JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner (in both the applications) is a public limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, and is engaged in the business of manufacturing automobiles, such as Tata Mercedes Benz trucks and buses, chassis, spare parts and accessories thereof, at Jamshedpur in Bihar. The manufactured products are supplied for use to various types of customers such as Government of India, State Transport Corporations, commercial and industrial undertakings and also private individuals. The machinery adopted for the supply of the vehicles is to appoint dealers in various parts of India who resale the vehicles to the consumers within the limits of the territories allotted to the dealers. The dealers, no doubt, are supposed to supply the vehicles to the various customers within their area as a rule, but they have not got any exclusive selling rights so that the petitioner also has reserved the right according to the terms of the agreement to supply direct to the consumers the vehicles according to convenience. The dealers maintain an efficient sales and service establishment in the region assigned to them. The agreements entered into with the dealers contain the rights and liabilities of both the parties. The sales to the dealers are on a principal to principal basis. Annexure 10 to the petition, modifying Annexure 1, is copy of the specimen the dealer's agreement. 2. The initial practice followed by the petitioner in view of the uncertainty of the demand for the vehicles was that the actual demand in the market was generally ascertained and firm ORDER :s were obtained by the dealers for the vehicles which were forwarded to the petitioner. The petitioner was thus able to form an exact idea of the requirement of the vehicles manufactured for the consumers, but the petitioner was not bound to supply the exact number of vehicles according to the firm ORDER :but it was free to sell any vehicles to the dealer keeping in view the quantum of production in the factory. 3. By the year 1958, however, the vehicles manufactured by the petitioner acquired considerable reputation in the market for their strength and durability and accordingly, demand for these vehicles went up a good deal so that it came to the unexpected figure of six thousand vehicles per year. 3. By the year 1958, however, the vehicles manufactured by the petitioner acquired considerable reputation in the market for their strength and durability and accordingly, demand for these vehicles went up a good deal so that it came to the unexpected figure of six thousand vehicles per year. As a consequence the petitioner did not restrict the manufacture to the initial necessity of producing only as many vehicles as were covered by firm ORDER :s placed with it by the dealers but that the process of production went on unimpeded in the expectation of a ready market for the vehicles. It may be stated that from the year 1958 on wards the demand for trucks and buses went up a good deal in the country which made it necessary to introduce certain measures to eliminate the possible objectionable tendencies on the part of the dealers to take undue advantage of the anxiety of the consumers to purchase the vehicles. Accordingly, a circular was issued by the petitioner, being Circular No. ADT/8890, dated the 30th of June, 1958. The circular contained the procedure to be followed by the dealers in resale of the vehicles. Annexure 2 is a copy of the said circular. 4. Being apprised of the position of shortage in respect of the truck and buses, the Government of India adopted some measures for proper and equitable distribution of the vehicles and issued a directive to the petitioner along with other manufacturers, being Directive No. DA/6 (59)/58 of 1st August, 1958, which directive contained the procedure for distribution of the vehicles. The object of the Government was to facilitate equitable distribution of the vehicles to serve the interest of several regions. This directive was consistent with the circular issued by the petitioner. The dealers were required in terms of the directive of the Government of India as also of the circular issued by the petitioner to maintain a register in the prescribed form and to forward to the petitioner at the end of each week full particulars of the entries in the ORDER :register during the week. The dealers were required in terms of the directive of the Government of India as also of the circular issued by the petitioner to maintain a register in the prescribed form and to forward to the petitioner at the end of each week full particulars of the entries in the ORDER :register during the week. The policy in instituting this procedure was to enable the petitioner to verify whether the dealers adhered to the specified procedure for the distribution of the vehicles as also to enable the petitioner to submit to the Development Officer of Automobiles a monthly statement containing particulars of the ORDER :s booked by the dealers in the preceding month. Such a statement was necessary to be filed in view of Paragraph (VI) in the Government directive. The statement furnished by the petitioner is Annexure 4 to the petition. 5. The directive of the Government of India was modified by its Letter No. A.E. IND. I (15)/59, dated the 4th April 1959. Under this modified direction the intending customers were required to register their applications for the vehicles with the dealer and those who placed ORDER :s were required to furnish bank guarantee of Rs. 2,000/- per vehicle. This revised procedure was communicated to the dealers by the circular ORDER :of the petitioner dated the 4th of May, 1959. According to this procedure the dealers were required to register only the applications and no ORDER :s. Such applications were required to be converted into ORDER :s at a much later date, generally, two months before the probable date of delivery. Annexure 5 is a copy of the said circular issued by the petitioner. The petitioner was anxious to fulfil the Government directive and insisted upon the dealers doing the same. The petitioner company was also interested in getting accurate statistical information to enable it to obtain a correct idea of the demand in the market and the prospects of sale of the products of the company in future. Accordingly the company wrote to the dealers to furnish certain details, such as those relating to (a) the applications received during the week, (b) applications accepted as firm ORDER :s during the week, (c) applications rejected during the week and (d) the deliveries made during the week. Accordingly the company wrote to the dealers to furnish certain details, such as those relating to (a) the applications received during the week, (b) applications accepted as firm ORDER :s during the week, (c) applications rejected during the week and (d) the deliveries made during the week. Accordingly, such specimen forms for submission of weekly returns were also supplied by the petitioner to the dealers along with the circular letter dated the 11th of May, 1959. 6. In May 1963, the Government of India promulgated the Commercial Vehicles (Distribution and Sales) Control ORDER :, 1963. This ORDER :was valid till September 1967 and covered the period of assessment from 1st April, 1965 to 31st March, 1966. The petitioner vide Circular No. ADT-4473 of 2nd May, 1963, brought this ORDER :to the notice of all the dealers. In Clause (3) of this ORDER :, the Controller of Commercial Vehicles had the power to fix quota for distribution of commercial vehicles by the manufacturers. The quotas fixed were as follows (a) Statewise distribution should follow the pattern as it existed during the year ended September 30, 1962 and (b) the distribution of vehicles among dealers or sub-dealers should be in proportion to ORDER :s pending with them as on 1st May, 1963. In case, where no ORDER :s were pending with the dealers or sub-dealers on 1st May, 1963, the distribution should be on the basis of the off-take by the dealers or sub-dealers during the year ended the 30th September, 1962. 