JUDGMENT T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, J. 1. The appeal filed by the plaintiff in O. S.143 of 1958 on the file of the Sub Court, Cochin, arises out of a proceeding for restitution under S.144, C.P.C. 2. The suit was filed by the plaintiff for recovery of damages with interest thereon on account of the alleged unlawful termination of the contract by the defendant and also for recovery of Rs. 10,000/- deposited by the plaintiff for due fulfilment of the contract. The suit was decreed by the trial court allowing the plaintiff to recover from the defendant Rs. 69,995.62 by way of damages with interest at 6% per annum and also the sum of Rs. 10,000/- with interest thereon at 6 % from the date of the decree. The defendant filed A. S. 452 of 1962 in this Court against the decree and judgment of the trial court. During the pendency of the appeal the plaintiff executed the decree as a result of which the defendant deposited the decree amount on 20-8-1963 which was withdrawn by the plaintiff decree holder on 24-8-1963. A. S. 452 of 1962 was disposed of by this Court on 11-12-1966 dismissing the plaintiff's suit regarding the claim for damages but confirming the decree for the return of the security amount. This Court awarded interest at the rate of 3% per annum on the security amount payable by the defendant. 3. Because of the partial reversal of the decree of the trial court by the decision in A. S. 452 of 1962 the defendant filed E.A. 231 of 1966 before the execution court for recovery of Rs. 1,17,166.79 with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum. The court below had directed the plaintiff to pay Rs. 1,17,166.79 with interest at 6% per annum from the date of withdrawal, viz., 24-8-1963 till recovery of the amount. The appeal is directed against that order. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant raised the following grounds. (1) The lower court should not have awarded interest on the amount claimed by way of restitution. (2) The rate of interest awarded is high. The appeal is directed against that order. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant raised the following grounds. (1) The lower court should not have awarded interest on the amount claimed by way of restitution. (2) The rate of interest awarded is high. (3) The liability to pay interest will if at all commence only from 11-12-1966 the date of the reversal of the decision of the trial court, and (4) The amount claimed by way of restitution includes the costs of the trial court realised by the plaintiff on which interest is not awardable We shall now examine these contentions. Point No. 1. Counsel for the appellant contended relying on the decision in B. N. Railway v. Ruttanji Ramji AIR 1938 PC 67 , and Union of India v Watkins and Co. AIR 1966 SC 275 , that even interest under S.144, C.P.C. is awardable only when it is payable by contract, custom or any law. The decisions referred to deal with the right of a plaintiff to claim interest for the period anterior to the suit for recovery of a sum of money. They have absolutely nothing to do with a case arising under S.144, C.P.C. The power to award interest in a case arising under S.144, C.P.C. depends upon the terms of that provision. It reads: "(1) Where and in so far as decree or an order is varied or reversed, the Court of first instance shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or order or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed; and, for this purpose, the Court may make any orders, including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damage, compensation and mesne profits which are properly consequential on such variation or reversal. (2) No suit shall be instituted for the purpose of obtaining any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application under sub-s.(1)." 5. (2) No suit shall be instituted for the purpose of obtaining any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application under sub-s.(1)." 5. The consequences arising on account of the variation or reversal of a decree are therefore contained in S.144, C.P.C. The said provision imposes a duty on the Court to order restitution, when an order or decree is varied or reversed and in ordering restitution it is open to the court to award interest which is properly consequential on such variation or reversal. S.144, C.P.C. only embodies the principle that the acts of court should not injure the suitors. The jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent in every court. In Dorsami Ayyar v Annasami Ayyar ILR 23 Mad. 306, Subrahmania Ayyar, J., pointed out: ''The principle of the doctrine of restitution is that on the reversal of a judgment the law raises an obligation in the party to the record who received the benefit of the erroneous judgment to make restitution to the other party for what he had lost. (Bank of the United States v. Bank of Washington). That obligation it is the duty of the Courts to enforce unless it is shown that restitution would be clearly contrary to the real justice of the case." 6. Identical are the observations pointed out by Mahajan, J. in Bhagwant Singh v. Sri Kishen Das, AIR 1953 SC 136 . His Lordship said: "An order of restitution in the manner asked for in the circumstances of this case would be contrary to the principles of the decline of restitution which is that on the reversal of a judgment the law raises an obligation on the party to the record who received the benefit of the erroneous judgment to make restitution to the other party for what he had lost and that it is the duty of the Court to enforce that obligation unless it is shown that restitution would be clearly contrary to the real justice of the case." As was pointed out in Rodger v Comptoir D'escompte De Paris (1871) LR 3 PC 465 at p. 475: ".... one of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the Suitors and when the expression 'the act of the Court' is used, it does not mean merely the act of the Primary Court, or of any intermediate Court of appeal, but the act of the Court as a whole, from the lowest Court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case." 7. