Judgment M.P. Verma, J. This petition in revision has been directed against an order of Shri K.K. Pathak, Magistrate First Class, Monghyr, dated 3rd February, 1969, by which he declared the possession of the members of the second party in respect of the dispute lands in a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The dispute between the parties appears to be a chronic one and so a brief history may be given. The disputed lands are the following: Plot No. 667 area 2.02 acres Plot No. 670 area 1.91 acres Plot No. 731 area 0.46 acres out of 1.50 acre These plots appertain to Khata No. 3 under Tauzi No. 2301 in village Chorwar Police Station Barbigha, in the district of Monghyr. Thus the total area in dispute was 4.39 acres, roughly equivalent to about 6 bighas. 3. The case of the first party to the proceeding is that the disputed lands were settled with him and his brother, Abdul Khair, about 20 years ago, by the 16 annas landlady of the tauzi. These lands were her bakasht lands. The petitioner applied for commutation of rent under Section 40 of the B.T. Act and the rent was commuted from bhaoli to naqdl. The landlady was not pleased with this move of the petitioner and she filed an appeal before the Additional Collector who set aside the order of commutation and remanded the case on the ground that the notice was not properly served on the landlady. When the case was sent back-on remand, the landlady and the petitioner entered into a compromise on the 23rd February. 1953. By this compromise the petitioner was accepted to be in cultivating possession of the lands and the rent was commuted. After this commutation, the petitioner amalgamated the disputed lands with other undisputed lands of his. The landlady also accepted rent from the petitioner. But subsequently she raised some objection and challenged the compromise itself. The petitioner, therefore, brought a title suit for a declaration that the rent of the lands was commuted into cash by virtue of the compromise. By that time the members of the second party had come in the picture and so they alia were made defendants second party in that suit. The petitioner, therefore, brought a title suit for a declaration that the rent of the lands was commuted into cash by virtue of the compromise. By that time the members of the second party had come in the picture and so they alia were made defendants second party in that suit. The landlady contested the title suit on the ground that commutation had not been made in respect of these plots, but they were subsequently interpolated in the compromise petition. Defendants second party also raised objection that they had taken the lands in settlement from the landlady and they were in possession thereof. The trial court (First Additional Subordinate Judge, Monghyr) decreed the suit in part and further observed that it was not necessary to go into the question of title as between the plaintiff of the suit (first party) and defendants 2 to 4 (second party). So that question was left open. The petitioner preferred First Appeal No. 520 of 1956 to this court, which was heard and disposed of by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mahapatra, who decreed the suit in its entirety and came to the conclusion that there has been a valid commutation of rent in respect of the plots in suit. Towards the end of the judgment his Lordship observed that the matter had been left open between the defendants second party, the plaintiff of the trial court and so that should not be disturbed. There was a Letters Patent Appeal No. 87 of 1960 in which compromise was effected and according to Order No. 22 dated the 19th February 1965, the claim of the plaintiff respondents of that appeal (i.e. petitioner and heirs of his brother) was admitted. Thereafter, the parties fought more than one case under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On a police report dated the 1st December, 1959, there was a proceeding under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal procedure which was later converted into a proceeding under Section 145 of that Code. That proceeding was decided in favour of the first party. The second party came in revision before this Court in Criminal Revision No. 1405 of 1965, which was heard by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.K. Chaudhary. That proceeding was decided in favour of the first party. The second party came in revision before this Court in Criminal Revision No. 1405 of 1965, which was heard by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.K. Chaudhary. His Lordship remanded the case to the learned Magistrate and now the Magistrate has found the possession of the second party and so the first party has come up in this revision. 3. The case of the members of the second party was that Bibi Sayeeda Sakina Begham, the 16 annas landlady of the Tauzl, settled the disputed lands with them under a registered deed of settlement dated the 3rd October, 1953, and since then the members of the second party are coming in possession. They got rent receipts horn the ex-landlady and when the zamindari vested in the State of Bihar under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, the names of the members of the second party were shown in the Jamabandi which was filed by the ex-landlady. Thereafter, the members of the second party got their names mutated in Government office and they have been getting receipts from the State Government. 4. After considering the documents and the affidavits filed by both sides, the learned Magistrate has declared the possession of the members of the second party. 5. Mr. J.C. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that on his behalf 15 witnesses had filed their affidavits and on the other side 9 witnesses had filed affidavits. The learned Magistrate has discarded the affidavits of the petitioner witnesses solely on the ground that they did not speak of the original settlement and commutation. His argument is that in a case under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the history of the land has not been given nor as to in what manner title was acquired in respect of the disputed land. He further submitted that 8 witnesses of the opposite party did not mention their own plot numbers in their affidavits and so it could not be said that they were competent witnesses to speak about possession. Therefore, his grievance is that double standard has been applied in appraisal of the affidavits. His next grievance is that the learned Magistrate has not considered the effect of the certified copy of the rent schedule which was prepared in favour of the petitioner. Therefore, his grievance is that double standard has been applied in appraisal of the affidavits. His next grievance is that the learned Magistrate has not considered the effect of the certified copy of the rent schedule which was prepared in favour of the petitioner. The remark of the learned Magistrate is that this rent schedule in not a decision on the question of possession and it was not binding on the members of the second party who were not parties to the commutation proceedings. He has argued that commutation of rent is allowed only in respect of an occupancy tenancy and when the rent is commuted it goes without saying that the tenant is an occupancy raiyat and was in cultivating possession of the land as such. A Pleader-commissioner had also gone to the spot to find out whether there was any amalgamation of the disputed plots with the other undisputed plots of the petitioner. The learned Magistrate has not attached any importance to the report of the Pleader-commissioner. In this case under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure an allegation has been made on behalf of the opposite party that the petitioner had forcibly broken the ridges. It is said that this allegation was totally false otherwise a criminal case must have cropped up. Apart from these objections, two other objections were also raised on behalf of the petitioner. Firstly, that the impugned order is vague because so far as plot no. 731 is concerned the disputed land is apparently a portion of a bigger area, that is, 0.46 acre out of the total area of the plot which is 1.50 acres. The boundary has not been given nor even the direction, and so this order cannot be given effect to because of vagueness. Secondly, it is contended that the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to convert the proceeding under Section 144 into one under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal procedure because he has not indicated in his order that there was any apprehension of a breach of the peace because of the land dispute, and so he had no jurisdiction to start such a proceeding in absence of such indication given in the initial order. It has also been argued that the declaratory portion of the order is defective because by the previous decision under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the petitioner was declared to be in possession. The attachment came to an end with that order and he entered into possession. Therefore, the learned Magistrate ought to have indicated in his order that the members of the second party were restored to possession. 6. I propose to discuss these points separately. 7. The first ground of attack by the petitioner against the impugned order is that the initiation of the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is without jurisdiction and the whole proceeding is, therefore, vitiated and the order passed by the learned Magistrate in such a proceeding cannot be given effect to. My attention has been drawn to the order of the learned Magistrate dated the 21st January 1950, by which he initiated the proceeding. The relevant portion of that order reads as follows:- "There has been a chronic dispute on the score of possession of the disputed land. This proceeding under Section 144 Cr. P.C. in spite of another 144 Cr. P.C. proceeding previously decided is a sufficient pointer to the fact that claims should not be decided in a summary proceeding under Section 144 Cr. P.C. Draw up proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P.C. asking the parties concerned to file written statement by 11/2." 8. This order of the learned Magistrate does not mention if that dispute was likely to occasion a breach of the peace. It is well known that any matter concerning possession of immovable property is the subject-matter of the Civil Court. A Criminal Court cannot ordinarily be called upon to decide the question of possession concerning immovable property. But when there is an apprehension of a breach of the peace because of that dispute, the Magistrate within whose jurisdiction this trouble is brewing gets jurisdiction and then comes to decide the question of possession over immovable property. This legal aspect has been reiterated in various decisions of various courts. But when there is an apprehension of a breach of the peace because of that dispute, the Magistrate within whose jurisdiction this trouble is brewing gets jurisdiction and then comes to decide the question of possession over immovable property. This legal aspect has been reiterated in various decisions of various courts. Of course it can be argued on behalf of the opposite party that when a party allows the order initiating the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to go unchallenged by not coming up in revision against it and chooses to wait and take the chance of judgment in his favour, he cannot, in revision against the final order, be heard to complain of excess of jurisdiction in the initiation of the proceeding by the Magistrate under Section 145 when the final order has gone against him [Vide (I) Shibnarayan Das V. Satyadeo Prasad A.I.R. 1943 Patna 44]. But in that case there were sufficient materials before the Magistrate to come to a decision or to hold the view that there was an apprehension of a bleach of the peace and so he was taking action under Section 145. In the present case no such thing has been shown to me. 9. There are, however, two decisions of the Supreme Court which emphasise that the Magistrate must disclose in his order and state the ground of his satisfaction as to the presence of the two conditions required to be expressed under Sub-section (1) of Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The first ground is that there should be a bonafide dispute concerning possession of immovable property. The second ground is that there must be an apprehension of a breach of the peace concerning that bonafide dispute. If both these conditions are present and the Magistrate is satisfied by recording his own reasons, the order cannot be assailed on the ground of insufficiency or otherwise of the Magistrate's satisfaction. It will be rather a question of great controversy if the higher court goes into the matter as to what material were present before the Magistrate to compel him to take action