7. The petitioner issued another Circular No. ADT-6510, dated the 14th Jane, 1963, requesting the dealers to submit statement at the end of each month instead of weekly statements, as was the practice followed by them so far prior to the issue of the Control ORDER :. According to the petitioner, this was done with a view to keeping the petitioner informed of the 'market movement and the sale prospects for their vehicles and to avoid any possibility of irregular allotment by the dealers. It was in these circumstances that by the end of 1964 the petitioner established a number of stock yards, being at the least one in almost every State. It was in these circumstances that by the end of 1964 the petitioner established a number of stock yards, being at the least one in almost every State. The stockyards were run by the personnel appointed by the petitioner and the vehicles were disposed of to several dealers as well as to other users from the stockyards, Dealership agreement was also suitably modified but more particularly Clause (1) (a) which stipulated that the petitioner would sell or supply from its stockyards outside the State of Bihar. The new agreement is Annexure 10 to the petition, the first one having been executed in 1955. 8. The petitioner filed its returns for the assessment period 1st April, 1965 to 30th June 1965 showing its turnover both under the Central Sales Tax Act and also under the Bihar Sales Tax Act in due course. In the returns filed by the petitioner, it included sales made in course of inter-State trade or commerce under the Central Sales Tax Act and those made in the State of Bihar and sales made in Bihar under the Sales Tax Act. The taxes payable thereunder were also paid in full. The petitioner, however, did not include in the returns, either under the Central Sales Tax Act or under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, the sales which were made by the petitioner's stockyards outside the State of Bihar as, according to the petitioner, these could not be taken to have been made in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. 9. By Notice No. 11284, dated the 12th November, 1965, the petitioner was informed by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes Jamshedpur (opposite party no. 1), that the returns filed by the petitioner did not appear to be correct and complete as this did not show that all the sales were included in them. The petitioner by letter dated the 23rd December, 1965 amended the returns as directed by the Assistant Commissioner without prejudice to its contention that the sales effected from its stockyards outside Bihar were not liable to be taxed by the Bihar Sales Tax authorities. This was followed by a service of correspondence between the Sales Tax authorities and the petitioner but the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (opposite party no. This was followed by a service of correspondence between the Sales Tax authorities and the petitioner but the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (opposite party no. 1) passed an ORDER :on the 1st March, 1966, holding that all the sales from the stockyards were also liable to be taxed under the Central Sales Tax Act. Notice of demand was also issued in pursuance of the aforesaid assessment ORDER :. 10. The petitioner moved this Court against this ORDER :in C.W.J.C. No. 252 of 1966 under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for a writ of certiorari calling for the records of the case so that after satisfying itself regarding the validity of the ORDER :of assessment, the Court might be pleased to quash the ORDER :of assessment. Any other ORDER :of appropriate nature also might be passed, if necessary. A Bench of this Court consisting of the then Chief Justice and Anwar Ahmad, J. rejected the application in limine and the petitioner sought for a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133 of the Constitution of India, but the Bench rejected that petition as well on the 6th April, 1966. The petitioner went up to the Supreme Court with a prayer for special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution and the Supreme Court granted special leave. By JUDGMENT : dated the 24th of February, 1967, (Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd. V. The Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes-19 Sales Tax Cases 520), the Supreme Court set aside the ORDER :of this Court and allowed the appeal. The Supreme Court, however, allowed the appeal on the preliminary question as to whether the High Court could enter into the merit of the writ petition at that stage and having held that it was a fit case for entering into the merit of the matter if no disputed questions of fact arose, directed this Court to decide the subject matter of the writ petition to determine the character of the transactions as to whether they were inter-State sale or sale outside the State of Bihar. This Court heard the writ petition and by ORDER :dated the 6th of November 1967, the ORDER :of assessment was set aside by consent of parties with a direction to opposite party no. 1 to make a fresh assessment in accordance with law. 11. This Court heard the writ petition and by ORDER :dated the 6th of November 1967, the ORDER :of assessment was set aside by consent of parties with a direction to opposite party no. 1 to make a fresh assessment in accordance with law. 11. A fresh notice was accordingly issued by the Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, who by ORDER :dated the 13th of March, 1968, held that the sales from the stockyards were also sales in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and accordingly the sales amounting to Rs. 27,81,77,446.74 were also liable to Central Sales Tax and thus a sum of Rs. 2,79,13,592.32 was demanded as additional amount payable by the petitioner by way of sales-tax. The said assessment ORDER :is marked Annexure 20 to the writ petition. The petitioner's claim for rebate of one per cent of the tax as permissible under the Act, because the annual returns were filed by petitioner within the prescribed or extended period and the admitted tax was also paid within the said period was not allowed. The refusal was based on the ground that the matter has been referred to the High Court. The appeal preferred against that ORDER :is pending before opposite party no. 2, the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals), Ranchi. The petitioner claimed in that that the realisation of sales-tax was stayed pending hearing of the appeal but the petitioner was directed to deposit a sum of Rs.89,85,752/- which is one-third of the total amount taxed and which was still outstanding. The principal question, therefore, for consideration before the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Jamshedpur, as also raised in this Court by Mr. Palkhivalla, learned counsel for the petitioner, is whether sales made by the petitioner of its vehicles from its stockyards in various States of India can be held liable to be taxed as inter-State trade or commerce as defined in Section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act. Apart from this main question, a number of ancillary points have also been raised which have been set out in great detail under Paragraph 29 of the petition at page 28 extending up to page 42, under twenty-six heads. 12. Apart from this main question, a number of ancillary points have also been raised which have been set out in great detail under Paragraph 29 of the petition at page 28 extending up to page 42, under twenty-six heads. 