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Jai Berham v. Kedar Nath Marwari 49 Indian Appeals 351 at 355 said: "It is the duty of the Court under S.144 of the Civil Procedure Code to 'Place the parties in the position which they would have occupied, but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed.' Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the Court to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved." S.144, C.P.C. is not exhaustive of the principle of restitution. In cases falling within the terms of S.144, C.P.C. restitution can be claimed as of right. In other cases it depends upon the discretion of the court which will also be exercised when the justice of the case demands it. In matters governed by S.144, C.P.C. the extent of the power to grant restitution is indicated by the Section itself when it specifies that it extends to cause such restitution as will place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed and for this purpose the court may make any orders including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest etc. The object of restitution spoken to by S.144, C.P.C. is to restore the status quo ante between the parties. 8. When a sum of money is deposited in execution of a first court's decree and drawn by the plaintiff and subsequently the decree is reversed by the court of appeal, it is an invariable rule that the decree holder should reimburse that money drawn by him with interest thereon because of the reversal of the decree in his favour. 8. When a sum of money is deposited in execution of a first court's decree and drawn by the plaintiff and subsequently the decree is reversed by the court of appeal, it is an invariable rule that the decree holder should reimburse that money drawn by him with interest thereon because of the reversal of the decree in his favour. Lord Cairns in Rodger v. The Comptoir D'Escompte De Paris (1871) LR 3 PC 465 at p. 475 already referred to observed: "It is contended, on the part of the Respondents here, that the principal sum being restored to the present Petitioners, they have no right to recover from them any interest. It is obvious that, if that is so, injury, and very grave injury, will be done to the Petitioners. They will by reason of an act of the Court have paid a sum which it is now ascertained was ordered to be paid by mistake and wrongfully. They will recover that sum after the lapse of a considerable time, but they will recover it without the ordinary fruits which are derived from the enjoyment of money. On the other hand, these fruit will have been enjoyed, or may have been enjoyed, by the person who by mistake and by wrong obtained possession of the money under a judgment which has been reversed. So far, therefore, as principle is concerned, their Lordships have no doubt or hesitation in saying that injustice will be done to the Petitioners, and that the perfect judicial determination which it must be the object of all Courts to arrive at, will not have been arrived at unless the persons who have had their money Improperly taken from them have the money restored to them, with interest, during the time that the money has been withheld." 9. Lord Atkin pointed out in L. Curan Ditta v. T. R. Ditta AIR 1935 PC 12 . "The duty of the Court when awarding restitution under. S.144 of the Code is imperative. It shall place the applicant in the position in which he would have been if the order had not been made: and for this purpose the Court is armed with powers (the "may" is empowering, not discretionary) as to mesne profits, interest and so forth. "The duty of the Court when awarding restitution under. S.144 of the Code is imperative. It shall place the applicant in the position in which he would have been if the order had not been made: and for this purpose the Court is armed with powers (the "may" is empowering, not discretionary) as to mesne profits, interest and so forth. As long ago as 1871 the judicial Committee in 3 PC 465 made it clear that interest was part of the normal relief given in restitution and this decision seems rightly to have grounded the practice in India in such cases." 