RAGHUNANDAN PRASAD GARG v. SREERAMIAH SETTY — 1970 DIGILAW 113 (KAR)

( 1 ) THIS is a defendant's second appeal against the decree passed by the principal Civil Judge, Bangalore, in RA No. 163 (1968. The respondents who are the plaintiff's filed O. S. No. 1648 of 1964 in the court of the first munsiff, Bangalore, for eviction of the defendant from the suit schedule premises and for recovery of possession of the same. ( 2 ) THE suit premises consists of the first floor and the second floor including latrines and bath rooms in premises bearing corporation Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 except one room in the first floor, situated in Dewanakhana Galli, chickpet, Bangalore city. It is not disputed that the suit premises is a non- residential premises where the defendant is running a lodging house. The case of the plaintiffs is that the entire suit premises was leased to the defendant for a fixed period of ten years, the terms of the agreement in that behalf having been incorporated in a lease deed dated 20th of October 1954 produced in this case as Ex, P. 2. At the time of the execution of the lease deed, the second floor was not constructed. Therefore, possession of the first floor only was given to the defendant. It is clear from the terms of Ex. P. 2 that the plaintiffs were required to construct ten rooms with attached bath rooms and latrines on the second floor and give possession of the same to the defendant. The rent agreed for the entire premises consisting of the first and the second floor as per Ex. P. 2 was Rs. 500 per month. But, as the second floor had not yet been constructed, the document recites that the defendant should pay only a rent of Rs. 300 per month until the plaintiffs construct and deliver possession of the second floor also as per the agreement. In pursuance of the terms of Ex. P-2, the second floor was constructed by the plaintiffs. It appears that by mutual agreement, the nature of the construction and the number of rooms to be constructed was altered. As per mutual agreement, instead of ten rooms with attached bath rooms and latrines, twelve rooms were constructed as desired by the defendant. In view of change in the plan, the plaintiffs incurred additional cost. Therefore the parties mutually agreed that rent should be fixed at Rs. As per mutual agreement, instead of ten rooms with attached bath rooms and latrines, twelve rooms were constructed as desired by the defendant. In view of change in the plan, the plaintiffs incurred additional cost. Therefore the parties mutually agreed that rent should be fixed at Rs. 580 per month instead of Rs. 500 as originally agreed. One room in the first floor was excluded. After the second floor was constructed as mentioned above, possession of the same was given to the defendant. All the terms referred to above were incorporated in another deed which has been produced in this case as Ex. P. 3 dated 25-2-1959. The said document is described as an additional lease deed. In the said document, it is specifically mentioned that the lease for the entire premises would expire on 30-9-1964. The case of the plaintiffs is that the lease expired on 30-9-1964 as per the terms of Exs. P-2 and P-3. The plaintiffs brought the present suit for possession on the 30th October 1964. The plaintiffs alleged that no notice terminating the tenancy is necessary in this case as the lease is determined by efflux of tune. It, however, appears, that a notice was given as per Ex. P. 6 dated 7-8-1964 demanding delivery of possession on the expiry of the lease period on 30th of September 1964. ( 3 ) THE defendant resisted the suit and contended that there are two separate leases in respect of the first and second floors evidenced by Exts. P. 2 and P. 3 respectively. He therefore contended that the suit brought on the basis that the first and second floors constituted a single premises leased to the defendant is not legal and proper. The defendant further contended that the suit is barred by the provisions of S. 21 of the Mysore Rent Control Act 1961, hereinafter referred to as the "act". He also contended that the lease has not been properly determined. S. 21 of the Act will not be applicable to non-residential buildings, the monthly rent of which exceeds rs. 500 in view of S. 31 of the Act. The defendant contended that S. 31 of the Act which excepts the non-residential buildings fetching a rent of more than Rs. 500 violates Art. 14 of the Constitution of India and is therefore void. 500 in view of S. 31 of the Act. The defendant contended that S. 31 of the Act which excepts the non-residential buildings fetching a rent of more than Rs. 500 violates Art. 14 of the Constitution of India and is therefore void. The defendant therefore prayed that the Court should make a reference to the High Court in regard to the validity of S. 31 of the