JUDGMENT V.P. Gopalan Nambiyar, J. 1. This Second Appeal, arising out of proceedings in execution of a decree in O.S.No. 733/1950, Munsiff's Court, Quilandy has been referred to a Division Bench. The execution proceedings were for attachment and sale of immovable property. Respondents 2 to 5 in the execution petition have filed the Second Appeal. The suit was one for recovery of possession with arrears of rent and future rent. The plaintiff was a melkamdar, from the 12th Defendant who was the karnavan of his tavazhi. Arrears of rent from 1118 to 1124 were claimed. The suit was originally decreed on 31st October 1956 for rent for the years 1123 to 1125 against the 12th Defendant personally and as karnavan of his tavazhi. R.I.A. No. 430/1957 filed by the plaintiff for review of judgment, was allowed, and a decree against the 12th Defendant followed even in respect of the arrears of rent, originally disallowed. Execution was levied for satisfaction of the said decree. Objection was raised that by Ext. B-1 karar, dated 6th November 1951, the 12th Defendant's tavazhi had been partitioned and that the property sought to be attached and sold had been allotted to Respondents 2 to 5, (appellants), and that even before the decree there had thus been a cessation of the representative capacity of the 12th Defendant. The decree was therefore claimed to be not valid and binding. The objection was overruled by both the courts below and has been repeated before us in this Second Appeal. 2. There is no dispute that at the stage of execution Respondents 2 to 5 who are interested in the property, were made parties, and that the execution proceedings are therefore valid. Counsel for the appellant contended that this would not save the decree which was still open to attack at the stage of execution, as the karnavan had lost his representative character, prior to it. Counsel for the appellant contended that this would not save the decree which was still open to attack at the stage of execution, as the karnavan had lost his representative character, prior to it. In Lakshmanan v. Kamal 1958 K.L.T. 851 a Full Bench of this Court held: "That in a suit or proceeding in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question (which would include the right to recover property) brought against the manager of a Hindu joint family on the karnavan of a Marumakkathayam tarwad in his representative capacity, which is not collusive, the plaintiff, or the decree-holder in the execution proceedings, is not bound to implead either in the suit or in the execution proceedings any person to whom the suit property has been allotted under a partition effected subsequent to the institution of the suit and that all proceedings in such a suit, whether on the trial, appellate or execution side, would be binding on all the members of the tarwad or joint family, including the persons who had obtained title to any part of the suit property under the subsequent partition, if they are valid and binding against the original defendant and the persons whom the plaintiff or decree-holder was bound to implead on the death of such defendant. It will, of course, he open to persons who have obtained rights to the suit properties by the subsequent partition to apply to get themselves impleaded in the suit or execution proceedings to protect their legitimate rights, if any, and courts have the power to implead them on their applications if their presence in the party array is necessary in the interests of justice. But the plaintiff and the decree-holder are not bound to implead them, and no proceeding can be held to be invalid merely because the plaintiff and the decree-holder have omitted to implead them." 3. The learned Judge who referred this case to a Division Bench was of the view that the principle of the above decision cannot apply to money decrees. In Venkitanarayana v. Somaraju, A.I.R. 1937 Mad. The learned Judge who referred this case to a Division Bench was of the view that the principle of the above decision cannot apply to money decrees. In Venkitanarayana v. Somaraju, A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 610, Full Bench of the Madras High Court had to consider the question whether a disruption of a joint Hindu family subsequent to the filing of a suit for partition would make the decree passed therein against Manager, competent to represent the family at the time of the institution of the suit, ineffective against the joint family and its member's. Two of the learned Judges expressed themselves on the question. Venkatasubba Rao, J.; observed: "Last the question remains, does the fact that subsequent to the suit there was a partition, make any difference? The reason for holding that the members not joined should be held liable is, that they are substantially parties to the suit through the manager, in other words, they are sufficiently represented, though not nomine parties on the record. It follows from this, that the decree can be executed not only against the parties whose names appear but