B. J. DIVAN, T. U. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners in both these petitions challenge the validity of secs. 3 and 4 of the Bombay Relief Undertakings (Special provisions) Act 1958 (which is hereinafter referred to as the State Act) and the notifications issued by the State Government under these sections. In Spl. C. A. 638/69 the petitioner has further challenged the validity of secs. 18a and 18f (1) (c) of the Industries (Development and Regulations) Act of 1951 (which is hereinafter referred to as the Central Act) as well as the notifications issued under sec. 18a thereof. ( 2 ) SO for as Spl. C. A. 589/69 is concerned the facts are that the petitioner is a partnership firm and the third respondent The New Manekchowk Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act 1913 The said company owns a factory namely a Textile Mill which has 628 looms including 100 automatic looms and is running about 28000 spindles. This company is found to be employing about 1700 workers at its factory. The petitioner firm is having business with the third respondent and as such it had some dealings with it. It is found that on 23rd August 1968 respondent No. 3 the company purchased 100 bales of cotton from the petitioner firm on condition of 80 of cash payment. In fulfillment of this agreement a cheque for the amount of Rs. 62 500 was given by the third respondent to the petitioner firm. This cheque was dishonoured and subsequent cheques which were issued were also dishonoured. The petitioner firm claims that its total dues under the above referred transactions amount to Rs. 78 309. 65 ( 3 ) IT is an admitted position that on 11th November 1968 the textile mill run by the third respondent ultimately closed down. ( 4 ) SO far as Spl. C. A. No. 638/69 is concerned there also the petitioner is a partnership firm. Its claim is that it has been supplying cotton bales to the above referred New Manekchowk Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. and in respect of the sale of these bales an amount of Rs. 6 34 236. 26 has become due to it as on 31st January. 1969. The said New Manek chowk Spinning and Weaving Co. Its claim is that it has been supplying cotton bales to the above referred New Manekchowk Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. and in respect of the sale of these bales an amount of Rs. 6 34 236. 26 has become due to it as on 31st January. 1969. The said New Manek chowk Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. failed to make payment of this amount and therefore this amount remains due to the petitioner firm even at present. ( 5 ) IT is an admitted fact that Central Government had ordered investigation under sec. 15 of the Central Act and since ultimately it was found that the above referred New Manekchowk Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. mill was managing its affairs in a manner highly detrimental to public interest a notification under sec. 18a of the Central Act was issued by the Central Government on 14th February 1969 Sec. 18a of the Central Act is in the following terms:18 (1) If the Central Government is of opinion that (A) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of sec. 16 has failed to comply with such directions or (B) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under sec 15 (whether or not any directions have been issued to the undertaking in pursuance of sec. 16) is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interestthe Central Government may by notified order authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of the undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order. (2) Any notified order issued under sub-sec (1) shall have effect for such period not exceeding five years as may be specified in the order:provided that if the Central Government is of opinion that it is expedient in the public interest that any such notified order should continue to have effect after the expiry of the period of five years aforesaid it may from time to time issue directions for such continuance or such period not exceeding two years at a time as may be specified in the direction so however that the total period of such continuance (after the expiry of the said period of five years) does not exceed ten years and where any such direction is issued a copy there of shall be laid as soon as may be before both Houses of Parliament. EXPLANATION:-THE power to authorise a body of persons under this section to take over the management of an industrial undertaking which is a company includes also a power to appoint any individual firm or company to be the managing agent of the industrial undertaking on such terms and conditions as the Central Government may think fit. BY the notification which is issued by the Central Government under this section on 14th February 1969 Gujarat State Textile Corporation Limited is appointed as the authorised controller to take over the management of the whole undertaking of The New Manekchowk Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. This notification is in the following terms:ministry of Industrial Development and Company Affairs (Department of Industrial Development) order new Delhi the 14th February 1969s. No. O. 620/18/a/idra/69-Whereas the Central Government is of the opinion that the New Manekchowk Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd. Ahmedabad an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under sec. 15 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act 1951 (65 of 