existence of any one of those grounds not withstanding the provisions of section 12, the Court can pass a decree for eviction against the tenant and thus pass a decree in favour of the landlord for recovery of possession of the premises. It is in the light of this scheme of the Act that we have to consider whether the consent decree passed in suit No. 57 of 1967 on July 27, 1967, was a nullity as contended by the appellant before me. 3. In Bahadur Singh and another v. Muni Subrat Das and another Civil Appeal No. 2468 of 1966. Decided by the Supreme Court on October 16, 1968. the Supreme Court held that a decree passed in terms of an award without the satis, faction of the court about the existence of any of the grounds mentioned in section 13 (1) of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 was a nullity. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that a decree passed in contravention of section 13 (1) is a nullity. The words of the relevant portion of section 13 (1) of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 were as follows: "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be passed by any court in favour of the land lord against any tenant including the tenant whose tenancy is terminated. Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any suit or other proceedings for such recovery of possession if the court is satisfied." Then follows a catalogue of grounds on which the decree for recovery of possession could be passed. It has been contended before me on behalf of the respondent that under the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 section 13 (1) prohibited the Court from passing a decree for eviction in favour of the landlord and against a tenant, except in such suits or proceedings in which the Court-was satisfied that the grounds of eviction existed. Mr. Shastri has relied upon the difference in the language between the provisions of the Act before me and the provisions of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act. 1952. In my opinion, all that the Legislature had done in enacting the Act before me is to split into two separate sections Section 12(1)& Section 13(1)what has been condensed into one subsection viz., section 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. 1952. In my opinion, all that the Legislature had done in enacting the Act before me is to split into two separate sections Section 12(1)& Section 13(1)what has been condensed into one subsection viz., section 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. Here also as in the case of the opening words of section 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Act, complete protection without any reservation is given to the tenant by section 12 (1) and a landlord is prohibited from recovering possession any premises from his tenant so long as the conditions mentioned in section 12 (1) of the Bombay Act are satisfied; and the words used by the Bombay Legislature are "a landlord shall not be entitled to recovery of possession.". To this blanket-ban set out in section 12 (1) of the Bombay Act an exception is provided by the non-obstance clause in section 13 (1) of the same Act by setting; "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of section 15". Therefore, whereas the Legislature which enacted the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, condensed into section 13 (1) of that Act both the blanket ban and the exception the Bombay Legislature has provided for the blanket-ban against eviction under section 12 (1) and has provided for exception in section 13 (1). With this difference between the two enactments regarding the scheme of the two sections, the basic provisions of the two enactments viz., the Bombay Act and the Delhi and Ajmer Act, remain the same viz., blanket-ban against eviction followed by exceptions and followed by the provision which empowers the Court to pass a decree for eviction if it is satisfied on one of the grounds specified in the exception. Under these circumstances, so far as the effect of the words occurring both in section 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Act and in section 13 (2) of the Bombay Act viz. Under these circumstances, so far as the effect of the words occurring both in section 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Act and in section 13 (2) of the Bombay Act viz. "If the Court is satisfied", is the same viz., that a decree for eviction either under the Delhi and Ajmer Act or under the Bombay Act, can only be passed if the Court is satisfied that one of the grounds mentioned in the relevant section for evicting the tenant exists it is in the context of these provisions of the Delhi and Ajmer Act and the Bombay Act that the legal position will have to be considered. 