P. N. BHAGWATI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners in these petitions are trustees or managers in charge of different religious institutions holding Devasthan Inams and they challenge the constitutional validity of the Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The Act came into force on 15th November 1969 and in its territorial operation it extends to the Bombay area of the State of Gujarat. sec. 2 enacts the definition clause:- sub-sec. (1) defines appointed day to mean the date on which the Act came into force namely 15 November 1969. Assessment in relation to any land means according to sub-sec. (2) the assessment fixed on the land under the Code immediately before the appointed day and where no assessment was so fixed on the land the amount which would have been fixed as assessment on the land under sec. 52 of the Code sub-sec. (3) says that authorised holder in relation to Devasthan land means a person in whom the ownership of such land vests permanently whether by virtue of the operation of the tenancy law or of any kind of valid transfer made otherwise than under the tenancy law. Devasthan Inam is defined in sub-sec. (6) to mean:-AN inam consisting of a grant or recognition as a grant (a) of a village portion of a village or land whether such grant be (i) of soil with or without exemption from payment of land revenue or (ii) of assignment of the whole of the land revenue of the village portion of the village or as the case may be land or of a share of such laid revenue or (iii) of total or partial exemption from payment of land revenue in respect of any land; or (b) of cash allowance or allowance in kind by whatever name called by the ruling authority for the time being for a religious or charitable institution and entered as such in the alienation register kept under sec 53 of the Code or in any other revenue record or public record maintained in respect of alienations or determined as such by a decision under sec 5 of the Gujarat surviving alienations Abolition Act 1963 but does not include xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx sub-sec. (7) defines Devasthan land:- it means a villages portion of a village or land held under a Devasthan Inam hell follow definitions of inferior holder inamdar tenancy law and unauthorised holder in sub-secs. (9) (10) (13) and (14) which read as follows:- (9) inferior holder means a person who is in possession of a Devasthan land whether by inheritance or succession or valid transfer under the tenancy law or otherwise and who being liable to pay assessment in cash or kind holds such land whether on payment of assessment or not; (10) `inamdar means the religious or charitable institution for which a Devasthan inam is held whether such inam is actually entered in the relevant revenue record in the name of such institution or of any person in charge of such institution or having the management thereof; (13) tenancy law means the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (14) unauthorised holder means a person in possession of a Devasthan land under any kind of alienation thereof which is null and void under the law applicable to such land immediately before the appointed day; Sec. 4 entrusts the determination of certain questions arising under the Act to the State Government and prescribes the machinery for such determination. sec. 5 which is the principal section provides for abolition of Devasthan inams and their incidents in these terms:-5 Notwithstanding any usage or custom settlement grant agreement sanad or order or anything contained in any decree or order of a Court or any law for the time being applicable to any Devasthan inam with effect on and from the appointed day (a) all Devasthan inams except in so far as they consist of a grant or recognition as a grant of cash allowance or allowance in kind shall be and are hereby abolished:- (B) save as expressly provided by or under this Act all rights legally subsisting immediately before the said day in the Devasthan inams so abolished and all other incidents of such inams shall be and are hereby extinguished; and (c) subject to the other provisions of this Act all Devasthan lands shall be and are hereby made liable to the payment of land revenue in accordance with the provisions of the Code and the rules made thereunder and accordingly the provisions therein relating to unalienated land shall apply to all Devasthan lands. On abolition of the Devasthan Inam tenure what shall be the consequences is provided in secs. 6 7 and 8 which are very material and of which the relevant portions are as follows:-6 In the case of a Devasthan land the person deemed to be the occupant primarily liable to the State Government for payment of land revenue in respect of such land in accordance with the provisions of the Code and the rules made thereunder shall be (a) where such land is in possession of the inamdar and had been cultivated on behalf of the inamdar immediately before the appointed day the inamdar (b) where such land is in the possession of an authorised holder or an inferior holder such authorised holder or inferior holder as the case may be and (c) where such land is in possession of a person other than the inamdar authorised holder unauthorised holder or inferior holder the inamdar. 7 (1) Where any Devasthan land is in the possession of an unauthorised holder it shall be resumed and such unauthorised holder shall be summarily evicted therefrom by the Collector in accordance with the provisions of the Code:- xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx8 All public roads lanes and paths the bridges ditches dikes and fences on or beside the same beds of creeks below high water mark and beds of rivers streams and nallas lakes wells tanks canals and water courses and all standing and flowing water and all lands (excluding lands used for building or other non-agricultural purposes) in respect of which no person is deemed to be an occupant under this Act and all mines whether being worked or not and minerals whether discovered or not and all quarries which are situate within the limits of any Devasthan land shall except in so far as any rights of any person other than the inamdar may be established in or over the same and except as may otherwise be provided by any law for the time being in force vest in and shall be deemed to be with all rights in or over the same or appertaining thereto the property of the State Government and all rights held by an inamdar in such property shall be deemed to have been extinguished and it shall be lawful for the Collector subject to the general or special orders of the State Government to dispose of them as he deems fit subject always to the rights of way and other rights of the public or of individuals legally subsisting secs. 9 and 11 provide for compensation and omitting portions immaterial they run as follows:-9 In the case of a Devasthan inam not consisting of a grant or recognition as a grant of cash allowance or allowance in kind there shall be paid to the inamdar as compensation for the abolition of all his rights in Devasthan inam in the form of an annuity in perpetuity (a) a sum of money equal to an average of the full assessment lawfully leviable on all the lands comprised in such inam during a period of three years immediately preceding the appointed day if the grant consisted of grant of soil with or without exemption from payment of land revenue (b) a sum of money equal to an average of the amount of land revenue or as the case may be the share in such land revenue received or due to the inamdar during a period of three years immediately preceding the appointed day if the grant consisted of assignment of land revenue or a share in such land revenue. 11 (1) If any person is aggrieved by the provisions of this Act as abolishing extinguishing or modifying any of his rights to or interest in property and if compensation for such abolition extinguishments or modification has not been provided for in the other provisions of this Act such person may apply to the Collector for compensation. (2) The application under sub-sec. (1) shall be made to the Collector in the prescribed form within the prescribed period. The Collector shall after holding a formal inquiry in the manner provided by the Code make an award determining the compensation in the manner and according to the method provided for in subsec. (1) of sec. 23 and sec. 24 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (3) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person to compensation on the ground that any Devasthan land which was wholly or partially exempt from payment of land revenue has been under the provisions of this Act made subject to the payment of full assessment in accordance with the provisions of the Code. Then comes sec. 19 which invalidates certain actions taken or things done after 18th March 1968 but before the appointed day in relation to Devasthan land so as to affect the rights of the tenant in respect of such land or to evict the tenant from such land. Then comes sec. 19 which invalidates certain actions taken or things done after 18th March 1968 but before the appointed day in relation to Devasthan land so as to affect the rights of the tenant in respect of such land or to evict the tenant from such land. Lastly sec. 31 amends the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land 1948 and the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act 1960 It removes the exemption from applicability of certain provisions of the Tenancy Act given under sec. 88b in respect of lands which are the property of an institution for public religious worship and inserts the following sec. 88e after sec. 88d:- 88 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sec. 88b with effect on and from the specified date lands which are the property of an institution for public religious worship shall cease to be exempted from those provisions of the Act except secs. 31 to 31d (both inclusive) from which they were exempted under sec. 88b and all certificates granted under that section in respect of such lands shall stand revoked. (2) Where any such land ceases to be so exempted then in the case of a tenancy subsisting immediately before the specified date the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the specified date and the provisions of secs. 32 to 32 (both inclusive) shall so far as may be applicable apply. Explanation:--In this section specified date means the date of the commencement of the Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act 1969 it also introduces sub-sec. (3) in sec. 3 of the Ceiling Act in the following terms:- (3) The Devasthan lands which immediately before the date of the commencement of the Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act 1969 were exempted under clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) shall with effect on and from the said date cease to be exempted lands. The constitutional validity of these provisions is challenged before us on various grounds taken in one or the other petition. ( 2 ) THE main ground of challenge is based on infraction of Article 26 (c) which confers on every religious denomination or any section thereof the fundamental right to own and acquire movable and immovable property subject to public order morality and health. ( 2 ) THE main ground of challenge is based on infraction of Article 26 (c) which confers on every religious denomination or any section thereof the fundamental right to own and acquire movable and immovable property subject to public order morality and health. The petitioners contend that the Devasthan lands owned by religious institutions of which they are managers or trustees belong to religious denominations or sections thereof and the provisions of the Act in so far as they abolish the rights in Devasthan inams (sec. 5) make the authorised holders and inferior holders occupants of Devasthan lands in their possession (sec. 6 clause (b)) provide for resumption of Devasthan lands in possession of unauthorised holders (sec. 7) and vest certain specific kinds of properties in the State (sec. 8) are therefore violative of Article 26 (c) and must be held to be void. If these provisions are void sec. 19 being an ancillary provision must also fall with them; but independently of the challenge to these provisions the validity of sec. 19 is also assailed before us on the ground that the date 18th March 1968 being an artificial date arbitrarily fixed by the Legislature the provision enacted in sec. 19 imposes an unreasonable restriction on the right of religious denominations to deal with their lands and is hence violative of Article 26 (c ). so also the amendment of sec. 88b and the introduction of sec. 88e in the Tenancy Act and the withdrawal of exemption in respect of Devasthan lands from