12. Before taking up the consideration of the character of the sales of the vehicles manufactured by the petitioner, admittedly, at its workshop in Jamshedpur it is convenient to point out the leading principles which have emerged out of several decisions of the Supreme Court as also of the various High Courts in India before whom the question of the nature of the transactions falling within the purview of inter-State trade or commerce came up for consideration. The relevant sections of the Central States Tax Act (Act 74 of 1956) are Sections 3, 6, 8 and 9, Section 3 provides the criterion as to when a sale or purchase of goods can be said to take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. In so far as relevant, it provides : "A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce if the sale or purchase :- (a) occasions the movement of goods from one State to another; or (b) is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods during their movement from one State to another." It is not necessary to set out the other Parts of the section as they are not relevant for determination of the question raised in the instant case. Section 6 lays down the liability of tax on inter-State sales. It runs thus :- "6(1) Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, every dealer shall, with effect from such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint, not being earlier than thirty days from the date of such notification, be liable to pay tax under this Act, on all sales effected by him in the course of inter-State trade or commerce during any year on and from the date so notified. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), where a sale in the course of inter-State trade or commerce of goods of the description referred to in Sub-section (3) of Section 8 (a) has occasioned the movement of such goods from one State to another; or (b) has been effected by a transfer of documents of title to such goods during their movement from one State to another; any subsequent sale to a registered dealer during such movement effected by a transfer of documents of title to such goods shall not be subject to tax under this Act: x x Section 8 deals with the rate of tax on goods sold in course of inter-State trade. Section 9 provides for the levy and collection of tax and penalty and lays down that it shall be levied and collected by the Government of India in the manner provided in Sub-section (3) in the State from which the movement commenced. There is no dispute that in the present case the initial movement of the vehicles began from Bihar at Jamshedpur where the petitioner's factory is situate and where several types of trucks and buses etc. are manufactured and sent out for sale to various parts of this country. The crucial question for consideration is whether the vehicles which are not actually sold to any customer at Jamshedpur but are sent out from Jamshedpur to the stock yards of the company in different States of India and from there they are supplied to dealers for sale to consumers can be taken to be inter-State trade in the sense that the movement of the vehicles from Bihar into another State is occasioned by the ORDER :placed by the dealers in respect of particular vehicles which are supplied to them from Jamshedpur. Mr. Palkhivalla has conceded that if it can be shown that any specific vehicles are ORDER :ed for by the customer or a dealer and then such vehicles are sent out even if the supply is made from the stockyard of the company in any State outside Bihar such a transaction will fall within the ambit of inter-State trade as is defined in Section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act. His only contention is that the company does not send out vehicles manufactured by it to its stockyard generally in pursuance of any specific ORDER :, but the company having taken stock of the general demand for vehicles manufactured by it in a State outside Bihar sends out vehicles to its stockyard and only when ORDER :s placed by the dealers or sub-dealers, which are received at the company's office in Bombay, are required to be executed, the vehicles are supplied to the dealers who, in their turn sell them to individual consumer". Such a movement of the vehicles cannot be regarded as movement occasioned by the requirement of inter-State trade or commerce. There is no intention in the mind of the management of the company to send out specific vehicles in execution of the ORDER :s placed for them by the dealers, but they are sent out in a general way to be kept in the stockyard of the company outside Bihar and actual movement begin in pursuance of the demand for supply of these vehicles from the stockyard into the dealer's garage or show-room. The initial movement from the stockyard at Jamshedpur, therefore, must be kept apart from the concept of movement of the vehicles in pursuance of ORDER :s for supply of the vehicles to the dealers. Learned Advocate-General who appears for the State of Bihar, however, has contended that this question cannot be solved on a theoretical foundation but only with a reference to the agreement executed between the petitioner and the dealer. Before reference is made in any case law, it is pertinent to refer to the agreement. The first agreement is of the year 1955 (Annexure 1 to the petition) between the petitioner (Tata Locomotive and Engineering Co. Ltd.) and the dealer. The second agreement which really governs the present transaction during the assessment period in question, although more or less the same but contains new clauses, is Annexure 10 to the petition at pages 92-109. The first agreement is of the year 1955 (Annexure 1 to the petition) between the petitioner (Tata Locomotive and Engineering Co. Ltd.) and the dealer. The second agreement which really governs the present transaction during the assessment period in question, although more or less the same but contains new clauses, is Annexure 10 to the petition at pages 92-109. The relevant clauses to which our attention has been drawn by learned counsel for the parties are as follows : "1 (a) Subject to the terms hereof, the Company agrees to sell (?) at Jamshedpur in the State of Bihar or from its depots and stockyards outside the State of Bihar to the Dealer doing business in the State of..........and the Dealer agrees to buy from the Company regularly from time to time on principal to principal basis all such new Tata Mercedes-Benz truck and bus chassis with or without can and/or body (hereinafter referred to as 'the vehicles')....... (b) This Agreement shall not preclude the Company from entering into or continuing any dealership agreement or agreements with any other person or persons within the said territory for the purchase from the Company of the said vehicles and resale thereof in the said territory on the terms herein contained or on such other terms as the Company deems, fit...... X X X 11 (a) The Dealer shall furnish the Company on a form prescribed by the Company and prior to the 15th of December each year; with an estimate by months of the numbers of different classes of the said vehicles to be sold and supplied to him in each of the various months of the following calender year, (b) The Dealer shall mail to the company on the 15th of each month, or so that the company will be in receipt thereof by the 20th of each month, his firm ORDER :for purchases to be effected during the next succeeding month and his estimated requirements of the said vehicles for the two months following the next succeeding month, for the said vehicles. X X X (d) Firm ORDER :s shall be deemed to be purchases not subject to postponement, revocation or cancellation by the Dealer except in the event of inability of the Company to make delivery within one month following the month during which delivery is specified to be made in the firm ORDER :. X X X 12. X X X (d) Firm ORDER :s shall be deemed to be purchases not subject to postponement, revocation or cancellation by the Dealer except in the event of inability of the Company to make delivery within one month following the month during which delivery is specified to be made in the firm ORDER :. X X X 12. If, in the opinion of the Company, it is not possible to supply fully the demand of the Dealer for the said vehicles, the Company shall be entitled to apportion those which are available among its dealers and other customers according to the Company's best JUDGMENT :, and to delay the delivery of or to cancel any or all ORDER :previously accepted. X X X 15(a) The Dealer shall buy and sell the said vehicles in his own name and on his own account. X X X (d) Payments of the full price, all taxes and duties if any, transportation charges, insurance premium and incidental expenses if any, in respect of the sale shall unless otherwise specified by the Company be