ORDER Tare, J. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by the Petitioner-Mills challenging the impugned order (Petitioner's Annexure C-1) calling upon the Petitioner to deposit the employees provident fund as required by the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, and refusing to exempt the Petitioner-Mills from deposit of the said fund as per Section 16(1) of the said Act. The Petitioner also seeks a writ of mandamus requiring the Provident Funds Commissioner to give the Petitioner a hearing before passing an order of the kind. According to the Petitioner, the new establishment known as 'Bimal Mills' was established on 1-5-1964. Undoubtedly it is one of the Units set up by the Petitioner-Mills along with other nine establishments mentioned in the Petitioner's Annexure B, at various points of time right from the year 1935 onwards. The Petitioner was constituted as a Company sometime in the year 1915. The Respondent, as is clear from the correspondence, was mainly influenced by the fact that there is a common Board of Directors of the Petitioner-Mills and the Bimal Mills. As such, there is common management and they are said to be located in one premises. The correspondence further shows that the Respondent was also influenced by certain representations made by the trade Unions or by the employees. Those representations have been filed. Thus, it is clear that the Respondent was mainly influenced by these two factors as also by the representations from the employees and the trade Unions. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that although he made a demand for being heard, the Respondent thought that as the work was purely of an administrative nature, it was not necessary to give a hearing. A specific contention in that behalf has been advanced by the Respondent in the return filed in this Court. Therefore, the question arises whether the Respondent was bound to give the Petitioner a hearing before deciding whether the Petitioner-Mills was liable to deposit the employees' provident fund with effect from the date of establishment or whether it would be exempt from such deposit for a period of 3 years, as per Section 16(1) of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952. It was pointed out by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the process of arriving at a conclusion whether Section 16(1) of the Act applies or not would not be purely an administrative function, but would also involve a quasi-judicial process of applying the mind to various questions, such as to when the Unit was set up and whether the Unit can be said to be extension of the Petitioner-Mill's work. Of course, the learned Counsel conceded that the factors mentioned by the Respondent in the various communications, such as the management being common or the offices being located in the same premises, might be relevant factors to be considered. But they by themselves would not be decisive which could lead to the conclusion one way or the other. Moreover, the learned Counsel pointed out that the correctness of these factors has been challenged in the affidavit filed along with the present writ petition. Therefore, it is contended that the order of the Respondent calling upon the Petitioner to deposit the employees' provident fund with effect from 1-5-1964 is not legal as it is in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is not necessary for us to elaborate the principles of natural justice, which may vary according to exigencies of a particular case or according to the facts and circumstances of each case. But so far as the present case is concerned, we may observe that the function of the Respondent to decide whether Section 16(1) of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, applies or not cannot be said to be purely of an administrative nature. It will certainly involves some sort of quasi-judicial process and the Respondent may be required to consider the various factors which may be pointed out by either of the parties. There can be no doubt that where quasi-judicial functions are required to be performed, the principles of natural justice have always to be followed. Even in respect of certain administrative matters the principles of natural justice may have to be followed, though it may not be necessary in many other types of administrative functions. However, the present one is not a matter pertaining to administrative function purely, but it involves a process of quasi-judicial nature as well. Even in respect of certain administrative matters the principles of natural justice may have to be followed, though it may not be necessary in many other types of administrative functions. However, the present one is not a matter pertaining to administrative function purely, but it involves a process of quasi-judicial nature as well. We feel that the refusal of the Respondent to give the Petitioner a hearing was unjustified, especially when he took into consideration the various representations said to have been made by the different trade Unions or the employees and the Petitioner never got an opportunity to explain the facts alleged in those representations. Moreover, the Petitioner also would have certain facts of its own to point out to the Respondent, which might help him to make up his mind whether Section 16(1) of the Act is attracted or otherwise. In this view of the matter we are convinced that the refusal of the Respondent to give the Petitioner a hearing was in clear violation of the principles of natural justice and as such, his ultimate conclusion cannot be supported in law. As a result, we quash the order passed by the Respondent and by a writ of mandamus we require him to decide the matter afresh after giving the Petitioner proper hearing. Consequently, the petition is allowed. But in view of the circumstances, we direct that there shall be no order as to costs. The security amount deposited by the Petitioner be refunded to it.