1951) is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to public interest;now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by sec. 15 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act 1951 (65 of 1951) is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to public interest;now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by sec. 18a of the said Act the Central Government hereby authorises the Gujarat State Textile Corporation Limited Ahmedabad (herein after referred to as Authorised Controller) to take over the management of the whole of the said undertaking namely the New Manekchowk Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd. Ahmedabad subject to the following terms and conditions namely:- (I) the Authorised Controller shall comply with all directions issued from time to time by the Central Government; (II) the Authorised Controller shall hold office for one year from the date of publication in the official Gazette of this order. The Central Government may terminate the appointment of the Authorised Controller earlier if it considers necessary to do so. THIS order shall have effect for a period of one year commencing on the date of its publication in the official Gazette. ( 6 ) THERE is also another Act namely Bombay Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act 1958 which is referred to in this judgment as State Act and with which we are concerned in both these petitions. This Act has come into force on 27th December 1958 It is an admitted position that it has received Presidents assent in due course. It is amended by Bombay Act 1 of 1960. The long title of this Act is as under:an Act to make temporary provisions for industrial relations and other matters to enable to the State Government to conduct or to provide loan guarantee or financial assistance for the conduct of certain industrial undertakings as a measure of preventing unemployment or of unemployment relief. THE preamble of this Act is also in the same terms. The petitioners have in these petitions challenged the vires of secs. 3 and 4 of this Act. It may be noted here that the Act consists only of four sections and one schedule. Sec. 1 provides for the title and the extent of the Act and sec. 2 provides for definitions. Sub-sec. (1) of sec. 2 defines the word as under: (I) industry means any business trade undertaking manufacture of calling or employers and includes any calling service employment handicraft or industrial occupation or vocation of workmen and the word industrial shall be construed accordinglysecs. 2 provides for definitions. Sub-sec. (1) of sec. 2 defines the word as under: (I) industry means any business trade undertaking manufacture of calling or employers and includes any calling service employment handicraft or industrial occupation or vocation of workmen and the word industrial shall be construed accordinglysecs. 3 and 4 of this Act are in the following terms: 3 (1) If at any time it appears to the State Government necessary to do so the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette declare that an industrial undertaking specified in the notification whether started acquired or otherwise taken over by the State Government and carried on or proposed to be carried on by itself or under its authority or to which any loan guarantee or other financial assistance has been provided by the State Government shall with effect from the date specified for the purpose in the notification be conducted to serve as a measure of preventing unemployment or of unemployment relief and the undertaking shall accordingly be deemed to be a relief undertaking for the purposes of this Act. (2) A notification under sub-sec. (1) shall have effect for such period not exceeding twelve months as may be specified in the notification; but it shall be renewable by like notifications from time to time for further periods not exceeding twelve months at a time so however that all the periods in the aggregate do not exceed five years. 4 Notwithstanding any law usage custom contract instrument decree order award submission settlement standing order or other provision whatsoever the State Government may by notification in the official Gazette direct that:- (A) in relation to any relief undertaking and in respect of the period for which the relief undertaking continues as such under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 4 Notwithstanding any law usage custom contract instrument decree order award submission settlement standing order or other provision whatsoever the State Government may by notification in the official Gazette direct that:- (A) in relation to any relief undertaking and in respect of the period for which the relief undertaking continues as such under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 3- (I) all or any of the laws in the Schedule to this Act or any provisions thereof shall not apply and such relief undertaking shall be exempt therefrom or shall if so directed by the State Government be applied with such modifications which do not however affect the policy of the said laws as may be specified in the notification; (II) all or any of the agreements settlements awards or standing orders made under any of the laws in the Schedule to this Act which may be applicable to the undertaking immediately before it was acquired or taken over by the State Government or before any loan guarantee or other financial assistance was provided to it by or with the approval of the State Government for being run as a relief under