made by the Dealer to the Company at Bombay prior to delivery or despatch of the said vehicles in each or in such other manner as may be acceptable to the Company. X X X 26(b)...The Company shall be the sole judge as to how many if at all, of the said vehicles previously sold to the Dealer and to what extent, if any spare parts, tools and accessories previously supplied to the Dealer shall be taken over from the Dealer in terms of this clause. Such of the said vehicles as are taken over by the Company under this clause shall be paid for by the Company at the actual net dealer price paid by the Dealer to the Company for such vehicles... " Learned Advocate General has urged that the cumulative effect of all these clauses must be taken to be that the vehicles were moved outside the State of Bihar only when firm ORDER :s were placed by the dealers with the company and unless such firm ORDER :s were received vehicles could not be moved out of Bihar to any other State. In that view of the matter, the only logical inference following from this is that if such ORDER :s were not received by the Company from the dealers the vehicles would not have moved out of Bihar and in such a situation, therefore it is difficult to contend that the movement of the vehicles was not occasioned by the ORDER :s placed by the dealers for supply of the vehicles. Mr. Palkhivalla, for the petitioner, however, has contended that the sale, in any case of the vehicles must be taken to be effected in the stockyards outside Bihar and movement prior to the sale, therefore, unless goods are definitely appropriated to the ORDER :so that it would be beyond the control of the company to divert the goods to any other purpose, is not relevant for determining the character of the sale. Only when movement takes place specifically in execution of the ORDER :can it be contended that the movement of the vehicles was occasioned by and in course of inter-State trade or commerce. Sending out of unspecified vehicles with prospect, at the highest, of sale outside Bihar cannot lead to the conclusion that movement of vehicles is occasioned by inter-State trade or commerce, In support of this contention he has placed reliance on (1) K.G. Khosla & Co. (P) Ltd. V. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Madras Division, Madras [(1966) 17 Sales Tax Cases 473]. This relates to import of goods into India from Belgium, In that case the assessee appellant to the Supreme Court entered into a contract with the Director-General of Supplies and Disposals, New Delhi, for the supply of axle-box bodies. The goods were to be manufactured in Belgium according to specifications and the D.G.I.S.D., London or his representative had to inspect the goods at the works of the manufacturers and issue an inspection certificate. At Madras also another inspection was to be held. The assessee was entitled to payment of 90 per cent of the price after inspection and delivery of the stores to the consignee. The balance of 10 per cent was payable on final acceptance by the Director-General of Supplies and Disposals, the consignee. The assessee-appellant was entirely responsible for the execution of the contract and for the safe arrival of the goods at the destination. The balance of 10 per cent was payable on final acceptance by the Director-General of Supplies and Disposals, the consignee. The assessee-appellant was entirely responsible for the execution of the contract and for the safe arrival of the goods at the destination. The contract contained also the covenant that notwithstanding any approval or acceptance given by an inspector the consignee had a right to refuse or accept the goods if it was found that the goods were not in conformity with the terms of the contract entered into in all respects. The manufacturers sent the goods in the name of the assessee by a ship. The goods were delivered at the Madras Harbour by the assessee's clearing agents. In these circumstances, a question was raised whether the sales by the assessee to the Government departments were in course of import and exempt from taxation under Section 5 (2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. It was held (i) that the expression "occasions the movement of goods" occurring in Section 3 (a) and Section 5 (2) had the same meaning; (ii) that before a sale could be said to have occasioned the import it was not necessary that the sale should have preceded the import; (iii) that the movement of goods from Belgium into India was incidental to the contract that they would be manufactured in Belgium inspected there and imported into India for the consignee, and was in pursuance of the conditions of the contract between the assessee and the Director-General of Supplies. There was no possibility of the goods being diverted by the assessee for any other 'purpose and therefore, the sales took place in the course of import of goods within Section 5 (2) of the Act, and exempt from taxation. Section 5 (2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 which has been put on the same footing as Section 3 runs thus : “5 (2) A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of the import of the goods into the territory of India only, if the sale or purchase either occasions such import or is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods. before the goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India.” Learned Advocate-General has contended that the facts of this case and the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in this decision lend support to the contention put forward on behalf of the department that even where actual sale of commodity has not taken place, in certain situations, the movement of goods from one State to another may well be regarded as having been occasioned by or in course of inter-state trade or commerce, even where actual transfer of title takes place only in the State in to which the goods are imported for sale. In the present case also irrespective of whether the stockyards of the petitioner are located in any State in India outside Bihar, and even –where actual transfer of property in goods has not taken place in Bihar but vehicles or parts thereof manufactured by the petitioner are dispatched from Bihar to another State where in pursuance of the ORDER :for sale issued by the petitioner's head office in Bombay deliveries are made, it may nevertheless be regarded as a transaction covered under Section 3 of the Central Act. Mr. Palkhivalla has conceded that he does not contest the proposition that it is so. He has, however, laid stress on the particular observation in the JUDGMENT : of the Supreme Court at page 489 that apart from the special facts and circumstances of the case when the goods were manufactured in pursuance of an ORDER :to be passed by Director General of Supplies and Disposals, the inspection to be done by the agents even in Belgium and shipment of the good from Belgium to Madras, the further consideration which weighed with their Lordships of the Supreme Court in holding such a transaction to be matter of movement of goods in course of import, having the same meaning as in the case of inter-State trade [Sections 5 (2) and 3 (a)] was, as their Lordships put it, "There was no possibility of these goods being diverted by the assessee for any other purpose'. If there had been any possibility of those goods being supplied to another customer, the Supreme Court would not have come to the conclusion that the movement of goods was occasioned by inter-State trade or commerce. If there had been any possibility of those goods being supplied to another customer, the Supreme Court would not have come to the conclusion that the movement of goods was occasioned by inter-State trade or commerce. Learned Advocate General has, however, contended that this particular sentence accurring in the JUDGMENT : Cannot be regarded as a conclusive determinant of the character of the transaction. In the facts of that case no doubt, it was held that there was no possibility of diverting the goods for any other purpose but what really the ratio of the case was is that in the context of that case it was so because the