the provisions of the Ceiling Act (sec. 31) are challenged as void as being in conflict with the right of religious denominations to own Devasthan lands under Article 26 (c ). To this argument several answers are made on behalf of the State. In the first place the State contends that Article 26 (c) has no application in the case of Devasthan lands since Devasthan lands are owned either by religious institutions like Maths deities etc. which are juristic entities or by trustees for the benefit of religious institutions and not by religious denominations or sections thereof. Even if Article 26 (c) can be invoked in relation to Devasthan lands argues the State it would not avail the petitioners since the Act barring the amendment of sec. 88b and the introduction of sec. which are juristic entities or by trustees for the benefit of religious institutions and not by religious denominations or sections thereof. Even if Article 26 (c) can be invoked in relation to Devasthan lands argues the State it would not avail the petitioners since the Act barring the amendment of sec. 88b and the introduction of sec. 88e in the Tenancy Act constitutes acquisitional legislation and if it satisfies the constitutional guarantee in Article 31 (2) it does not have to meet the challenge of Article 26 (c ). The fundamental right under Article 26 (c) is delimited by Article 31 (2) which recognises the power of the State to compulsory acquire properly subject only to two conditions namely existence of public purpose and specification of an appropriate or relevant principle of compensation and therefore if a law of compulsory acquisition complies with these two conditions prescribed by Article 31 (2) it is not required to stand the scrutiny of Article 26 (c ). A law falling within Article 31 (2) does not have to be tested by reference to Article 26 (c) for Article 26 (c) is subject to Article 31 (2 ). It is also argued by the State that in any event Articles 25 and 26 form part of a single pattern and therefore though the words subject to the other provisions of this Part do not occur in the opening part of Article 26 as they do in the opening part of Article 25 (1) the qualification introduced by these words in Article 25 (1) must be carried into Article 26 and Article 26 (c) must be read as conferring a right on religious denominations subject to the other provisions of Part III which would include Article 31 (2):- Article 31 (2) must accordingly prevail over Article 26 (c ). The State also contends in the alternative that even if Article 26 (c) is not subject to Article 31 (2) the right of property it confers is abstract right and not concrete right and since no provision of the Act interferes with the general right or capacity of religious denominations to own and acquire property the Act does not offend Article 26 (c ). The position is no different even if Article 26 (c) is considered as conferring a concrete right of property. The position is no different even if Article 26 (c) is considered as conferring a concrete right of property. The right to own and acquire property guaranteed under Article 26 (c) is not an absolute right:- it is subject to reasonable regulation by the State so long as the substance of it is not impaired. The impugned provisions of the Act do not affect the substance of the right to own and acquire property:- they merely regulate the right by substituting one form of property for another. For these reasons the State contends there is no violation of Article 26 (c ). ( 3 ) THE first question which arises for consideration on these arguments is whether Article 26 (c) can be invoked at all in respect of Devasthan lands. It is apparent that under Article 26 (n) the right to own and acquire property is conferred on a religious denomination or a section thereof and therefore unless it can be shown that Devasthan lands are owned by a religious denomination or a section of it the petitioners cannot invoke Article 26 (c ). Now Devasthan lands being lands held under a Devasthan inam granted for a religious institution the legal ownership of Devasthan lands would vest either in the religious institution if like a Math or a deity it is a juristic entity or in the trustees for the benefit of the religious institution and the State therefore contends that no part of the Devasthan lands could be said to be owned by a religious denomination or a section thereof so as to attract the applicability of Article 26 (c ). This contention plausible though it may seem is based on a misconception of the true scope and ambit of Article 26 (c ). It proceeds on a wrong hypothesis that the word own in Article 26 (c) connotes legal ownership and it is only when legal ownership of property is vested in a religious denomination or a section thereof that the constitutional guarantee in Article 26 (c) is attracted. A little reflection will show how insupportable is this hypothesis. If accepted as correct it would reduce the fundamental right under Article 26 (c) to futility. It is obvious that a religious denomination not being a juristic entity legal ownership of property cannot be vested in it. A little reflection will show how insupportable is this hypothesis. If accepted as correct it would reduce the fundamental right under Article 26 (c) to futility. It is obvious that a religious denomination not being a juristic entity legal ownership of property cannot be vested in it. It can own property only through the agency of some other natural person or legal entity. But in such a case the legal ownership of the property would be vested in such other person or entity and the religious denomination would only have beneficial interest in it. If therefore Article 26 (c) is to have any meaning or content it must be held to refer to beneficial ownership of property. The word own must be construed in a broad and liberal sense to mean the substance of ownership which would include beneficial ownership. That is the only way we can give meaning and force to Article 26 (c) and save it from being a futile exercise of constituent power. It would therefore be sufficient to invoke the applicability of Article 26 (c) if it can be shown that a religious denomination or a section thereof is the beneficial owner of Devasthan lands. Now it is clear and indisputable that even where property is vested in a religious institution such as a Math or a deity which is a juristic entity or in trustees for the benefit of a religious institution it is not the religious institution which is the real beneficiary but the real beneficiaries are the worshippers or followers of the particular religious denomination to which the religious institution belongs. This was settled long ago by the Supreme Court in Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 133. The question which arose for consideration in that case was whether a certain temple namely. Thakurdwara of Sri Radhakrishnaji was a public endowment or a private one. Dealing with this question Venkatarama Ayyar J. speaking on behalf of the Supreme Court pointed out :- the distinction between a private and a public trust is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific individuals in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. While in the former the beneficiaries are persons who are ascertained or capable of being ascertained in the latter they constitute a body which is incapable of ascertainment. . While in the former the beneficiaries are persons who are ascertained or capable of being ascertained in the latter they constitute a body which is incapable of ascertainment. . A religious endowment must therefore be held to be private or public according as the beneficiaries thereunder are specific persons or the general public or sections thereof. Then the question is who are the beneficiaries when a temple is built idol installed therein and properties endowed therefore ? Under the Hindu Law an idol is a juristic person capable of holding property and the properties endowed for the institution vest in it. But does it follow from this that it is to be regarded as the beneficial owner of the endowment ? Though such a notion had a vogue at one time and there is an echo of it in these proceedings (vide para 15 of the plaint) it is now established beyond all controversy that this is not the true position. It has been repeatedly held that it is only in an ideal sense that the idol is the owner of the endowed properties. It cannot itself make use of them it cannot enjoy them or dispose of them or even protect them. In short the idol can have no beneficial interest in the endowment. The learned Judge then after referring to certain Sanskrit texts proceeded to add:-THUS according to the texts the Gods have no beneficial enjoyment of the properties and they can be described as their owners only in a figurative sense (Gaunartha) and the true purpose of a gift of properties to the idol is not to confer any benefit on God but to acquire spiritual benefit by providing opportunities and facilities for those who desire to worship. . . . . Thus it was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins C. J. at p. 138 that the pious purpose is still the legatee the establishment of the image is merely the mode in which the pious purpose is to be effected and that the dedication to a deity may be a compendious expression of the pious purposes for which the dedication is designed. . . In Hindu Religious Endowments Board v. Veeraraghavacharlu A. I. R. 1938 Mad. 750 Varadachariar J. dealing with this question referred to the decision in I. L. R. 37 Cal. . . In Hindu Religious Endowments Board v. Veeraraghavacharlu A. I. R. 1938 Mad. 750 Varadachariar J. dealing with this question referred to the decision in I. L. R. 37 Cal. 128 and observed:-AS explained in the case that purpose of making a gift to a temple is not to confer a benefit on God but to confer a benefit on those who worship in that temple by making it possible for them to have the worship conducted in a proper and impressive manner. This is the sense in which temple and its endowments are regarded as a public trust. When once it is understood that the true beneficiaries of religious endowments are not the idols but the worshippers and that the purpose of the endowment is the maintenance of that worship for the benefit of the worshippers the question whether a endowment is private or public presents no difficulty. It is clear from these observation that even where Devasthan lands vest in a Math or a deity or a religious institution or in trustees for the benefit of a religious institution the true beneficiaries of Devasthan lands are not the Math idol or religious institution but the worshippers or followers and since they belong to one or the other religious denomination or a section thereof it is not incorrect or inappropriate to say that Devasthan lands are beneficially owned by a religious denomination or a section thereof and the condition for the applicability of Article 26 (c) is satisfied. ( 4 ) THAT takes us to the next question as to the interrelation between Article 26 (c) and Article 31 (2 ). The argument of the State was that Article 26 (c) is subject to Article 31 (2) and if a law of compulsory acquisition satisfies the conditions of Article 31 (2) it is not required to meet the challenge of Article 26 (c) or in other words compliance with the requirements of Article 31 (2) excludes the applicability of Article 26 (c ). This argument is an echo of the doctrine which bedeviled the law relating to fundamental rights prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in R. C. Cooper v. Union of India commonly known as the Bank Nationalisation Case reported in A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 564. This argument is an echo of the doctrine which bedeviled the law relating to fundamental rights prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in R. C. Cooper v. Union of India commonly known as the Bank Nationalisation Case reported in A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 564. The theory which held the field then was that the extent of protection of important guarantees such as the liberty of person and right to property depends upon the form and object of the State action and not upon its direct operation upon the individuals freedom and as a necessary corollary of this theory the view was taken in several decisions that Article 31 (2) is a complete code relating to infringement of the right to property by compulsory acquisition and if a law of compulsory acquisition satisfies the requirements of Article 31 (2) it is not liable to be tested by reference to Article 19 (1) (f ). Now if this theory were correct on a parity of reasoning Article 26 (c) would also have to be consigned to a subordinate position like Article 19 (1) (f) in relation to Article 31 (2) and