taking shall be suspended in operation or shall if so directed by the State Government be applied with such modifications as may be specified in the notification; (III) rights privileges obligations and liabilities shall be determined and be enforceable in accordance with clauses (i) and (ii) and the notification; (IV) any right privilege obligation or liability accrued or incurred before the undertaking was declared a relief undertaking and an remedy for the enforcement thereof shall be suspended and all proceedings relative thereto pending before any Court tribunal officer or authority shall be stayed; (B) the right privilege obligation or liability referred to in clause (a) (iv) shall on the notification ceasing to have force revive and be enforceable and the proceedings referred to therein shall be continued:provided that in computing the period of limitation for the enforcement of such right privilege obligation or liability the period during which it was suspended under clause (a) (iv) shall be excluded notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force. (2) A notification under sub-sec. (1) shall have effect from such date not being earlier than the date referred to in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 3 as may be specified therein and the provisions of sec. (2) A notification under sub-sec. (1) shall have effect from such date not being earlier than the date referred to in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 3 as may be specified therein and the provisions of sec. 21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904 shall apply to the power to issue such notification. THE Schedule which is referred to in sec. 4 (1) (a) (i) mentions two Central Acts namely The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 1946 (XX of 1946) and The Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (XIV of 1947) and two Bombay Acts namely The Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 (Bom. XI of 1947) and The Bombay Shops and Establishments Act 1948 (Bom. LXXIV of 1948) and one Saurashtra Act one Hyderabad Act and two Madhya Pradesh Acts with which we are not concerned in this petition. Under the provisions of secs. 3 and 4 of the State Act which are quoted above the State Government has issued two notifications on 21 February 1969 The notification issued under sec. 3 of the State Act says that with effect from 21st February 1969 the New Manekchowk Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. to which a guarantee for the advance of a loan of rupees twenty lakhs by the State Bank of India has been provided by the Government of Gujarat shall with effect from 21st February 1969 be conducted to serve as a measure of unemployment relief and shall accordingly be deemed to be a relief undertaking for the purpose of the said Act. This notification when it was issued was to have effect for a period of 12 months. It is found at Annexure B to the petition in Spl. C. A. No. 589/69. As stated above on the same date the State Government issued another notification under sec. 4 of the State Act issuing direction that in relation to the New Manekchowk Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. Ahmedabad which is declared to be a Relief Undertaking under sec. 3 of the State Act all rights privileges obligations and liabilities accrued or incurred before the undertaking was declared a relief undertaking and any remedy for the enforcement thereof shall be suspended with effect from 21st February 19696 It is obvious that as a result of the above notification under sec. 3 of the State Act all rights privileges obligations and liabilities accrued or incurred before the undertaking was declared a relief undertaking and any remedy for the enforcement thereof shall be suspended with effect from 21st February 19696 It is obvious that as a result of the above notification under sec. 4 of the State Act the debts due to the petitioners have been suspended during the period the notification issued under sec. 3 remains in force. 7 Therefore the case of the petitioners is that by these notifications issued under secs. 3 and 4 of the State Act their dues are suspended and they are deprived of their right to recover these dues for the period during which the notifications in question remain in force. The petitioners have therefore challenged in these petitions the validity of secs. 3and 4 of the State Act as well as the notification issued under them. 8 As stated above the petitioners in Spl. C. A. No. 638/69 have also challenged the validity of secs. 18a and 18e (1) (c) of the Central Act and the notification issued under sec. 18a. But this challenge does not survive in view of entry No. 19 of 9th Schedule attached to the Constitution read with Art. 31b thereof. The learned Advocate of the petitioner concerned has conceded this position. We shall therefore confine our attention only to the challenge by the petitioners to the vires of secs. 3 and 4 of the State Act and the validity of the notifications issued under these two sections. 