JUDGMENT Khanhaiyaji, J. The second appeal and the civil revision application both arise out of the same order of the learned District Judge, Monghyr, passed in Title Appeal No. 74 of 1966, reversing- a decision of the Munsif, Second Court, Monghyr, and remanding the suit with a direction to give notice to both the parties and then to give them the requisite time for filing objections and thereafter decide the case in accordance with law. The civil revision application hat been filed only by way of precautions, and, therefore, both of them will be decided by this judgment. 2. The plaintiff, who is the appellant-petitioner in this Court, filed Title Suit No. 140 of 1963 of the Munsif, Second Court, Monghyr, for declaration of Title and recovery of possession over the suit land as described in the schedule attached to the plaint along with the tree standing thereon. The plaintiff also prayed for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the suit land. The suit land is one katha out of fourteen kathas of plot no. 19096 in Mahalla Sherpur Kemkha in the town of Monghyr along with a Neem tree. On service of summons, the defendants appeared in the suit and filed two sets of written statement. On the 3rd September, 1965, both the parties filed a joint petition before the court for referring their entire dispute which was the subject-matter of the aforesaid suit to the arbitration of the punches jointly chosen by them, and the learned Munsif was pleased to refer the case to the arbitration of the said punches as mentioned in the joint petition of the parties. The punches, accordingly after deliberations, gave the award on the 30th June, 1966, and the said award was filed in the court by the arbitrators on the 4th July, 1966. On the 6th of July, 1966, the date fixed in the suit, both the parties filed their hazries. The learned Munsif directed them to file objection, if any, against the award on or before the 18th July, 1966. On that date, both the parties filed their hazries, but neither party filed any objection to the said award. The learned Munsif accepted the award and decreed the suit in terms of the said award. The decree was prepared on the 28th July, 1966. 3. On that date, both the parties filed their hazries, but neither party filed any objection to the said award. The learned Munsif accepted the award and decreed the suit in terms of the said award. The decree was prepared on the 28th July, 1966. 3. The defendants, who are the respondents-opposite party in this Court, filed an appeal against the said decree before the District Judge off Monghyr on the 30th August, 1966. The appeal was preferred mainly on the ground that the award was not according to the terms of the agreement incorporated in the joint petition of the parties. The appeal was called out for hearing on the 16th September, 1967, and it was heard in full, and 18th of September, 1967 was fixed for judgment. The learned District Judge, while going through the records of the case, found that the learned Munsif had not granted the requisite time for filling objection to the award after it was filled before him. This fact was brought to the notice of the lawyers off the parties, and they prayed for time to argue on this point. The appeal was again heard on the 21st September, 1967, and judgment was delivered on the 26th September, 1967. The learned District Judge held that the learned Munsif waited only for fourteen days and not for full period of thirty days as required by law and, as such the decree was without jurisdiction. The learned District Judge further held that the appeal against the decree was maintainable, and, he could interfere with the decree passed by the learned Mansif. 4. On behalf of the appellant, who is the plaintiff, the only contention is that no appeal lay to the District Judge. On behalf of the respondents, it is contended that the appeal before the District Judge was competent, and, even if no appeal lay to the District Judge, he had passed a proper order, such as the court would have passed and, therefore, this Court should not interfere. The main question for consideration is whether an appeal lies under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940), hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’, from the decree of the learned Munsif when it is not in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with, the award. The main question for consideration is whether an appeal lies under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940), hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’, from the decree of the learned Munsif when it is not in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with, the award. Section 17 of the Act runs as follows : “Where the court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration or to set aside the award, the court shall, after the time for making an a application to set aside the award has expired, or such application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow, and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of, or Rot otherwise in accordance with, the award.” The Section is based on Paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure since repeated by Arbitration Act, 1940 which corresponds to Section 522 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882. A proceeding is to be initiated by filling an award under Section 14 of the Act. If the court sees no cause to remit or set aside the award, it has to pass a judgment and decree on the award. It is true that under Section 17 of the Act, the court has to wait at least for a period of thirty days from the date of the service of notice of filing of the award before pronouncing judgment on the same. The application disputing the award has got to be filed formerly within ten days as prescribed by Article 158 (old) and now thirty days by Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act. So, the court must wait for thirty days after the service of notice of filing the award before pronouncing judgment according