Act. It it unnecessary to advert to the other contentions taken in the written statement as they are not material for the disposal of this appeal. ( 4 ) THE learned Munsiff decreed the plaintiffs' suit. He did not make any reference to the High Court as he came to the conclusion that there is no substance in the contention of the defendant regarding constitutional validity of S. 31 of the Act. The learned Munsiff came to the conclusion that the first and the second floor together constitute one premises and are the subject matter of the same lease transaction. He also held that the suit is not barred by any of the provisions of the Act. He negatived the contention of the defendant that there are separate leases in respect of the first and the second floors. The learned Munsiff held that the lease was determined by efflux of time on the expiry of 30th of September 1964. ( 5 ) BEING aggrieved by the aforesaid decree, the defendant preferred r. A. No. 163/1968 in the court of the Principal Civil Judge, Bangalore. The learned Civil Judge has dismissed the appeal and confirmed the findings of the learned Munsiff. ( 6 ) THE defendant has challenged the aforesaid decree in this second appeal under S. 100 C. P. C. ( 7 ) SRI Gulur Srinivasa Rao, learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the tenancy has not been terminated in accordance with law. He urged that the lease is for a period of ten years commencing from 1-10-1954. Relying upon S. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act, it was urged that the lease which commenced in this case on 1-10-1954 would expire only on the mid-night of 1-10-1964. The notice Ex. P. 6 given in this case terminates the tenancy on the expiry of 30-9-1964. Sri Gulur srinivasa Rao therefore urges that the notice terminating the tenancy and demanding delivery of possession on the expiry of 30-9-1964. The notice Ex. P. 6 given in this case terminates the tenancy on the expiry of 30-9-1964. Sri Gulur srinivasa Rao therefore urges that the notice terminating the tenancy and demanding delivery of possession on the expiry of 30-9-1964. is not legal and valid. In support of this contention of his Sri Srinivasa Rao also relied upon the decision of the Privy Council reported in Benoy Krishna Das v. Salciocini AIR. 1932 PC. 279. He relied upon the following passage in the said judgment of the Privy Council: "now the answer seems to be that the section in terms applies unless there is an express agreement to the contrary, and no express agreement to the contrary can, in fact, be found in the lease in question. That being so, it must be taken that the lease ended at midnight on 1st June 1925, and that any notice to determine thereafter given must be a notice to quit expiring with the month ending at midnight on the first day of any month. The notice in fact given on 1st February 1928, clearly is a notice in regard to 1st March 1928, and not in regard to 29th february 1928. It therefore is a notice which, in the language of S. 106, expired with the end of a month of the tenancy, because the month of the tenancy expired at midnight of 1st March 1928. The Privy Council was dealing with a ease which required notice determining tenancy as per the provisions of S. 106 of the Transfer of Property act. In that case, the original lease was for a fixed term of four years commencing from the 1st of June 1921. After the expiry of the fixed term. the tenant was continued as a monthly tenant. Their Lordships of the Privy council were dealing with the question of determination of tenancy of a monthly tenant. In the present case, we are not concerned- with the determination of a tenancy of a monthly tenant. In this case, the tenancy is for a fixed duration commencing from the 1st of October 1964. The term of lease expired, according to the plaintiffs, on 30-9-1964. The suit has been filed on 30-10-1964. It is clear from the facts of the present case that the defendant never became tenant holding over after the expiry of the lease period. In this case, the tenancy is for a fixed duration commencing from the 1st of October 1964. The term of lease expired, according to the plaintiffs, on 30-9-1964. The suit has been filed on 30-10-1964. It is clear from the facts of the present case that the defendant never became tenant holding over after the expiry of the lease period. It is not even the case of the defendant that he became a monthly tenant after the term of lease fixed under Exs. P. 2 and P. 3 had expired. Therefore, the question of determining the validity of 'notice with reference to s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act does not arise in this case. Therefore, the decision of the Privy Council relied upon by Sri Srinivasa rao is not of any assistance to him. ( 8 ) THERE is no recital in Ex. P. 2 requiring the landlord to issue any notice of termination as the lease was for a fixed term. It is obvious that there need not be a stipulation regarding termination of tenancy by notice. But, in Ex. P. 3 there is a stipulation to the following effect:"all conditions mentioned in the lease deed dated 20-10-1954-will be applicable as far as possible to this lease deed also. The notice to quit should be given according to the dates as are applicable to the lease deed dated 20-10-1954". As the lease is for a fixed period, the lease gets determined by efflux of time under S. