JUDGMENT : A. Misra, J. - The question of law which has necessitated the reference of this criminal miscellaneous application to a Division Bench is formulated as follows: Can the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers recognised in Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure review or recall its previous decision in a criminal revision or modify the sentence imposed by it thereunder. 2. The Petitioner was tried for an offence u/s 408, Indian Penal Code on the allegation that while working 88 Secretary of the grain golla at Buguda, he committed criminal breach of trust in respect of 74 bags of chemical fertilisers. The learned trying Magistrate by his judgment dated 17-8-1964 convicted and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imperilment for II years and pay a fine of Rs. 1500/- and in default to undergo further R.I. for three months. The learned Sessions Judge, Ganjam dismissed the appeal preferred by the accused by his judgment dated 11-9-1965 and maintained the conviction and sentence. Petitioner then preferred a criminal revision before this Court which was registered as Criminal Revision No. 551 of 1965. Barman, J as he then was dismissed the revision by his judgment dated 10-10-1966 and confirmed the conviction and sentence passed against the Petitioner. 3. Admittedly, one of the grounds taken in the criminal revision before this Count was that the sentence imposed on the Petitioner is illegal, in view of the provisions contained in Sub-section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It is also not disputed that in the order passed by Barman, J dismissing the revision, the plea of the Petitioner hased on Section 6 of the Act was not considered. On the very next day, the present application was filed by the Petitioner u/s 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure praying that in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction Court may extend the benefit of Section 6 of the Act to the Petitioner who was below 21 years of age when the judgment of the trial Court was pronounced. On the very next day, the present application was filed by the Petitioner u/s 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure praying that in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction Court may extend the benefit of Section 6 of the Act to the Petitioner who was below 21 years of age when the judgment of the trial Court was pronounced. In view of the importance of the question involved and the prevailing divergence of opinion relating to the ambit and extent of the powers vested in the Court u/s 561-A, one of us for reasons given in the relevant order referred this case for decision by a larger bench and that is how the matter has come up before us. 4. It is not disputed before us that the accused Petitioner was below 21 years of age on the date of pronouncement of the judgment by the trial Court; that he was entitled to be dealt with according to the provisions of Section 6 of the Act in view of his age at the time of his conviction by the trial Court that in his revision petition before this Court, he took a specific ground claiming extension of benefit of Section 6(1) of the Act and that while disposing of the revision, this claim of Petitioner had not been considered. It is further not disputed by learned Government Advocate that in view of the provisions contained in Section 11 of the Act, Courts exercising appellate or revisional jurisdiction are empowered to exercise the jurisdiction conferred under the Act not only under Sections 3 & 4 and the consequential provisions, but also u/s 6. While construing the provisions contained in Section 11(1) of the Act, the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Ramji Missir and Another Vs. The State of Bihar, observed as follows: We therefore reject the submission made to us on behalf of the Respondent that an appellate Court has an unfettered discretion in dealing with a case which comes before it u/s 11 and that its discretion and Powers are not to be governed by the terms of Section 6(1). 5. The State of Bihar, observed as follows: We therefore reject the submission made to us on behalf of the Respondent that an appellate Court has an unfettered discretion in dealing with a case which comes before it u/s 11 and that its discretion and Powers are not to be governed by the terms of Section 6(1). 5. The main contentions of learned Government Advocate in re-sisting the present application are two fold: Firstly, it is argued by him that the inherent Power of the Court u/s 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure does not extend to reviewing, altering or modifying a previous judgment which has attained finality, even if any error was committed in the said judgment and the only course open to the Petitioner was to approach the Supreme Court. In this context, it is also stated by him that the plea of the Petitioner in the revision petition u/s 6 of the Act must be deemed to have been impliedly rejected rightly or wrongly when no relief thereunder was granted to him. Secondly, it is urged that the circumstances envisaged for exercise of the inherent power u/s 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure do not exist in the present case. 6. On the other hand, Mrs. Padhi, learned Counsel for Petitioner contends that the statutory finality of the judgments of criminal Courts envisaged in Sections 369 and 420, Code of Criminal Procedure does not extend to orders passed in revision by the High Court and the general principles of finality ordinarily attached to judgments of criminal Courts will not be a bar to review or recall an order passed in revision, if the ends of justice a require and, that apart, without disturbing the finality, it will be within the jurisdiction of the Court to pass a separate composite order u/s 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure which will not bare the effect of recalling, altering or reviewing the judgment as such. It is also urged by her that this is a fit case for exercise of inherent powers u/s 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure for securing the ends of justice and preventing abuse of the process of the Court. 