JUDGMENT KOTVAL C. J.-A reference in both these special civil applications has been made because there was difference of opinion on an important and recurring question of law between Mr. Justice Tarkunde and Mr. Justice Bal. The question they have referred for our decision is as follows: “Whether a retrenched employee is an employee within section 3 (13) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 and can apply for reinstatement to a Labour Court under sections 78 and 79 of the said Act?" 2. In both these special civil applications the petitioners were employees who had been retrenched by their employers. They applied first to the Labour Court and then to the Industrial Tribunal at Bombay for reinstatement. The Industrial Tribunal had upon this question already taken a final decision in Appeal (IC) No. 34 of 1964 before them, in Soma Ramjee Varghode v. Shri Madhusudan Mills Ltd., Bombay1. In that decision the Tribunal had taken the view that a person who had been employed and subsequently retrenched after being given notice would not be deemed to be "an employee" under section 3 (13) of the Act. Therefore, when these two matters came before the Industrial Tribunal they merely relied upon their previous decision and dismissed the employees applications. Against these orders of the Industrial Tribunal the employees moved the two special civil applications and on the very question on which they were dismissed before the Industrial Tribunal there was a difference of opinion between the two learned Judges. 3. How this difference of opinion arises may be briefly stated. Against these orders of the Industrial Tribunal the employees moved the two special civil applications and on the very question on which they were dismissed before the Industrial Tribunal there was a difference of opinion between the two learned Judges. 3. How this difference of opinion arises may be briefly stated. The Bombay Industrial Relations Act by which these matters are governed at the material time defined the word "employee" as follows: "3 (13) employee means any person employed to do any skilled or unskilled work for hire or reward in any industry, and includes- (a) a person employed by a contractor to do any work for him in the execution of a contract with an employer -within the meaning of sub-clause (e) of clause (14) ; (b) a person who has been dismissed or discharged from employment on account of any dispute relating to change in respect of which a notice is given or an application made under section 42 whether before or after his dismissal or discharge ;" Subsequent to the arising of the present dispute between the employer and the employee this section has been materially amended so far as sub-clause (b) is concerned and instead of the words "dismissed or discharged" the following words have now been substituted: "dismissed, discharged or retrenched or whose services have been terminated" and at the end, instead of the words "after his dismissal or discharge" the following words have been instituted namely "dismissal, discharge, retrenchment or, as the case may be, termination from employment". These changes were incorporated into the Act by the Maharashtra Act 22 of 1965. In both these cases the retrenchment took place in the year 1963 so that the amendments will rot be attracted. 4. We may here also dispose of a point which was made in the course of the arguments based upon the amendment. It was urged that the fact that section 3 (13) was required to be amended by expressly adding the word "retrenched" shows that previously "retrenchment" was not included in section 3 (13). This may be so, but, on the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the employees that these amendments were incorporated only by way of abundant caution and that even previously an employee retrenched was included in the definition of "employee". This may be so, but, on the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the employees that these amendments were incorporated only by way of abundant caution and that even previously an employee retrenched was included in the definition of "employee". Nothing therefore turns upon this submission based upon the amendments and we will have to examine the definition as it stood prior to the amendments independently of the amendments but in the context of the other provisions of the Act. 5. Long prior to these special civil applications, a Division Bench of this Court at Nagpur in Laxman v. The State Industrial Court at Nagpur2 had clearly taken the view that the definition of the word "employee" did not cover the case of an employee who had been retrenched, because he bad ceased to be an employee and the definition did not include an ex-employee like him. 6. Mr. Justice Bal was a party to that decision and when these two matters came before the Division Bench Bal J. took the same view under the present Act. He felt that there was no reason why that decision should not govern the decision of this case even though it arises under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, because the definition in the two Acts were in pari materia. 7. We have already reproduced the definition of the word "employee" in section 3 (13) and it will be noticed that it consists of two parts, the first part giving the meaning of the word and the second part including certain categories in the definition which has been referred to in some of the j1,ldgments as the second part or the inclusive part The same is the case with the definition under the C P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act and in coming to their decision in Laxmans case the Division Bench considered only the second or the inclusive part and came to the conclusion that a retrenched employee would not far within the definition of the word "employee" contained in the inclusive part. In that case there was no argument advanced before that Division Bench that a retrenched employee would be covered by the first or the main part of the definition. 8. When the matter came before the Division Bench in the present case Mr. In that case there was no argument advanced before that Division Bench that a retrenched employee would be covered by the first or the main part of the definition. 