JUDGMENT A. B. N. Sinha, J. – All these three applications in revision are directed against final orders, passed under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; Criminal Revisions 486 and 487 of 1968 arise out of the same order, the former having been filed by the fourth party in the proceeding and the latter by the members of the third party. Criminal Revision No. 957 of 1968 arises out of a different final order and has been filed by members of the first patty. 2. The main ground urged on behalf of the petitioners in all these cases in support of the rule is that the Magistrate who initiated the proceedings having omitted to state in the initial order that there was an apprehension of a breach of the peace and also the grounds upon which be was satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed, the whole of the subsequent proceedings were null and void, and the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to make the final order under revision. It is for the determination of this question that these three cases have been referred to a Division Bench. Hence, these cases before us. 3. In Criminal Revision No. 957 of 1968, the Magistrate passed the following order on the 16th December, 1968:- "Perused the police report dated 16.11.64 received from Barbigha P. S. through the D. I. Lakhisarai for action under Section 144 Cr. P. C. against both the parties. From the report I am satisfied that there is apprehension of a breach of the peace between the parties. Draw op proceeding under Section 144 Cr. P. C. against members of both the parties, viz. Ragho Mahto and six others of the 1st party and Jhari Mahton and nine others of the 2nd party restraining them from going over the disputed land for a period of sixty days and to show cause as to why the order be not made absolute against them and put op on 10.1.65." The 10th January being Sunday, the record of the case was put up on the following day. The first party was absent, but haziri was filed on behalf of some members of the second party and a petition was filed on behalf of Jhari Mahton, a member of the second party for getting the standing paddy crop harvested. The first party was absent, but haziri was filed on behalf of some members of the second party and a petition was filed on behalf of Jhari Mahton, a member of the second party for getting the standing paddy crop harvested. The learned Magistrate directed the local police to get the standing crop harvested and stored with a third party agreeable to both the parties and further directed the case to be put on the 2nd February, 1965. On the 2nd February, 1965, while the first party filed petition fur time, the second party filed its show cause and the case was adjourned to the 10th February, 1965 for hearing. On the 10th February, 1965, the first party as well as three sets of the second party filed their respective haziris and show cause. The case was adjourned to the 12th February for hearing. On the 12th February, 1965, the learned Magistrate passed the following order in presence of the parties:- "Heard. The dispute appears to be chronic and both the parties are armed with documents and counter documents. So in order to decide the fact of possession once for all, let this proceeding be converted into a proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P. C. The disputed lands are attached under Section 145 (4) Cr. P. C. Let both the parties file written statements and affidavits, if any, latest by 11.3.65." The initial notices issued in pursuance of the order dated the 12th February, 1965 was drawn up in the following terms: "WHEREAS I am satisfied from the report of the police. Barbigba P. S. dated 16.11.64, and also on hearing the lawyers of the parties and going through their show cause and documents that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists between the parties named above in respect of land in village Belao Tala Chhabila Thika P. S. Barbigha as per details given below situated within the local limits of my jurisdictions. I, therefore, under Section 145 Cr. P. C. do hereby order the aforesaid parties to appear before me in person or through their lawyers on 12.8.65, at 10.30 A.M. and to put in written statement, affidavits and documentary evidence etc. in respect of their facts of their actual possession over the subject matter of the suit. I, therefore, under Section 145 Cr. P. C. do hereby order the aforesaid parties to appear before me in person or through their lawyers on 12.8.65, at 10.30 A.M. and to put in written statement, affidavits and documentary evidence etc. in respect of their facts of their actual possession over the subject matter of the suit. AND WHEREAS it is a case of emergency, I hereby order the attachment of the subject matter of the dispute under Clause 4 of Section 145 Cr. P. C. proceeding till disposal of this proceeding. The parties are restrained to go upon the disputed land till further order of this court." This notice was dated the 21st July 1965 and to it the details of the disputed lands were appended. On the terms of the order passed on the 12th February 1965, converting the proceedings under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure into a proceeding under Section 145, it has been urged before us that the said order did not in any sense comply with the requirements of Section 145 (1) of the Code, and as such the subsequent proceedings were entirely null and void. 4. In Criminal Revision Nos. 486 and 487 of 1968 which, as mentioned earlier arise out of the same proceeding under Section 145 of the Code and are directed against the same final order, a proceeding under Section 