7. Relying on the reasoning and ratio of the majority judgments in the Full Bench decision reported in Raj Narain and Others Vs. 7. Relying on the reasoning and ratio of the majority judgments in the Full Bench decision reported in Raj Narain and Others Vs. The State it is inherent power the High Court is competent to recall, alter or review its earlier decision, if circumstances justify or necessitate exercise of such an exceptional power. In support of this contention, besides the Full Bench decision reported in Raj Narain and Others Vs. The State reliance is also placed on a number of decisions of other High Courts including those reported in Bhagawan Das v. State AIR 1954 M.B. 10 , Ganeshram v. State of Rajasthan 1968 Cri.L.J. 74, 1972, In re: Biyamma AIR 1963 Mys. 326, Ramballabh Jha Vs. The State of Bihar and Lal Singh and Others Vs. State and Others. In reply, in support of his contention that finality of a criminal Court judgment cannot be interfered with, learned Government Advocate primarily relies on the observations in the Full Bench decision of the Andhrdr Pradesh High Court reported in Public Prosecutor v. Devereddi AIR 1962 A.P. 479 , and the decisions reported in Karam Das Sautha Vs. Sangat Ram P. Kannan Kunhimangalam Vs. The Food Inspector Cannanore Municipality Dasappa v. State of Mysore AIR 1965 Mays. 224, Namdeo Sindhi and Others Vs. The State and Nalu Sahu and Another Vs. The State, . 8. For a proper appreciation of the rival contentions, it will be convenient to refer to the statutory provisions enshrining the principles of finality of criminal Court judgments occurring in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the language of those provisions and the context in which they appear in the scheme of the Code: 369. Court not to alter judgment-Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force or, in the case of a High Court by the Letters Patent or other instrument constituting such High Court, no Court, when it has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the same, except to correct a clerical error. 43a Finality of orders on appeal-judgment and orders passed by an appellate Court upon appeal shall be final, except in the cases provided for in Section 417 and Chapter XXXII. 9. 43a Finality of orders on appeal-judgment and orders passed by an appellate Court upon appeal shall be final, except in the cases provided for in Section 417 and Chapter XXXII. 9. From an overall view of the scheme of the Code, language and placing of the relevant sections, there can be no room for doubt that the finality envisaged in Section 369 is confined to original Courts, and the finality envisaged in Section 430 to judgments of appellate Courts, subject to the exceptions mentioned therein. This conclusion has been placed beyond controversy by the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court. In the decision reported in U.J.S. Chopra Vs. State of Bombay, while dealing with the rule of finality, the following observations appear in the judgment of S.R. Das, J. (as he then was): There can be no question that the finality embodied in this section is only in relation to the Court which pronounces the judgment, for it forbids the Court, after 'it' has signed 'its' judgment, to alter or review the same. In other words, after pronouncing the judgment the Court that pronounces it becomes 'functus officio'. There is indication in the Code it self that the purpose of Section 369 is not to prescribe a general rule of finality of all judgments of all criminal Courts but is only to prescribe finality for the judgment of the trial Court so far as the trial Court is concerned. In the decision reported in Nirbhay Singh v. State of M.P. (1969) II S.C.W.R. 133, while dealing with the contention that the earlier order of the High Court dismissing the Appellant's appeal having become final, the High Court was not competent to set aside the order of acquittal of the Sessions Judge in the appeal filed by the State, their Lordships examined the provisions contained In Sections 369 and 430 of the Code and observed as follows: Section 369 occurs in Chapter XXVI and prima facie applies to judgments of the Courts of First Instance. Section 430 applies to judgments of an appellate Court; it declares the judgment of an appellate Court final except in the cases provided for in Section 417 and Chapter XXXII. In terms the provision applies to all judgments of appellate Courts, of the District Magistrate, Courts of Sessions and the High Courts. Section 430 applies to judgments of an appellate Court; it declares the judgment of an appellate Court final except in the cases provided for in Section 417 and Chapter XXXII. In terms the provision applies to all judgments of appellate Courts, of the District Magistrate, Courts of Sessions and the High Courts. Finality of the judgment of the appellate Court declared by Section 430 is subject to the restrictions, i.e. the judgment may be set aside or modified in an appeal u/s 417 of the -Code by the High Court and in exercise of the power conferred upon the Courts under Chapter XXXII which deals with the exercise of power to entertain references and revisions. Judgment of a High Court in appeal is not subject to the exercise of any appellate or revisional power exorcise be under the Code. The' exception declared in Section 430 therefore only applies to judgment of a Court subordinate to the High Court' exercising appellate power. 