8. When the matter came before the Division Bench in the present case Mr. Justice Tarkunde took the view that really it is the main part which defines the word "employee" and considering the provisions of that definition in the context of the remaining provisions of the Act, it was clear that although the definition speak of any person employed to do any walk, is necessarily included within it a retrenched employee or an ex-employee as he has been called. Mr. Justice Tarkunde also referred to several other decisions, two of the Supreme Court and one of this Court under other Acts particularly the Central Industrial Disputes Act and the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act. He felt therefore that it was quite unnecessary to consider whether the term "retrenched employee" came within the inclusive part of the definition. It would thus appear that the two learned Judges different because each invoked a different portion of the definition. 9. If a retrenched employee can fall within the first of the two parts of the definition. it would be unnecessary to consider whether he falls or does not fall within the second part of the definition and So we proceed to consider whether in the first place a retrenched employee could be said to fall under the main or the first part of the definition which subject to other requirements merely says that "employee" means "any person employed to do any ... work .... in any industry." (We have omitted the portions which are not relevant). Since we are concerned with the construction of a definition, it is obvious that we cannot c0mider the definition in isolation but must consider it in the context of other definitions and the various provisions of the Act in which the expression defined is to be found in order to gather its true meaning. Section 3 itself begins with the words "In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context .... ". Section 3 itself begins with the words "In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context .... ". Therefore the wording of the definition undoubtedly would be plenary but considered in the light of a particular provision of the law or in the context of a particular section, it may carry a meaning larger or smaller than the bare definition. Secondly, no interpretation of the definition would be proper which would militate against the very purpose and object of the law and in this case the purpose and object of the law has been already stated in its preamble and it is (1) to provide for the regulation of the relations of employers and employees and (2) to consolidate and amend the law relating to the settlement of industrial disputes. Therefore the Act provides a complete Code for the regulation of the relations of employers and employees. 10. The definition of an "employee" refers to any person employed in any industry and "industry" is defined in section 3 (19). The definition is extremely wide and includes any kind of business including agriculture and agricultural operations, Then we must also have regard to the important definitions of "industrial matter" and industrial dispute" contained in sections 3 (18) and 3 (17) of the Act. An "industrial dispute" is defined as meaning any dispute or difference between an employer and employee or between employers and employees or between employees and employees and which is connected with any industrial matter. "Industrial matter" has been defined as follows (we will quote only such portions as are necessary for our purpose) : " industrial matter means any matter relating to employment, work, wages, hours of work, privileges, rights or duties of employers or employees, or the mode, terms and conditions of employment, and includes- (a) all matters pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees, or to the dismissal or non-employment of any person;. .. .. (d) alt questions of", hat is fair and right in relation to any industrial matter having regard to the interest of the person immediately concerned and of the community as a whole ;" A mere consideration of these definitions gives rise to certain important points which are noteworthy, The first is that in the definition of an "employee" though its main part speaks of any person employed in any industry, the second part containing the inclusive definition, particularly clause (b), refers to a person who has been dismissed or discharged from employment. In other words, the person dismissed or discharged would be an employee but curiously enough a retrenched employee does not find place in the definition of "employee". A dismissed or discharged employee also has his employment terminated just like a retrenched employee and yet the former is entitled to all the benefits of the Act but not a retrenched employee because it is said he is nowhere mentioned. Could it have been the intention in this Act to exclude a retrenched employee when a dismissed or a discharged employee is considered an "employee"? Secondly, a consideration of the definition "industrial matter" shows (from the main part of the definition) that an industrial matter is any matter relating to employment and we can see absolutely no reason why the person who is retrenched and asks to be reinstated does not raise a question "relating to employment". It also speaks of rights or duties of employers or employees or the mode, terms and conditions of employment. Now retrenchment is a matter of codified law in Chapter VA of the Central Industrial Disputes Act and employers have a duty to observe the provisions and the employees have a right to be reinstated and therefore the question of retrenchment and reinstatement would clearly fall within the definition of "industrial matter", What is more, the definition includes all matters pertaining to "the dismissal or non-employment of any person". The expression "non-employment of any person" is somewhat curious. In the definition of "employee" the words used are "dismissed or discharged" whereas in the definition of "industrial matter" in section 3 (18) (a) the words used are "the dismissal or non-employment of any person"- Undoubtedly the expression "non-employment" is much wider than the word "discharged". "Discharged" is only one form of Don-employment and under "non-employment" come termination of employment, dismissal, discharge and retrenchment. "Discharged" is only one form of Don-employment and under "non-employment" come termination of employment, dismissal, discharge and retrenchment. The definitions themselves therefore indicate beyond any shadow of doubt that where retrenchment takes place and the employee applies to be reinstated it would be an "industrial matter". The question is whether in spite of this definition of "industrial matter" it was intenced to exclude an employee who has been retrenched from the definition of "employee". 