10. The Section itself provides that in order to place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for the erroneous decree it is open to the court to make any orders including the payment of interest. The jurisdiction therefore to award interest is derived from the Section itself. Even therefore apart from the Decisions we have no hesitation to hold that on the terms and content of S.144, C.P.C. the Court has jurisdiction to award interest in appropriate cases. Point No. 2 Learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that interest at the rate of 6% per annum allowed by the court below is excessive and submitted that interest at 3% per annum is alone awardable. Unlike S.34, C.P.C. the rate of interest to be awarded under S.144, C.P.C., is not specified. The rate should depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is admitted that the amount deposited in Court by the respondent was withdrawn by the appellant. It has not been shown that the amount in his hands was earning only 3% per annum. The rate of interest to be awarded under S.144, C.P.C. is purely a matter of discretion of the Court of first instance depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. Counsel for the appellant relied on the decisions in Mahabir Prasad v Durga Datta AIR 1961 SC 990 at P. 993 and Md. Taoi Khan v. Raja Ram AIR 1943 All. 267 at p. 270. to contend that 4% interest alone should be awarded. The former decision was concerned with the rate of interest payable for the period subsequent to the date of the suit. Taoi Khan v. Raja Ram AIR 1943 All. 267 at p. 270. to contend that 4% interest alone should be awarded. The former decision was concerned with the rate of interest payable for the period subsequent to the date of the suit. Their Lordships observed: "As regards interest pendente lite until the date of realisation, such interest was within the discretion of the Court. The rate fixed is 6 per cent which, in the circumstances and according to the practice of Courts, appears high. Interest shall be calculated at 4 per cent per annum." 11. We do not think that this decision can have any bearing on the question before us. In Md. Taoi Khan v. Raja Ram AIR 1943 All. 267 at p. 270, which no doubt was a case covered by S.144, C.P.C., it was observed: "The ordinary rule is that in the absence of special circumstances court rate of interest should be allowed and, in our opinion, no special circumstances were proved in this case and the Courts below were clearly in error in allowing the judgment debtors interest at 6 per cent per annum and the interest which could have been allowed was only 3 per cent per annum but having regard to the special circumstances of this case we have come to the conclusion that no interest should be allowed." 12. We are unable to agree with the above proposition. So long as there is no limitation on the rate of interest payable under S.144, C.P.C. we cannot subscribe to the proposition that interest awardable is only at the rate of 3 per cent per annum. As we have already stated the rate of interest awardable is a matter depending upon the facts of each case. The appellant was given 6 % interest on the damages he claimed from the date of suit. In these circumstances, we are of the view that no interference is called for in regard to the rate of interest awarded by the learned judge. Point No. 3 This point raises the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that interest is payable only from the date of the reversal of the decision of the trial court, viz., 11-2-1966. Point No. 3 This point raises the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that interest is payable only from the date of the reversal of the decision of the trial court, viz., 11-2-1966. This is not warranted by the provisions of the Section and no special circumstances are brought out why in this particular case the respondent should be deprived of the interest from the date of the withdrawal of the amount by the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that O.41 R.5, C.P.C. enables his client to execute the decree and realise the decree amount even during the pendency of the appeal against the decree and the retention of the money became unlawful only from the date of the reversal of the decree of the court of first instance. In out view, this cannot have any significance at all. In view of the content of S.144, C.P.C., it is necessary to place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree etc. 13. On the other hand, counsel for the respondent contended relying on the decision in N. Subramonia Iyer v. R. Venkitachalam Iyer 1968 KLT 442 , that in every case under S.144, C. P. C. when decree for money is reversed it is obligatory on the part of the court when ordering restitution to award interest also irrespective of the question whether the money deposited in court was drawn by the decree holder. In the case before us the money deposited was drawn by the appellant and it is therefore not necessary to consider the correctness of the decision in N. Subramonia Iyer v. R. Venkitachalam Iyer 1968 KLT 442 . which was challenged by the appellant's counsel. Rodger v The Comptoir D'Escompte De Paris (1871) LR 3 PC 465 at p. 475, was a case where money had been drawn and utilised by the successful party under a decree which was subsequently reversed. Their Lordships of the Privy Council significantly enough stated that an act of Court should not injure any of the Suitors and it should make every order which is fairly and properly consequential on the reversal of a judgment. We cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition of law stated in N. Subramonia Iyer v. R. Venkitachalam Iyer 1968 KLT 442 . We cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition of law stated in N. Subramonia Iyer v. R. Venkitachalam Iyer 1968 KLT 442 . Since the facts in the case before us are entirely different it is unnecessary for us to place the appeal before a larger bench. We therefore hold that the appellant is liable for interest from the date on which he withdraw the money from court. Point No. 4. Counsel for the appellant contended that his client is not liable for interest on costs. We cannot accept this contention for the simple reason that there is nothing in S.144, C.P.C., to prohibit the same. The appeal is without merit and we dismiss the same with costs.