1a It is next contended by learned Govt. Advocate that even if the statutory finality contained in Sections 369 and 430 of the Code does not apply to orders passed in, revision, on general principles of finality of judgments of the High Court, the same result will follow, and therefore, it is not open to the High Court to review, recall or modify the order passed in revision in exercise of its inherent power u/s 561-A. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on some observations of Bhagwati, J. in the decision reported in U.J.S. Chopra Vs. State of Bombay and the decisions of this Court reported in Namdeo Sindhi and Others Vs. The State and Nalu Sahu and Another Vs. The State. The decision of the Supreme Court reported in U.J.S. Chopra Vs. State of Bombay was not concerned with the question of inherent powers of the High Court recognised in Section 561-A. That case involved two propositions that after dismissal of the appeal by the accused, an application at the instance of the State for enhancement of the sentence was maintainable and that the accused canvass the correctness of his conviction, summary dismissal of his appeal notwithstanding. In that context, Bhagwati, J. expressed that a judgment pronounced by the High Court in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction after a full hearing in the presence of both the parties is a final judgment. In that context, Bhagwati, J. expressed that a judgment pronounced by the High Court in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction after a full hearing in the presence of both the parties is a final judgment. These observations cannot, in isolation, removed from the context in which they were made, be relied upon as supporting the proposition put forth by learned Govt. Advocate. The decision of our High Court reported in Nalu Sahu and Another Vs. The State which purports to follow the earlier decision reported in Namdeo Sindhi and Others Vs. The State is primarily hased on the observations referred to above in the decision reported in U.J.S. Chopra Vs. State of Bombay. We have already referred to, the decision of the Supreme Court and expressed our view that the observations therein were not made in the context of examining the powers of the High Court u/s 561-A, but in a different context. 11. Thus, on an overall examination of the relevant statutory provisions, we are unable to find any fetter whatsoever, express or implied, which would rule out the applicability of the inherent power of the High Court u/s 561-A in respect of an order purporting to be hased u/s 439, Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, in our opinion it will not be correct to say that the inherent power which the Court possesses to review a judgment made in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction either relates to a matter covered by any specific provision of the Code or that its exercise is in any way Incompatible with any express statutory provision. 12. The principles embodied in Section 561-A are nothing more than recognition of the fact that it is the duty of the Court to see that no injury results to a suitor by its own Act. Section 561-A runs as follows: 561-A. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 561-A runs as follows: 561-A. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. By its very nature inherent power implies a power which can not be precisely defined or expressed, but must reside in a Court for achieving the higher and main objective of doing justice and preventing injury to any litigant before it by its own Act. The Supreme Court in the decision reported in Talab Haji Hussain Vs. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar and Another while considering the scope and the purpose of inherent power u/s 561-A of the Code observed as follows: It is only if the matter in question is not covered by any specific provisions of the Code that Section 561-A can come into operation, subject further to the requirement that the exercise of such power must serve either of the three purposes mentioned in the said section. In prescribing rules of procedure, legislature undoubtedly attempts to provide for all cases that are likely to arise; but it is not possible that any legislative enactment dealing with Procedure, however carefully it may be dragged, would succeed in providing for all cases that may possibly arise in future. Lacunae are sometimes discovered in procedural law and it is to cover such lacunae and to deal with cases where such lacunae are discovered that procedural law invariably recognises the existence of inherent power in Courts. Thus, from an examination of the various provisions and the observations of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the inherent power of the Court can be exercised where either of the three purposes specified in 561-A justifies, subject to the limitation that such inherent power cannot be invoked in respect of any matter covered by the specific provisions of the Code nor where its exercise would be inconsistent with any of the specific provisions of the Code. 13. Next we proceed to consider some of the authorities cited at the Bar in support of