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. No notice of termination is required to be given under the provisions of the Transfer of Property act. But, relying on the aforesaid stipulation in Ex. P. 3, Sri Srinivasa rao submitted that notice to quit was required to be given. That notice according to Srinivasa Rao, must conform to the requirements of S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is necessary to note that all that is stated in the stipulation extracted above is that the notice to quit should be given according to the dates as are applicable to the lease deed dated 20-10-1954. The lease deed dated 20-10-1954 mentions that the lease commences from 1-10-1954. There is nothing to show as to what is the duration of the notice that is contemplated. There is only a reference to notice to quit. The lease deed dated 20-10-1954 mentions that the lease commences from 1-10-1954. There is nothing to show as to what is the duration of the notice that is contemplated. There is only a reference to notice to quit. Sri S. K. Venkataranga lyengar, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the aforesaid stipulation is an unnecessary stipulation and does not impose any obligation on the part of the plantiffs to give notice to quit as required by S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. As the stiplation does not mention that the notice should conform to S. 106 of the Transfer of Property act, the appellant cannot contend on the basis of the aforesaid stipulation that a notice should be given in conformity with S. 106 of the Transfer of property Act. 1 have already stated that in Law no notice was required to be given as per S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as the lease in question is a lease for a fixed term. There is another recital in Ext. P-3 which, in my opinion, clinches the issue which reads as follows:"and the tenant should deliver back the possession of the entire premises including the building whose possession is delivered today on the expiry of 30-9-1964, as per the terms of the registered lease deed dated 20-10-1954. "it is therefore clear from this stipulation that the lease which is for a fixed term expires on the 30th of September 1964. The second para of s. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act states that:"where the time so limited is a year or a number of years, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, the lease shall last during the whole anniversary of the day from which such time commences. "but, as there is an agreement in this case to the effect that the lease expires on 30-9-1964, the appellant cannot contend that he would be entitled to remain in possession of the premises as a tenant thereof during the whole anniversary of the day from which the tenancy commenced. As already mentioned, the tenancy commenced from 1-10-1954. As the period of lease is stated to be ten years, it would ordinarily expire only on 1-10-1964 in view of the provisions contained in the second para of S. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act. As already mentioned, the tenancy commenced from 1-10-1954. As the period of lease is stated to be ten years, it would ordinarily expire only on 1-10-1964 in view of the provisions contained in the second para of S. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act. But, as there is an agreement to the contrary in this case the lease expired on 30-9-1964. There is therefore no substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the lease expired in this case only on 1-10-1964. It is on the basis that the lease expired on, 30-9-1964, that the present suit for possession has been filed on 30th of october 1964. ( 9 ) IT is also necessary to note that a notice has been given in this case on 7-8-1964 determining the tenancy. Though that notice was wholly unnecessary, the same has been given for abundant caution. The notice states that possession should be delivered as per the agreement on the expiry of 30-9-1964. The notice is, therefore, consistent with the stipulation in Ex. P. 3, which states that the tenancy expires on 30-9-1964. It cannot therefore be said that possession was demanded in this case at any time earlier than the expiry of the lease period. ( 10 ) THE next submission of Sri Gulur Srinivasa Rao, learned Counsel for the