JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - This is an application u/s 115, CPC questioning the propriety of the appellate decision in a money claim. The Plaintiff opposite party No. 1 sued for recovery of Rs. 240/- from the Defendants on the allegation that the said amount represented the value of the crop that had been illegally removed by the Defendants from the lands belonging to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff?s case was that one Suduri Jena owned the suit holding, measuring 1. 69 acres as an occupancy tenant. He sold the same to the Plaintiff and the father of Defendant No. 6 under sale deeds dated 4-1-1929 (Exts. 1 and 3). One Pahali owned another occupancy holding with an area of 84 decimals out of which he sold 76 decimals in favour of the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 6 under two sale deeds (Exts. 1/a and 2). The original tenants were liable to pay produce rent to the landlord Lakshminarayan Thakur. Members of the Bose family were the marfatdars of the said deity. Defendant No. 6 executed a deed of relinquishment in respect of his interest under the aforesaid sale deeds on 31-5-1965 in favour of the Plaintiff under Ext. 4. Thus the Plaintiff became entitled to the entire property referred to above. On 11-12-1962, Defendants 1 to 5 forcibly cut and carried away the paddy from three of the plots bearing Nos. 2, 4 and 19. 2. Defendants 1 and 2 who alone contested in a joint written statement admitted the removal, but denied the Plaintiff?s title and possession over the suit lands and contended that they were bhag tenants under the original landlord. As such they continued to be in possession of the property even if there may have been any transfer of title. 3. The trial Court negatived the Plaintiff?s claim mainly on the basis that the Plaintiff bad failed to satisfy that be was in possession of the property. The learned Subordinate Judge who heard the appeal reversed the judgment and gave a decree to the Plaintiff for the claim made by him. 4. Mr. Patra, appearing for the Defendants-Petitioners, has made an application under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC asking for receiving additional evidence at this stage. The learned Subordinate Judge who heard the appeal reversed the judgment and gave a decree to the Plaintiff for the claim made by him. 4. Mr. Patra, appearing for the Defendants-Petitioners, has made an application under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC asking for receiving additional evidence at this stage. The documents which he asks to be received in evidence now consist of (1) A certified copy of the order-sheet in an O.T.R. proceeding between the parties, (2) A copy of the order-sheet in the said O.T.R. case in original sent to the Defendants by the O.T.R. Collector, (3) A certified copy of the Collector?s order in Canal Revenue Appeal No. 363 of 1958.59, (4) A certified copy of a judgment in a criminal case between the parties, and (5) The entire order-sheet of Case No. 35/62 out of which one particular order dated 6-8-1963 has already been marked as Ext. B. 5. The Defendants in their written statement had taken the plea of being bhag tenants. There were certain proceedings under the O.T.R. Act initiated by the Plaintiff as the landlord. There are certain admissions therein relating to possession. There is no dispute that if a person goes to the O.T.R. Court asking for eviction it can only be on the footing that there is existence of relationship of landlord and tenant. The Plaintiff?s action in approaching the O.T.R. Court for such relief has a material bearing on the present dispute. Two of the documents which are now produced as additional evidence, namely, the order-sheet of the O.T.R. case and the order in original sent by the O.T.R. Collector were not in existence when the suit was disposed of. The other documents are public records being judgments of the revenue Court or of criminal Court. There is no dispute that they relate to the same subject matter and the criminal case was between the same parties. The Canal Revenue Mutation Appeal seems to be between the parties or their predecessors-in-interest. In the circumstances, these documents which are now being produced appear to have some bearing on the point in issue. Mr. Das appearing for the Plaintiff opposite party No. 1 objected to the acceptance of such evidence. Normally in a revision I would have been very slow to receive such evidence on an application under Order 41, Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Das appearing for the Plaintiff opposite party No. 1 objected to the acceptance of such evidence. Normally in a revision I would have been very slow to receive such evidence on an application under Order 41, Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure. But there are certain important features in this case which give me an impression that the appellate Court has In a very careless and casual manner disposed of the case without looking into the materials properly and coming to his conclusion on the basis of the documents placed on record. 6. In paragraph 5 of the appellate judgment the learned Subordinate Judge has written, The learned Munsif has unnecessarily discussed about the order-sheet filed on 16-12-1966, that is, on the date of the trial, marked Ext. B in spite of protest from the Plaintiff that the same was forged and connection. A document simply because it purports to be an order sheet should not be accepted, particularly when protested by other side. After all, the Plaintiff was not offered an opportunity to meet the same. Further, the order-sheet reads bogus where the suit plots 4 and 9 have been incorrectly described as a 48 acre. In fine, these documents should be ignored for the purpose of the present litigation. The Ext. B/l is an order-sheet by the Member, Board of Revenue, on tile question of mutation of water rate. The order is practically defective, or at any rate, different from the ones, raised by the contesting Defendants in the present suit. It is indeed surprising that the learned Subordinate Judge who seems to be an experienced judicial officer should be disposing of cases in such reckless manner. It is not very intelligible as to what he meant when he said "The order reads bogus", or "The order (referred to the order of the Member, Board of Revenue) is practically defective". These two documents refer to proceedings before revenue courts and were definitely relevant for the present purpose. They should have been dealt with greater care and attention, because it was definitely open to the lower appellate Court to reject them for cogent reasons to be given. Reference to the term "bogus" in a part of the judgment is definitely not a very welcome process. 7. They should have been dealt with greater care and attention, because it was definitely open to the lower appellate Court to reject them for cogent reasons to be given. Reference to the term "bogus" in a part of the judgment is definitely not a very welcome process. 7. The other reasonings which have been advanced by the learned Subordinate Judge to reverse the, findings of the trial Court seem also to be not at all weighty. I am conscious of the fact that the jurisdiction which I am asked to exercise in this case is one u/s 115 Code of Civil Procedure. But I have gathered an impression after going through the records that the lower appellate Court has not applied its mind and has come to rough and ready conclusions. The reasons advanced for refusing to accept additional evidence are also not very intelligible. I must hold that the jurisdiction has been very improperly exercised by the lower appellate Court and as such proper justice has not been meted out to the parties. The lower appellate Court has certainly not been alive to the solemn duty which was cast on it as a Court of law to adjudicate a litigation. The only course open to me is to vacate the appellate judgment and remand the matter to the lower appellate Court for a fresh disposal. As the said presiding officer is not there, I do not make any direction for the hearing of the case by another learned Subordinate Judge. This Civil Revision is allowed. Costs will abide the result. Final Result : Allowed