their respective contentions. In the Full Bench decision reported in Raj Narain and Others Vs. The State Raghubar Dayal and M.L. Chaturvedi, JJ. 13. Next we proceed to consider some of the authorities cited at the Bar in support of their respective contentions. In the Full Bench decision reported in Raj Narain and Others Vs. The State Raghubar Dayal and M.L. Chaturvedi, JJ. who delivered the majority judgment exhaustively considered the various decisions on the point and came to the conclusion that the High Court has inherent power to revoke, review, recall or alter its earlier decision in a crimina) revision in certain circumstances. The Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in the decision reported in In reo Biyama AIR 1963 Mys. 326, have affirmed the view of the law enuciated in the course of the judgment, Hedge, J. observed as follows: If the criminal Courts had no inherent jurisdiction to alter or review their judgments, there was no need to prohibit the exercise of that power by enacting Section 369 as well as Section 424. The legislature would not have prohibited the exercise of a non existing power. The legislature while wisely, I may say so with respect, prohibited the subordinate Courts from altering or reviewing their judgments left the field clear to the High Court either by exercising its revisional powers or by exercising its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution but such remedies are Dot available as against any error or mistakes that may be committed by the High Court. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the High Court has inherent power to alter or review its appellate judgments. The Patna High Court in the decision reported in Ramballabh Jha Vs. The State of Bihar also expressed the view that the High Court u/s 561-A has power to set aside an appellate judgment and order rehearing of the same. In a recent decision of the Punjab High Court reported in Lal Singh and Others Vs. State and Others view expressed in the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court after examination of the divergent views expressed on the point, has been approved. 14. The decisions cited in support of the contrary view on the facts arising therein are quite distinguishable. The Full Bench decision reported in Public Prosecutor v. Devereddi AIR 1962 A.P. 479 , dissented from the view expressed in the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court. 14. The decisions cited in support of the contrary view on the facts arising therein are quite distinguishable. The Full Bench decision reported in Public Prosecutor v. Devereddi AIR 1962 A.P. 479 , dissented from the view expressed in the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court. It is, however, to be noticed that in that case, the learned Judges were considering the distinction between lack of inherent jurisdiction and illegal or irregular exercise of the same. Even there, while expressing that there is no such inherent power in the High Court u/s 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure to alter or review its own judgment once it has been pronounced, an exception has been made in cases where the judgment was passed without jurisdiction or in cases of judgments passed on default of appearance. Thus, even this decision does not totally exclude the inherent power of the Court u/s 561-A to recall or rehear, but recognises such a power in limited circumstances, such as, judgments pronounced on default of appearance. The Single Judge decision reported in Karam Das Sautha Vs. Sangat Ram, was dealing with a case as to whether there is an inherent power to review judgments passed in appeal and it was held as in the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court that no such inherent power can be exercised, except where the judgment was without jurisdiction or was delivered without affording an opportunity to the parties of being heard. This was not a case where the question of inherent power of the High Court in relation to its decision in revision was under consideration. In a Single Judge decision reported in Dasappa v. State of Mysore AIR 1965 Mays. 224, an application u/s 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure praying for benefit u/s 6 of the Act was rejected observing that such a review would be clearly against the principles of finality of orders of dismissal passed by the High Court. The facts of that case are, however, distinguishable. There the accused were convicted u/s 380, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to four months' R.I. After hearing counsel, the revision was dismissed, and thereafter, the application u/s 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure was filed alleging that one of the accused was 7 years of age. The facts of that case are, however, distinguishable. There the accused were convicted u/s 380, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to four months' R.I. After hearing counsel, the revision was dismissed, and thereafter, the application u/s 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure was filed alleging that one of the accused was 7 years of age. It was conceded in that case on behalf of Petitioners that the point which related to claiming benefit u/s 6 of the Act was neither raised nor argued in the Courts below nor before the High Court while revision. Expressing the view that the provisions of Section 6 of the Act are not mandatory provisions of law, the Court negatived the contention that it was the duty of the Court to have considered that aspect, irrespective of its having been raised or urged