also against those who must be deemed to be constructive parties. In this view it is immaterial whether the family continues to remain joint or became divided.. In this case the partition was, as already stated entered into prior to the decree (though long after the commencement of the suit) but that circumstances, as I have held above, makes no difference." Venkataraman Rao, J., said: "The question is did that representation cease by virtue of the partition before the date of the decree in the High Court? The suit having been properly constituted, any severance of status between several members of the family would not divest the representative character of the manager therein till the other members choose to disaffirm it; he was entitled to carry on the litigation for and on behalf of the respondent and can be held accountable in respect thereof. The suit having been properly constituted, any severance of status between several members of the family would not divest the representative character of the manager therein till the other members choose to disaffirm it; he was entitled to carry on the litigation for and on behalf of the respondent and can be held accountable in respect thereof. The estate of a person dying during the pendency of a suit was held to be fully represented by one of his several heirs brought on the record in his place but only for that purpose, much more so in respect of a transaction concerning the joint family, the manager who is empowered by law to represent the other members who are interested therein much be deemed to continue to represent them till the transaction is completed, as until then the joint interest in the transaction cannot be said to have ceased.....If the present respondent thought that his father should not be allowed to represent him, it was his duty to have come on the record."t The above observations were cited with approval in Valappilekkandy Parambante Valappil Raman v. Koroth Thanicheri Kunhi Kannan Nambiar and others A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 445. In that case, a preliminary decree for sale of the jenmam rights was passed on 30th July 1937, and a final decree on 1st December 1937. The karnavan of the jenmi's tarwad alone was a party to the proceedings. A suit for partition of the tarwad had been filed on 7th April 1937 and a preliminary decree had been passed on 31st December 1938. Thereafter, in execution proceedings of the decree for sale, certain properties were sold, again with the karnavan alone on the party array. The decree still remained unsatisfied, and an application was made for passing a personal decree against all the members of the tarwad. It was objected that by the time of the execution proceedings, the karnavan had lost his representative status, that the sale held was void, that the condition precedent to an application for passing of the personal decree had not been satisfied, and hence the application itself was not maintainable. This contention was sustained by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court. Govinda Menon, J., who spoke for the Bench noticed the observations of two of the learned Judges of the Full Bench in Venkitanarayana v. Somaraju, A.I.R. 1937 Mad. This contention was sustained by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court. Govinda Menon, J., who spoke for the Bench noticed the observations of two of the learned Judges of the Full Bench in Venkitanarayana v. Somaraju, A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 610, but declined to extend that principle of that decision to the stage of execution with the following observations: "But it is one thing to say that the decree would be binding and another thing to say that the decree can be enforced in execution proceedings behind the back of the other members of the family. We do not think that the learned Judges have gone to that extent." The principle of the above case was applied by a learned Judge of this Court in Cheria Assankutty v. Cheria Abdulla, 1957 K.L.T. 1302. Neither of these cases are directly in point. They only proceed on the assumption that while the cessation of the representative capacity of the karnavan pendente lite will not make the decree ineffective against the tarwad or in members, the same principle cannot be extended to, execution proceedings. A direct pronouncement that a decree for arrears of maintenance obtained against a tarwad is not void at its inception by reason of the disruption of the family by partition by that time, and that it did not become void because the karnavan who was impleaded ceased to be such on account of the disruption of the tarwad by a partition action was rendered by Raghava Rao, J., in the decision reported in 1952 M. L. J. (Short Notes) page 29. A full report of the case is not available but the facts and purport of the decision are referred to in V. Raman v. Kunhikannan Nambiar, A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 445. In Ittiavara Thomas v. Sankaranarayanan, A.I.R. 1964 Kerala 144 Raman Nayar, J. (as he then was) approved the principle stated in Venkitanarayana v. Somaraju, A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 610 and held that the representative character occupied by the karnavan is not affected by a severance in status pending suit unless the other members choose to disaffirm it. The same principle underlies the decision of Krishna Iyer, J., in Ayiranazhi Kovilakath Kunchukutty and others v. Ayiranazhi Kovilakath Vedapuratti and others, A.I.R. 1969 K.L.J. 771. Despite time granted for research our attention was not drawn to any other descision of this Court on the point. 