144 of the Code wail initiated on the 19th September 1960, against both the parties. The order initiating the proceeding under Section 144 of the Code wall passed on a police report which, as mentioned in the order, had set out an apprehension of a breach of the peace regarding dispute as to lands between the parties. After the parties had filed their respective show cause petition, the learned Magistrate passes the following order on the 14th November 1960:- "Perused the record. In this proceeding over 40 bighas of land is involved in dispute. The parties are mostly co-sharers or their descendants. A large number of documents have been filed. It would be worthwhile to have additional evidence in shape of affidavits on point of possession before any decision could be given. This proceeding is, therefore, converted into one under Section 145 Cr. P. C. Draw up proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P. C. asking parties to file written statement, if any, by 8.12.60. It would be worthwhile to have additional evidence in shape of affidavits on point of possession before any decision could be given. This proceeding is, therefore, converted into one under Section 145 Cr. P. C. Draw up proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P. C. asking parties to file written statement, if any, by 8.12.60. Lands in dispute ale attached under Section 145(4) Cr. P. C." Learned counsel for the petitioners in both these cases has referred to the aforesaid order dated the 14th November, 1960, converting the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code from one under Section 144 of the Code and has urged that the said order was not at all in accordance with the requirement of Section 145 (1) of the Code and as such the subsequent proceeding or the final order pasted therein were wholly null and void and without jurisdiction. 5. Clause (1) of Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as under :- "145 (1) Whenever a District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the First Class is satisfied from a police report or other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within the local limits of his jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his court in person or by pleader within a time to be fixed by such Magistrate, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respect the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute." It is clear, that in order to give jurisdiction to a Magistrate to initiate proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, existence of two elements is essential, first that the Magistrate should be satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists, and second that such dispute refers to land or water or the boundaries thereof lying within his local jurisdiction. When these two elements co-exist, the Magistrate is obviously entitled to exercise his jurisdiction. Clause (1) of Section 125 Cr. P. C., however, lays down a particular form for the recording of the final (Sic) order. In deed the contents of the final (Sic) order are specified in that Clause. When these two elements co-exist, the Magistrate is obviously entitled to exercise his jurisdiction. Clause (1) of Section 125 Cr. P. C., however, lays down a particular form for the recording of the final (Sic) order. In deed the contents of the final (Sic) order are specified in that Clause. If a particular initial order does not strictly comply with the requirements of Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. because, it does not state the grounds upon which the Magistrate is satisfied, the order so made is apparently defective, bat that by itself cannot imply that the order is without jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Magistrate is founded on the factual existence of the two elements referred to above, and it cannot be said that the said jurisdiction is ousted merely because there was an error in the manner in which the jurisdiction had been exercised. It is true that none of the initial orders whether in Criminal Revision No. 957 of 1968 or Criminal Revision No. 486 and 487 of 1968 the content is such as is required under Clause (1) of Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but, in my opinion, the initial orders in these cases, with a view to grasp its substance must be read along with the order initiating the proceedings under Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code and the police report on which it was founded and when they are read in that manner, it is evident, in fact there was an apprehension of a breach of the peace between the parties concerning dispute as to land, and the Magistrate was satisfied as to its existence. Thus both the elements which constitute foundation for the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to initiate the proceeding under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code existed, and, accordingly, the initial order though defective in form was not one without jurisdiction. In Criminal Revision No. 957 of 1968, the order of the 16th December 1968 which has been set out in Paragraph 3 above, in terms refers to the police report dated the 16th November, 1964 received through the D. I. of Lakhisarai; the incorporating the said police report as part of the order initiating the proceedings under Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code by reference. It is apparent from the said order that the Magistrate on a perusal of the said police report was satisfied that there was an apprehension of a breach of the peace between the parties concerning land. That such a dispute existed was confirmed by the