before it. In those circumstances, the application u/s 561-A was rejected. The observations of Hedge, J. in In re Biyamma AIR 1963 Mys. 326, were distinguished on the ground that in the said case, both the Courts and counsel had proceeded on a total misapprehension of fact that there has been an infringement of principles of natural justice. Even' in this case, it has been observed that the inherent power of the Court can, no doubt, be exercised to reconsider where reconsideration is necessary to secure the ends of justice. This decision, therefore, cannot be relied upon as totally excluding the inherent power of the Court u/s 561-A in all circumstances. In the decision reported in P. Kannan Kunhimangalam Vs. The Food Inspector Cannanore Municipality the scope of the inherent power u/s 561-A has not been directly considered, but incidentally it purports to agree with the view expressed in the Fun Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in Public Prosecutor v. Devereddi AIR 1962 A.P. 479 . The decision reported in Nalu Sahu and Another Vs. The State is hased primarily on observations of the Supreme Court reported in U.J.S. Chopra Vs. State of Bombay. We have already referred to this authority of the Supreme Court and in our view, the observations there were not made in the context of examining the powers u/s 561-A and the said observations do not in any way debar the exercise of the inherent power for the purpose of reviewing an order passed in revisional jurisdiction. 15. We have already referred to this authority of the Supreme Court and in our view, the observations there were not made in the context of examining the powers u/s 561-A and the said observations do not in any way debar the exercise of the inherent power for the purpose of reviewing an order passed in revisional jurisdiction. 15. On a close analysis of the various authorities and pronouncements of the Supreme Court, we fully accept and adopt the ratio and the enunciation of law in Raj Narain's case reported in Raj Narain and Others Vs. The State. Accordingly, we are of the view that the High Court in exercise of its inherent power recognised in Section 561-A of the Code is empowered to review, recall or modify its previous decision in a criminal revision. It, however, needs no reiteration that the circumstances in which this power ('an be exercised necessarily would be exceptional ones and considered necessary to conform to either of the three conditions enumerated in Section 561-A of the Code. 16. Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure envisages three distinct circumstances which entitle the High Court to exercise the inherent power, i.e. when it is necessary (1) for securing the ends of justice (2) for preventing abuse of the process of the Court and (3) to give effect to any order under this Code. 17. As indicated earlier, it is conceded by learned Govt. Advocate that Petitioner was below 21 years of age at the date of judgment of the trial Court; that he was entitled to be dealt with according to the provisions of Section 6 of the Act in view of his age; that in the revision petition before this Court, Petitioner took a specific ground claiming benefit u/s 6(1) of the Act and that the point was urged during hearing of the revision, but while disposing it of, this aspect was omitted to be oonsidered. On the very next day of delivery of the judgment, Petitioner was prompt in moving the Court u/s 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure. Learned Counsel for Petitioner contends that the circumstances of the present case are clearly covered by the first clause of Section 561-A, i.e., to secure the ends of justice to justify exercise of inherent power. On the other band, learned Govt. Learned Counsel for Petitioner contends that the circumstances of the present case are clearly covered by the first clause of Section 561-A, i.e., to secure the ends of justice to justify exercise of inherent power. On the other band, learned Govt. Advocate's concoction is that non-consideration of Petitioner's claim while deciding the revision amounts to its implied rejection. Section 6(1) of the Act imposes a duty upon the Court not to subject such juvenile offenders to a sentence of imprisonment unless it is satisfied that his case does not fall within the purview of Section 3 or Section 4 of the Act. Even, in that case, while passing any sentence of imprisonment against him, the Court shall have to record its reasons for doing so. Thus, Section 6(1) lays down a special provision in respect of offenders under twenty-one years of age. When the Court has failed to consider the specific ground pleaded for claiming benefit under the Act and no reasons are recorded as required under the section while sentencing him to imprisonment, we are unable to agree with learned Govt. Advocate that it will amount to an implied rejection of the plea. The order sentencing the Petitioner to imprisonment, where the legislature has superseded the ordinary penal law is ex facie illegal and rectification of such an error is necessary to secure the ends of justice. Therefore, in our opinion, this is a fit case where the inherent power should be exercised in order to secure the ends of justice and give relief to the Petitioner. 18. In the result, we allow the petition and while maintaining the decision in the original revision, so far as the conviction of Petitioner is concerned, we set aside the sentence of imprisonment passed against him and direct that the case be remitted to the trying Magistrate forproceeding u/s 6 of the Act. B.K. Patra, J. 19. I agree. Final Result : Allowed