Judgment :- 1. The appellant in this second appeal was the 1st defendant in O. S. No. 87 of 1948 on the file of the Tellicherry Sub Court. That suit was filed by respondents 1 and 2 as plaintiffs for recovery of certain immovable and movable properties alleged to have been gifted by the father of defendants 1 and 2. 2. In the trial court the suit was decreed but in appeal the High Court dismissed the suit with costs. The decree passed by the High Court is being executed and the question that arises for consideration is whether the decree for costs is against the estate of Sivagiri Madhom Society of Sree Narayana Dharma Sanghom, of which the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs (1st and 2nd respondents) were the President and Secretary respectively. In the decree of the High Court, respondents 1 and 2 are described as President of the Sivagiri Madhom Society of the Sree Narayana Dharma Samajam, Swami Sankaranandan and Secretary of the Society Swami Narayana Thirthan. The decree runs as follows: "That respondents 1 and 2 [plaintiffs] do pay to the appellant [1st defendant] the sum of Rs. 114512 9 as and for his costs of the appeal in this court and the sum of Rs. 417 6 0 as and for his costs of the suit in the lower court." The executing court interpreted the decree as one against plaintiffs 1 and 2 personally and did not agree with the contention of the appellant that the decree was against the estate of the Sivagiri Madhom Society. The appellate court confirmed the decision of the executing court so far as this point was concerned, although on certain other points the decision of the executing court was modified by the lower appellate court. 3. It was argued on behalf of the appellant by his learned counsel that respondents 1 and 2 had filed the suit in their capacity as President and Secretary of Sivagiri Madhom Society, that the suit was on behalf of the society and that the costs should be recovered from the society as the respondents had no personal interest in the suit filed. In support of this contention he relied on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Shyan Sunderm Shanti Devi AIR. 1961 Allahabad 563. 4. In support of this contention he relied on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Shyan Sunderm Shanti Devi AIR. 1961 Allahabad 563. 4. On behalf of the respondents the contention is that under S.35 of the Code of Civil Procedure if the costs has to be recovered from a trust, the estate has to be made liable specifically and in the absence of any such direction the decree can be executed only against defendants 1 and 2 personally. The respondents' learned counsel sought support for this contention from the decisions in Panchakshari v. Venkataratnam AIR. 1934 Madras 430, Munuswami Mudaliar v. Kandaswami Pillai AIR. 1935 Madras 5 and Har Kishan v. Coshain Parshotamnand AIR. 1934 Allahabad 793. In the first of these cases, the decree directed the defendants to pay costs and the contention raised was that since the defendants were Dharmakartas of a temple, the costs could be recovered from the property belonging to the temple. This contention was rejected, the court holding that since the decree did not specifically provide that the costs should come out of the temple funds, the defendants were liable for the costs only personally The Madras High Court placed reliance on an English decision reported in Ex Parte Russel in re Butterworth (1882) 19 Chancery Division 588. That was a case where the trustees who had failed in the County Court succeeded in appeal before the Court of Chief Judge, but again failed when an appeal was carried to the Court of Appeal. There was a direction that the trustees should pay the costs incurred in the two higher courts. It was held that the trustees were personally liable and not the estate which they represented. In Westminster Corporation v. St. George Hanover Square (1909) Chancery 592, the same point was considered. Cozens Hardy, M. R., observed as follows: "If a trustee appeals to the Court of appeal against a decision in the Court below and the appeal is unsuccessful, I feel no doubt that under ordinary circumstances the trustee as appellant is in no better position than another appellant and under ordinary circumstances if the appeal fails, it fails with what we so frequently describe as the usual consequences." In Munuswami Mudaliar v. Kandaswami Pillai AIR. 1935 Madras 5, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that where a plaintiff who sues as a trustee incurs a liability to costs, the rule undoubtedly is that it is in the first Instance a personal liability, unless he obtains an order from the court that the costs should come out of the estate. Again in Har Kishun Coshain v. Parshotamnand AIR. 1934 Allahabad 793 it has been held that in a suit between a trustee and a stranger where a decree was passed granting costs against the trustee, he was on no better footing than an ordinary plaintiff or defendant and he was personally liable and the trust property could not be proceeded against. All the arguments addressed before me in this case have been considered in this decision and the court has clearly come to the conclusion that the trustee is personally liable to pay the costs, which he has incurred, although the suit was brought by him in his capacity as the trustee. It is therefore clear that the trend of authority is in favour of the view that the trust property can be made liable only if there is a specific direction to that effect in the decree itself. Where there is no such specific direction, the decree can be executed only against the persons against whom the decree is passed. 5. It was argued by the appellant's learned counsel that a court should be presumed to have passed a decree only according to jaw, that the decree against respondents 1 and 2 should be construed as one passed against the estate of the trust as respondents 1 and 2 had initiated action only in their capacity as representatives of the trust. In my opinion, this contention has no substance. It is an elementary principle that a court executing a decree cannot go behind the terms of the decree. What are the reasons which actuated the court in denying a decree against the estate are not known and it is not permissible to the executing court to go behind the decree. When the words are clear enough and in this case that cannot be denied an executing court cannot attribute some other meaning to what has been expressly stated in the decree. The decree clearly says that the costs have been decreed against respondents 1 and 2. When the words are clear enough and in this case that cannot be denied an executing court cannot attribute some other meaning to what has been expressly stated in the decree. The decree clearly says that the costs have been decreed against respondents 1 and 2. The fact that they have been described as the President and Secretary respectively of the Trust does not mean that the decree permits recovery of costs from the estate of the Trust. The decision relied on by the appellant in Shyam Sunder v. Shanti Devi AIR. 1961 Allahabad 563 is clearly distinguishable. That was a case where a manager filed the suit on behalf of another person and the question that arose for consideration was whether the manager was personally liable. That decision did not consider the position of a trustee with reference to the trust property, and therefore, in my view the ratio of that decision cannot be applied to the face of this case. It follows that the decision of the lower courts is correct. The second appeal fails and is dismissed with the costs of the contesting respondents.