its applicability would he excluded where there is a law of compulsory acquisition falling within Article 31 (2 ). But this theory no longer holds good in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Bank Nationalisation Case. The law as now finally settled by the majority decision in this case is that the extent of protection against impairment of a fundamental right is determined not by the object of the Legislature nor by the form of the action but its direct operation upon the individuals right. Each freedom guaranteed by the Constitution has different dimensions and operates as a limitation on the authority of the State within its allotted field. Both Articles 31 (2) and 19 (1) (f) operate in their respective fields and the law in order to be valid has to be within the authority of the State as delimited by both Articles. It is therefore not possible to say that where a law of compulsory acquisition complies with the conditions of Article 31 (2) it does not have to meet the challenge of Article 19 (1) (f ). Such a law has to satisfy the test of both the Articles namely Article 31 (2) and 19 (1) (f ). It is therefore not possible to say that where a law of compulsory acquisition complies with the conditions of Article 31 (2) it does not have to meet the challenge of Article 19 (1) (f ). Such a law has to satisfy the test of both the Articles namely Article 31 (2) and 19 (1) (f ). It may be that a law which complies with the conditions of Article 31 (2) may be held also to satisfy the test of Article 19 (1) (f) read with Article 19 (5) but that would be a totally different thing from saying that such a law is not required to meet the challenge of Article 19 (1) (f) read with Article 19 (5 ). Compliance with the conditions of Article 31 (2) does not dispense with the necessity of complying with Article 19 (1) (f) read with Article 19 (5 ). Shah J. speaking on behalf of the majority summed up the position in the following words in paragraphs 62 and 63 of his judgment at page 597 of the report:-WE are therefore unable to hold that the challenge to the validity of the provision for acquisition is liable to be tested only on the ground of non-compliance with Article 31 (2 ). Article 31 (2) requires that property must be acquired for a public purpose and that it must be acquired under a law with characteristics set out in that Article. Formal compliance with the conditions under Article 31 (2) is not sufficient to negative the protection of the guarantee of the right to property. Acquisition must be under the authority of a law and the expression law means a law which is within the competence of the Legislature and does not impair the guarantee of the rights in Part III. We are unable therefore to agree that Articles 19 (1) (f) and 31 (2) are mutually exclusive. The area of protection afforded against State action by the freedom under Article 19 (1) (f) and by the exercise of the power of the State to acquire property of the individual without his consent must still be reconciled. We are unable therefore to agree that Articles 19 (1) (f) and 31 (2) are mutually exclusive. The area of protection afforded against State action by the freedom under Article 19 (1) (f) and by the exercise of the power of the State to acquire property of the individual without his consent must still be reconciled. If property is compulsorily acquired for a public purpose and the law satisfies the requirements of Articles 31 (2) and 3t (2a) the Court may readily presume that by the acquisition a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right to hold property is imposed in the interest of the general public. But that is not because the claim to plead infringement of the fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (f) does not avail the owner; it is because the acquisition imposes a permissible restriction on the right of the owner of the property compulsorily acquired. ( 5 ) THESE observations made in the context of inter-relation between Article 19 (1) (f) and Article 31 (2) must apply equally in regard to the interrelation between Article 26 (c) and Article 31 (2 ). Article 26 (c) and 31 (2) cannot be read as mutually exclusive. Both Articles operate in their respective fields and a law of compulsory acquisition in order to be valid must stand the challenge of both the Articles. Article 26 (c) is not subordinate to Article 31 (2) so that compliance with he conditions of Article 31 (2) may exclude the applicability of Article 26 (c ). It would indeed be highly detrimental to the content of fundamental rights to read them in a manner as if one is subordinate to the other. Both Articles are of equal force and validity and full effect must be given to them. If there is any apparent conflict between them the Court may apply the rule of harmonious construction and resolve the apparent conflict by demarcating their respective spheres of influence so as to avoid clash. But it is not possible to subscribe to the view that if the requirements of Article 31 (2) are satisfied Article 26 (c) cannot be invoked Article 31 (2) is addressed to the State and it imposes a limitation on the authority of the State to compulsorily acquire property by prescribing two conditions which must he fulfilled before any law can be made for compulsory acquisition of property. This limitation must be complied with in order to the making of a valid law of compulsory acquisition. But merely because it is complied with it does not mean that if there is any other limitation imposed by an Article of the Constitution such as Article 26 (c) that limitation is dispensed with. The law would have to comply with such other limitation as well unless it is impossible to comply with both limitations which of course is not so in the present case. It is therefore obvious that even if the Act is a piece of acquisition legislation and satisfies the requirements of Article 31 (2) it would still have to meet the challenge of Article 26 (c ). The next question which falls for consideration is whether Article 26 (c) subject to the other provisions of Part III of the Constitution and is hence subordinate to Article 31 (2 ). To determine this question it is necessary to examine the terms of Articles 25 and 26. These two Articles occur under the heading Right to Freedom of Religion and omitting portions immaterial read as follows:-25 Freedom of conscience and free profession practice and propagation of religion:- (1) Subject to public order morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess practice and propagate religion. (2) Nothing in this Article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law (a) regulating or restricting any economic financial political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice (b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. xxx xxx xx xxx xxx 26 Freedom to manage religious affairs:--Subject to public order morality and health every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes:- (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law. It will be seen that the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 25 (1) is expressly made subject to public order morality and health and to the other provisions of Part III but when we turn to Article 26 we find that the words subject. . to the other provisions of this part are omitted in Article 26 and the only words of limitation employed in the opening part of Article 26 are subject to public order morality and health. There is thus a deliberate and calculated departure in the language used in Article 26 and the Constitution-makers must be presumed to have done so with a view to achieving a different result than the one they intended under Article 25 (1 ). The deliberate omission of the words subject to the other provisions of this Part while retaining the expression subject to public order morality and health clearly and unmistakably points to the that the fundamental right conferred under Article 26 was not intended to be made subject to the other provisions of Part III. The words subject to the other provisions of this Part which occur in the opening Part of Article 25 (1) cannot be carried into Article 26 by any of judicial interpretation. such an attempt would be in defiance of all recognised canons of construction and would do violence to the language used by the Constitutions-makers. Article 26 (c) cannot therefore be read as subject to Article 31 (2) or to any other provisions of Part III. ( 6 ) IT is evident from this discussion that the impugned provisions of the Act to be valid must satisfy the challenge of Article 26 (c ). But the question then arises:- what is the scope and ambit of Article 26 (c)? Does it refer to abstract right of property or does it also comprise concrete right of property ? Though there was much debate on this question and a strenuous argument was advanced on behalf of the State we do not think this question presents any difficulty of solution. The phraseology of Article 26 (c) wide and Prima facie it takes within its sweep both abstract and concrete rights of property. To suggest that abstract tights of property of a religious denomination cannot be infringed by the State but its concrete rights can is to deprive Article 26 (c) of its real content. The phraseology of Article 26 (c) wide and Prima facie it takes within its sweep both abstract and concrete rights of property. To suggest that abstract tights of property of a religious denomination cannot be infringed by the State but its concrete rights can is to deprive Article 26 (c) of its real content. It would mean that the State cannot make a law declaring generally that a religious denomination shall not be entitled to acquire property but it can make a law taking away the property of a religious denomination after it is acquired. That would reduce Article 26 (c) to a pious declaration of a platitude without any force or vitality. We must also consider the setting in which Article 26 (c) occurs. Article 26 consists of four clauses (a) to (d ). Clauses (a) (b) and admittedly deal with concrete rights. Then is it not reasonable to assume that clause (c) also deals with a concrete right? It is difficult to imagine why the Constitution-makers should have pitch forked an abstract right in a catena of concrete rights so as to disturb the general pattern of the various clauses of Article 26. The words such property in Article 26 also indicate that the property referred to in Article 26 (c) is concrete property and the right it confers is concrete right of property. ( 7 ) THIS conclusion indeed becomes irresistible if we have regard to the purpose for which Article 26 (c) is enacted. Article 25 (1) confers on every individual the right to freedom of religious belief and religious practice. But here in this country as elsewhere religion is institutionalized and with a view to facilitating and effectuating the individuals freedom of religion under Article 25 (1) certain fundamental rights are conferred on religious denominations under Article 26. Article 26 (a) guarantees to every religious denomination or any section thereof the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes and Article 26 (b) confers the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. Now obviously these rights would have no value unless the religious denomination has property with the help of which it can exercise these rights. without property these rights would be illusory. Now obviously these rights would have no value unless the religious denomination has property with the help of which it can exercise these rights. without property these rights would be illusory. It would be poor consolation to a religious denomination to be told that it is free to establish its religious institutions when its property is confiscated freedom to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes and to manage its own affairs in matters of religion would in such a case be reduced to a shadow:- it would be merely a freedom on paper a mockery of freedom. It was therefore necessary to safeguard the concrete property rights of religious denominations from unreasonable encroachments which would materially impair the exercise of the right of religious freedom. Now concrete right of property was conferred on citizens under Article 19 (1) (f) subject to reasonable restrictions which may be imposed in the interests of general public under Article 19 (5) but protection was not regarded by the framers of the Constitution as sufficient for safeguarding the concrete property rights of religious denominations. They felt that having regard to the long history of religious strife and bitterness which had ravaged the social and political life of this country during the period of the British rule and the strong religious sentiment which formed the bed-rock of the social