show cause petitions filed by the parties in the proceedings under Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code. In those circumstances the order dated the 12th February, 1965, was passed converting the proceedings from one under Section 144 Criminal Procedure Code, to one under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. It has been laid down repeatedly that the appropriate proceeding which the Magistrate should initiate in such cases is one under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, so that the question of possession be settled once for all, as far as the criminal courts are concerned. In my opinion, it was not necessary for the Magistrate to repeat his satisfaction of the existence of the apprehension of a breach of the peace in the order convening the proceeding from one under Section 144 Cr. P. C. to one under Section 145 Cr. P. C. as the latter order was in substance a mere substitution of Section 144 Cr. P. C. by Section 145 Cr. P. C. The essential conditions conferring jurisdiction on the Magistrate for initiating the proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P. C. were obviously in existence on the date the proceeding under Section 144 Cr. P. C. was converted into one under Section 145 Cr. P. C. This is apparent from the notice issued to the parties in pursuance of the order dated the 12th February, 1965. In the said notice the Magistrate speaks about his satisfaction of there being existence of dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace between the parties in respect of lands specified therein born the police report dated the 16th November, 1964, as also from the oral submissions made by the lawyers of the parties before him and their show cause and documents filed on their behalf. The position in Criminal Revision Nos. 486 and 487 of 1968 is not different. There again the order dated the 14th November, 1960, converting the proceeding under Section 144 Cr. P. C. to one under Section 145 Cr. The position in Criminal Revision Nos. 486 and 487 of 1968 is not different. There again the order dated the 14th November, 1960, converting the proceeding under Section 144 Cr. P. C. to one under Section 145 Cr. P. C. has to be read in its proper context, namely along with the initiatory order dated the 19th September, 1960, commencing the proceeding under Section 144 Cr. P. C. The initial order dated the 12th February, 1965 in Criminal Revision No. 957 of 1968 and 14th November, 1960 in Criminal Revision Nos. 486 and 487 of 1968, may not be self-contained orders and may be defective in that sense, but when read along with other relevant materials including the respective police reports on which they were founded, it is apparent that there was no lack of jurisdiction in the Magistrate concerned to initiate the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. 6. The view expressed above finds support from the various cases to which our attention was drawn on behalf of the opposite party in all these cases. The first case to which reference was made is the decision in (I) Khosh Mohamed Sirkar V. Nazir Mahomed (I.L.R. 33 Calcutta 352 F.B.). In that case the initiatory order had not stated as required by Section 145 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the grounds on which the Magistrate was satisfied about the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, but the police report on which the initiatory order was founded had given grounds for the apprehension of the likelihood of a breach of the peace. On those facts it was held that the initiatory order could not be said to be defective because it was not self-contained in so far as it did not state the grounds upon which the Magistrate was satisfied that the dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed because those grounds appeared in the police report on which the order was founded and to which it made reference in express terms. In the order of reference to the Full Bench, it was pointed out that if the initiatory order "does not strictly comply with the requirements of the Section, because it does not contain a statement of the grounds upon which the Magistrate is satisfied, it is no doubt defective, but we are unable to appreciate the grounds upon which it is contended that such defective order is one made without jurisdiction. This argument appears to us to be based upon the fallacy that a court has jurisdiction only to make a correct order, and when it happens to make an order which is incorrect all defective, it acts without jurisdictions; such a view can hardly be maintained after the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Malkerun V. Narhari (I.L.R. 25 Bombay 337)". Dealing with the argument that the omission to state the grounds in the initial order amounts to an illegality sufficient to render null and void the subsequent proceedings and with the decision of the Judicial Committee in Subrahmania Ayyar V. King Emperor (I.L.R. 25 Mad 61) which was cited in support of that argument, it was pointed out by the learned Judges in their order of reference to the Full Bench that "the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly recognises that such non-compliance may, in some instances come within the description of error, omission or irregularity. The question, therefore, must necessarily arise, when the jurisdiction of a court is exercised, not strictly in accordance with the mode prescribed by the Statute, whether the defect amounts to an irregularity or illegality; and the answer to the question in any particular case depends upon the object and character of the rule which has been contravened. Now