contract between the parties was such that the movement of goods was occasioned by the ORDER :placed by the Director-General of Supplies and Disposals without which the goods concerned "axle-box bodies" would not have been manufactured or proved from Belgium. It was construed that the transaction must be regarded as falling within the ambit of sale in course of import. The possibility of diverting for any other purpose cannot be regarded as a part of the ratio of the case, because what the ratio of the case was is to be determined with reference to the other pronouncements of the Supreme Court an this matter. Learned Advocate-General has drawn our attention in this connection to a recent decision of the Supreme Court (2) (Civil Appeal No. 1926 of 1968 dated 11th February, 1969, not yet reported) in Messrs Hanuman Mining Corporation Ltd. V. The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Indore, by a Bench consisting of J.C. Shah, V. Ramaswami and A.N. Grover, JJ., the leading JUDGMENT : having been delivered by Ramaswami, J. In that case the appellant, a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and carrying on business of mining manganese ore and selling it to various buyers in India, was assessed to sales-tax under the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, for the period 1st January, 1958 to 31st December, 1958. Manganese ore had been sold by the company to different parties outside the State of Madhya Pradesh under a written contract. The company contended in that case that the transactions were exempt from taxation under the Madhya Pradesh Sales Tax Act as the sale had been made from the State of Madhya Pradesh to the State of Maharashtra. Manganese ore had been sold by the company to different parties outside the State of Madhya Pradesh under a written contract. The company contended in that case that the transactions were exempt from taxation under the Madhya Pradesh Sales Tax Act as the sale had been made from the State of Madhya Pradesh to the State of Maharashtra. It was exempted from sales-tax under the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, and also under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 (Act 2 of 1959). The contention was rejected by the Sales Tax Officer, Chhindwara. An appeal preferred to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax was dismissed. The Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh, however, allowed the appellant's appeal. The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, moved the Board of Revenue for starting a case for consideration by the High Court under Section 44 of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958. The Madhya Pradesh High Court answered the question of law formulated against the assessee against which an appeal was preferred to the Supreme Court. That Court allowed the appeal and set aside the JUDGMENT : of the Madhya Pradesh High Court holding that in the facts and circumstances of that case the transaction of the assessee must be held to be in the nature of inter. State trade or commerce and as such not liable to sales-tax under the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, or for the matter of that under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958. Their Lordships considered in that connection the history of the amendment of Article 286 of the Constitution on the 11th September, 1956, by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act. 1956, and how the First Clause was omitted and for Clauses (2) and (3) the following Clauses were inserted. "(2) Parliament may by law formulate principles for determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in any of the ways mentioned in Clause (1). 1956, and how the First Clause was omitted and for Clauses (2) and (3) the following Clauses were inserted. "(2) Parliament may by law formulate principles for determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in any of the ways mentioned in Clause (1). (3) Any law of State shall, in so far as it imposes, or authorises the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of goods declared by Parliament by law to be of special importance in inter-State trade or Commerce, be subject to such restrictions and conditions in regard to the system of levy, rates and other incidents of the tax as Parliament may by law specify." By the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956, a new Clause in Article 286 was added giving to Parliament the power to formulate principles for determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. In ORDER :to carry into effect the conferment of this power, the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act inserted a new entry being entry 92-A in List I of Seventh Schedule and amended Entry 54 of the State List. In exercise of this power under Entry 92A Parliament enacted the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, which came into force on the 5th January, 1957. Reference was made by their Lordships to Section 3 of this Act which is relevant for the determination of the question raised on behalf of the assessee in the present proceeding as well. Their Lordships also referred to the decision of the question in (3) Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. V. S.R. Sarkar and Co. (11 Sales Tax Cases 655) in which Shah, J. made the following observation : In our view, therefore, within Clause (b) of Section 3 are included sales in which property in the goods passes during the movement of the goods from one State to another by transfer of documents of title thereto; Clause (a) of Section 3 covers sales, other than those included in Clause (b), in which the movement of goods from one State to another is the result of a covenant or incident of the contract of sale, and property in the goods passes in either State". Their Lordships also referred in this connection to the observations of the Supreme Court in (4) Cement Marketing Co. Their Lordships also referred in this connection to the observations of the Supreme Court in (4) Cement Marketing Co. V. State of Mysore (14 Sales Tax Cases 175) and again in (5) State Trading Corporation V. State of Mysore (14 Sales Tax Cases 188). Sarkar, J. observing as follows in the latter case : "The question then is, did the sales occasion the movement of cement from another State into Mysore within the meaning of the definition? In (3) Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. V. S.R. Sarkar (11 Sales Tax Cases 655) it was held that a sale occasions the moment of goods from one State to another within S.3 (a) of the Central Sales Tax Act, when the movement 'is the result of a covenant or incident of the contract of sale'. That the cement concerned in the disputed sales was actually moved from another State into Mysore is not denied. The respondents only contend that the movement was not the result of a covenant in or an incident of the contract of sale". In that case Ramaswami, J., on interpretation of the various decisions referred to above, has held that it did not matter whether the property passed in one State from another. The only point to be kept in view in determining the character of the transaction as to whether it is inter-State trade or commerce or not is to see whether the movement of goods has been occasioned by any contract between the manufacturer and the purchaser. In that case although the goods were to be despatched from Madhya Pradesh, there was an important stipulation in the contract that the first weighment at the Gondia weighage would be the weight for the purpose of the contract. Price was fixed as a result of the first weighment at Gondia weighbridge; hence, it was held that the parties did contemplate the movement of goods from Madhya Pradesh to Maharashtra for weighment at Gondia by virtue of the contract between them. Hence, it was held that all the eight contracts involved in that case between the assessee and the purchaser must be taken to be inter-State within the language of Section 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act and as such they were exempt from the liability for payment of sales-tax