under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That matter must be left to the subjective discretion of the Magistrate himself. It will be rather a question of great controversy if the higher court goes into the matter as to what material were present before the Magistrate to compel him to take action under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That matter must be left to the subjective discretion of the Magistrate himself. In the instant case the order of the Magistrate initiating the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, of course, does show that there was chronic dispute on the score of possession of the disputed land. But there is not a word about any apprehension of a breach of the peace on account of that dispute. In the case of (2) Bhinka V. Charan Singh (A.I.R. 1959 Supreme Court 960) it was observed that, in passing an order under Section 145(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate does not purport to decide a party title or right to possession of the land, but expressly reserves that question to be decided in due course of law. The foundation of his jurisdiction is an apprehension of the breach of the peace, and, with that object, he makes a temporary order, irrespective of the rights of the parties, which will have to be agitated and disposed of in the manner provided by law. In another case (3) R.H. Bhutani V. Miss Mani J. Desai (A.I.R. 1968 Supreme Court 1444)] the Supreme Court had observed that Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the Magistrate must be satisfied, before initiating proceeding, that a dispute regarding an immovable property exists and that such dispute is likely to cause a breach of the peace. But once he is satisfied of these two conditions, the section requires him to pass a preliminary order under Sub-section (1). The satisfaction under Sub-section (1) is of the Magistrate, and no hard and fast rule can, therefore, be laid down as to the sufficiency of the material for his satisfaction. Apparently, therefore, there cannot be any roving and searching inquiry as to the sufficiency of the materials which induced the Magistrate to take action under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It may be further observed that submission by a party to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, when he has no jurisdiction to assume, would not confer jurisdiction on that Magistrate. It may be further observed that submission by a party to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, when he has no jurisdiction to assume, would not confer jurisdiction on that Magistrate. The matte of jurisdiction of the Magistrate can be agitated at an, stage, because it is a question of inherent lack of jurisdiction. Had it been a question of irregular exercise of jurisdiction, then other consideration so as to cause prejudice to the parties etc. would arise. I would, therefore, conclude on this point by saying that when the learned Magistrate has not indicated that there was an apprehension of a breach of the peace, he had no jurisdiction to start a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code and on this ground alone the entire proceeding has been vitiated. 10. The next point which makes the order of the Magistrate defective in that he has not mentioned in his order' as to which portion of plot no. 731 comprising a total area of l.50 acres is the disputed area of 0.46 acre. He has not mentioned any boundary thereof. Obviously, at the time of taking possession, there will be a hue and cry and the identity cannot be fixed. Learned counsel appearing for the opposite party has said that the boundary is given in the settlement deed. The settlement deed is a piece of evidence and the learned Magistrate has not even indicated that this area is in accordance with the settlement deed. These two defects make the order of the learned Magistrate legally unsustainable and the impugned order has to be set aside on these two scores. 11. It is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction of a Court is very much limited. If, after a consideration of the evidence, both oral and documentary, a Magistrate takes a view, it is not advisable to set aside that view simple because on the same set of facts and evidence the revisional Court could come to another finding. It is only when there is miscarriage of justice because of apparent mistake on the face of the record, or there is non-consideration or wrong consideration of any document or evidence that the revisional court would like to interfere. It is only when there is miscarriage of justice because of apparent mistake on the face of the record, or there is non-consideration or wrong consideration of any document or evidence that the revisional court would like to interfere. When the impugned order of the learned Magistrate is going to be set aside on the above two main grounds it is no use enumerating and deciding the other criticisms which have been leveled against this order of the learned Magistrate. 12. In this case both parties claimed settlement from the same landlady. One party has got the commutation order and the judgment of the title suit in his favour, though that title suit did not decide the question of possession. But when it confirmed the order of commutation, it may indirectly indicate that the person in whose favour the commutation order had been passed had possession as an occupancy raiyat. Commutation of rent cannot be made in abstract. Mahapatra, J., while disposing of the first appeal, observed a follows:- “The evidence is also sufficient to prove that Rs.2900/- was paid by the plaintiffs to the landlady through her manager as salami before the compromise was arrived at. Rent receipts also have been proved (Exhibits 1 and 1a) for the year given to the plaintiff no. 2 and plaintiff no. 1, respectively, which conforms to the story of the compromise and settlement of cash rent.” It is further to be noted that the commutation case had stated much earlier than the registered qabuliyat under which the members of the second party claim possession over the lands in dispute. The matter is not very simple to decide. Any way, it would be always desirable to get the entire case thrashed out about title and possession in a regular civil suit if the parties intend to live peacefully. 13. In the result, this application in revision succeeds and is allowed and the impugned order of the learned Magistrate is set aside. Application allowed