the object of requiring a statement of the grounds in the initial order is obviously to inform the parties, against whom proceedings are initiated, of the reasons which have induced the Magistrate to take action, and thus to enable them to make their defence properly. When, therefore, an initial order has been recorded without a statement of the reasons and has been duly served upon the parties, if they find any difficulty in preparing their defence by reason of this vagueness in the order, it is open to them to apply to the Magistrate for a statement of the grounds or to ask him to amend the order. If, however, the parties do not feel any difficulty owing to the omission of the grounds in the initial order, and adduce evidence in support of their respective cases, it is difficult to see upon that principle. It can be asserted that the defect in the order is an illegality, which vitiates the whole of the proceedings". The conclusion to which their Lordships reached in that case was expressed as under:- "On the whole, therefore, we are inclined to take the view that the omission to state the grounds in the initial order does not make the order one without jurisdiction, nor does it amount to an illegality which vitiates the whole proceedings, but such omission is an irregularity for which this Court may be rightly invited to set aside the proceeding, if it is shown that it has operated to the prejudice of any of the parties." The Full Bench concerned with the above conclusion and held, as pointed out above, that indeed there has been a substantial compliance with sub-section (1) of Section 145, and the initial order even though it did not state the grounds of the Magistrate. Is satisfaction as to the existence of apprehension of a breach of the peace was not a defective order? 7. The second case to which reference was made is (2) Kapoor Chand and another V. Suraj Prasad (A.I.R. 1933 Allahabad 264). In this case one Sarju Prasad as the servant of one Chunni Lal Gorg filed a petition on the 21st July, 1930 before the City Magistrate of Cawnpore praying for initiating the proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P. C. on the ground that his master Chunni Lal while in peaceful possession of a house in the city was being interfered with in possession of the said house by the opposite party and thus there was likelihood of a breach of the peace. The Magistrate took down the statement of Sarja Prasad on oath and directed a police inquiry into the matter and on receipt of the police report, he passed the following order:- "There appeals to be some basis for this complaint to judge from the police report. The Magistrate took down the statement of Sarja Prasad on oath and directed a police inquiry into the matter and on receipt of the police report, he passed the following order:- "There appeals to be some basis for this complaint to judge from the police report. As I am unable, owing to pressure of work, to dispose of it myself I transfer it for such action as may be thought fit, along with a connected application to the court of Babu Anand Sarup Sahib for disposal." The transferee court on receipt of the records passed the order on the 7th August, 1939 to the following effect:- "The record of the case has been received. It was put up before the Mukhtar of the complainant. The complainant is not present in person; on inspection of the record it is ordered that notice be issued, in accordance with law, to the opposite parties on condition of the complainant depositing the process fee. The complainant and his Mukhtar may also be informed. The Mukhtar is present and he is informed." On the above order a notice was issued which purported to be one under Section 145 Cr. P. C. That notice reads as follows:- "Since I have been informed that with respect to house No. 35/183 situated in Bengali Mohalla in the city of Cawnpore there is a serious dispute between the parties, you are hereby informed that on 19th August, 1930, you should appear in my court and file your reply. Till then you should not in any way interfere with the property aforesaid." On those facts it was held by the Full Bench that 'the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to take action under Section 145 arises from the fact that he has received certain information and that he is satisfied as to the truth of that information. The jurisdiction of the Magistrate does not depend on how he proceeds. If be has jurisdiction, be is not deprived of jurisdiction merely because his procedure is wrong or defective. Hence, the omission on the part of the Magistrate to follow certain directions contained in the Code, although some of these directions may be more important than others cannot be said to deprive him of jurisdiction. Their Lordships also dealt with the scope of Section 357 Cr. Hence, the omission on the part of the Magistrate to follow certain directions contained in the Code, although some of these directions may be more important than others cannot be said to deprive him of jurisdiction. Their Lordships also dealt with the scope of Section 357 Cr. P. C. and held that the sole criterion given by Section 357 is whether the accused person has been prejudiced or not. The subject of procedure is to enable the court to do justice, but if in spite of even a total disregard to the rules of procedure, justice has been done, there would exist no necessity for setting aside the final order which is just and correct simply because the procedure adopted was wrong'. 