4. The same principle underlies the decision of Krishna Iyer, J., in Ayiranazhi Kovilakath Kunchukutty and others v. Ayiranazhi Kovilakath Vedapuratti and others, A.I.R. 1969 K.L.J. 771. Despite time granted for research our attention was not drawn to any other descision of this Court on the point. 4. In Pareekutty Haji v. Parameswaran Nambudiri 1959 K.L.J. 766, a Division Bench of this Court recognised that a karnavan continuing to be in management of the tarwad properties pending a suit for partition in which no order had been passed to dispossess him of the management is competent to represent the entire tarwad in execution proceedings against it and the proceedings taken after notice to him would be binding on all the members unless any case of fraud or collusion had been made out. The decision certainly seems to recognise that the division of a status of the tarwad does not automatically spell a cessation of the representative capacity of the karnavan for all purposes. 5. We have already referred to the Full Bench decision in Lakshmanan v. Kamal, 1958 K.L.T. 851. The Full Bench referred to Raman v. K. K. Nambiyar A.I.R 1956 Mad. 445, noticed that the Madras decision was inclined to hold that notwithstanding partition the karnavan was competent to represent other members before the decree, and observed: "On principle we can see no distinction between the proceedings before a decree and the proceedings thereafter in a suit in which a right to immovable property was directly and specifically in question and to which section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would therefore apply?" 6. Counsel for the appellant contended that the question before us is concluded by the Full Bench decision in Balakrishna Pillai v. Gourikutty Amma, 1965 K.L.J. 797. That decision was concerned with the scope and interpretation of section 31 of the Travancore Nayar Act 2/1110, which provided that "no decree was binding on the tarwad unless it is obtained against the karnavan as such and the senior Anandiravan of his tavazhi, etc.''. The Full Bench made the following observations on which counsel for the appellant placed reliance. That decision was concerned with the scope and interpretation of section 31 of the Travancore Nayar Act 2/1110, which provided that "no decree was binding on the tarwad unless it is obtained against the karnavan as such and the senior Anandiravan of his tavazhi, etc.''. The Full Bench made the following observations on which counsel for the appellant placed reliance. "We entertain no doubt that the correct principle is that if a plaintiff in a suit in respect of property wishes to obtain a decree binding on the persons interested in the property, it is incumbent on him to see that all persons interested in the property are impleaded. It seems to us to make little difference whether a devolution of ownership or interest in the property has been brought about by transfer, or by inheritance, or by bequest or by partition." The above observations, rendered while considering the statutory provisions of the Nayar Act can have no application on the general question with which we are concerned in the present case. The decision in Koroth Tanicheri Kunhikannan Nambiar v. Cheriath Cheeru and others, 1950 (2) M.L.J. 549 , is also distinguishable, as, in that case, the karnavan had lost his representative status even at the time of the institution of the suit. 7. We record our concurrence with the principle of the decisions in 1952 (II) M. L. J. (Short Notes) page 29, in Ittiavira Thomas v. Sankaranarayanan, A.I.R. 1964 Kerala 144, and in Ayiranazhi Kovilakath Kunchukutty and others v. Ayiranazhi Kovilakath Vedapuratti and others, 1969 K.L.J. 771. The principles seems to have been impliedly accepted or assumed to be correct in V. Raman v. Kunhikannan Nambiyar, A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 4454, in Cheria Hussankutty v. Cheria Abdulla, 1957 K.L.T. 1302, in Pareekutty Haji v. Parameswaran Nambudiri, 1959 K.L.J. 776, and in the Full Bench decision in Lakshmanan v. Kamal, 1958 K.L.T. 851. In the present case there was proper representation till the stage of the decree. At the stage of the execution, the appellants to whom the properties sought to the attached and sold were allotted, were eo nomine joined as parties. The procedure was correct. And so is the decision of the courts below. 8. We dismiss this Second Appeal with costs.