appellant is that there are separate leases in this case one pertaining to the first floor which is governed by the term contained in Ex. P. 2 and the second pertaining to the second floor governed by the terms contained in ex. P. 3. According to him, the rent fixed under Ex. P. 2 for the first floor is Rs. 300 p. m. and that the rent fixed for the second floor is rs. 280 p. m. It is therefore urged that the rent of each one of these premises is less than Rs. 500. It is conceded that the premises in question is a non-residential building. The provisions of Part V of the Act will not be applicable to non-residential buildings, the monthly rent of which exceeds rs. 500 or the annual rental value of which exceeds Rs. 6,000. The plaintiffs have brought the suit claiming exemption under S. 31 of the Act. 500. It is conceded that the premises in question is a non-residential building. The provisions of Part V of the Act will not be applicable to non-residential buildings, the monthly rent of which exceeds rs. 500 or the annual rental value of which exceeds Rs. 6,000. The plaintiffs have brought the suit claiming exemption under S. 31 of the Act. According to the plaintiffs, the first and the second floor together constitute a single premises which has been leased to the defendant for a rent of Rs. 580 per month. Therefore it is claimed by the plaintiffs that S. 31 of the Act is attracted and that the landlord is not required to evict the tenant only by resorting to the provisions contained in S. 21 of the Act. The question as to whether S. 31 of the Act applies to the present case, therefore, depends upon the finding as to whether the first and the second floors together constitute premises let on a monthly rent of Rs. 580 or whether the first and the second floor premises are separate premises, one fetching a rent of Rs. 300 per month and the other fetching a rent of Rs. 280 per month Both the courts, after considering the terms of Exs. P. 2 and p. 3 and the other circumstances in the case, have concurrently come to the conclusion that the first and the second floors together constitute one premises leased to the defendant on a monthly rental of Rs. 580. In view of that finding, both the courts have held that the landlord is entitled to claim exemption under S. 31 of the Act. The finding of the two Courts below is assailed by the appellant in this second appeal. ( 11 ) IT is no doubt true, as contended by Sri Gulur Srinivasa Rao, learned counsel for the appellant, that on 20-10-1954, the date on which Ex. P-2, the lease deed, was executed, the second floor was not yet constructed. The second floor was, however, under contemplation. It appears that the defendant needed much larger premises than the first floor. The defendant needed the premises for running a lodging house in the premises. As the first floor was not adequate for the defendant, it was agreed between the parties that ten rooms with attached flu shouts, bath-rooms and flush basins should be constructed on the second floor. It appears that the defendant needed much larger premises than the first floor. The defendant needed the premises for running a lodging house in the premises. As the first floor was not adequate for the defendant, it was agreed between the parties that ten rooms with attached flu shouts, bath-rooms and flush basins should be constructed on the second floor. The schedule to the lease deed, Ext. P-2, which describes the property demised, refers not only to the first floor but also to the second floor to be constructed. The rent that is stipulated In Ex. P. 2 is a sum of Rs. 500 per month in respect of the first and the second floors (to be constructed) together. At the same time, there is a stipulation to the effect that the landlord has agreed to receive a rent of Rs. 300 per month for the first floor till the second floor is constructed and possession is given to the tenant. The aforesaid stipulations in Ex. P. 2 make it clear that the second floor which was agreed to be constructed shall become part of the premises which the defendant took possession under Ext. P-2. It. is clear that what was agreed to be constructed is additional rooms as the rooms in the first floor were not sufficient for the use of the defendant. It is therefore clear that what was agreed to be constructed under Ext. P-2 is only additional rooms so that the first and the second floor together could become one premises. It is for this reason that a rent of Rs. 500 was fixed even before the second floor was constructed in respect of the first and the second floors together. It is for this reason that the schedule Ext. P-2 mentioned the first and the second floors to gether. Ext. P-2 therefore clearly indicates the intention of the parties that after construction of the second floor, the first and the second floors together should be treated as a