11. In order to resolve this question-and for the time being we are merely considering the provisions of the Act by itself we must look to several other provisions of the Act. Section 35 deals with the settlement of Standing Orders and it prescribes that the Standing Orders may be made with regard to any of the industrial matters mentioned in Schedule I of the Act. Item No. 10 of Schedule I mentions as one of the subjects "termination of employment including notice to be given by the employer and the employee". Under Section 42 provision is made for changes in respect of industrial matters. Under sub-section (2) of section 42 an employee desiring a change in respect of an industrial matter not specified in Schedule I or III has to give notice and then proceed by a certain procedure. By sub-section (4) any employee desiring a change in respect of an industrial matter specified in Schedule III has to make an application to the Labour Court. Now, turning to Schedule III entry (6) thereof reads as under: "(6) Employment including- (i) reinstatement and recruitment ; (ii) unemployment of persons previously employed in the industry concerned". Therefore, with regard to these provisions of section 42 read with entry (6) in the third Schedule it is clear that the right has been given to the employee to ask for reinstatement and also to ask for relief in case he is unemployed. In the context in which the word "unemployment" is used in entry (6) of Schedule III it is remarkable that in section 3 (18) (a) the word used is "non-employment". We do not suppose, however, that any particular point arises upon this difference in the terminology because in entry (6) of Schedule III the word "unemployment" is followed by the words "of persons previously employed" which would include "non-employment" also. We do not suppose, however, that any particular point arises upon this difference in the terminology because in entry (6) of Schedule III the word "unemployment" is followed by the words "of persons previously employed" which would include "non-employment" also. Thus the employee is given the right by virtue of section 42 read with entry (6) of Schedule III not only to seek a remedy for his unemployment but also to apply for reinstatement. When the entry speaks of "unemployment of persons previously employed" we can see no reason whatsoever for holding that retrenchment would not be included in this category. A person who is retrenched by his employer would equally well be a person who is unemployed but previously employed and who would also be entitled to reinstatement as indeed the workers have claimed in both these petitions. 12. Next we turn to the provisions of section 78. Under section 78(1)A (a) (i) a Labour Court is given the power to decide disputes regarding the propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer acting or purporting to act under the Standing Orders and we have already shown that termination of employment is one of the subjects, vide item No. 10 mentioned in Schedule I. Therefore the1e again the remedy given to the employee is to question the legality or propriety of an order passed by his employer acting or purporting to act under the Standing Orders which includes termination of his employment and dismissal (vide item No. 11). It could surely not be said that when these rights are given to the Court to adjudicate upon these questions and to the employee to seek relief against dismissal or termination of employment, the right cannot be available because in the definition the word used is "employee" and it does not expressly include a retrenched employee. 13. More important are the provisions of section 78 (1) A (a) (iii) which says that the Labour Court shall have power to decide disputes regarding any change made by an employer or desired by employee in respect of an industrial matter specified in Schedule III (except. Item 5 thereof) and matters arising out of such change We have already shown that Schedule III, entry (6) relates to unemployment of persons previously employed in the industry concerned and to reinstatement. Item 5 thereof) and matters arising out of such change We have already shown that Schedule III, entry (6) relates to unemployment of persons previously employed in the industry concerned and to reinstatement. Therefore clearly a retrenched employee is given the right to approach a Labour Court and it will be anomalous if although these rights are given to an employee who is retrenched, by the several provisions of the Act which we have referred, nonetheless because a retrenched employee is not mentioned in terms in the definition of an "employee" he will be disentitled to such relief 14. We do not think that such a conclusion is necessarily forced upon us. On the other hand, it seems to us that the definition of "employee" in section 3 (13) is wide enough to cover a retrenched employee. All that it says is that "employee" means any person employed to do any skilled or unskilled work for hire or reward in any industry. The essential thing to find is therefore whether a person is employed for work in any industry and receives remuneration therefur. It is not necessary to limit the meaning of the ward "any person employed" to "any person employed at the time that the dispute arose", and therefore we can safely hold having regard to the clear indications given by the other provisions of the Act that it means any person employed to do work at any time and that the definition has no reference to the point of time at which the person whose case is under consideration was doing this work. It is also clear from what we have said above that in the context of the other provisions of the Act to which we have referred above, it is necessary that we should hold that an employee means any person employed at any time to do any skilled or unskilled work for hire or reward in any industry. If this construction of the definition is not to be given it is clear that we would be rendering nugatory large parts of the Act particularly the provisions which we have mentioned above. If this construction of the definition is not to be given it is clear that we would be rendering nugatory large parts of the Act particularly the provisions which we have mentioned above. What is still worst, we would be rendering nugatory the provisions of Chapter V A of the Central Industrial Disputes Act (India Act XIV of 1947) which deal with the right of the worker not to be retrenched without the conditions precedent under section 25F, the procedure for retrenchment under section 25G and the re-employment of retrenched workmen under section 25H. If no remedy would be available to such persons who are retrenched it would be idle to make these provisions in the Industrial Disputes Act. Moreover, before we come to any such conclusion viz. that the retrenched worker has no remedy, we must be compelled of the absolute necessity to do so which having regard to the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act we have shown is not necessary. 