9 Shortly stated following are the main points which are raised on behalf of the petitioners by their learned advocates in these petitions. (1) According to them secs. 3 and 4 of the State Act are ultra vires Arts. 245 and 246 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as they encroach upon the legislative powers of Parliament. In other words the competency of the State Legislature to enact these sections is challenged by them. (2) They have further contended that the impugned secs. (1) According to them secs. 3 and 4 of the State Act are ultra vires Arts. 245 and 246 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as they encroach upon the legislative powers of Parliament. In other words the competency of the State Legislature to enact these sections is challenged by them. (2) They have further contended that the impugned secs. 3 and 4 of the State Act are ultra vires the Constitution inasmuch as they delegate in favour of the State Government wide and excessive powers without fixing any guide lines and they thus enable the State Government to discriminate between persons falling within the same classification thereby infringing the fundamental rights of equal protection contemn plated by Art. 14 of the Constitution. (3) Further according to the petitioners these two impugned sections of the State Act also infringe the fundamental right to hold property contemplated by Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution and (4) It was alternatively contended on behalf of the petitioners that even if it is believed that the impugned secs. 3 and 4 of the State Act are intra vires the Constitution the notifications issued under these two sections are vitiated because notification under sec. 3 is beyond the scope of that section and the notification issued under sec. 4 is issued by the Government without applying its mind. THESE are the only four points which are raised on behalf of the petitioners. We propose to consider these points in the order in which they are set out. 10 So far as the first point is concerned it relates to the competency of the State Legislature to enact the State Act. The argument is that if reference is made to entry No. 52 of the First List of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution it would be found that it refers to industries the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. It was argued on behalf of the petitioners that the establishment known as The New Manekchowk Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. is a cotton textile industry the control of which is taken over by the Central Government under sec. 18a of the Central Act. It is said that under these circumstances it was not competent for the State Legislature to make an enactment with regard to this industry. Ltd. is a cotton textile industry the control of which is taken over by the Central Government under sec. 18a of the Central Act. It is said that under these circumstances it was not competent for the State Legislature to make an enactment with regard to this industry. In this connection our attention was also drawn to entry No. 24 of the Second List (State List) of the 7th Schedule which describes the subject in the following words: industries subject to the provisions of entries 7 and 52 of List I. ( 7 ) ENTRY of the First List is with regard to the industries declared by Parliament by law to be necessary for the purpose of defence or for the prosecution of war. So far as these petitions are concerned this entry is not relevant. But the relevant entry is entry 52 to which we have already made a reference above. Therefore what entry 24 of the State List provides is that the State Legislature can make an enactment with regard to those Industries which are not covered by entry 52 of the First List. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners was that since the industry in question is clearly covered by an entry 52 of the First List it was not competent for the State Legislature to make any enactment with regard to this industry under entry 24 of the Second List of the 7th Schedule. In support of this argument our attention was also drawn to sec. 20 of the Central Act which is in the following terms:20 After the commencement of this Act it shall not be competent for any State Government or a local authority to take over the management or control of any industrial undertaking under any law for the time being in force which authorizes any such Government or local authority to do so. POINTING to the provisions of this section the learned Advocates of the petitioners contented that it was not open either to the State Legislature or to the State Government to take over the management and control of the industry conducted by New Manekchowk Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. and therefore also the State Act should be struck down as ultra vires and void. Ltd. and therefore also the State Act should be struck down as ultra vires and void. 11 In reply to these Contentions the learned Advocates of the respondents contended that the State Act really falls within entries 22 23 and 24 of the 3rd List (Concurrent List) of 7th Schedule and neither under entry 52 of the First nor under entry 24 of the Second List. In order to appreciate the contentions of the respondents it would be proper to know what these three entries of the Concurrent List provide. These entries are in the following terms: 22 Trade unions; industrial and labour disputes. 23 Social security and social insurance; employment and unemployment. 