4. Bachawat K. delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bahadur Singh's case (supra) observed: "Now the decree in the present case is on the fact of it one for recovery of possession of the premises in favour of the landlord and against the tenant The Court passed the decree according to the Award under section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 without satisfying itself that a ground of eviction existed, in a proceedings to which the landlord was not a party. On a plain wording of section 13 (1) the court, was forbidden to pass the decree. The decree is nullity and cannot be enforced in execution." In Bahadur Singh's case (supra), the Supreme Court considered the decision of the Court of Appeal in England in Peschey Property Corporation Ltd. v. Robinson & another (1966)2 All. E.R. 981, and approved the observations of Winn, L. J. at page 983 of the report. The wording of the relevant section of the English Act with which the Court of Appeal In England was concerned was similar to the wording of section 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control, Act, Winn I. J. has observed:- "It is perfectly plain from what I have said that before the judgment in default of appearance was entered no court had determined whether it was reasonable to make such an order or to give such a judgment. It my view, therefore, by express force of that section the judgment in default of appearance was a nullity. It my view, therefore, by express force of that section the judgment in default of appearance was a nullity. It was according to Its terms, a judgment for recovery of possession of these premises, and that is something which the section prohibits unless there has been a prior determination by the Court that it was reasonable to give such a judgment." The relevant wordings of the English section were "unless the court considers it reasonable to give such a Judgment". This decision of the Supreme Court in Bahadur Singh's case was followed by the Supreme Court in Smt. Kaushalya Devi v. K.I. Bansals (1959) I.S.C. 59, Sikri J. delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court has pointed out that the cause before the Supreme Court in Kaushalaya Devi was that of a compromise decree and Sikri J. has cited the above observations of Bachawat J. and held that the case of a compromise decree was also governed by the provisions of section 13 (1) of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act. 4952 and the decision of the High Court of Punjab was confirmed. As Sikri J. has pointed out the High Court of revision held that the decree was a nullity as the order passed on the basis of the compromise did not indicate that any of the statutory grounds mentioned in section 13 of the Act existed. With respect, I would add that unless a compromise decree as held in Bahadur Singh's case (supra) indicates the satisfaction of the Court about the existence of one of the grounds specified in section 13 (1) of the Bombay Act or section 13 (1) of the Delhi & Ajmer Act, the decree even if it is a compromise decree would be a nullity. That is the only way in which full effect can be given to the decision in Bahadur Singh's case and Kaushalaya Devi's case (supra). To my mind no difference is made because of the slight difference in phraseology of slight difference in the scheme of section 12 (1) and section 13 (1) of the Bombay Act and section 13 (1) of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. 5. Mr. To my mind no difference is made because of the slight difference in phraseology of slight difference in the scheme of section 12 (1) and section 13 (1) of the Bombay Act and section 13 (1) of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. 5. Mr. Shastri in the alternative contended that under the Code of the Civil Procedure, order 23 rule 3 unless the Court is satisfied as required in rule 3, order 23, a compromise decree cannot be passed by the Court. Order 23 rule 3, provides: "Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly on in part by any lawful agreement or compromise or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit, the court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit." The satisfaction which the court is required to arrive at is regarding two points, viz., satisfaction stated in order 23 rule 3. C. P. C. that the suit has been adjusted wholly or in part and secondly, that it has been so adjusted by any lawful agreement or compromise between the parties. The satisfaction of the Court required under section 13 (1) of the Bombay Act and section 13 (1) of the Delhi & Ajmer Act is regarding the existence of one of the grounds specified in each of those two sections. Under these circumstances, before a consent decree can be passed regarding the recovery of possession by the landlord, the court must be first satisfied that the suit has been adjusted wholly or in part and secondly that there must be any lawful agreement, so far as provisions of order 23, rule 3, are concerned and as required by section 13 (1) of the Bombay Act. it must further be satisfied that one of the grounds mentioned in section 13 exists; unless and until the court's satisfaction regarding section 13 (1) is indicated in the decree itself; or in the order regarding the compromise, the court cannot pass a decree for recovery of possession by the landlord where the tenants of the premises are protected by the provisions of Act. Under these circumstances, in the instant case, the decree passed by the trial court on July, 1967, was a nullity in as much as the decree does not indicate on the face of it the satisfaction of the Court regarding any of the grounds specified in section 13 (1) of the Act. 6. The result, therefore, is that this appeal must be allowed and the orders passed by the courts below must be set aside. There will be no order as to costs of this Second appeal because the appeal is decided in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court, which was not available when the decisions of the lower Courts are given. Since the decree of which the execution is sought is a nullity, the Darkhast must also be dismissed, and is dismissed accordingly. Appeal allowed.