8. The third case to which reference was made is (3) Khudi Ram Mandal V. Jitendra Nath and another (A.I.R. 1952 Calcutta 713). This case made reference to the two cases mentioned above, and besides holding that where a preliminary order under Section 145 (1) did not state the grounds of satisfaction as to the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, the order may be said to be a defective order and if challenged in proper time, i.e. about the time when the written statements were filed or evidence was led, it will be corrected or set aside but such omission was only an irregularity in the proceedings and did not affect the Magistrate's jurisdiction, and, accordingly, when it is complained of at the end of the proceedings, the validity of the final order must be judged by the test of prejudice, and therefore, in a case where in spite of the omission to state the grounds in the preliminary order or to make a reference to the police report which contained the grounds the parties did not complain of it and led evidence on all question relevant to Section 145 Cr. P. C. and the point was raised only for the first time at the stage of revision before the High Court, it must be taken that the applicant was not prejudiced by the defective order as he was clearly aware of the grounds and had put up a defence against them; the learned Judges pointed out that on a close examination of the object and structure of Section 145 Cr. P. C. it appeared at once that the form in which the final order was drawn up cannot be the basis of the Magistrate's jurisdiction to act under the Section, rather jurisdiction to take action under that Section arises as soon as the Magistrate was satisfied that a likelihood of a breach of the peace existed concerning dispute as to land. They further pointed out that it must necessarily be such a satisfaction alone which causes the jurisdiction to accrue. This decision dealing with Sub-section (1) of Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code points out that that Sub-section not only laid down the basis of jurisdiction, but also prescribed the manner in which the first step was to be taken, bat taking a step, even if the first step, in exercise of a certain jurisdiction, must necessarily be subsequent to the accrual of the jurisdiction and obviously, the very jurisdiction to take action cannot arise out of or depend upon the manner in which the first step was to be taken. 9. The fourth case referred on behalf of the opposite parties was the case of (4) Durjan Singh V. The State and others (A.I.R. 1964 Rajasthan 217). It was held in this case that a Magistrate's jurisdiction or lack of it under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code arises not from the presence or absence of a formal order under Section 145 (1), or again from a statement of his grounds as to his satisfaction of a likelihood of a breach of the peace, or his failure to record such grounds, but the Magistrate really acquired jurisdiction from certain basic conditions, namely, (1) that there existed a dispute concerning any land or water or boundaries thereof within the local limits of his jurisdiction and (2) that he was satisfied from some information whether it be a police report on any other information that such dispute is likely to cause a breach of the peace. It further held that as soon as these conditions are fulfilled, the Magistrate is at once seized of the dispute and acquires jurisdiction to act under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code. It further held that as soon as these conditions are fulfilled, the Magistrate is at once seized of the dispute and acquires jurisdiction to act under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code. What he does thereafter, however, is all a matter of procedure and if a Magistrate commits any error with respect to any of the matters last mentioned, i.e., with respect to any matter of procedure, his errors are merely procedural, and cannot be considered to have the effect of depriving him of jurisdiction, which he undoubtedly possessed at the commencement of the proceedings. Their Lordships pointed out that errors of procedure as such were of varying degrees and they may sometimes have the effect of vitiating conclusions of law or fact, for instance, where the failure to draw up a preliminary order under Sub-section (1) in a proceeding under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code results in prejudice to one or both the party, the failure may have the effect of vitiating the proceeding, but where the party fully know their respective cases and have fought the dispute out without raising any objection at the appropriate opportunity and then seek to avoid the adverse final result on account of mere procedural irregularities then such a proceeding will not for such reason be invalidated. 10. A reference was also made to two cases of this Court; one (5) Shih Narain Das and others V. Satyadeo Prasad and another (A.I.R. 1943 Patna 44) and the other (6) Wazir Mohton and others V. Badri Mohton and another (A.I.R. 1950 Patna 372). In the first case which is a Bench decision it was held that where a party allowed the order initiating the proceeding under Section 145 to go unchallenged by not coming up on revision against it and chooses to wait and take the chance of judgment in his favour, he cannot in revision against the final order be heard to complain of excess of jurisdiction in the initiation of proceeding by the Magistrate under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code when the final order has gone against him. Their Lordships further held that while it was true that a Magistrate hall no jurisdiction to institute a proceeding under Section 145 if there was no material at all on the record showing that