JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows : Mookerjee, J.: This is an application for a Certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against our decision, dated 10th December, 1968. The application has been made under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution and it is directed against an order of this Court, varying the order of the learned District Judge, in the matter of custody of the minor boy concerned in a proceeding under section 38 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, started by the father for modification of the directions in the matter, contained in a decree for divorce, dissolving the marriage between the parents concerned. 2. The learned District Judge gave qualified or conditional custody to the father in preference to the mother, who had the custody under the above decree, and this Court varied the said conditions or qualifications for a limited period and gave liberty to the father, after the expiry of the said limited period, to apply to the Court below for necessary directions in the matter of the said custody for finalising the same. The chief reason, which weighed with this Court in taking the above view, was that the learned District Judge, in deciding the matter of custody, did not take into consideration the views of the minor concerned, as required under the statute (section 38 of the Special Marriage Act). Indeed, the only purpose, for which we directed a fresh application for finalising the matter of custody, was to give an opportunity to the Court below to act in accordance with law to decide the said question after taking into consideration the wishes of the minor concerned in terms of the relevant statute. Our order, however, has not satisfied the father, and he is seeking to take the matter higher up for restoration of the order of the learned District Judge. 3. Our order, however, has not satisfied the father, and he is seeking to take the matter higher up for restoration of the order of the learned District Judge. 3. The application, as we have said above, is one under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution and the three grounds, which have been urged in support of it, are as follows :- 1) That as the judgment of this Court is a judgment of reversal, Certificate for leave should be given; 2) That, as the case involves an interpretation of section 38 of the Special Marriage Act, the test under the said clause is immediately satisfied ai1d the Certificate should follow as a matter of course; and 3) That, as the point involved raises consideration of the extent and limit of the father's right of custody, it is one of great general importance, both private and public, so as to satisfy the requirement for a Certificate under the aforesaid clause and, accordingly, the same should be granted. 4. We are unable to accept any of above contentions. The mere fact that the judgment of this Court is a judgment of reversal is not, by itself, sufficient for the grant of a certificate under the above clause, although, if the test of valuation under clause (a) or clause (b) of Article 133(1) had been satisfied, it would have, without more, entitled the petitioner to a Certificate under the same. The instant case, however, is not one, where the said test can be said to be satisfied and, accordingly, the petitioner cannot claim a certificate merely on the ground that the judgment of this Court is a judgment of reversal. 5. The fact, again, that the case might involve a question of statutory interpretation would not also be enough for the purposes of the petitioner, as the said question, as arising here, does not seem to us to be of sufficient importance or complication to justify the granting of the Certificate. 6. 5. The fact, again, that the case might involve a question of statutory interpretation would not also be enough for the purposes of the petitioner, as the said question, as arising here, does not seem to us to be of sufficient importance or complication to justify the granting of the Certificate. 6. Lastly, although, in a sense, the right of the father to the custody of his minor son may certainly be said to be involved in the present case, that, in the facts and circumstances before us, does not raise any substantial question, as we have kept that matter open for consideration in accordance with the statute and only directed that, in the matter of such consideration, the wishes of the minor concerned should be taken into account, as intended by its relevant provision (section 38) itself, as read by us. 7. In the course of arguments, Mr. Deb, learned Counsel for the petitioner, referred us to two decisions of this court, reported in (1) Damra Coal Company v. Benares Bank, 21 CLJ 281, and (2) Siva Prasad Singh v. Rani Prayag Kumari Debi, ILR 49 Cal 967, - but, in the view, we have expressed, above, and, particularly, when the decision, given by us, against which the matter is sought to be taken to the Supreme Court, is sufficiently elastic in the petitioner's favour and does not appear to us to involve any grave injury or needless complication, we do not think that the same would be of any assistance to him. These decisions, indeed, would obviously, be distinguishable, as the questions there were of sufficient complication and of much graver consequence. 8. We may add further that, having regard to the nature of our order, as set forth hereinbefore, it may not also satisfy the test of a final order for purposes of the above Article 133(1)(c), and, in that view, the said Article would not be attracted to the instant case. That also distinguishes the decisions, cited above by Mr. Deb, which were decisions under the old section 109(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was not limited to final orders. 9. That also distinguishes the decisions, cited above by Mr. Deb, which were decisions under the old section 109(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was not limited to final orders. 9. Indeed, as we read the judgment, delivered by us, against which the petitioner intends or proposes to go to the Supreme Court, we do not find anything there, which really harms the petitioner's cause, as we have, in substance, maintained his custody of the boy concerned, subject to the petitioner's obtaining appropriate and necessary directions from the Court below upon due consideration of all aspects, relevant under the governing, statute. There is, therefore, no question of any grave injury or serious complication, arising upon our said judgment, so far as the petitioner is concerned, and as the matter is really intended to be finalised by the further proceeding to be taken by the petitioner under the liberty, given to him by us, our aforesaid decision would not also be, in essence, a final order in the matter of the rights of the parties concerned. 10. In the premises, the instant application cannot succeed and it must fail both on the merits and in limini It will, accordingly, be dismissed and the Certificate, prayed for, refused. There will be no order for costs. Bagchi, J: I agree.