24 Welfare of labour including conditions of work provident funds employers liability workmens compensation invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits. ON behalf of the respondents it was pointed out that with a view to decide whether a particular enactment is within or beyond the legislative competency of the particular legislature it is the pith and substance of the enactment which should be taken into consideration and if this is done it is quite evident from the long title preamble and the provisions contained in secs. 3 and 4 of the State Act that the main object which the State legislature had in view was to make temporary provision for industrial relations to prevent unemployment or to provide unemployment relief. According to the respondents it would be the above quoted entries 22 23 and 24 of the Concurrent List which would cover the subject-matter of the impugned legislation and therefore there is no scope for contending that the State Act falls beyond the competency of the State Legislature. 12 The simple question which arises from these contentions is under which List and entry the impugned State Act falls. ( 8 ) NOW if a reference is again made to the State Act it is found that sub-sec. (1) of sec. 2 defines industry and then in secs. 3 and 4 it makes certain provisions which provide for the manner in which the industrial undertaking in question should be managed. Sec. 4 in terms makes specific provisions for suspending either in whole or in part the operation of the enactments which clearly refer to the subject of industry. (1) of sec. 2 defines industry and then in secs. 3 and 4 it makes certain provisions which provide for the manner in which the industrial undertaking in question should be managed. Sec. 4 in terms makes specific provisions for suspending either in whole or in part the operation of the enactments which clearly refer to the subject of industry. It therefore cannot be gainsaid that some of the provisions of the State Act do touch the subject of industry. However a bare reference to the long title preamble as well as the provisions contained in sec 3 of the Act shows that the main object of the State Act is to make temporary provisions for industrial relations to conduct or to provide loan guarantee or financial assistance for the conduct of certain industrial undertakings and thereby to prevent unemployment or to provide for unemployment relief. Sec. 3 of the Act provides very specifically that the notification which the State Government is expected to make should declare that the industrial undertaking in question shall with effect from the specified date be conducted to serve as a measure of preventing unemployment. It is thus evident that the main burden of the different provisions of the State Act including its long title and preamble point out clearly that it is enacted with a view to relieve or to prevent unemployment. Thus on the one hand it is found that the statute is enacted with a view to prevent unemployment or to relieve the same on the other hand some of the provisions of the statute do provide for the subject of industry. It cannot be disputed that the industry conducted by the New Manekchowk Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. is industry covered by entry 52 of the First List. Thus there is undoubtedly some over lapping on the subject of industry contemplated by entry 52 of the First List. But over-lapping of this type is inevitable in a federal Constitution. In this connection we may refer to the following observations of Sir Maurice Gwyer C. J. in The United Provinces v. Mst. Atisa Begum and others 1940 F. C. R. 110 at page 134;the subjects dealt with in the three Legislative Lists are not always set out with scientific definition. In this connection we may refer to the following observations of Sir Maurice Gwyer C. J. in The United Provinces v. Mst. Atisa Begum and others 1940 F. C. R. 110 at page 134;the subjects dealt with in the three Legislative Lists are not always set out with scientific definition. It would be practically impossible for example to define each item in the Provincial List in such a way as to make it exclusive of every other item in that List and Parliament seems to have been content to take a number of comprehensive categories and to describe each of them by a word of broad and general import. In the case of some of these categories such as Local Government Education Water Agriculture and Land the general word is amplified and explained by a number of examples or illustrations some of which would probably on any construction have been held to fall under the more general word while the inclusion of others might not be so obvious. Thus Courts of Wards and treasure trove might not ordinarily have been regarded as included under Land if they had not been specifically mentioned in item No. 21. I think however that none of the items in the Lists is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense and that each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. THEREFORE it is evident that the mere circumstance that some of the provisions of an enactment trench upon a subject falling under a different List is not conclusive of the competency or otherwise of the Legislature to make that enactment. ( 9 ) SINCE in a Federal constitution such encroachments on legislative lists are to an extent unavoidable the jurists have evolved the test of pith and substance or true nature and character of the legislation in question to ascertain whether it falls within the legislative competence of the Legislature concerned. As early as 1940 Sir Maurice Gwyer C. J. has observed in A. L. S P. P. L. Subramaniam Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan A. I. R. 1941 F. C. 47 at page 52. As early as 1940 Sir Maurice Gwyer C. J. has observed in A. L. S P. P. L. Subramaniam Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan A. I. R. 1941 F. C. 47 at page 52. IT must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation though purporting to deal with a subject in one list touches also on a subject in another list and the different provisions of the enactment may be so closely inter wined that blind adherence to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a large number of statutes being declared invalid because the Legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere. Hence the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial Committee whereby the impugned statute is examined to ascertain its pith and substance or its true nature and character for the purpose of determining whether it is legislation with respect to matters in this list or in that. IN Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce Ltd. Khulna (1947) 74 Indian Appeals 23 a contention was raised that though the doctrine of pith and substance may apply to Canada and Australia it is not applicable in India as in our country difficulty in dividing legislative the powers has been foreseen and that is why three Lists instead of two Lists have been prepared with a view to cover the whole field of legislation with clear cut demarcations. Their Lordships of the Privy Council have rejected this contention by making the following observations:we doubt experience of past difficulties has made the provisions of the Indian Act more exact in some particulars and the existence of the Concurrent List has made it easier to distinguish between those matters which are essential in determining to which list particular provisions should be attributed and those which are merely incidental. But the over lapping of subject matter is not avoided by substituting three lists for two or even by arranging for a hierarchy of jurisdictions. Subjects must still overlap and where they do the question must be asked what in pith and substance is the effect of the enactment of which complaint is made and in what list is its true nature and character to be found. If these questions could not be asked much beneficent legislation would be stifled at birth and many of the subjects entrusted to provincial legislation could never effectively be dealt with. If these questions could not be asked much beneficent legislation would be stifled at birth and many of the subjects entrusted to provincial legislation could never effectively be dealt with. THIS principle is subsequently accepted in a series of cases including the case of A. S. Krishna and others v. State of Madras A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 297. We therefore need not elaborate this point any further. It is therefore clear that it is the pith and substance of a statute which should decide under which of the Lists of the 7th Schedule it is enacted. Hence the real question is what is the pith and substance or the true nature and character of the impugned statute and how it should be determined. For this we find some guidance in A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras (supra) wherein it is held that to ascertain the true character of legislation which is impugned on the ground that it is ultra vires the powers of the Legislature which enacted it one must have regard to the enactment as a whole to its objects and to the scope and effect of its provisions. It is further observed in this decision that it would be quite an erroneous approach to the question to view such a statute not as an organic whole but as a mere collection of sections then disintegrate it into parts examine under what heads of legislation those parts would severally fall and by that process determine portions thereof are intra vires and what are not. In In Re The Kerala Education Bill 1959 S. C. R. 995 their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the policy and purpose of a statute could be deduced from its long title and the preamble and this has been recognised in many a decisions of the Supreme Court. From these observations it is clear that with a view to decide what is the true nature and character of a statute we can look to the long title preamble and other provisions of the Act and it would not be a proper approach to consider the provisions of the statute piece meal and to find out which of these provisions so considered falls under which of the List. Therefore applying these tests if we approach the provisions of the State Act we find it quite evident from its long title and preamble that the Act is enacted for three main purposes namely (i) to make temporary provisions for industrial relations (ii) to enable the State Government to provide loan guarantee or financial assistance for the conduct of the industrial undertakings in question and (iii) to do the above as a measure of preventing unemployment or of unemployment relief. We have already pointed out how sec. 3 provides for the conduct of the undertaking in such a manner as to serve the prevention of unemployment. As will be evident from the desiccation which follows we are of the opinion that even the provisions of sec. 4 of the Act are made to sub serve the main purpose of the Act namely prevention of unemployment. If after having issued the notification contemplated by sec. 3 the Government finds that it is not feasible to run that undertaking economically without putting curbs contemplated by sec. 4 the Government would put these curbs by issuing a notification contemplated by sec. 4. Therefore it is clear to us that even the provisions of sec. 4 are subservient to the main object of the statute as embodied in the long title and preamble. We have