life of our people it was necessary to confer a distinct and independent fundamental right of property on religious denominations which would safeguard their concrete rights of property and therefore they enacted Clause (c) of Article 26. The intention obviously was that so far as religious denominations are concerned the guarantee of the right of property should not be left to the whim or caprice of the majority but it should be placed on the high pedestal of fundamental right so as to be beyond the reach of an oppressive or misguided majority. If this was the real object and purpose of the makers of the Constitution in enacting Article 26 (c) it is apparent that the right of property conferred by it must be concrete right of property. If this was the real object and purpose of the makers of the Constitution in enacting Article 26 (c) it is apparent that the right of property conferred by it must be concrete right of property. ( 8 ) NO authority would seem to be necessary in support of this conclusion but we may fortify ourselves by reference to the observations of Iyengar J. in Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 853 at page 873 where the learned Judge points out in reference to concrete property belonging to a religious denomination that: -. . . if a law permitted or enjoined the use of the property belonging to the denomination by an apostate it would be a wholly unauthorised diversion which would be violation of Article 26 (d) and also of Article 26 (c ). We may also invoke the S. M. Transport (P) Ltd. v. Sankaraswamigal Mutt A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 864 where Subba Rao J. as he then was delivering the judgment of the Court held that Article 19 (1) (f) applies both to concrete as well as to abstract rights of property. The reasoning which prevailed with the Supreme Court in relation to Article 19 (1) (f) must also apply equally in relation to Article 26 (c ). ( 9 ) BUT then the question immediately arises:- what is the content of the concrete right of property embodied in Article 26 (c)? Is the fundamental right under Article 26 (c) absolute and supreme subject only to the specific limitations introduced by the words subject to public order morality and health or is it subject to any other limitations ? It must be remembered that when the Constitution was enacted the framers of the Constitution knew that they were making a Constitution for a society which was soon expected to develop into a highly industrial society. Now in a modern industrial society vast masses live together in close physical and economic inter-dependence and the traffic is so dense that it might lead to friction and strife resulting in disorder and chaos if there were no regulation of individual and social conduct. There is also an evolution of social values with a decisive shift in public opinion which would not permit economic individualism and state passivity to take absolute precedence over social justice. There is also an evolution of social values with a decisive shift in public opinion which would not permit economic individualism and state passivity to take absolute precedence over social justice. In the context of these physical and technical conditions of life in a modern industrial society and changing values leading to more and more active participation by the State in the social and economic life of the society could the framers of the Constitution have contemplated that the right of property conferred on religious denominations should be an absolute right ? No right in a modern political society how ever unrestricted be the terms in which it is couched can be absolute. It is a right to be exercised within the framework of a political society organised by law a society membership of which to use the words of Kitto J. in Breen v. Sweddon 106 C. L. R. 406 to 415: -. . . . ENTAILS because of its nature acts and forbearance on the part of each by which room is allowed for the reasonable enjoyment by each other of his own position in the same society. and it must therefore be subject to limitations inherent in the formation and structure of the political society. Absolute exercise of the right without any limitations might tend to threaten the existence of an ordered society by producing social and economic tensions arising from clash of competing claims demands and interests of different individuals or social groups. Every right absolute though it may seem must therefore be read subject to inherent limitations. What those limitations should be would depend on diverse considerations including the nature of the political society in which the right is to be exercised but broadly speaking it may be said that the right would be subject to reasonable regulation by the State. This would be much more so in the case of right of property for property is the creation of law and in the ultimate analysis law represents the social conscience of the community which it is intended to govern. The right of property conferred on a religious denomination under Article 26 (c) is therefore not an absolute right but it is subject to reasonable regulation by the State provided of course the regulation is not of such a nature as to impair the substance of the right. The right of property conferred on a religious denomination under Article 26 (c) is therefore not an absolute right but it is subject to reasonable regulation by the State provided of course the regulation is not of such a nature as to impair the substance of the right. ( 10 ) THIS approach to the interpretation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 26 (c) receives considerable support from the American Constitution. In the Constitution of the United States there is a provision which bears some analogy to the one we have in Article 26 (c) of our Constitution. The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides that Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. In the United States the problems created by this provision have been solved in large measure by holding that the provisions for protection of religion is not an absolute provision to be interpreted and applied independently of the other provisions of the Constitution. The Supreme Court said in Jones v. Opelika 316 U. S. 584 at p. 593:- 86 L. Ed. 1691 at 1699 with reference to the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech freedom of press and freedom of religion:-THEY are not absolute to be exercised independently of other cherished privileges protected by the same organic instrument. These privileges it was held must be reconciled with the right of the State to employ the sovereign power to ensure orderly living without which constitution guarantees of civil liberties would be a mockery. The freedom of action of man under colour of a constitutional right such as that of freedom of speech or of the press or the free exercise of religion must rest subject to necessary accommodation to the competing needs of his follows. We find a practical application of the doctrine of accommodation in the case of Cox. New Hampshire 312 U. S. 569 at 574:- 85 L. Ed. 1049 where the Court said:-ONE would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that means to direct public attention to an announcement of his opinions. New Hampshire 312 U. S. 569 at 574:- 85 L. Ed. 1049 where the Court said:-ONE would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that means to direct public attention to an announcement of his opinions. The result has been that the Supreme Court of the United States has refused to regard the provisions relating to freedom of religion freedom of assembly and freedom of speech as involving invalidation of all laws which in any degree interfere with such freedom. The power to regulate has been recognised with this qualification that the regulation must not be such as to amount to undue infringement of the protected freedom. It was pointed out in Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U. S. 296 at p. 304:-84 L. Ed. 1213 at p. 1218:- Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but in the nature of things the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not in attaining a permissible end unduly to infringe the protected freedom. This statement frankly recognizes that the general protection given by the Constitution to the freedom in question leaves it to the Court to determine whether a particular measure which in fact limits complete freedom involves an undue infringement of that freedom. It is upon this principle that many cases have been decided in the American Courts and freedom of speech freedom of assembly and freedom of religion have been reconciled with the competing needs of the society. ( 11 ) WE find that the same approach has been adopted by the Australian Courts in interpreting sec. 92 of the Australian Constitution which provides that on the imposition of uniform duties of customs trade commerce and intercourse among the States whether by means of internal carriage ocean navigation shall be absolutely free. ( 11 ) WE find that the same approach has been adopted by the Australian Courts in interpreting sec. 92 of the Australian Constitution which provides that on the imposition of uniform duties of customs trade commerce and intercourse among the States whether by means of internal carriage ocean navigation shall be absolutely free. Though the words used are absolutely free it has been held by the Australian Courts and the view of the Australian Courts has been confirmed by the Privy Council in Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales (1950) A. C. 235 that the expression free though emphasized by the accompanying absolutely yet must receive some qualification. Lord Porter delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales (supra) observed:-THE conception of freedom of trade commerce and intercourse in a community regulated by law presupposes some degree of restriction en the individual. As long ago as 1916 in Sir Samuel Griffith C. J. said:- But the word free does not mean extra legem any more than freedom means anarchy We boast of being an absolutely free people but that does not mean that we are not subject to law and through all the subsequent cases in which sec. 92 has been discussed the problem has been to define the qualification of that which in the Constitution is left unqualified. In this labyrinth there is no golden thread. But it seems that two general propositions may be accepted:- (1) that regulation of trade commerce and intercourse among the States is compatible with its absolute freedom and (2) that sec. 92 is violated only when a legislative or executive act operates to restrict such trade commerce and intercourse directly and immediately as distinct from creating some indirect or consequential impediment which may fairly be regarded as remote. In the application of these general propositions in determine whether an enactment is regulatory or something more or whether a restriction is direct or only remote or incidental there cannot fail to be differences of opinion. The problem to be solved will often be not so much legal as political social or economic yet it must be solved by a Court of law. The problem to be solved will often be not so much legal as political social or economic yet it must be solved by a Court of law. These observations recognise an important principle of construction in Constitutional law and clearly support the view that even where a right or freedom is couched in absolute terms it must be read subject to qualification permitting the State to impose reasonable regulation on the exercise of right or freedom. ( 12 ) OUR Supreme Court has also adopted a similar approach in construing Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. That Article confers an absolute right on all minorities linguistic or religious to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. But the absoluteness of this right has been limited by the Supreme Court by declaring that it does not preclude the State from imposing reasonable regulations upon the exercise of the right. This question first came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in - In re Kerala Education Bill A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 956 and the Supreme Court pointed out in that case that notwithstanding the absolute terms in which the fundamental freedom under Article 30 (1) is guaranteed it was open to the State by legislation or by executive direction to impose reasonable regulations. This view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the subsequent case of Sidhrajbhai v State of Gujarat A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 540 where Shah J. delivering the judgment of the Court observed:- any law or executive direction which seeks to infringe the substance of that right under