15. We may also say that any other connotation than the one which we have placed upon this definition would strongly militate against the very purpose and object of this enactment and of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in which Chapter VA was incorporated by express amendment. The whole purpose of Chapter VA was to control the right of the employer to retrench by laying down the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman and prescribing the procedure for retrenchment which the employer is bound to follow. What is more, that Chapter says that the worker if retrenched under the conditions mentioned would have a preferential right of employment under section 25H upon certain conditions. All these salutary provisions made in the interest of fair and just relations between employers and employees would be rendered nugatory if the employee were deprived of the right given to him to approach the Court under section 78 because the definition of the word "employee" does not specifically contain the word "retrenchment" or "retrenched employee". In our opinion a retrenched employee is also "a person employed in any industry" within the meaning of the main definition of "employee" in section 3 (13). 16. In our opinion a retrenched employee is also "a person employed in any industry" within the meaning of the main definition of "employee" in section 3 (13). 16. We have so far considered the position as it emerges upon the provisions of the Act we are called upon to construe, but on behalf of the parties several decisions were relied upon which throw a flood of light upon these provisions. No doubt it must be conceded that of the decisions that have been cited none arose specifically under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, but as we shall show the definitions of the words "employee", "industrial dispute" and "industrial matter" in several of these statutes are in pari materia with the corresponding definitions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. The first of these cases is the decision of the Supreme Court in O. P. T. Service v. Raghunath3. In that case the Supreme Court wall called upon to construe the definition of "employee" in the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act (23 of 1947). The definition as it then stood in that Act in section 2 (10) was as follows: " employee means any person employed by an employer to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for contract or hire or reward in any industry and includes " We are not concerned here with the inclusive part of that definition for the purpose of the point we are dealing with. The first difference between this definition and our own is that there are the additional words "by an employer". In our Act those words are not to be found. If anything, the omission of the word from the Bombay Industrial Relations Act would enlarge the scope of the definition, because the word "employer" is also defined both in the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act and in the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, and limits the meaning of that word, but the essential part of the definition is identical with the definition under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act as meaning "any person employed to do any skilled or unskilled work for hire or reward in any industry .. " Secondly, in the definition under the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act the words "for contract" are also to be found but it hardly makes any difference in that Act also the expression "industrial matter" was substantially the same as in our Act particularly the inclusive definition "and includes questions pertaining to (a) the relationship between employer and employee, or to the dismissal or non-employment of any person " It will be noticed that this definition is in almost similar terms as clause (a) of section 3 (18) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. Dealing with these provisions the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether a dismissed worker is a "worker". The contention On behalf of the employer in that case is set forth at page 106 in para. 4 as follows: ., .. It was argued by Mr. Umrigar that when the respondent was dismissed on 28-6.1950, his employment came to an end, and that he could not therefore be termed an employee, as that word is ordinarily understood, that it could not have been the intention of the legislature to include in the definition of an employee even those who had ceased to be in service, as otherwise there was no need for the further provision in section 2 (10) that discharged employees would in certain cases be employees; and that, in any event, the inclusive portion of the definition would, on the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, operate to exclude all ex-employees, other than those mentioned therein", The argument was in somewhat wider terms than it is necessary to consider in the present case but it would a fortiori apply in the present case where the ques1ion is whether a retrenched employee is an employee. Mr. Justice Venkatarama Ayyar referred to the decision of the Federal Court in Western India Automobile Assoc. Mr. Justice Venkatarama Ayyar referred to the decision of the Federal Court in Western India Automobile Assoc. v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay4, and pointed out that in that case the Federal Court had held having regard to the provisions of section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act No. 14 of 1947 that definition "including as it did, all disputes or differences in connection with employment or non-employment of a person was sufficiently wide to include a claim for reinstatement by a dismissed workman" The learned Judge repelled the contention of counsel that the provisions of that Act were different from those of the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act and went on to say that section 2 (12) and section 2 (13) of the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act are substantially in pari materia with section 2 (k) of Act No. 14 of 1947 and that the decision of the Federal Court would apply in the case of the C. p, and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act. Then it was contended before the Supreme Court That the inclusive clause gave an indication that the Legislature did not intend to include within that definition those who had ceased to be in service because it made express provisions for some categories of such persons. This contention was repelled (vide para. 6) (p. 107) : "We are also unable to accede to the contention of the appellant that the inclusive clause in section 2 (10) of the Act is an indication that the legislature did not intend to include within that definition those who had ceased to be in service. In our opinion, that clause was inserted ex abundanti cautela to repel a possible contention that employees discharged under sections 31 and 32 of the Act would not fall within section 2 (10), and cannot be read as importing an intention generally to exclude dismissed employees from that definition" , We have already said that in our opinion the substantial definition of "employee" in the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act is in pari materia with the definition in the first or the main clause of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and in our opinion, therefore, the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court would apply in the present case. The decision also gives a clue to the proper construction of the definition. 17. The decision also gives a clue to the proper construction of the definition. 17. In a recent decision (B. Colem In & Co v. P. P. Das Gupta5), under the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act (1955) the Supreme Court has made important observations as to the object of industrial legislation and the manner in which it ought to be construed upon questions such as these and we think that any doubt that may be left in ones mind is completely dispelled by those observations. In this case a working journalist bad claimed gratuity and compensation for the leave due to him on termination of his services. One of the contentions raised on behalf of Bennet Coleman and Co. Ltd. in which he was employed was that the working journalist not being in the companys employment at the time he filed his claim in the Labour Court, be was not a working journalist and, therefore, was not entitled to avail himself of the provisions of the Act. The definition of "working journalist" ill that Act is of some importance. Clause (f) of section 2 of the Act defines a "working journalist" to mean a person whose principal avocation is that of a journalist and "who is employed as such in, or in relation to, any newspaper establishment". It may be noted that in that Act the present tease was used whereas under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act "employee" means any person employed. The latter definition is without reference to any tense, past, present or future and yet the Supreme Court held upon the contention advanced that the benefit of sections 5 and 17 of that Act would be available to an ex-employee though he had ceased to be in the employment of that particular newspaper establishment at the time that be made his application for gratuity. The Supreme Court also pointed out in coming to this conclusion that the definition was prefaced by the clause "In this Act unless the context otherwise requires" as in the present Act also and then went on to say what should be the proper mode of construction (p. 432) : " .. The definition in section 2 of the present Act commences with the words In this Act unless the context otherwise requires and provides that the definitions of the various expressions will be those that are given there. The definition in section 2 of the present Act commences with the words In this Act unless the context otherwise requires and provides that the definitions of the various expressions will be those that are given there. Similar qualifying expressions are also to be found in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 and certain other statutes dealing with industrial questions. It is, therefore, clear that the definitions of a newspaper employee and a working journalist have to be construed in the light of and subject to the context requiring otherwise". I t was urged before their Lordships that the provisions of the Act should be examined to see if they are in pari materia, but their Lordships repelled the contention by holding (p. 432) : " .. The scheme of all these Acts dealing with industrial questions is to permit an ex-employee to avail of the benefits of their provisions the only requirement being that the claim in dispute must be me which his arisen or accrued whilst the climant "as in the employment of the person against whom it is made. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the definitions of a newspaper employee and working journalist being subject to a context to the contrary, the benefit of sections 5 and 17 is available to an ex-employee though he has ceased to be in the employment of that particular newspaper establishment at the time of his application for gratuity. The contention that the respondent was not entitled to maintain his application as he was not in the service of the appellant company on the date of his claim before the Labour Court cannot be sustained". (Italics are ours). It is also of some interest to note that even in this case their Lordships reiterated the principle originally laid down in the Western India Automobile Associations case by the Federal Court and applied it equally to a case under the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act and observed that the same would be the position in regard to "all similar Acts dealing with industrial relations". In our opinion, upon these pronouncements of the Supreme Court there can be no doubt left that the construction that we have placed upon similar words in the Bombay Industrial Relations Act is the correct construction. 