Judgment :- 1. This Criminal Revision Petition arises from an application under S.488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The two respondents in this revision petition, the mother and a child, respondents 1 and 2 respectively applied for a maintenance order against the petitioner in the court below alleging that the latter was cohabiting with the 1st respondent on the promise that he would marry her and that the 2nd respondent was born as a result of such union. The petitioner denied the allegations in the counter statement filed by him as well as in his evidence. The court below held that the petitioner was the father of the child and accordingly ordered that he should pay maintenance at the rate of Rs. 20/- a month. The counter-petitioner before the lower court has, therefore, preferred this criminal revision petition from the order of the court below. 2. The main point urged on behalf of the petitioner is that there is no evidence corroborating the version of the 1st respondent examined as pw.1 in the lower court and in that case where the paternity of the child of an unmarried woman is denied, it is unsafe to act on the uncorroborated testimony of the woman. In this regard, the question of law involved in the case may be stated first. In Prasad Gaseri v. Mt. Kesari (AIR. 1941 Patna 444) it was held that the burden was upon the woman to establish the paternity of the child and to show that the person from whom she claimed maintenance for the child was the father of the child and that it was prima facie improper to accept without corroboration the mere statement on oath by the mother who asserted that the opposite party was the father of the child. 3. This view has been reiterated and followed in a later decision reported in Thakur Prasad v. Mt. Godavari (AIR. 1951 Patna 514). It runs as follows: "Where the question at issue is whether a, certain man is the father of a certain child, it is prima facie improper to accept without corroboration, the mere statement on oath of the mother who asserts the paternity. Her evidence in such a case cannot but be highly interested, and it would be unreasonable and improper for any Court to act merely on her own statement without some independent corroboration thereof. Her evidence in such a case cannot but be highly interested, and it would be unreasonable and improper for any Court to act merely on her own statement without some independent corroboration thereof. Such corroborative evidence may be circumstantial but it must be such as to corroborate the evidence of the woman that the child was born of the alleged father. The fact of improper association after the child was born would not be sufficient to corroborate her evidence. 4. This question came up for consideration before this court as well in a number of cases, some of which will be referred to hereinafter. One such case was reported in Abdul Rahimankutty v. Aysha Beevi (AIR. 1960 Kerala 101). That was a case where this court found that there had been corroboration of the evidence of the petitioner to establish her case of paternity. The corroboration was that she lived as a domestic servant of her child's putative father, that he took interest in getting her married to another man and that no counter evidence was adduced on behalf of the person who claimed to be her husband. Under those circumstances, the court held that there was sufficient corroboration of the evidence. But, in a later case reported in Bhaskaran v. Kunhipennu (AIR. 1960 Kerala 110) it was found that there was no such corroboration though it confirmed that the court should seek corroboration of the petitioner's evidence before granting maintenance. Again, in another decision reported in Raghavan Pillai v. Gourikutty Amma (AIR. 1960 Kerala 119) the same position was reiterated that without sufficient corroboration, the evidence of the alleged wife alone is not sufficient to establish her claim for maintenance against the putative father of her child. All these cases lay down the proposition that the evidence of the wife shall be corroborated either by director some circumstantial evidence to establish that during the period when the wife could have conceived of the child, the wife and the alleged father had some access to each other. In the light of the above decisions, I will now examine the evidence in the case. 5. In the light of the above decisions, I will now examine the evidence in the case. 5. The case of pw.1 was that the petitioner developed illegal intimacy with the 1st respondent while she was passing continuously as a student by the side of a Vaidyasala, in which the petitioner was employed, some 3 years prior to her giving birth to the child and that that intimacy culminated into a wife-husband relationship later and that they lived together in her bouse for about 2 years before she gave birth to the child on 25-4-68. There was absolutely no evidence to establish that while the petitioner was employed as a compounder in the Vaidyasala he developed illegal intimacy with the respondent by her constant contact with him. No independent evidence has been let in to prove her contact with the petitioner during that period. The next stage was when the petitioner was said to be living with her in her own house for about 2 years