Article 30 (1) would to that extent be void. This however is not to say that it is not open to the State to impose regulations upon the exercise of this right. The fundamental freedom is to establish and to administer educational institutions:-IT is a right to establish and administer what are in truth educational institutions-institutions which cater to the educational needs of the citizens or sections thereof. Regulations made in the true interests of efficiency of instruction discipline health sanitation morality public order and the like may undoubtedly be imposed. such regulations are not restrictions on the substance of the right which is guaranteed. Regulations made in the true interests of efficiency of instruction discipline health sanitation morality public order and the like may undoubtedly be imposed. such regulations are not restrictions on the substance of the right which is guaranteed. It is therefore clear that even if a fundamental right is couched in absolute terms it is subject to reasonable regulation by the State so long as in the guise of regulation the State does not unduly impair or affect the substance of the right. ( 13 ) THE question then arises what regulation of the fundamental right should be regarded as reasonable. What should be the test for determining the reasonableness of the regulation ? The answer to the question must obviously depend on the nature of the fundamental right the purpose for which it is conferred and the general pattern of constitutional rights and obligations. The directive principles of State policy enumerated in Part IV of the Constitution must also enter into the determination of this question. The directive principles set out the socio-economic structure envisaged by the Constitution and it is only within the framework of this socio-economic structure that the fundamental rights are intended to be exercised and enjoyed by the people. It is no doubt true that the directive principles are made unenforceable by any Court but even so they are declared to be fundamental in the governance of the country and the State is enjoined to apply them in making the laws. In fact Part IV which contains the directive principles has been described by some of the framers of the Constitution as the most important and creative part of the Constitution and is said to contain the hopes and aspirations of the people. The directive principles aim at making the Indian masses free in the positive sense free from the passivity engendered by centuries of coercion by society and by nature free from the abject physical conditions that had prevented them from fulfilling their best selves. While the fundamental rights secure what one may call the concept of negative freedom the directive principles represent the aspect of positive freedom. The directive principles are therefore as paramount in importance as the fundamental rights and both have to be read together as integral part of the Constitution. While the fundamental rights secure what one may call the concept of negative freedom the directive principles represent the aspect of positive freedom. The directive principles are therefore as paramount in importance as the fundamental rights and both have to be read together as integral part of the Constitution. Though in an early judgment of the Supreme Court reported in State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951) S. C. R. 525 observations were made which seemed to suggest that the directive principles are subordinate to the fundamental rights we find a reversal of this trend in the subsequent decisions where two rules of construction have been clearly evolved by the Supreme Court:- (1) that whenever there is a conflict between the right of an individual and a legislation purporting to implement socio-economic policies laid down in Part IV of the Constitution greater weight should be given to the latter; and (2) that every socio-economic legislation made in pursuance of the directive principles must of necessity be construed as one designed for public purpose or as one intended to promote public interest or as a reasonable restriction on the fundamental rights. Mudholkar J. also adopted more or less a similar approach in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 845 where he spoke of applying the doctrine of harmonious construction to resolve the conflict between the fundamental rights and directive principles by reading the former in the light of the latter. The same principle or rule of construction has received implicit approval in the majority judgment of Subba Rao C. J. in Golaknaths Case (1969) 2 S. C. R. 762 where the learned Chief Justice pointed out that the fundamental rights and the directive principles enshrined in the Constitution form an integrated scheme which is elastic enough to respond to the changing needs of the society. The fundamental rights and the directive principles are to quote the words of Hegde J. in Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore (1969) 3 S. C. C. complimentary and supplementary to each other. The fundamental rights and the directive principles are to quote the words of Hegde J. in Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore (1969) 3 S. C. C. complimentary and supplementary to each other. It may therefore now be taken a s a well-established principle that the fundamental rights must be read in the light of the directive principles as forming part of an integrated scheme and if that be so the concept of reasonableness of regulation for the purpose of determining whether there is infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 26 (c) must take into account the socioeconomic policies embodied in the directive principles. ( 14 ) WE may point out here as an instance of application of this principle that where the property of a religious denomination is compulsorily acquired or transferred and the religious denomination is given compensation it cannot be said that the substance of the right of property of the religious denomination is impaired or affected provided of course the compensation is reasonable. The religious denomination in such a case continues to own the property in a different form. The right to own property is not infringed merely because the property changes its form. It is inevitable that in a modern democratic society the property may change its form. If such change were not permissible it would stifle the development and growth of the economy. such change is in fact inherent in the content and dimension of the right to own property. Compulsory acquisition or transfer of property from the hands of a religious denomination does not therefore impair or affect the substance of the right to own property so long as reasonable compensation is paid for it. such acquisition or transfer would be justifiable as a reasonable regulation of the right to own property under Article 26 (c ). Whether compensation provided by the law is reasonable or not would of course have to be decided by reference to the tests which we have already discussed above. such acquisition or transfer would be justifiable as a reasonable regulation of the right to own property under Article 26 (c ). Whether compensation provided by the law is reasonable or not would of course have to be decided by reference to the tests which we have already discussed above. This view finds support from the observations of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh (supra) vide Paragraph 214 in the judgment of Mahajan J. and paragraph 233 in the judgment of S. R. Das J. ( 15 ) IT is in the light of this discussion that we must proceed to consider whether the impugned provisions of the Act can successfully meet the challenge of Article 26 (c ). Now at this stage it would be relevant to point out that after the enactment of the Constitution the State started introducing several measures one after the other for carrying out agrarian reform within the State The Tenancy Act had already been enacted in 1948 but several drastic amendments of far-reaching importance were introduced in it with a view to making the tenant deemed purchaser of the land held by him. These amendments were made in pursuance of the policy that the tiller should be the owner of the soil having direct relationship with the State and there should be no intermediary between the tiller and the State. There were numerous categories of alienated lands held on different tenures such as Jagir Tenure Ankadia tenure Koti tenure Inam tenure and similar other different tenures. The State enacted a series of tenure abolition Acts with a view to abolishing these tenures and converting alienated into unalienated lands liable to payment of land revenue to the State. The net result of these tenure abolition Acts was that barring Devasthan inams held by religious or charitable institutions which were specifically excepted all tenures on which alienated lands were held within the State were abolished and alienated lands become liable to payment of land revenue to the State as if they were unalienated lands. The net result of these tenure abolition Acts was that barring Devasthan inams held by religious or charitable institutions which were specifically excepted all tenures on which alienated lands were held within the State were abolished and alienated lands become liable to payment of land revenue to the State as if they were unalienated lands. Devasthan inams or inams held by religious or charitable institutions were not touched by any of these tenure abolition Acts presumably because the State felt that the alienated lands being held for religious or charitable institutions there would be no exploitation of tenants and the object of agrarian reform might therefore at least for the time being be subordinated to the need of religious or charitable institutions. But as is evident from the speech made by the Honourable Minister for Revenue in the Legislative Assembly on 27th August 1969 this expectation was found to be unjustified and cases came to the knowledge of the State which showed that tenants in possession of Devasthan lands were also being exploited and it was therefore considered necessary to extend protection to tenants of Devasthan lands to bring to an end the exceptional treatment which was being meted out to religious and charitable institutions. The State therefore enacted the present Act with a view to abolishing Devasthan Inam tenure and placing religious and charitable institutions on the same basis as other holders of alienated lands whose tenures have been abolished by the earlier Acts. It is the last in the series of tenure abolition Acts enacted by the State from time to time. ( 16 ) TO the provisions of the Act sec. 5 consists of clauses (a) (b) and (c ). Clause (a) abolishes all Devasthan inams except in so far as they consist of a grant or recognition as a grant of cash allowance or allowance in kind and clause (b) provides that all rights legally subsisting in the Devasthan inams so abolished and all other incidents of such inams shall be extinguished. The effect of these two clauses is that the tenure known as Devasthan inam on which Devasthan lands were held is abolished and all rights and incidents arising from such tenure are extinguished. The effect of these two clauses is that the tenure known as Devasthan inam on which Devasthan lands were held is abolished and all rights and incidents arising from such tenure are extinguished. Clause (c) then proceeds to say that all Devasthan lands shall be liable to the payment of land revenue in accordance with the provisions of the Code and the rules made thereunder and accordingly the provisions therein relating to unalienated lands shall apply to all Devasthan lands. The Devasthan lands which were alienated lands thus become unalienated lands liable to payment of land revenue to the State and subject to any contrary provision made in the Act the holders of Devasthan lands become by virtue of the definition of occupant in the Bombay Land Revenue Code occupants of such lands liable to pay land revenue to the State. sec. 6 however enacts a deeming provision and says who shall be deemed to be the occupant primarily liable to payment of land revenue to the State in the cases specified in the section. Clause (a) provides that where Devasthan land is in possession of the inamdar and had been cultivated on behalf of the inamdar immediately before the appointed day the inamdar shall be deemed to be the occupant of such land. This clause on a plain natural construction of its language would apply only if two conditions are fulfilled:- (1) the land must be in possession of the inamdar on the appointed day and (2) it must have been cultivated on behalf of the inamdar immediately before the appointed day. The two conditions are cumulative and both must be satisfied in