ORDER G.S. Lal, J. - This writ petition relates to certain proceedings under the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act 1953 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). 2. Village Birwa Nizampur of Tahsil Bilgram, district Hardoi was notified for consolidation u/s 4 of the Ant. In the course of Section 9 proceedings opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 Paras Ram and Gauri filed an objection claiming Sirdari rights over plot No. 148 in the village over which the names of the Petitioners were recorded as tenure holders. The claim of the objectors was that they had become Sirdars by reason of long adverse possession. The objection was dismissed by the Consolidation Officer and an appeal filed by the objectors was also dismissed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). The objectors thereupon filed a revision u/s 48 of the Act on 10-7-1967. This revision was heard and allowed by Sri B.S. Rawat who described himself as Director of Consolidation. The present writ petition was, therefore, filed to question the order of Sri Rawat and to have it quashed on the ground of being illegal and manifestly erroneous. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed by opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 and rejoinder affidavit has been filed by the Petitioners. 4. A point raised in the petition about the jurisdiction of Sri Rawat to decide the revision has not been pressed before me and has been specifically given up. 5. Another point taken in the petition and on which arguments have been addressed relates to the maintainability of the revision. Rule 111 framed u/s 54 of the Act provides that an application u/s 48 of the Act shall be presented by the Applicant within 30 days of the order against which the application is directed and it shall be accompanied by a copy of the judgment and order in respect of which the application is preferred and also that copies of judgment and orders, if any, of other subordinate authorities in respect of the dispute shall also be filed along with the application. In the instant case the copy of the order of the Consolidation Officer had admittedly not been filed by the contesting oppisite parties along with their application u/s 48. The same was filed after more than a month from the date of the filing of the application. In the instant case the copy of the order of the Consolidation Officer had admittedly not been filed by the contesting oppisite parties along with their application u/s 48. The same was filed after more than a month from the date of the filing of the application. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has urged that the provision about the filing of copies of the judgment and order of other subordinate authorities is mandatory. It has no doubt been so held by a learned Judge of this Court in Desh Raj v. Dy. Director of Consolidation 1969 AWR 688 and also by a Division Bench sitting at Lucknow in Writ Petition No. 102 of 1969 decided on 25-3-1969. They were both cases in which the revision application had been dismissed for want of noncompliance with the said provision which was held to be mandatory. In the instant case, the position is that the revisional authority heard the revision application and allowed it. It, however, appears from the judgment that the fact that the revision was defective for non-compliance with the mandatory provision was not raised before the revisional authority. Learned Counsel for the contesting opposite parties has contended that the provision in Rule 111 about the filing of a revision application within 30 days of the order sought to be revised is not covered by the rule-making power u/s 54 of the Act and is, therefore, to be ignored as ultra vires. This contention is not correct since Clause (r) of Sub-section (2) of Section 54 specifically provides for rules being made in regard to the time within which applications and appeals may be presented under the Act in cases for which no specific provision in that behalf had been made in the Act. His argument is that the word revision is not mentioned in Clause (r). But revision as such has no meaning and it is only through an application that the concerning authority may be moved u/s 48 to revise the order. It will appear that Rule 111 also refers to "an application u/s 48" and not to a revision. However, the question arises as to whether the revision application is to be treated as a nullity in the eye of law so that any order passed on it could also be treated as a nullity. It will appear that Rule 111 also refers to "an application u/s 48" and not to a revision. However, the question arises as to whether the revision application is to be treated as a nullity in the eye of law so that any order passed on it could also be treated as a nullity. Section 53-B of the Act makes the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applicable to the applications, appeals etc. under the Act or the rules made thereunder. It is arguable with force that if copy of a judgment or order is not filed along with the application in revision but is filed later on, then the application may be treated to be properly presented on the date on which the copy is filed. In that case it would be merely a case of belated filing of the application in revision. Such a belated application could possibly be entertained by condoning delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It cannot be presumed that if the defect in the revision application had been brought to the notice of the revisional authority, it must have dismissed the revision application as defective. The possibility of the revisional authority having admitted the revision application by condoning delay, cannot be ruled out. Accordingly, in the above context, the order of the revisional authority cannot be taken to be illegal and void by reason of the fact that the revision application was not accompanied by a copy of the order of the Consolidation Officer and no relief can be granted on that ground. 