prior to her delivery. It was in this connection that pw. 3 was examined. The evidence of pw. 3 was that he had seen the petitioner several times in the residence of the 1st respondent. But, at the same time, he had also seen other persons in the same house. He had occasion to see the female inmates of his own house having talks with the strangers. But, pw- 3 himself did not come to any conclusion whether the petitioner and the 1st respondent lived as husband and wife. His knowledge with regard to the husband-wife relationship between them was only hearsay. He did not, therefore, corroborate the evidence of pw.1 that they lived as husband and wife in one and the same house. The next evidence was that of pw. 4, who was alleged to be a Municipal Councillor, happened to see a crowd on 7-11-68 when the marriage of the petitioner with another lady was to be performed in a temple. When he saw the crowd in the premises of the temple, he was tempted to go there when he came to know that there was some dispute between the petitioner and the 1st respondent. However, he was prevailed upon to mediate and as a result thereof Pw.4 paid Rs. 100/- to the 1st respondent as compensation. When he saw the crowd in the premises of the temple, he was tempted to go there when he came to know that there was some dispute between the petitioner and the 1st respondent. However, he was prevailed upon to mediate and as a result thereof Pw.4 paid Rs. 100/- to the 1st respondent as compensation. On this point, the evidence of Pw.4 was that he did not get the amount from the petitioner nor had he received any indication from the petitioner that he admitted the paternity of the child. The petitioner denied the alleged intervention by pw. 4 and payment of the amount. The amount was paid by one Sankaranarayanan to pw.4 for payment to the 1st respondent. There was however no evidence to connect Sankaranarayanan with the petitioner. It is not known as to how the mediation took place and the payment made. It does not appear that the mediation of pw. 4 was at the instance of the petitioner or anyone connected with him. So, the evidence of pw- 4 in this regard also does not establish that there had been husband-wife relationship between the petitioner and the 1st respondent. The evidence of pw. 4 does not lead to any corroboration of the evidence of pw.1 6. It is clear that pw.1 did not try to let in any other evidence to establish either of her father or that of her brother that the petitioner lived with her in the same house. There is one Thankam by name who lived very near to her house. She would have been a better witness to prove that the petitioner lived with the 1st respondent. The 1st respondent got the help of pw. 3, who lived more than 11/2 furlongs away from her house to come and swear that he met the petitioner and the 1st respondent in one and the same bouse. It is also brought out that a criminal complaint was filed against the 1st respondent and her parents for an alleged house trespass of a building as if the building belonged to the petitioner. The first information in that case was furnished to the police on 11-5-67- pw-5, Sub Inspector, investigated in the case. After trial, the 1st respondent and her parents were acquitted on 30 71967. It is now admitted that the building in question belonged to the petitioner. The first information in that case was furnished to the police on 11-5-67- pw-5, Sub Inspector, investigated in the case. After trial, the 1st respondent and her parents were acquitted on 30 71967. It is now admitted that the building in question belonged to the petitioner. Whether trespass alleged was true or not, the indication was that the feeling was strained between the petitioner and the 1st respondent even after 115 67 when the alleged first information was lodged. If it was true, it would appear that there was no likelihood to have the child conceived to the 1st respondent after that incident through the petitioner. It is quite improbable that after the 1st respondent trespassing upon a property belonging to the petitioner, he would have anything to do with 1st respondent thereafter. Under these circumstances it is quite unlikely that the 1st respondent's case that the petitioner had access to her or that the child was born as a result of the cohabitation between the petitioner and the 1st respondent was true. The evidence of pw.1 was not corroborated in relevant particulars by pws. 2 and 4. pw. 3 did not support the respondents at all. Taking into consideration these circumstances, I am of the opinion that there has not been proper corroboration either by independent or circumstantial evidence to establish that the child was born as a result of the cohabitation between the petitioner and the 1st respondent. Ordinarily, the Revisional Court does not interfere with the finding of fact. But when such a finding is arrived at on disregard of the fundamental rule of evidence, I am of the opinion that interference is necessary and called for. In view of this conclusion, I find that the order passed by the learned Magistrate is not sustainable and that it has to be set aside. 7. In the result, the revision petition is allowed. The order passed against the petitioner granting maintenance allowance to the 2nd respondent is set aside.