order to attract the applicability of the clause. The State contended that the conjunction and in this clause must be read as or but this contention does not appeal to us. The two limbs of the clause which are connected by the conjunction and do not denote two alternatives. The first limb of the clause is in fact so wide in its ambit and coverage that it would render the second limb of the clause totally redundant if they were to be read as alternatives. The two limbs of the clause which are connected by the conjunction and do not denote two alternatives. The first limb of the clause is in fact so wide in its ambit and coverage that it would render the second limb of the clause totally redundant if they were to be read as alternatives. Devasthan land in possession of the inamdar would include all land whether it has been cultivated on behalf of the inamdar or not and therefore the first limb of the clause would cover a case falling within the second limb and the second limb would be rendered meaningless and futile on the construction contended for on behalf of the State. It is therefore clear beyond doubt that the clause refers to cultivated land in the possession of the inamdar and makes the inamdar deemed occupant in respect of such land Clause (b) provides for a case where Devasthan land is in possession of a authorised holder or an inferior holder and says that in such a case the authorised holder or inferior holder shall be deemed to be the occupant. But where Devasthan land is in possession of a person other than the inamdar authorised holder inferior holder or unauthorised holder the inamdar is again made deemed occupant by clause (c ). The result therefore is that where there is cultivated Devasthan land in possession of the inamdar or there is Devasthan land in possession of a person other than the inamdar authorised holder unauthorised holder or inferior holder the inamdar is deemed to be the occupant of such land:- where Devasthan land is in possession of an authorised holder or an inferior holder the authorised holder or inferior holder is deemed to be the occupant of such land:- where there is uncultivated land in possession of the inamdar none of the three clauses of sec. 6 applies but in such a case by virtue of the abolition of Devasthan tenure the inamdar who is in lawful possession of Devasthan land becomes occupant of such land. Where Devasthan land is in possession of an unauthorized holder sec. 7 provides that it shall be resumed and such unauthorised holder shall be summarily evicted therefrom by the Collector in accordance with the provisions of the Code. Neither the inamdar nor the unauthorised holder would become occupant of the land in such a case. Where Devasthan land is in possession of an unauthorized holder sec. 7 provides that it shall be resumed and such unauthorised holder shall be summarily evicted therefrom by the Collector in accordance with the provisions of the Code. Neither the inamdar nor the unauthorised holder would become occupant of the land in such a case. ( 17 ) THEN comes sec. 8 which vests certain specific kinds of properties in the State. It says that all public roads lanes and paths bridges ditches dikes and fences on or beside the same beds of creeks below high water mark and beds of rivers streams and nallas lakes wells tanks canals and water courses and all standing and flowing water and all lands (excluding lands used for building or other non-agricultural purposes) in respect of which no person is deemed to be an occupant under the Act all mines whether being worked or not and minerals whether discovered or not and all quarries which are situate within the limits of any Devasthan land shall be the property of the State Government. Lands used for building or other non-agricultural purposes are specifically excepted from the provisions of sec. 8 by the parenthetical clause. Such lands would not therefore vest in the State but the inamdar who is lawfully holding such lands would be the occupant in respect of the same. If there are any lands in respect of which no person is deemed to be an occupant under sec. 6 such lands would vest in the State. They would include uncultivated lands in the possession of the inamdar for in respect of those lands no person would be deemed to be an occupant under any of the clauses of sec. 6. Uncultivated lands in possession of the inamdar other than lands used for building or other non-agricultural purposes would therefore vest in the State along with the trees standing on such lands. so also mines minerals and quarries situate within the limits of any Devasthan lands would vest in the State. The vesting of these properties would of course be subject to any rights which a person other than the inamdar may have in respect of the same. ( 18 ) THE provision for compensation for abolition of rights in Devasthan inam is to be found in sec. The vesting of these properties would of course be subject to any rights which a person other than the inamdar may have in respect of the same. ( 18 ) THE provision for compensation for abolition of rights in Devasthan inam is to be found in sec. 9 which says that there shall be paid to the inamdar as compensation for the abolition of all his rights in Devasthan inam in the form of an annuity in perpetuity a sum of money calculated on a particular footing if the Devasthan inam consisted of grant of soil with or without exemption from payment of land revenue and on another footing if the Devasthan inam consisted of land revenue or a share in such land revenue. This compensation is to be paid to the inamdar for the abolition of all his rights in Devasthan inam. Devasthan inam being a form of tenure this expression has reference only to the abolition of the rights of the inamdar under Devasthan inam tenure which rights are abolished by sec. 5. It has obviously no reference to the extinguishments of the rights of the inamdar in Devasthan land by virtue of the operation of sec. 8. The only effect of abolition of rights under the Devasthan inam tenure is that the inamdar who is lawfully in possession of Devasthan lands would become the occupant in respect of such lands subject to the provision of sec. 6. The inamdar would not lose the Devasthan lands by reason of the abolition of his rights in Devasthan inam. The Legislature has therefore justly provided that for the abolition of all his rights in Devasthan inam the inamdar should be paid average annual assessment in perpetuity by way of compensation and not the value of the Devasthan lands. The provision for compensation in sec. 9 is clearly limited to abolition of the rights of the inamdar in Devasthan inam tenure under sec. 5 and does not extend to extinguishments of the rights of the inamdar in the specific Devasthan lands falling within sec. 8. The extinguishments of the rights of the inamdar in the specific Devasthan lands covered by sec. 8 arises not by reason of the abolition of the rights of the inamdar in Devasthan inams but by reason of the operation of sec. 8. Compensation for such extinguishments is provided for in sec. 8. The extinguishments of the rights of the inamdar in the specific Devasthan lands covered by sec. 8 arises not by reason of the abolition of the rights of the inamdar in Devasthan inams but by reason of the operation of sec. 8. Compensation for such extinguishments is provided for in sec. 11 which is a residuary section for compensation. sub-sec. (1) of sec. 11 says that if any person is aggrieved by the provisions of the Act as abolishing extinguishing or modifying any of his rights to or interest in property and if compensation for such abolition extinguishments or modification has not been provided for the other provisions of the Act such person may apply to the Collector for compensation. It was argued before us on behalf of the State that sec. 11 sub-sec. (1) has application only where the person claiming compensation is some one other than the inamdar and in support of this argument strong reliance was placed on the marginal note which reads:- Method of awarding compensation for abolition etc. of rights of other person in property. But this argument is unsustainable. It suffers from several infirmities. In the first place it seeks to limit the width and amplitude of the words any person which would include an inamdar and to read them as if they said any person other than the inamdar. If we look at the Bombay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act 1953 which may be regarded as an allied piece of legislation we find that where the Legislature wanted to confine the right to compensation to a person other than the Jagirdar the Legislature said so in express terms by using the words any person other than a Jagirdar in sec. 14 of that Act. Legislature here could have also used a similar expression any person other than an inamdar but the Legislature deliberately and advisedly conferred the right of compensation on any person which would include an inamdar. The marginal note no doubt suggests that the section is intended to give compensation for abolition of rights of other persons in property. But it is now well-settled that a marginal note cannot be used as an aid in construction of a section. Vide Lord Reids speech in Chandler v. D. P. P. (1964) A. C. 763. The marginal note no doubt suggests that the section is intended to give compensation for abolition of rights of other persons in property. But it is now well-settled that a marginal note cannot be used as an aid in construction of a section. Vide Lord Reids speech in Chandler v. D. P. P. (1964) A. C. 763. Where the language of a section is plain and unambiguous it cannot be allowed to be controlled by the marginal note. Then again it may be noticed that there is a vital difference in the language of the two sections namely secs. 9 and 11. Whereas sec. 9 provides for compensation to the inamdar for the abolition of his rights in Devasthan inam sec. 11 gives compensation to any person who is aggrieved by the provisions of the Act as abolishing extinguishing or modifying any of his rights to or interest in property. If therefore an inamdar claims compensation not for the abolition of his rights under the Devasthan inam tenure which are abolished by sec. 5 but for the extinguishments of his rights in specific Devasthan lands by reason of the operation of sec. 8 his claim would fall within sec. 11 sub-sec. (1) and not within sec. 9. If sec. 11 sub-sec. (1) is construed as inapplicable to an inamdar the result would be that even for extinguishments of his rights in uncultivated lands in his possession including trees on such lands and mines minerals and quarries situate within the limits of Devasthan lands he would get no Compensation beyond that provided in sec. 9 for the abolition of the Devasthan inam tenure. It is difficult to imagine that the Legislature could have ever intended that uncultivated lands in possession of the inamdar which might be building sites having large market value or which might have the potential of building sites trees standing on waste and uncultivated lands in possession of the inamdar and mines minerals and quarries should be taken away from religious institutions without payment of proper compensation. As a matter of fact if we turn to the earlier tenure abolition Acts such as the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act 1952 and the Bombay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act 1953 we find that even in those Acts the Legislature gave full compensation for the trees be providing that the amount of compensation shall be the market value of the trees. Vide sec. 19 (1) (b) (iii) of the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act 1952 and sec. 11 (3) (iii) of the Bombay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act 1953 If the Legislature gave full compensation for the trees to the holders of personal inams as also to the jagirdars is it possible to believe that the Legislature intended to deprive religious institution of trees without payment of proper compensation ? The Legislature could not possibly have intended to be harsher to religious institutions than to individual holders of personal inams and jagirdars. The interpretation which we are placing on secs. 9 and 11 (1) makes a consistent and intelligible scheme of compensation which is not only just and rational but is also in line with the policy underlying the earlier tenure abolition Acts. It is no doubt true that on this interpretation the State would have to pay to the inamdar the market value as compensation for taking over uncultivated lands in his possession and that would be very much more than the compensation provided for taking over such lands under the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act 1952 and the Bombay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act 