there was an apprehension of a breach of the peace between the parties on account of dispute relating to land, in cases where there was some material, sufficiently or otherwise of the said material for initiating a proceeding under Section 145 was entirely for the Magistrate to decide and not for the High Court in revision to go into. It is significant to note that in that case the Deputy Magistrate who had recommended proceeding under Section 145 had reported that at present there was absolutely no apprehension of a breach of the peace as the only crop on the disputed land was Rahar which will be fit for cutting after a few months, yet the Sub-divisional Magistrate had instituted a proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P. C. Adverting to those facts their Lordships held that although the crop was not fit for cutting at the time, both the parties were claiming the right to cut it and a clash was likely to take place between them at the time of cutting or even before, if any party wanted to cut it before it was completely ripe, and, therefore, a dispute undoubtedly existed at the time and it was of such a character which was likely to cause a breach of the peace. The second decision of this Court referred to above is of a learned single Judge, but the view which commended itself to him is quite clearly in accord with the view taken in the cases discussed above. It was pointed out by him that the mere failure to state the reasons why the Magistrate was satisfied that there was apprehension of a breach of the peace was nothing more than an irregularity insufficient to render subsequent proceedings void. In other words, failure to draw up a formal preliminary order in accordance with the provisions of Section 145 (1), was nothing more than a mere irregularity and could not vitiate the subsequent proceedings in cases where no prejudice had been caused. 11. From the above cases, the (allowing conclusions emerge:- (i) The jurisdiction of the Magistrate to initiate proceedings under Section 145 Cr. 11. From the above cases, the (allowing conclusions emerge:- (i) The jurisdiction of the Magistrate to initiate proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. did not depend on the manner in which he drew up the initial order, it rather depended on the existence of a dispute concerning any land or water or boundaries thereof within the local limits of his jurisdiction and on his satisfaction from some information whether by a police report of any other information that such dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace) (ii) failure to draw up a formal preliminary order in accordance with Sub-section (1) of Section 145 Cr, P. C. was a mere procedural irregularity and whether it vitiated the subsequent proceedings including the final order passed under Section 145 Cr. P. C. depended on the facts and circumstances of each cane, and had to be judged by the test of prejudice under Section 537 Cr. P. C. (iii) though it is quite clear that a Magistrate has no jurisdiction to institute a proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P. C. if there wall no material at all on the record to show the existence of dispute concerning land, water or boundaries thereof and apprehension of a breach of the peace on that account, yet when on scrutiny of the materials the court discovered that there was some material on the record pointing to the above effect it was entirely for the Magistrate to decide whether that material was sufficient or not to justify initiation of proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P. C. and the High Court in revision could not go into the sufficiency or otherwise of that material, and (iv) where a party had allowed the order initiating the proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P. C. howsoever defective, to go unchallenged and chooses to wait and take the chance of judgment in his favour he cannot in revision against the final order be heard to complain of excess of jurisdiction in the initiation of a proceeding by the Magistrate under Section 145 Cr. P. C. when the initial order has gone against him. 12. In the instant case, there can be no doubt on the materials on the record including the prohibitory order under Section 144 Cr. P. C. when the initial order has gone against him. 12. In the instant case, there can be no doubt on the materials on the record including the prohibitory order under Section 144 Cr. P. C. and the show cause and other documents filed by the parties respectively that a dispute concerning land existed within the local limits of the Magistrate's jurisdiction and that the Magistrate was satisfied from the said materials including the police report that the dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. In the circumstances, merely because the Magistrate has failed to mention in the initial order the grounds for his satisfaction, it cannot be held that the subsequent proceedings including the impugned final orders were null and void. Further the failure to draw tip formal order in accordance with Section 145(1) Cr. P. C. cannot be said to have caused any prejudice to the petitioners. In deed as was pointed out by this Court in the name of (6) Shibnarayan Das V. Satyadeo Prasad (A.I.R. 1943 Patna 44), the petitioners having allowed the order initiating the proceeding to go unchallenged and having chosen to wait and take the chance of judgment in their favour, cannot in revision against the final order be heard to complaint of any excess of jurisdiction in initiating the proceedings by the Magistrate after the final orders have gone against them. 13. Before concluding the