6. Coming to the last point, namely, the error said to have been committed by the revisional authority, it may be stated that though oral evidence was also produced the question in regard to possession has primarily been decided on the basis of entries in the village records. The names of the contesting objectors came to be recorded as in possession only from the year 1369 Fasli though the revisional authority has wrongly stated in its order that Paras Ram's name was recorded from 1368 Fas to 1371 Fasli. However, the name of one Bhagga was recorded in the remarks column as in possession from the year 1361 Fasli. However, the name of one Bhagga was recorded in the remarks column as in possession from the year 1361 Fasli. In regard to the Petitioners their names were recorded as Sirdars all along till 1362 Fasli and thereafter the name of Jagannath, who had earlier been recorded as Shikmi, was recorded as tenant in-chief from 1363 Fasli to 1367 Fasli. The Petitioner's names were again recorded as tenants-in chief from 1368 Fasli. The revisional authority has referred to the want of the names of the Petitioners in the years 1363 Fasli to 1367 Fasli and about re-entry of their names from 1368 Fasli. It is found invalid to the extent that the names were recorded in black ink instead of red ink. Firstly I do not see how the absence of the names of the Petitioners in some years in which the names of the con testing opposite parties were not recorded at all even as in possession has any bearing on the question of the adverse possession of the said opposite parties. Secondly, from Annexure 4 it is obvious that Jagannath's name was recorded as Sirdar in place of the names of the Petitioners. He had been recorded as Shikmi formerly and was treated as having become Sirdar on the ground of his having been Adhivasi. However, after a contest raised by the Petitioners, Jagannath was not held to be Adhivasi and therefore, the names of the Petitioners were restored. Rights of the Petitioners existing upto 1362 Fasli were accordingly continued and the Petitioners continued to be the tenants-in-chief of the plot in the years in which, for the reasons stated above, their names had been replaced by that of Jagannath. The entry in the name of Paras Ram being only for 3 years, it fell short of the required period to mature title as Sirdar by adverse possession. For that reason the two lower consolidation authorities treated Paras Ram and Gauri as mere trespassers. The revisional authority, however, tacked the possession of Bhagga with that of the two persons and on that footing he held the contesting opposite parties to have matured their title. He observed : "It is true that Bhagga and the present revisionists are two separate entities nevertheless they are sons of the same father and are full brothers. I would, therefore, extend the benefit of constructive possession to them." 7. He observed : "It is true that Bhagga and the present revisionists are two separate entities nevertheless they are sons of the same father and are full brothers. I would, therefore, extend the benefit of constructive possession to them." 7. Firstly the question arises as to whether there was any evidence to show that Bhagga was the own brother of the revisionists. The Petitioners averred in para 23 of the writ petition that none of the witnesses examined by the revisionists before the Consolidation Officer had deposed anything about Bhagga or that Bhagga was ever in possession of the plot is dispute or that he was in possession on behalf of the revisionists or even that the revisionists were in constructive possession through Bhagga. It was also stated that no such case was set up by the revisionists in their objection nor was any such admission contained in the pleading or evidence of the Petitioners. In para 24 of the counter-affidavit it was stated in reply to the said para 23 of the writ petition that deponent Paras Ram had filed an affidavit before the Consolidation Officer to the effect that Bhagga was his real brother. A copy of the affidavit is also to be found as Annexure No. 1 to the counter affidavit. It will be observed that the said affidavit contained by way of verification no more words than that the affidavit was true. As pointed out by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners this was no compliance with the provisions of Rule 3 of Order XIX, CPC which requires that affidavits shall he confined to such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove. Only on interlocutory applications statement based on belief may be admitted but that too if the grounds thereof are stated. 8. The learned Counsel has also cited the cases of G.C. Bazbarua v. State of Assam and Ors. AIR 1951 Assam 161 and Chhaganlal v. Ramnarayan 1956 Madhya Bharat 244 in support of his contention that if affidavit is filed to establish a case it must comply with the terms of Rule 3(i) of Order XIX of the Code of Civil Procedure. It cannot be doubted that the affidavit was defective. Apart from that fact, it is to be borne in mind that every affidavit filed in a case cannot be treated as evidence. It cannot be doubted that the affidavit was defective. Apart from that fact, it is to be borne in mind that every affidavit filed in a case cannot be treated as evidence. A fact in dispute may be allowed by the court to be proved by an affidavit no doubt, but in the instant case the parties produced oral evidence and there is nothing to show that the contesting opposite parties as objectors were allowed to prove any fact by filing an affidavit. In the rejoinder affidavit the Petitioners have brought out the fact that they never had notice or knowledge of the filing of the alleged affidavit nor was any opportunity afforded to them in rebuttal. On the other hand, Paras Ram himself, when he appeared in the witness box, neither referred to the affidavit nor made any statement on the lines given in the affidavit. It is note-worthy that none of the two lower consolidation authorities also made any reference to this affidavit. The revisional authority was, therefore, not right in taking it as a fact that Bhagga was the own brother of the revisionists. Apart from all this, in the absence of a specific case that the objectors (contesting opposite parties in this Court) were jointly in adverse possession with Bhagga, the possession of Bhagga could not have been tacked to that of the objectors and they could not have been held to have conferred Sirdari rights through possession for the requisite period of Bhagga and the objectors taken together. A right by ad verse possession is a right acquired under law and it cannot be conferred. Further the adverse possession of two persons at different times cannot be tacked even though they may be related together as brothers. The revisional authority had no right under law to "extend the benefit of constructive possession" to the objectors. The revisional authority was, therefore, manifestly wrong in the view of law that I took and its order is therefore, vitiated. 9. The writ petition is allowed with costs and the order of the revisional authority contained in Annexure 3 to the writ petition is quashed.