to the award. But, in this case the learned Munsif accepted the award filed by the arbitrators without giving the parties full time to file objections to the award. The principle of Section 17 of the Act seems to be that finality must follow the award. But, in this case the learned Munsif accepted the award filed by the arbitrators without giving the parties full time to file objections to the award. The principle of Section 17 of the Act seems to be that finality must follow the award. So, according to this Section where a decree is in accordance with the award, no appeal shall lie from such a decree except in so far as the decree may be in excess of or not in accordance with the award. It is immaterial whether the validity of the award is challenged on the ground of the illegality of the procedure adopted by the arbitrator or on account of the invalidity of the reference which constitutes the foundation of the authority. It was urged on behalf of the respondents that the bar of appeal provided in Section 17 of the Act was that the right of appeal was only taken away in case where there had been a decree pronounced on a valid and legal award and that if the award was void and illegal, then, in fact there was no award and there was nothing upon which the provisions of this section could legally operate. In 1901, their Lordships of the Privy Council had to consider the terms and provisions of the old Section 522 of the then Code of Civil Procedure. In the case of (1) Ghulam Jilani V. Muhammad Hassan (29 Indian Appeals 51), their Lordships of the Privy Council laid down in distinct and definite terms what they believed to be the true interpretation to be pot upon the arbitration (Sic) section set out in Schedule 2 of the Code, and more specially with regard to the interpretation they put upon Section 522. It was further laid down clearly and distinctly that to hold that an appeal lay from a decree pronounced on foot of an award in an arbitration matter from the court having session of the arbitration proceedings, would be doing violence to the plain language and obvious intention of the code, except in so far as the decree might be in excess of or not in accordance with the provisions of the award. The principle of this case was followed by this Court in (2) Khudiram Mahto V. Chandi Charan Mahton and others (1 P.L.J. 306-A.I.R. 1916 Patna 190). The principle of this case was followed by this Court in (2) Khudiram Mahto V. Chandi Charan Mahton and others (1 P.L.J. 306-A.I.R. 1916 Patna 190). Jwala Prasad, J. observed that though the facts of the Privy Council case were different, still in view of the general proposition laid down by the Privy Council and its uniform observance, his Lordship held that the appeal was incompetent. In (3) Sagar Mull V. Hira Maharaj and others (A.I.R. 1926 Pate3 164), the learned District Judge had held that the reference to arbitration was illegal as no permission was granted to the minor plaintiff to enter into the agreement by which the case was submitted to the arbitrators. This Court on appeal held that no appeal lay as the award was not invalid. This case also laid down that when the District Judge entertained and decided the appeal, there could be a second appeal to this Court. 5. Mr. Verma relied on a decision in (4) Najm-Ud-Din Ahmad V. Albert Puech (I.L.R. 29 Allahabad 584). also referred to b, the learned District Judge in his judgment. This is the solitary case in which it has been held that an appeal will lie from a decree passed in accordance with an award if such decree has been passed without allowing to the parties the time prescribed by law for filing objections to the award. This case has not considered the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Ghulam Jilani’s case. Even the Allahabad High Court has not approved this view in later cases. In a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in (5) Lutawan and others V. Lachya and others (I.L.R. 36 Allahabad 69), the view expressed by the Privy Council in Ghulam Jilani's case was followed. 6. The case of (6) Lachman Das and other V. Brijpal and another (I.L.R. 6 Allahabad 174)-a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court, holding that an appeal lies from a decree passed in accordance with an award when such decree is impugned on the ground that there is no award in law or in fact, is a decision of the year 1884, prior to the time when the Privy Council decided the Ghulam Jilani’s case. In Ramesh Chandra Dhar V. Karunamoyi Dutt (I.L.R. 33 Calcutta 498), their Lordships dismissed the appeal as they thought that there were no just reason to interfere with the judgment of the lower appellate court. The other cases cited by Mr. Verma are of no help to him, because in those cases the appeal was held maintainable because the award itself was bad. The act itself provides appeals from certain orders enumerated in Section 39 of the Act. 7. As to contention of the respondents that this Court should not interfere when a proper order has been made, in my opinion this argument can be raised only in answer to an application for the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of the court. This is not the case here. In an appeal, the matter has to decided and the judgment of the court below if found to be without jurisdiction, has to be set aside. Mr. Verma also has not brought to our notice any special circumstances under which one may be persuaded to exercise suo motu power of revisional jurisdiction. The judgment of the learned District Judge also does not show any defect in the preparation of the award except that he set aside the decree on a technical ground that the learned Munsif had not waited for thirty days. 8. On merits, it is clear that the appellants is entitled to succeed. The civil revision application has not been pressed. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge are set aside and those of the learned Munsif are restored. The application in revision is dismissed. There will be no order for cost. K.B.N. SINGH, J. I agree.