under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. Hence, it was held that all the eight contracts involved in that case between the assessee and the purchaser must be taken to be inter-State within the language of Section 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act and as such they were exempt from the liability for payment of sales-tax under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. Their Lordships also referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in (6) The Commissioner of Sales Tax M.P., Indore V. Shri Allwyn, Cooper (Civil Appeal No. 1208 of 1966 decided on 21.8.1968) in which also the character of the movement of goods was determined with reference to the relevant clauses of the contract as well. Learned Advocate-General has contended that the stress laid by Mr. Palkhivalla on the particular clause in Khosla's case (17 Sales Tax Cases 473) that before movement of goods from one State to another can be determined to be movement in course of inter-State trade or commerce, it must necessarily be also a concomitant of it that there is no possibility of diverting the goods for any other purpose, is not correct. All that is required to be noticed is the cumulative effect of the circumstances in which movement of goods begins from one State to another-whether it is for the purpose of being sold in another State. It is true, no doubt, that the movement of goods from one State to another at the instance of the manufacturer may, in a particular case, begin in a general manner without reference to any kind of real contract preceding the movement. It may be that such movement from the manufacturer’s factory into stockyard in another State may not be regarded as movement occasioned by inter-State trade or commerce even if these may be a possibility or a prospect of sale of the goods in the State where the goods are stocked for the purpose. But where from the terms of the contract, as in this case between the petitioner and the dealers who purchase the goods and supply them to the actual consumers in accordance with the direction issued by the Government of India, it must be taken that the goods could not have been moved into another State without actual ORDER :s being received by the manufacturers from the dealers concerned in States outside Bihar. It has been urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that there are occasions when vehicles were moved from Bihar into the petitioner's stockyards in other States from where supplies were made to the dealers or even to the actual consumers without reference to any actual ORDER :, but the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Jamshedpur, has passed a general ORDER :holding all such sales which have been occasioned as inter-State trade or commerce and liable to be taxed under Section 9 of the Act. Learned Advocate General has urged in reply, however, that the position is not as Mr. Palkhivalla states. The dealer's agreements, the old one (Annexure 1) and the new one (Annexure 10), both indicate that the vehicles were sent only after the actual requirement of the dealer was received. It was, no doubt, stated that the supply could be made either from Jamshedpur or from the manufacturer's stockyards in the various States, such as Amravati in Maharashtra, Aslali in Gujrat and other places, but the movement was occasioned only when firm ORDER :s or, at any rate, ORDER :s were received by the petitioner from the dealers. 13. Mr. Palkhivalla has contended that the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes was in error in holding that the vehicles were moved from Bihar into the other States of India only after firm ORDER :s were received. Learned Advocate General has contended that this is a question of fact and this Court would not be in a position to reopen it as to whether the vehicles were moved outside the State of Bihar in pursuance of the firm ORDER :s or not. If the petitioner has at all got a remedy to reopen the finding of the learned Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, his remedy would be before the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes where the petitioner’s appeal is pending. – So far as this Court is concerned, it cannot go into that matter. All that this Court can do by virtue of the remand ORDER :made by the Supreme Court is to determine whether the matter falls within the ambit of Sections 3, 6 and 9 of the Act. At one stage, no doubt, the validity of these sections was challenged by the petitioner. All that this Court can do by virtue of the remand ORDER :made by the Supreme Court is to determine whether the matter falls within the ambit of Sections 3, 6 and 9 of the Act. At one stage, no doubt, the validity of these sections was challenged by the petitioner. In course of his argument, however, stress has been laid by learned counsel for the petitioner upon the merit of the case which, in fact, is to be determined in course of the appeal by the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, and this Court will not by-pass the appellate authority apart from the difficulty in the way of this Court in going to the question of facts raised before it. In my opinion, the contention of the learned Advocate-General is well-founded. This Court can only determine the character of the transaction as a point of law by virtue of the remand ORDER :passed by the Supreme Court and cannot enter into the merit of any specific question to be raised by the petitioner as against any particular item of movement of goods. So far, however, as movement of goods were occasioned in pursuance of the dealer's agreement, which is the basis of the finding of the learned Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, it must be held that whenever goods were moved in pursuance of the ORDER :s placed by the dealers and whatever vehicles or spare parts were sent or are to be sent in pursuance of such ORDER :s must fall within the ambit of Sections 3(a) and 6 of the Act as inter-State trade or as movement occasioned by the contract for sale and as such inter-State in character. 14. I may refer in this connection also to a decision of the High Court of Calcutta in (7) Jeewanlal Ltd. V. Commercial Tax Officer, Lyons Range Charge (20 Sales Tax Cases 345) where an identical question was also considered by a Division Bench of that Court and the scope and ambit of movement of goods in course of inter-State trade or commerce has been considered with reference to several decisions of the Supreme Court. In that case the assessee was a limited company with its registered office at Calcutta manufacturing aluminium utensils. In that case the assessee was a limited company with its registered office at Calcutta manufacturing aluminium utensils. It entered into a contract of sale with the Government of India under which goods were delivered in West Bengal, the price was paid in West Bengal and the property in the goods also passed to the Government in West Bengal. The goods were subsequently transported from West Bengal to a place outside that State by or on behalf of the Government, the assessee having no concern with it. In those circumstances, it was held that the transactions were not in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and were subject to payment of sales-tax under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. The schedule to the acceptance of tender contained the necessary particulars. In that case the following points were raised by learned counsel for the assessee: (1) In ORDER :to be an inter-State sale the place where the property has passed in is consequential. (2) In an inter-State sale the decisive factor is the movement of the goods sold either as a covenant of the contract of sale or as an incident of the contract. (3) In an inter-State sale, the sale need not precede the movement of the goods. (4) In an inter-State sale there need not be any obligation at all on the selling dealer to despatch the goods. The first three points formulated were, however, not contested by learned counsel for the respondents in that case. Argument was, however, centred on the fourth proposition. Learned Judges referred