1953 but it is quite possible that having regard to the fact that Devasthan lands were given for the benefit of religious institutions and not for the purpose of benefiting private individuals the Legislature might have felt that so far as religious institutions are concerned they should not be deprived of other lands without payment of market value as compensation. ( 19 ) THE net effect of these provisions taken together is that by sec. 5 the tenure known as Devasthan inam tenure is abolished together with all rights under it and on the abolition of the Devasthan inam tenure the inamdar becomes the occupant in respect of lands used for building or other nonagricultural purposes. ( 19 ) THE net effect of these provisions taken together is that by sec. 5 the tenure known as Devasthan inam tenure is abolished together with all rights under it and on the abolition of the Devasthan inam tenure the inamdar becomes the occupant in respect of lands used for building or other nonagricultural purposes. so far as cultivated lands in possession of the inamdar are concerned the inamdar becomes the deemed occupant under clause (a) of sec. 6:-WHERE the lands are in possession of an authorised holder or an inferior holder such authority holder or inferior holder becomes deemed occupant under sec. 6 clause (b) and where lands are in possession of a person other than the inamdar authorised holder unauthorised holder or inferior holder the inamdar becomes deemed occupant under sec. 6 clause (c ). No one becomes an occupant in respect of lands in possession of an unauthorised holder. such lands would be resumed by the State. Uncultivated lands in possession of the inamdar with the trees standing thereon as also certain other specific kinds of property including mines minerals and quarries vest in the State under sec. 8. The inamdar is paid the annual average assessment in perpetuity as compensation for the abolition of his rights under Devasthan inam tenure under sec. 5. so far as the extinguishments of his rights in uncultivated lands in his possession and other specific kinds of property including trees mines minerals and quarries under sec. 8 is concerned the inamdar is entitled to compensation under sec. 11 ( 20 ) THIS is the scheme of the provisions of the Act and the question which arises for consideration is whether these provisions impair or affect the substance of the right of religious denomination to own and acquire property under Article 26 (c) or they can be justified as reasonable regulations on the exercise of such right. Let us first take land in respect of which the Inamdar becomes an occupant or deemed occupant. Whereas formerly the inamdar was the owner of the soil now he becomes an occupant but the substance of his right in respect of the land remains the same. Occupancy under the Code has all the material incidents of ownership:- in a raiyatwari system of land tenure it is virtually same as ownership. Whereas formerly the inamdar was the owner of the soil now he becomes an occupant but the substance of his right in respect of the land remains the same. Occupancy under the Code has all the material incidents of ownership:- in a raiyatwari system of land tenure it is virtually same as ownership. Of course formerly the inamdar was not liable to pay land revenue to the State while now he is made liable but for that annual average assessment is paid to him in perpetuity by way of compensation. The substance of the right of property of the inamdar therefore remains unchanged:- the sum total remains unaffected. so far as land in possession of an authorized holder or inferior holder becomes the deemed occupant and the inamdar loses his rights in the rights in the land:- he merely gets average annual assessment in perpetuity as compensation. But here also the substance of the right of property is not affected:- one form of property is substituted for another and what is substituted is reasonable. Where land is in possession of an authorised holder the inamdar obviously cannot expect any compensation from the State since the ownership of the land is vested permanently in the authorised holder. The inamdar merely continue theoretically to hold the inam and for the abolition of his rights under the inam he is paid average annual assessment in perpetuity which is more than reasonable. The compensation is also reasonable in the case of land in possession of an inferior holder for the inamdar was at the highest entitled to recover assessment from the inferior holder and for the loss of assessment resulting from occupancy rights being conferred on the inferior holder the inamdar is given average annual assessment in perpetuity. Then we may consider land in possession of an unauthorised holder. such land is resumed by the State and the only compensation paid to the inamdar is average annual assessment in perpetuity. The reason for this provision is obvious. unauthorised holder is an alienee of the land from the inamdar and though the alienation is found to be null and void it is reasonable to assume that the inamdar must have received consideration for the alienation. The inamdar then cannot expect any further compensation from the State. He cannot get the value of the land over again. unauthorised holder is an alienee of the land from the inamdar and though the alienation is found to be null and void it is reasonable to assume that the inamdar must have received consideration for the alienation. The inamdar then cannot expect any further compensation from the State. He cannot get the value of the land over again. But even so he is paid average annual assessment in perpetuity presumably to compensate for the possibility of his having to return the amount of consideration to the alienee on account of the alienation being null and void. In this case too it is not possible to say that the substance of the right of property is impaired. so far as other lands and properties are concerned the rights of the inamdar are extinguished and those lands and properties vest in the State. But for expropriation of the rights of the inamdar in these lands and properties compensation is paid on the basis of market value in the manner and according to the method provided for in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 23 and sec. 24 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 The property of the religious denomination merely changes its form:- equivalent cash is substituted for immovable property. There is no infringement of the substance of the right of property. It is therefore not possible to accept the argument of the petitioners that secs. 5 6 7 and 8 are violative of Article 26 (c ). . ( 21 ) IT was also contended by the petitioners that in any event secs. 5 6 7 and 8 are violative of Article 31 (2) inasmuch as they provide for compulsory acquisition of property without specifying any appropriate or relevant principle of compensation. This contention is unsustainable and there are at least two answers sufficient to repel it. Firstly so far as agricultural lands and waste or uncultivated lands situate in rural areas are concerned the Act is clearly a measure of agrarian reform and is protected by Article 31a from challenge under Article 31 (2 ). Vide Gnagadharrao v. State of Bombay A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 88 and Ranjit Singh v. of Punjab A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 632. Vide Gnagadharrao v. State of Bombay A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 88 and Ranjit Singh v. of Punjab A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 632. Secondly it is clear from what we have stated above in relation to the challenge under Article 26 (c) that compensation provided by the Act is reasonable and is based on a proper to principle so as to satisfy the constitutional guarantee under Article 31 (2 ). ( 22 ) THAT takes us to the question of validity of sec. 19. This section is clearly an ancillary provision. The affidavit of R. V. Vora Under Secretary to the Government of Gujarat Revenue Department shows that on 18th March 1968 the Honourable Minister for Revenue made an announcement on the floor of the Legislative Assembly that the Government had decided to abolish Devasthan inam tenure which was the only land tenure in regard to alienated land which remained to be abolished. In view of this announcement it appears many inamdars holding Devasthan inams gave notices terminating the tenancy of their tenants and requiring them to hand over possession of the lands in their respective occupation. so also diverse actions were taken and things done by the inamdars so as to affect the rights of the tenants in anticipation in order to defeat the object of the proposed enactment. The Legislature therefore with a view to effectuating the purpose of the Act which was to grant protection to the tenants and preventing it from being thwarted by anticipatory action taken or thing done by the inamdar inferior holder or authorised holder enacted sec. 19 setting at naught any action taken or thing done after 18th March 1968 in relation to Devasthan land so as to affect the rights of the tenant in respect of such land unless the inamdar the inferior holder or the authorised holder as the case may be established to the satisfaction of the Collector by making an application within the prescribed period that the action or thing was not taken or done in anticipation in order to defeat the object of this Act or the tenancy law. This was an ancillary provision necessary for the purpose of carrying out fully and effectively the purpose of the legislation and the date 18th March 1968 was selected because that was the date on which the announcement was made by the Honourable Minister for Revenue that the Government was bringing legislation for abolition of Devasthan inam tenure. The validity of sec. 19 cannot therefore be assailed on the ground that the date 18th March 1968 is an artificial date arbitrarily fixed by the Legislature and on that account the section imposes unreasonable restriction on the right of religious denominations to hold Devasthan lands. ( 23 ) LASTLY we must consider the validity of sec. 31 which introduces amendments in the Tenancy Act and the Ceiling Act. so far as the amendment in the Tenancy Act is concerned it removes the exemption from certain provisions of the Act in respect of lands which are the property of an institution for public religious worship with the result that secs. 32 to 32r become applicable to such lands and by introducing sec. 88e it provides in so many terms that when any land which is the property of an institution for public religious worship ceases to be so exempted then in the case of a tenancy subsisting immediately before the specified date the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the specified date and the provisions of secs. 32 to 32r shall so far as may be applicable apply. The result of this amendment in the Tenancy Act is that secs. 32 to 32r become applicable to land which is the property of an institution for public religious worship and the tenant of such land becomes the deemed purchaser on the specified date namely the date on which the Act came into force. The validity of this amendment might have been challenged under Article 19 (1) (f) but the amendment being clearly and indubitably a measure of agrarian reform like the parent Act it is immune from challenge under Article 19 (1) (f) by reason of Article 31a. Vide Sri Ram Narain v. State of Bombay A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 459. But the question still remains:- what is the impact of Article 26 (c) on the amendment:- does the amendment successfully meet the challenge of Article 2 (c)? Vide Sri Ram Narain v. State of Bombay A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 459. But the question still remains:- what is the impact of Article 26 (c) on the amendment:- does the amendment successfully meet the challenge of Article 2 (c)? The net effect of the amendment is that the tenant becomes deemed purchaser the land on the specified date and the inamdar is entitled to receive the purchase price computed in the manner laid down in sec. 3211 of the Tenancy Act. The purchase price undoubtedly s not based on the market value of the land and it is therefore quite possible that in many cases it may not represent the full value of the land. But that is no ground for saying that the amendment is an unreasonable regulation which unduly infringes the right of property We have already pointed out above that in determining the reasonableness of the regulation the socio-economic policy set out in the directive principles of State policy must play a vital part. The elimination of the intermediary and establishment of direct relationship between the tiller of the soil and the State is