therefore no doubt that in with and substance the State Act is enacted by the State Legislature with the dominant object of preventing unemployment and of providing relief against unemployment. ( 10 ) IN this connection the learned advocates of the petitioners contended that the reference in the preamble to prevention of unemployment is merely incidental and at the most supplies evidence of motive but not of the main objects behind the enactment. In support of this contention it was pointed out that the purpose of preventing unemployment is not effectively carried out by sec. 3 of the Act. According to them the only purpose for which sec. 3 is enacted is for issuing a notification under sec. 4 putting curbs on the rights of labour or the rights of other persons including creditors. A criticism was leveled against the provisions of sec. 3 of the Act to show that these provisions are not potent enough to enforce the object of preventing unemployment because the State Government would be powerless if the authorised controller who is appointed under sec. A criticism was leveled against the provisions of sec. 3 of the Act to show that these provisions are not potent enough to enforce the object of preventing unemployment because the State Government would be powerless if the authorised controller who is appointed under sec. 18a of the Central Act does not carry out the State directions to conduct the undertaking so as to serve it as a measure of preventing unemployment. We do not find any substance in this contention because it is evident that once a notification under sec. 3 is issued it becomes law and it becomes legally incumbent on the authorised controller concerned to conduct the undertaking so as to serve it as a measure of preventing unemployment or of unemployment relief. It may be noted here that the notification under sec. 3 can be issued by the State Government only if the conditions mentioned in that section are satisfied. One of the conditions mentioned in that section is for providing a loan guarantee or other financial assistance by the State Government. Therefore if the undertaking is not conducted to serve the purpose mentioned in sec. 3 (1) the State Government would be at liberty to stop further financial assistance. Again the State Government would also be entitled not to renew the notification from time to time as contemplated by sub-sec. (2) of sec. 3. From the perusal of the provisions contained in sec. 4 of the State Act it is obvious that these provisions are enacted with a view to give a sort of moratorium to the undertaking which is declared a relief undertaking under sec. 3. This moratorium would be available to the undertaking only if the State Government issues notification under sec. 4. If therefore the authorised controller fails to conduct the undertaking so as to serve the purpose mentioned in sec. 31) the State Government would be at liberty to review the situation at the end of every twelve months. ( 11 ) WE thus find that there are ample safeguards in the Act to see that the authorised controller carries out the object of preventing unemployment. We therefore see no substance in the contention that the idea of preventing unemployment is merely incidental. In our opinion it is the main object which determines the true nature and character Entry N. 23 Legislation. We therefore see no substance in the contention that the idea of preventing unemployment is merely incidental. In our opinion it is the main object which determines the true nature and character Entry N. 23 Legislation. If this be so the State Act clearly falls within Entry No. 23 of the Concurrent List of 7th Schedule. ( 12 ) FURTHER argument which was advanced on behalf of the petitioners in this connection was that if a reference is made to secs. 15 16 and 18 of the Central Act it would be found that the management of an industrial undertaking would be taken over by the Central Government under sec. 18a of the Central Act only if the economy of that undertaking is found to have been adversely affected. It was contended therefore that by the application of the State Act the object for which the Central Government is expected to take over the undertaking under sec. 18a of the said Act would be frustrated because by compelling the authorised controller to conduct this Undertaking as a measure of preventing unemployment the economic burden of the undertaking would increase. We are not impressed even with this argument because we find that far from being contradictory the provisions of the State Act are very much complementary to the provisions of the Central Act. Secs. 3 and 4 of the State Act serve the purpose of stabilizing the economy of the undertaking in question. It may be recalled that notification under sec. 3 can be issued by the State Government only if any of the pre conditions mentioned in it are satisfied. One of the pre conditions is the rendering of financial assistance by the State to the undertaking. Hence before the State Government imposes on the authorised controller the burden of conducting the under-taking to serve the purpose of preventing unemployment the State should be found to have provided a loan guarantee or other financial assistance to the undertaking. Rendering of such financial assistance to a private undertaking as in this case would be a positive step to stimulate its financial affairs. But this is not all. Sec. 4 provides for further steps for putting the economy of the undertaking on sounder footing. A bare perusal of the