in that case also to (3) Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. V. S.R. Sarkar & Co. (11 Sales Tax Cases 655) where reference was made to Section 4(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, defining when sale or purchase of goods can be deemed to take place inside a State. The Section being relevant was quoted. It stands thus: “A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place inside a State if the goods are within the State. The Section being relevant was quoted. It stands thus: “A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place inside a State if the goods are within the State. (a) in the case of specific or ascertained goods, at the time the contract of sale is made; and (b) in the case of unascertained or future goods, at the time of their appropriation to the contract of sale by the seller or by the buyer, whether assent of the other party is prior or subsequent to such appropriation. Explanation - Where there is a single contract of sale or purchase of goods situated at more places than one, the provisions of this Sub-section shall apply as if there were separate contracts in respect of the goods at each of such places." After quoting this, their Lordships considered the scope of Section 3 (a) and (b) of the Act and referring to Section 3 (a) their Lordships observed that it covered sale other than those included in Clause (b) in which the movement of goods from one State to another is the result of a covenant or incident of the contract of sale, and property in the goods passes in either State. In (7) Jeewanlal's case, therefore, the learned Judges had occasion to consider the meaning of the expression "incident of the contract of sale". Their Lordships in that connection had to deal with the argument as to the character of the inter-State trade or commerce under the following heads: (1) there must be of necessity as a result of the transactions the movement of the goods across the bORDER :; (2) the sale and export form parts of a single transaction; (3) the sale and the export were integrally connected; (4) the export is the result of the sale (5) the export is inextricably linked with the sale; and (6) the movement of goods is in connection with the sale; and their conclusion was that all these expressions mean' and connote the same thing, namely, there must be (a) a sale of goods and (b) a transport of goods from one State to another under the contract of sale. The decision of their Lordships in this case, however, was based upon a consideration of the terms of the contract between the parties and on a consideration of the terms, their Lordships held that the principal point in that case was the determination of the place where the goods were delivered and the property in the goods had passed. It was held that the property in the goods had passed in the State of West Bengal and transportation of the goods outside the territory of West Bengal was carried out by the purchaser with which the dealer had no concern. In the present case, however, the position is clearly different. In this case the seller being the manufacturing company sent out goods to other States in pursuance of the ORDER :s placed for such goods by the dealers and as such, as was held by the Supreme Court in (8) Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd. V. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (17 Sales Tax Cases, 197) where during the assessment periods coal was transported from the colliery of the company to the consumers outside the taxing State pursuant to the directions of the Coal Commissioner as an incident of the contract of sale, it was construed as movement of goods as an incident of the contract of sale. Reference has been made to a Full Bench decision of this Court in (9) Shankerjee Raut Gopalji Raut V. State of Bihar (22 Sales Tax Cases 241) in which also an identical principle has been laid down. It may be stated that the learned Judges of the Supreme Court in (10) the Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. V. State of Bihar (6 Sales Tax Cases 446) quoted certain observations of Gavit, Willoughby and Rotachaeffer. While giving quotation from Gavit's Commerce Clause (1932 edition) their Lordships referred to the observation: "The dividing line between an inter-State sale and intra-State sale is rather fine, although clear. If the goods are shipped into a State without a previous sale, any sale within the State is intra-State commerce." Quotations from Willoughby and Rottachaeffer have also been made in that JUDGMENT :. If the goods are shipped into a State without a previous sale, any sale within the State is intra-State commerce." Quotations from Willoughby and Rottachaeffer have also been made in that JUDGMENT :. Rottachaeffer in his Constitutional Law (1939 edition) stated as follows : "The decisive factor that renders, making a contract an act of inter-State commerce is that it contemplates or necessarily involves the movement of goods in inter-State commerce, and this test applies whether it be a contract to buy or one to sell." Venkatarama Ayyer, J. also in the above case has put it in slightly different words that a sale can be said to be an inter-State trade only if two conditions concur; (1) a sale of goods, and (2) a transport of those goods from one State to another under the contract of sale. It is not necessary to pile up more decisions on this question which have been collected in the aforesaid JUDGMENT : of the Calcutta High Court (20 Sales Tax Cases) at page 357. The history of the law of inter-State trade or commerce has also been referred to in (11) Shree Bajarang Jute Mills Ltd., Guntur V. The State of Andhra Pradesh (15 Sales Tax Cases 430). It is thus clear that if the sale be completed within the State and the sold goods are transported outside the State by the buyer at his own initiative having nothing to do with the contract of sale it must be a case of intra-State trade. Where, however, the seller himself has to export the goods outside the State in pursuance of the contract then such movement must be taken to be as movement in course of inter-State trade or commerce irrespective of where property in the goods has passed. 15. Mr. Palkhivalla has urged further that it is erroneous to hold that where goods are despatched by manufacturer from one State to another it cannot but be regarded as movement of goods in course of inter-State trade or commerce inasmuch as to bring the matter within the purview of such transaction it is necessary that, in the case of unspecified goods, the goods must be appropriated to the particular ORDER :. When the dealers place ORDER :s for supply of a number of vehicles, their agents do not come to the spot at which vehicles would await sale to them. When the dealers place ORDER :s for supply of a number of vehicles, their agents do not come to the spot at which vehicles would await sale to them. As a matter of fact such ORDER :s are received from the dealers only for the purposes of assessing the general demand for these vehicles in the market and in Every case such ORDER :s are not even executed according to the demand of the dealers and as such the principle of movement of goods in course of inter-State trade or Commerce cannot arise in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In my opinion, however, if it is once accepted that the Supreme Court has laid down that passing of title or property in goods in the despatching State is not necessary in ORDER :to bring such a movement within Section 3 of the Act, the question of appropriation in the case of unspecified goods does not arise because that is a matter which relates to passing of title to the goods and is not concerned with the movement of goods from one State to another for the purpose of inter-State trade or commerce. The ambit of Sections 3(3) and 5(2) of the Act is to be found to the effect that where goods are moved from one State to another from the head office or branch office of the manufacturer irrespective of any purchase ORDER :being kept in view of the manufacturer, and not in pursuance thereof, it can certainly not be regarded as movement in course of