clearly comprised within the directive principles of State policy which aim at preventing exploitation by distribution of the ownership and control of the material resources of the community in a manner which would sub serve the common good and if for the purpose of carrying out this socio-economic objective which is enjoined by the directive principles the Legislature provides that not the full market value of the land but purchase price not exceeding a certain maximum which the Legislature regards as reasonable shall be received by the landlord from the tenant such purchase price must a fortiori be regarded as reasonable for the purpose of Article 26 (c ). The norm of reasonableness laid down by the Legislature for all landlords other than institutions for Public religious worship must be accepted by the Court for the purpose of adjudging reasonableness of the purchase price under Article 26 (c) when we are dealing with a legislation of agrarian reform intended to carry out the socio-economic objective set out in the directive principles. Moreover it may be noticed that sec. Moreover it may be noticed that sec. 8 of the Tenancy Act which admittedly applied to lands belonging to institutions for public religious worship even prior to the amendment prescribed that subject to the provisions of the Tenancy Act rent shall not exceed five times the assessment payable in respect of the land or rupees twenty per acre whichever is less. No rent exceeding five times the assessment could therefore be charged by institutions for public religious worship from their tenants and on that basis the purchase price to be determined under sec. 32h cannot be said to be unreasonable. It is therefore clear that by the amendment one form of property namely land is substituted by another form of property namely cash representing purchase price and having regard to the nature of the amendment it does not constitute unreasonable interference with the substance of the right of property and hence there is no violation of Article 26 (c); ( 24 ) THE amendment in the Ceiling Act made by sec. 31 stands on the same footing. It is a measure of agrarian reform and is therefore clearly saved from attack under Article 31 (2) by reason of Article 31a. so far as the challenge based on Article 26 (c) is concerned Article 31a undoubtedly does not protect the amendment from that challenge but the amendments like the parent Act being a measure of agrarian reform intended to carry out the socio-economic objective set out in the directive principles namely that the operation of the economic system should not resolution concentration of wealth and means of production the lands of few to the common detriment of many the reasonableness of the provision must be adjudged in the light of the socio-economic objective which it seeks to fulfill. The Devasthan lands held in excess of the ceiling would vest in the State and compensation would be paid for the same on the basis set out in sec. 23 of the Ceiling Act. This compensation having been regarded by the Legislature as reasonable in the case of all persons to whom the Ceiling Act applies must be accepted as reasonable in case of Devasthan lands particularly having regard to the nature of the legislation. 23 of the Ceiling Act. This compensation having been regarded by the Legislature as reasonable in the case of all persons to whom the Ceiling Act applies must be accepted as reasonable in case of Devasthan lands particularly having regard to the nature of the legislation. We may also take note of the fact as we did in the case of the amendment in the Tenancy Act that rent in respect of Devasthan lands could not exceed five times the assessment by reason of the Tenancy Act and in the light of this provision compensation provided under sec. 23 cannot be said to be unreasonable. The amendment in the Ceiling Act therefore does not involve any infringement of the fundamental guarantee under Article 26 (c ). ( 25 ) HAVING disposed of the main arguments we may now notice one or two subsidiary arguments advanced on behalf of some of the petitioners The petitioners contended that sec 88e introduced in the Tenancy Act by sec. 31 is violative of Article 14 on the following two grounds:- (A) When Bombay Act 13 of 1956 introduced secs. 32 to 32 secs. 31 to 31 were also simultaneously introduced giving an opportunity to the landlords to terminate the tenancy of tenants for personal cultivation and non-agricultural use before the tenants became deemed purchasers under sec. 32 but no such opportunity is given to institutions for public religious worship since the exemption from the provisions of secs. 31 to 31d which was given under sec. 88b still continues to subsist and those sections are accordingly not applicable to institutions for public religious worship; (B) sec. 43a and 43c exempt lands leased for certain specified purposes as also lands situate in certain specified areas from the applicability of sec. 32 to 32r hut when such lands belong to institutions for public religious worship the exemption given by sec. 43a and 43c does not apply for sec. 88e sub-sec. (2) provides in so many terms that in respect of all lands which are the property of an institution for public religious worship the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the specified date:- there is thus discrimination between institutions for republic religious worship and other landlords for which there is no rational justification. ( 26 ) RE:- GROUND (A) :-There is no merit in this ground. ( 26 ) RE:- GROUND (A) :-There is no merit in this ground. Article 14 strikes down discrimination between persons similarly circumstanced and it is not possible to say that institutions for public religious worship affected by sec. 88e stand on the same footing as landlords affected by the introduction of secs. 32 to 32r by Bombay Act. 13 of 1956. The passage of a long period of thirteen years separates the two categories of landlords and that makes a vital difference in the treatment to be meted out to them. Moreover sec. 88e being a measure of agrarian reform is protected by Article 51a and its validity cannot be assailed Oil ground of infraction of Article 14. ( 27 ) RE:- GROUND (B) :-This ground is also without force. secs. 43a and 43c were originally not applicable to lands belonging to institutions for public religious worship by reason of sec. 88b clause (b ). But this exemption from the provisions of secs. 43a and 43c given to lands belonging to institutions for public religious worship is withdrawn by sec. 31 of the present Act by amending sec. 88b and introducing sec. 88e subsec. (1 ). The con joint effect of sec. 88b sub-sec. (1) read with the amended sec. 88b is that now lands belonging to institutions for public religious worship are no longer exempted from secs. 43a and 43c. There two sections are therefore now applicable to lands belonging to institutions for public religious worship and consequently secs. 32 to 32r cannot apply if such lands are leased for the purposes specified in sec. 43a or are situate in the areas specified in sec. 43c. But sec. 88e sub-sec. (2) provides in general terms with regard to all lands belonging to institutions for public religious worship that the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the specified date and the provisions of sec. 32 to 32r shall so far as may be applicable apply. There is therefore an apparent conflict between sec. 88e sub-sec. (1) read with the amended sec. 88b on the one hand and sec. 88e sub-sec. (2 ). The question is how this apparent conflict is to be resolved. 32 to 32r shall so far as may be applicable apply. There is therefore an apparent conflict between sec. 88e sub-sec. (1) read with the amended sec. 88b on the one hand and sec. 88e sub-sec. (2 ). The question is how this apparent conflict is to be resolved. The rule of construction is well-settled that where there are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other they should be so interpreted that if possible effect could be given to both. This is what is known as the rule of harmonious construction. if we read sec. 88e sub-sec. (2) as comprising all lands belonging to institutions for public religious worship sec. 43a and 43c would be rendered nugatory in their application to such lands though by reason of the express enactment of sec. 88e sub-sec. (1) those sections are in so many terms made applicable to such lands. On the other hand if we read sec. 88e sub-sec. (2) as limited to lands not covered by sec. 43a and 43c then full effect can be given to sec. 88e sub-sec. (2) subject only to this that as regards lands falling within sec. 43a and 43c sec. 88e (2) will not apply but they will be governed by sec. 43a and 43c. We must therefore hold that sec. 88e sub-sec. (2) is subject to sec. 43a and 43c and if any land belonging to an institution for public religious worship falls within the terms of sec. 43a or sec. 43c sec. 32 to 32r would not apply and the tenant would not become the deemed purchaser of the land. This construction displaces the challenge under Article 14 and the argument of the petitioners based on infraction of that Article must be rejected. We may point out that even otherwise the challenge based on Article 14 fail since as already pointed out above sec. 88e is a measure of agrarian reform and sub-sec. (2) of that section cannot therefore be attacked as violative of Article 14 by reason of Article 31a. ( 28 ) THAT leaves one last contention urged on behalf of the petitioners in Special Civil Applications Nos. 497 and 750 of 1970. The contention was that sub-sec. (3) introduced in sec. 3 of the Ceiling Act by sec. (2) of that section cannot therefore be attacked as violative of Article 14 by reason of Article 31a. ( 28 ) THAT leaves one last contention urged on behalf of the petitioners in Special Civil Applications Nos. 497 and 750 of 1970. The contention was that sub-sec. (3) introduced in sec. 3 of the Ceiling Act by sec. 31 is violative of Article 14 since it makes the provisions of the ceiling Act applicable only Devasthan lands that lands held under Devasthan inams and not to other lands held by institutions for public religious worship and not to other lands held by institutions for public religious to Devasthan lands is confined only to the Bombay area of the State of Gujarat while similar other lands belonging to institutions for public religious worship in Saurashtra and Kutch areas continue to enjoy the exemption from the provisions of the Ceiling Act. Now there can be no doubt that the discrimination alleged by the petitioners does exist and there is no rational explanation for this discrimination. But this provision is immune from challenge under Article 14 by reason of Article 31a and the argument based on infraction of Article 14 howsoever valid it might otherwise be cannot prevail. ( 29 ) SOME attempt was also made on behalf of the petitioners to challenge the validity of sec. 22 sub-sec. (1) but we do not see how this challenge can be sustained. What sec 22 sub-sec (1) provides is that wherever an officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf so directs an inamdar shall deliver to him or such other officer as may be specified by him the records maintained by the inamdar relating to the Devasthan lands. This is an ancillary provision necessary for effectuating the purpose of the Act and its validity cannot be assailed. ( 30 ) ). These were the only contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners in support of the petitions and since there is no substance in them the petitions fail and the rule issued in each petition will stand discharged with costs. Messrs. I. M. Nanavati M. I. Patel B. R. Shelat A. N. Surti Mangaldas M. Shah M. D. Pandya for Mr. S. K. Zaveri Mr. J. C. Sheth Mr. M. M. Patel and Mr. Messrs. I. M. Nanavati M. I. Patel B. R. Shelat A. N. Surti Mangaldas M. Shah M. D. Pandya for Mr. S. K. Zaveri Mr. J. C. Sheth Mr. M. M. Patel and Mr. N. S. Parghi learned advocates appearing on behalf of the petitioners in all the petitions in which they appear and Mr. A. M. Joshi learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners in Special Civil Applications Nos. 985 and 991 of 1970 only and Mr. J. M. Patel learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner in Spl. C. A. No. 604/70 apply for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Articles 132 (1) and 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution. Leave as applied for is granted. We also issue an interim injunction restraining the respondents from enforcing or acting upon any provision of the Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act 1969 until the expiration of a period of fifteen days from the date when the certified copy of the judgment is ready for delivery to the petitioners in these petitions. .