single premises, the rent payable in respect of which being Rs. 500 per month. It appears that though ten rooms with attached bath rooms were agreed to be constructed as per Ex. P. 2, by mutual agreement, the landlord constructed 12 rooms without attached bath rooms and latrines. It is also clear from the recitals in Ext. 500 per month. It appears that though ten rooms with attached bath rooms were agreed to be constructed as per Ex. P. 2, by mutual agreement, the landlord constructed 12 rooms without attached bath rooms and latrines. It is also clear from the recitals in Ext. P-3, the type of construction was also changed costing more amount to the landlord. After the construction of 12 rooms, it was mutually agreed that the rent for the first and the second floors should be Rs. 580 per month instead of Rs. 500 as was agreed under Ex. P. 2. This is clear from the recitals in Ex. P. 3. The premises demised is described in the schedule to Ex. P. 3 as consisting of the first and the pccond floors It is clearly stated in Ext. P-3 that additional rooms were constructed in the second floor as per the agreement, Ex. P. 2. It is further stated that by mutual agreement, the number of rooms and the nature of the construction as well as the rent payable have been altered. It is also stated that all the conditions mentioned in Ex. P. 2 will be applicable as far as possible to the lease deed, Ex. P. 3 also. In order to ascertain as to whether the first and the second floors together became a single premises leased to the defendant. Exts. P2 and P3 have to be read together. I have already held that it was contemplated under Ext. P2 that a second floor should be constructed to provide additional accommodation to the tenant. I have also held that it was the intention of the parties when Ex. P. 2 was executed that the first and the second floors should together constitute a single premises, the rent in respect of which being fixed at Rs. 500 per month. The Intention of the parties evidenced by Ex. P. 2 has been carried into effect as is clear from the recitals in Ex. P. 3. By mutual agreement, the nature of construction was changed and the rent was increased from rs. 500 to 580 per month in view of the additional cost incurred by the landlord. The recitals in Ext. P-3 give a clear indication that at any rate from the date of the execution of Ex. P. 3. By mutual agreement, the nature of construction was changed and the rent was increased from rs. 500 to 580 per month in view of the additional cost incurred by the landlord. The recitals in Ext. P-3 give a clear indication that at any rate from the date of the execution of Ex. P. 3 that both the first and the second floors together were to be treated as a single premises, the rent being fixed at Rs. 580 per month. As already mentioned the Schedule to ex. P. 3 mentions the first and the second floor. The rent fixed is Rs. 580 in respect of the entire premises. There is no stipulation in Ex. P. 3 fixing any rent for the second floor. There is no substance in the assertion of the learned counsel for the appellant that the rent was fixed at Rs. 280 per month in respect of the second floor. There is no stipulation either in Ext. P-2 or In Ext. P-3 fixing any separate rent in respect of the second floor, in Ext. P-3, all that Is stated is that in respect of the suit premises consisting of the first and the second floor, the rent payable is Rs. 580 per month. The absence of a separate stipulation of rent for the second floor is a strong circumstance negativing the contention of the appellant that the second floor was the independent subject matter of lease under Ex. P. 3. Clause 4 in Ex. P. 3 refers to delivery of possession after the expiry of the lease of 30-9-1964. The said stipulation refers to delivery of the entire premises including the second floor, the possession of which was delivered on the date of execution of Ext. P-3. This is another circumstance clearly indicating that the first and second floors together were treated as one premises. There is also evidence to show that there is only one stair-case which leads to first and the second floors. If the second floor was intended to be treated as an independent premises, one would have expected a separate stair-case being fixed to give a separate and independent access to the residents of the second floor. It appears that the defendant also understood that the first and the second floors together constitute one premises. Ex. If the second floor was intended to be treated as an independent premises, one would have expected a separate stair-case being fixed to give a separate and independent access to the residents of the second floor. It appears that the defendant also understood that the first and the second floors together constitute one premises. Ex. P. 7 is a reply given by the defendant's advocate to the