18. In our opinion, upon these pronouncements of the Supreme Court there can be no doubt left that the construction that we have placed upon similar words in the Bombay Industrial Relations Act is the correct construction. 18. So far as this Court is concerned, dealing with the corresponding definition of a "workman" in the Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947, Chief Justice Chagla came to a similar conclusion and held that a person who is dismissed from his employment prior to the date when the dispute relating to his dismissal is referred by Government under section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947, is a workman within the meaning of section 2 (8) of the Act. (See P.L. Mayekar v. Amichand6). Of course under that Act the procedure for the settlement of such a dispute is that prescribed by section 10 (1) (c) namely to refer the dispute to Government for making a reference. When a similar contention was raised namely that a workman dismissed prior to the reference made by Government would not fall within the definition of "workman" and no industrial dispute could be raised with regard to him, Chief Justice Chagla remarked (p. 1003) : " .. We will presently examine this contention, but it seems to us rather a startling sub. mission to make that under the Industrial Disputes Act a workman who has been wrongly dismissed cannot raise an industrial dispute with regard to his wrongful dismissal. We should have thought that the very purpose of labour legislation was to prevent employers wrongfully dismissing their employees. and if they did so to confer jurisdiction upon Labour Court to adjudicate upon the question as to whether the employee was wrongfully dismissed or not and also to confer jurisdiction upon Labour Courts in the case of a wrongful dismissal to compel the employer either to reinstate the employee or to pay compensation". Dealing with the particular definition in that Act he observed (p. 1004) : " .. Now, the definition of workman does not indicate that the workman must be employed at a particular moment of time. What is emphasised is that he must be employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward; in other words. Now, the definition of workman does not indicate that the workman must be employed at a particular moment of time. What is emphasised is that he must be employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward; in other words. the definition is intended to point out what the nature and characteristic of a person is who can be deemed to be a workman within the meaning of the Act. In our opinion, a workman as defined in this sub-section means any person who is employed at any time in an industry". These remarks will apply equally to the present case. 19 In view of what we have said above, we must hold that we are in agreement with the view taken by Mr. Justice Tarkunde and not with the view expressed by Mr. Justice Ral. In that view also we do not think that we are called upon to say much regarding the decision in Laxman v. The State Industrial Court at Nagpur, for a mere perusal of that judgment shows that the learned Judges attention was only invited to the second or the inclusive clause in the definition in the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act and the contention which has been put forward in the present case based upon the main definition in the first clause was not advanced. It is that contention which is the principal contention raised before us and which commended itself to Mr. Justice Tarkunde. It is unnecessary for us therefore to examine the Division Bench judgment at Nagpur became it was concerned with the subsequent portion of the definition whereas, in our opinion, a retrenched employee would clearly fall within the main definition contained in the first clause. We must, however, say that we must not be understood to be in agreement with the conclusion reached in that decision. 20. On behalf of the employers an ancillary contention was sought to be raised before us that in this case an employee qua employee has no right to go to the Labour Court at all but that if he has any right at all it can be agitated only through a representative of the employees namely the labour union. Counsel sought to raise this point saying that it was an ancillary point arising upon a reconsideration of the definition of an employee. Counsel sought to raise this point saying that it was an ancillary point arising upon a reconsideration of the definition of an employee. In the first place we do not think that we are called upon to consider this point in the present reference. As we have shown the reference has framed only one question and our duty is to answer that question and to say nothing more. We only advert to this point here to make it clear that whatever we may have decided in this reference is only with reference to the question referred to us and that does not shut out the employers as also the employees from raising any other point when the matter goes back to the Division Bench for a final decision of the Special Civil Application. 21. In the result, we answer the question as follows : A "retrenched employee" is an employee within section 3 (3) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 and can apply for reinstatement to a Labour Court under sections 78 and 79 of the said Act. The costs shall be costs in the Special Civil Applications. The papers will now be returned early for decision of the Special Civil Applications to a Division Bench doing Constitutional work since both the learned Judges who took part in this reference are no longer members of this Court. Mody J.-I fully agree, with respect, with the final conclusion reached by the learned Chief Justice in his judgment, As regards the reasoning on which the conclusions are reached, I speaking for myself, would rest content only on the ground that the judgment of the Supreme Court in B. Coleman & Co. v. P.P. Das Gupta, as regards the construction of the word "employee" in clause (13) of section 3 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act is binding upon this Court without this Court examining the different provisions of that Act and the scheme of the Act and the effect of other decided cases. Answer accordingly.