discussion on the preliminary point, reference may be made to the cases which were cited on behalf of the petitioners. The first case to which learned counsel for the petitioners made reference is that of (7) State of Uttar Pradesh V. Singhara Singh and others (A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 358). In that case dealing with the recording of statement or confession under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code by a Second Class Magistrate who had not been specifically empowered by the State Government the Supreme Court adverted to the well-known principle adopted in Taylor V. Taylor (1876) 1 Ch. D. 426, where power was given to a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all, and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden, and held that the said principle applied to judicial officers as well. D. 426, where power was given to a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all, and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden, and held that the said principle applied to judicial officers as well. In that case the only point argued in the appeal was as to the admissibility of the evidence which had been given by aforesaid Second Class Magistrate of confession of guilt made to him by the accused and purported to have been incorporated by him under Section 164 Cr. P. C. Quite clearly the decision in that case bas no application to the facts of the instant case. We are not dealing here with initiation of a proceeding by a Magistrate who was not competent to initiate the same. In that cases a Magistrate who was incompetent had recorded a confession course of investigation contrary to the provisions of Section 164 Cr. P. C. whereas in the instant casts there is no doubt about the competence of the Magistrate concerned and about the existence of the foundation of their jurisdiction. Thus the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court is of no assistance to the petitioners. The second case to which reference was made in that is R. H. Bhutani V. Miss Mani J. Desai (A.I.R. S. C. 1444). If at all, this case is clearly against the petitioners. One of the grounds on which the High Court had interfered with the order passed by the Magistrate was that he had failed to record in the preliminary order the reasons for his satisfaction, just as in the present cases. Referring to that ground the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "The section, no doubt, requires him to record reasons. The Magistrate has expressed his satisfaction in the basis of the facts set out in the application before him and after he had examined the applicant on oath. What means that those facts were prima facie sufficient and were the reasons leading to his satisfaction." In other words, the Supreme Court approved of the view expressed in (I) I.L.R. 33 Calcutta 352 (FB) that by referring to the application before him the Magistrate must be taken to have incorporated the said application by reference. What means that those facts were prima facie sufficient and were the reasons leading to his satisfaction." In other words, the Supreme Court approved of the view expressed in (I) I.L.R. 33 Calcutta 352 (FB) that by referring to the application before him the Magistrate must be taken to have incorporated the said application by reference. In any case, even though the reasons for his satisfaction had not been stated by the learned Magistrate in that cse, the Supreme Court upheld the order. Reference was also made to (8) AIR 1921 Patna 176, (9) AIR 1923 Patna 369, (10) AIR 1949 Patna 412. In my opinion none of these decisions are of any assistance to the petitioners. The view expressed by the learned single Judge in (8) Khubi Singh V. Darbari Mahto (IR 1921 Patn 176) that unless the Magistrte sets forth the grounds of his satisfaction of the existence of danger to a breach of the peace, he acquires to jurisdiction, runs counter to the several authorities discussed above as also to the wordings of Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. itself. That decision, in my opinion, fails to recognize the distinction between the foundation of jurisdiction and the manner of the exercise of the same. The decision in the case of (9) Ramjharia and another V. Piar Koeri (AIR 1923 Patna 369) far from supporting the petitioner's contention on the preliminary point is against them so far as it held that in order to give jurisdiction to a Magistrate to proceed under Section 145 Cr. P. C. all that was necessary was that he should be satisfied of there being a likelihood of a breach of the peace. It is true that thereafter the learned Judge proceeded to say that the Magistrate should make a note stating his grounds of his being so satisfied and require the parties to attend and to put in written statements of their claims. The latter part of the learned Judge's observation quite clearly points to be procedural aspect of a proceeding under Section 145 Cr. The latter part of the learned Judge's observation quite clearly points to be procedural aspect of a proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P.C. So far as the Special Bench decision in the case of (10) S. M. Yaqub and others, V. T. N. Basu and another [A.I.R. 1949 Patna 146 (SB)] is concerned it is decidedly against the petitioners so far as they held that if the Magistrate failed to give reasons for his satisfaction that danger of a breach of the peace existed, no question of jurisdiction was involved though the procedure may not be in accordance with Section 145(1) Cr. P. C. and the final order would not be set aside on that ground. The decision in the case of (11) Dirgopal Singh and others V. Rambrich Singh (A.I.R. 1951 Patna 412) to which reference was made on behalf of the petitioners is distinguishable on the grounds that in that case neither in the initiatory order nor in the notice issued to the parties or even in the order passed by the Magistrate after hearing the parties there was any indication that he was satisfied as to the existence of a dispute likely to cause any breach of the peace. On those facts the learned single Judge held that the Magistrate could not be held to have jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. The precise question which arises in the present case was neither debated not decided. Reference was also made to an unreported decision in Criminal Revision No. 594 of 1957 disposed of on the 25th September, 1958, by a learned Single Judge of this Court. In that case there was no mention at all that the Magistrate apprehended that there was likelihood of a breach of the peace when he ordered for drawing up a proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P. C. not to say any ground of his being so satisfied. That failure on the part of the Magistrate was taken as an initial mistake ousting his jurisdiction. It is not clear from the facts of that case whether on the materials it could be said that, in fact, there was an apprehension of a breach of the peace. This decision, in my opinion, as well fails to distinguish between the foundation or existence of jurisdiction and the manner in which the same has to be exercised. It is not clear from the facts of that case whether on the materials it could be said that, in fact, there was an apprehension of a breach of the peace. This decision, in my opinion, as well fails to distinguish between the foundation or existence of jurisdiction and the manner in which the same has to be exercised. Another unreported decision of the same learned Judge was also referred to on behalf of the petitioners. This is the decision in (12) Criminal Revision No. 623 of 1967 disposed of on the 14th November, 1958. It is true that in that case the learned Judge upheld the preliminary objection to the effect that the entire order passed under Section 145 Cr. P. C. was without jurisdiction because the proceeding had not been drawn up in accordance with the provisions of Section 145(1) of the Code. It appears, however, that the main ground on which the learned Judge came to that conclusion was that in this opinion there was no material whatsoever before the Magistrate to justify him to start a proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P.C. In any case, the view expressed in that decision in so far as it serves to blur the distinction between the existence or foundation of jurisdiction and the manner in which the jurisdiction had to be exercised ruus counter to the several decisions which I have discussed above in detail. The actual decision in that case can be supported on the ground that, in fact, there was any material before the Magistrate for being satisfied that there was an apprehension of a breach of the peace at the time of commencement of the proceeding. Lastly reference was made to the decisions reported in (13) A.I.R. 1958 Punjab 47 and (14) A.I.R. 1958 J.&K. 17(FB). No doubt these two cases support the petitioners' contention, but in view of what I have discussed above and with utmost respect to the learned Judges concerned, I am of the opinion that none of these cases lay down the correct law. 14. It follows from the aforesaid discussions that there is no substance whatsoever in the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the petitioners in all these three cases. 14. It follows from the aforesaid discussions that there is no substance whatsoever in the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the petitioners in all these three cases. The Magistrate had jurisdiction to commence the proceedings and the final orders passed cannot be set aside on the ground that he has failed to state the grounds of his satisfaction or to draw up a formal order in accordance with the requirement of Section 145(1) Cr. P. C. 15. So far as the merits of these cases are concerned, it appears to me that the learned Magistrate has referred to and considered all the relevant materials including the affidavits filed on behalf of the respective parties in support of their respective cases. In Criminal Revisional No. 487 of 1968 it was, however, urged that two of the affidavits filed, namely, those of Suro Singh and Gulo Singh have not been referred to and considered. In the circumstaaces, we were taken through those affidavits by the learned counsel and after having gone through them we are definitely of the opinion that those affidavits are in no way better than the rest of the affidavits filed on behalf of rest of the parties. Thus there is hardly anything on the merits of any of these cases which justifies interference with the final orders passed in the proceedings. In Criminal Revision No. 957 of 1968 as well no ground whatsoever has been made out to interfere with the final order on its merits. The learned Magistrate has discussed all the relevant materials and has come to the conclusion that though some of the plots were in possession of opposite party nos. 4 to 9, all the rest were in possession of opposite party nos. 1 to 3 and that the members of the first party were not in possession of any of the plots in dispute. Nothing were pointed out to me to show that the finding reached by the learned Magistrate was vitiated on any account. 16. In the result, all these applications fail and are dismissed. B. D. SINGH, J. I agree Applications dismissed.