notice given on behalf of the plaintiffs. This is what is stated in Ext. P-7:"that my client admits of having been the tenant of your client in respect of the notice schedule premises on a monthly rental of rs. 630. "though the rent is Rs. 580, there is a reference to Rs. 630. Additional of rs. 50 is in regard to one room, the possession of which the landlord was to get. The rent of Rs. 50 for that room is included and the total amount is specified as Rs. 630. The premises referred to in the notice given on behalf of the plaintiffs in Ex. P. 6 consists of the first and the second floor. Ex. P. 7 indicates that the defendant, did not treat the second floor as a separate and independent premises taken on lease. In another letter written by the defendant's Advocate, Ext. P-9 dated 19-10-1965, this is what is stated:"may I invite your attention to your notice issued to my client on 7-8-1964. The lease of the premises is composite and as indicated in the detailed schedule to your said notice and having regard to the rent claimed viz. , at Rs. 630 p. m. it is apparent that the first notice can only be treated and does operate as waiver in law of the terms of the requisition contained in your said notice of 7-8-1964. "the contents of Ext. P-9 also clearly indicate that the defendant treated the first and the second floor as constituting a single premises taken on lease. All these circumstances, in my opinion, clearly indicate that the first and the second floor together constituted a single premises, the rent of which was fixed by mutual agreement at Rs. 530 per month with effect from the date of execution of Ext. P-3. It was urged by Sri Gulur Srinivasa rao, learned counsel for the appellant that the fact that Ex. 530 per month with effect from the date of execution of Ext. P-3. It was urged by Sri Gulur Srinivasa rao, learned counsel for the appellant that the fact that Ex. P. 3 is described an an additional lease deed indicates that under the said lease deed only the second floor was leased as an independent premises. Ext. P-3 has been described as an additional lease deed because it is an agreement which has been executed in pursuance of Ex. P. 2. It became necessary to execute Ex. P. 3 by mutual agreement because the nature and type of construction of the second floor as well as the rent payable were altered. Subject to these alterations by mutual agreement, it is clear that Ex. P. 8 was executed in pursuance of agreement arrived at between the parties as per Ex. P. 2. Ex. P. 3 has been described as an additional lease deed in order to indicate that Ex. P. 2 and P. 3 should be read together and that ex. P. 3 should not be read as an independent, lease deed, pertaining only to the second floor. There is therefore no substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that, the description of Ext. P-3 as an additional lease deed Indicates that the second floor was an independent premises leased to the defendant. Sri Srinivasa Rao also relied upon the fact that only Rs. 30 has been paid as stamp on Ex. P. 3. Even assuming that inadequate stamp has been affixed, that does not by itself indicate that only the second floor was leased to the defendant as an independent premises. ( 12 ) SRI Gulur Srinivasa Rao next contended that in order to constitute a single lease in respect of the first and the second floors together, it was necessary for the plaintiffs to show that the first floor which was taken on lease under Ext. P-2 was surrendered to the landlord and. that thereafter the first and the second floors together were taken on lease under Ext. P-3. As the defendant was already in possession of the first floor, it was wholly unnecessary to surrender possession of the same and take back possession of the same along with the second floor. P-2 was surrendered to the landlord and. that thereafter the first and the second floors together were taken on lease under Ext. P-3. As the defendant was already in possession of the first floor, it was wholly unnecessary to surrender possession of the same and take back possession of the same along with the second floor. I have already held that the second floor was constructed only as an addition to the first floor as per the original agreement, Ex. P. 2. As additional accommodation was provided as per the agreement, Ex. P. 2. it was wholly unnecessary to. resort to the unnecessary ceremony of delivering possession of the first floor and taking back possession of the same along with the second floor. There is therefore no substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the first and the second floors have been independently leased to the tenant for rents of Rs. 300 and Rs. 280 respectively and that therefore S. 31 of the Act is not attracted. ( 13 ) IT was lastly contended by Sri Gulur Srinivasa Rao, learned counsel for the appellant that S 31 of the