inter-State trade or commerce. It is also conceded that if title to the goods dispatched has passed within the State where goods are manufactured. This too, generally speaking, will not be regarded as inter-State trade because it may be the case of intra-State sale, provided the purchaser takes delivery of the goods in the State where they are manufactured and takes them out of the State of his own without any legal obligation on the manufacturer to do so. This too may well be regarded as a case of intra-State trade and not inter-State trade. This too may well be regarded as a case of intra-State trade and not inter-State trade. But where between these two positions a situation is contemplated when goods are despatched from one State to another under the terms and covenants of an agreement whether title has passed or not, this must be regarded as a case of inter-State trade or commerce as in the present case the dealer's agreement (Annexure 10) makes it clear that the vehicles were despatched outside Bihar to the various States in pursuance of the ORDER :s placed by the dealers to whom title passed and in the event of failure to sell them, the manufacturer had to repurchase the vehicles at the same price at which the vehicles were supplied to the dealers. It is clear beyond doubt that even if title did not pass to the dealers unless supplies were actually made from the stockyard, nevertheless the movement of the vehicles was occasioned by the ORDER :s placed by the dealers. In that view of the matter I am inclined to hold that the decisions of the Supreme Court in particular in the case of (1) The State Trading Corporation of India Limited V. The State of Mysore (14 Sales Tax Cases 188), completely cover the point. In this case, cement had to be supplied from any factory outside the State of Mysore and this was held sufficient to constitute the sale an inter-State sale. Even the language of Section 3 of the Act does make it clear that even if any firm ORDER :s were not placed by the dealers but ORDER :s were in fact placed in pursuance of which alone the vehicles would be moved from Bihar to a State outside Bihar, even to the stockyards of the company, such a case would also come within the ambit of inter-State trade or commerce. Mr. Palkhivalla has urged that in ORDER :to bring the transaction within the meaning of the expression "inter-State trade or commerce" three factors must necessarily be there, (1) the despatch and supply to the purchaser must be integral parts of a single transaction; (2) there must be a legal obligation on the part of the manufacture to supply the goods ORDER :ed for and not mere commercial expediency; and (3) it must not be possible for the manufacturer to divert the goods despatched to any other purpose. In my opinion, so far as the first point is concerned, as I have already indicated, on the facts and circumstances of this case, the terms and covenants of the contract make it clear that since the goods are vehicles despatched in pursuance of ORDER :s irrespective of appropriation or specific vehicles being sent for specific dealers, the despatch and supply to the dealers must of necessity be regarded as integral part of a single transaction. This test, therefore, is fulfilled in the special facts and circumstances of this case, apart from the fact that the company charges from the dealers even the expenses incurred in the movement of the vehicles from Jamshedpur to the place from where supply is made to the dealers. Mr. Palkhivalla has contended that the charging of such expenses is necessary and, must be added to the price of the vehicles, but this should not be taken to be an indication that the movement was occasioned by specific ORDER :s. Even so, this is immaterial. The next contention is that there must be legal obligation to move and not merely commercial Expediency. I am unable to accede to this contention because the question is not whether the goods are moved from one State to another as a matter of legal obligation. It is sufficient to state that the manufacturer has despatched the goods in pursuance of any concrete ORDER :and contemplating the supply of goods in pursuance of a concrete ORDER :by a dealer, even assuming that in certain circumstances a dealer's agreement itself exempts the manufacturer from executing the ORDER :s of the dealers in every case. As for the third contention that there should be no possibility of diverting the" goods for any other purpose, I have already disposed of this matter and it need not be adverted to again. Mr. As for the third contention that there should be no possibility of diverting the" goods for any other purpose, I have already disposed of this matter and it need not be adverted to again. Mr. Palkhivalla has also referred to the following decisions in support of his proposition: (12) 6 Sales Tax Cases 627-Ram Narain Sona Ltd. V. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax; (13) 14 Sales Tax Cases 416-The State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. V. The State of Mysore; (14) 12 Sales Taxes Cases 1-The State of Kerala V. The Cochin Coal Company Ltd; (15) 17 Sales Tax Cases 612 (619)-The State of Jammu and Kashmir V. Caltex (India) Ltd. It appears to me to be unnecessary to refer to all these cases inasmuch as the principle has been reiterated in the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court which is an unreported decision and to which I have made reference above. On behalf of the petitioner, it has been urged that no other State has levied inter-State Sales-tax in respect of goods sent by the manufacturer in that State to its depot outside the State, as it has not treated such transaction as inter-State trade. Certain correspondence has been brought to our notice in this connection, such as from Dunlop India Ltd., Dunlop House, 57 B, Free School Street, Calcutta-16, dated the 16th April, 1969; letter addressed by the office of Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, West Bengal, to the Managing Director, French Motor Car Co. Ltd., dated the 24th April, 1969; letter from the Hindustan Motors Ltd., Uttarpara, Hooghly, West Bengal, to the French Motor Car Co. Ltd., 234/3. Lower Circular Road, Calcutta-30, dated the 29th April, 1969, to show that transport of goods from the factory of the manufacturer in West Bengal to the branch office of the company in any State outside West Bengal is not treated as inter-State trade. In my opinion, however, these letters are of no avail because, as I have already pointed out, all the decisions in regard to the character of inter-State trade turn upon the terms of contract between the purchaser and the seller, as in this case between the dealers and the petitioner. In my opinion, however, these letters are of no avail because, as I have already pointed out, all the decisions in regard to the character of inter-State trade turn upon the terms of contract between the purchaser and the seller, as in this case between the dealers and the petitioner. Since the agreement referred to above in the clearest possible language contemplates movement of goods from the State of Bihar to a place outside the State of Bihar for the purpose of sale, this case is clearly covered by the expression that vehicles and the spare parts manufactured by the petitioner were being sent outside the State of Bihar in pursuance of the contract for sale of the vehicles. Sale is contemplated from the very beginning with concrete reference to the dealers,' ORDER :s and as such the present case must come within the abmit of Section 3(a) of the Act. 17. In this view of the matter, the application must fail and is accordingly dismissed. If the petitioner wants to raise any other questions with regard to any specific transaction outside the general principle laid down above or with regard to the question of rebate etc., this is a matter to be determined by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes before whom the appeal is pending and it will not be proper for this Court to enter into a detailed consideration thereof to come to any specific conclusion. There will be no ORDER :for costs. I agree. Application dismissed