ORDER K. Sadasivan, J. The revision petitioner was the 1st respondent in B.R.C. 4/68 on the file of the Rent Control Court (Principal Munsiff of Shertallai). The petition for eviction was allowed on the ground that rent was in arrears, and the tenant was directed to deposit arrears within one month. The period of one month allowed, expired on 7th November 1969; but by that time, only part of the arrears was deposited. The balance was deposited only on 9th November 1969. A petition was accordingly filed by him to condone the delay. That was dismissed by the court saying that the court has no jurisdiction to extend the time in the circumstances of the case. It is from that order the tenant has come up in revision. A preliminary objection was raised by the respondent-landlords against the maintainability of the present revision. According to the learned counsel the order under revision is an appealable one and the petitioner ought to have taken it in appeal before the appellate authority. Counsel would point out that when an appeal forum is provided by the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (shortly stated the Act), a party aggrieved by an order of the Rent Controller cannot by-pass that forum and come before this court in revision. I think the stand taken by the learned counsel is sustainable. Section 18 (1) (b) of the Act provides that:- "(b) any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Control Court may, within thirty days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction..." Learned counsel for the revision petitioner argue that the expression 'an order' in the above section can refer only to the final order passed in the Rent Control proceedings; that is to say, the order allowing or refusing eviction. Other orders like the present one, passed in the interim, are not appealable according to him and from such orders a revision to this court can lie. In support of the position, he pointed out that the adjective "an" is used in the section in contra-distinction to ''any'' which is the adjective used in other sections like section 4 (6) (e) and section 20. In support of the position, he pointed out that the adjective "an" is used in the section in contra-distinction to ''any'' which is the adjective used in other sections like section 4 (6) (e) and section 20. Section 4 (6) (e) runs: "(e) Any landlord who is aggrieved by any order passed...." And in section 20 the relevant expression runs:” "20(1)...call for and examine the records relating to any order passed.." According to the learned counsel ''any'' would indicate an indefinite number and can, therefore, take in all orders passed under the section, while the adjective "an" can indicate only a definite and particular order, which according to him can only be the final order. I do not think there is any force in this contention. I fail to see any such distinction between "an" and "any". The dictionary meaning of "an" which is usually called the indefinite article, means, "one" "one or any" without special emphasis on the number. "It is used before nouns of the singular number denoting an individual object, or a quality individualised before collective nouns, and also before plural nouns when the adjective few or the phrase great many or good many is interposed; as, a dog, an owl, a house, a man, a hundred, a fleet, an army, a regiment, a few persons, a great many days." So also "any" would mean, "one indifferently out of a number; one indiscriminately of whatever kind or quantity." (Vide Webster's New International Dictionary, Vol. I.) I am led to think, therefore, that the two adjectives indicate one and the same situation and if they are interchanged I do not think the meaning would change. Section 18 (1) (b) even if read as, "any person aggrieved by 'any order'", instead of "any person aggrieved by 'an order' ", the meaning cannot change. It is difficult, in the circumstances, to subscribe myself to the view of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, that the adjective "an" is used in section 18 (1) (b) to denote the final order to be passed in the present case, and that alone. The petitioner ought to have filed an appeal from the order to the appellate authority. The petitioner ought to have filed an appeal from the order to the appellate authority. If an appeal lies against the adjudication directly to the High Court or to another court subordinate to it, it has no power to exercise its revisional jurisdiction, but where the decision itself is not appealable to the High Court directly or indirectly, exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court would not be deemed excluded." (Vide A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 497 Khanna v. Dillon). "Appellate authorities are special tribunals created by the statute and do not form part of the hierarchy of the established civil courts of the State;" as was held by a Full Bench of this court in Ouseph Vareed v. Mary, 1968 K.L.T. 583 F.B. The Judge functioning as an appellate authority is "persona designata" and when the section provides an appeal to that authority it can be filed only before that authority. By-passing that authority, no revision can be filed before this court. The revision petition, therefore, fails and it is dismissed. The copy of the order produced will be returned for presentation to the proper court, if so advised.