Act is void and inoperative as it violates Art. 14 of the Constitution. The plea in this behalf has been taken in paragraph 12 of the written statement which reads as follows: -"it is also submitted alternatively that the plaintiff can only ask for eviction in the rent control court. This is because the exception created in favour of premises fetching a rent of Rs. 500 and over per month is arbitrary, discriminatory and offends Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is a void provision and is non est in law and plaintiff cannot take advantage of it and file a suit 'dehors' the provisions of the HRC. Act. In law, the provision is ineffective and this court has to ignored it. "the defendant who raised the aforesaid contention pressed the trial court as well as the lower appellate court to make a reference under S. 113 of CPC and seek the opinion of the High Court. Both the courts below after examining the contentions of the defendant in this behalf declined to make a reference under S. 113 of CPC as they were satisfied that S. 31 of the act is not void as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution. Both the courts below after examining the contentions of the defendant in this behalf declined to make a reference under S. 113 of CPC as they were satisfied that S. 31 of the act is not void as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution. The same point has been canvassed again in this Court. As the constitutional validity of S. 31 of the Act was questioned by the appellant, the learned Advocate General was notified In the matter. Accordingly, he has appeared and made his submissions, ( 14 ) SRI Gulur Srinivasa Rao does not complain that the classification between residential and non-residential buildings made under S. 31 of the Act violates Art. 14 of the Constitution. His only complaint is about the classification of non-residential buildings on the basis of rent. Non- residential buildings fetching rents exceeding Rs. 500 per month are exempted from the operation of part V of the Act. Non-residential buildings fetching rents of Rs. 500 and less per month are governed by the provisions of part V of the Act which contains S. 21 relating to eviction. This classification, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, is not based on any rational classification having any nexus with the object of the act. He therefore urges that S. 31 of the Act is void as offending Art. 14. The learned Advocate General submitted that having regard to the object and scheme of the Act, it cannot be said that the classification made under s. 31 of the Act is in any way violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is clear from the preamble and the scheme of the Act that the object of the Act is to protect poorer classes of tenants from either being evicted from the premises or being compelled to pay higher rent by reason of shortage of accommodation and general economic situation. The legislature exempted non-residential buildings fetching a rent of more than rs. 500 p. m. from the operation of Part V of the Act on the ground that the tenants who have the capacity to pay such higher rents are not persons who need the protection given by the Act under Part V. Persons who are in a position to take on lease non-residential premises paying a rent exceeding rs. 500 p. m. from the operation of Part V of the Act on the ground that the tenants who have the capacity to pay such higher rents are not persons who need the protection given by the Act under Part V. Persons who are in a position to take on lease non-residential premises paying a rent exceeding rs. 500 per month are fairly affluent persons and cannot be considered as persons who become victims of exploitation at the hands of the landlords taking advantage of the paucity of accommodation. Hence the classification of exempted buildings on the basis of rent is a reasonable one consistent with the object of the Act and is not discriminatory. Similar view is taken by the Madras High Court in Sha Matumal Mishimal v. Natha Rukmani Ammal (1964) 1 Mad. L. J. 312. dealing with the similar provision contained in the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960. The Madras high Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 30 of the Madras act which exempted non-residential buildings of the rental value of rs. 400 and above per month from the operation of the Act. I respectfully agree with the view taken by the Madras High Court. There is absolutely no substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellent that S. 31 of the Act is discriminatory and violates Art. 14 of the Constitution. ( 15 ) FOR the reasons stated above, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs. ( 16 ) IN the circumstances of the case the appellant is given three months time to vacate the premises. --- *** --- .