provisions of sec. Rendering of such financial assistance to a private undertaking as in this case would be a positive step to stimulate its financial affairs. But this is not all. Sec. 4 provides for further steps for putting the economy of the undertaking on sounder footing. A bare perusal of the provisions of sec. 4 shows that the State Government acting under that section can exercise wide powers to give temporary relief to the undertaking not only from the pressing claims of creditors but also from the exacting demands of labour under different labour laws. agreements and awards. Thus while asking the authorised controller to prevent unemployment of labour the statute also protects the undertaking from certain demands of labour which may prove to be very strenuous if the umbrella of the State Act is not extended. This analysis of secs. 3 and 4 therefore shows that the State Act is in no way detrimental to the object for which the Central Government has to act under the provisions of the Central Act. On the contrary the provisions of the State Act are complimentary to the provisions of the Central Act in as much as unemployment cannot be prevented unless the undertaking is helped to be on a sound financial basis by exercising some of the powers under the State Act. ( 13 ) IT was then contended that if a reference is made to sub clause (iv) of sec. 4 (1) (a) of the State Act it will be found that it provides for the suspension of all rights privileges obligations and liabilities accrued or incurred before the undertaking was declared a relief undertaking as well as the remedy for the enforcement thereof. The contention of the learned Advocates for the petitioners was that by making this provision even the rights liabilities and obligations which have arisen under different statutes which may fall under the First List of the 7th Schedule are liable to be suspended and if that is so the said suspension would amount to a legislation with respect to the subjects mentioned in the First List of the 7 Schedule. This argument is follicles because provision for suspending rights liabilities and obligations are not tantamount to legislation on a topic which is covered by the subject-matters enumerated in the First List of the 7th Schedule. ( 14 ) AS already observed above secs. This argument is follicles because provision for suspending rights liabilities and obligations are not tantamount to legislation on a topic which is covered by the subject-matters enumerated in the First List of the 7th Schedule. ( 14 ) AS already observed above secs. 3 and 4 no doubt make some provisions which touch the subject of industry and therefore it can be said that to that extent they encroach upon a legislative subject of Union List. But in our opinion this encroachment is merely incidental to the main object of the enactment which is to relieve unemployment. Here it should be noted that one of the consequences of the doctrine of pith and substance is that once the true nature and character of an enactment takes the enactment under consideration within a particular legislative entry then an incidental encroachment on an entry contained in another list does not affect its validity or authority. This principle is followed in a large number of cases including the above referred case of Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of commerce Ltd. Khulna Privy Council case of Gallagher v. Lynn (1937) A. C. 863 and Supreme Court cases of State of Bombay v Narottamdas (1951) S. C. R. 51 and State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara (1951) S. C. R. 682. It is obvious that in order to achieve effectively the main object for which the Stave Act is enacted the Legislature has necessarily to make some incidental provisions with regard to the subject of industry. For instance we find by a reference to the provisions contained in sec. 3 of the State Act that the State Government is expected to render financial assistance to the industry in question. Now merely providing for financial assistance may not be sufficient for carrying out the main object namely the prevention of unemployment. it is very likely that in spite of the financial assistance by the State the industry cannot go ahead either on account of the heavy wage bill of the labourers or on account of the disproportionate amount of debts incurred by the previous management. Under the circumstances it would be necessary to make some temporary provisions for suspending these liabilities so that the financial assistance provided by the State with a view to prevent unemployment may not be wasted. It is for this reason that the Legislature has made under sec. Under the circumstances it would be necessary to make some temporary provisions for suspending these liabilities so that the financial assistance provided by the State with a view to prevent unemployment may not be wasted. It is for this reason that the Legislature has made under sec. 4 certain provisions which touch industrial relations between the employees of the industry and the management. This would necessarily touch the subject of industry. But these provisions touching the subject of industry are merely incidental because their main object is to make the industry run so that the unemployment would not be a necessary consequence of the stoppage of the industry. We thus find that all the provisions which the Act makes with respect to the subject of industry are merely incidental and if that is so they cannot touch the intrinsic nature and character of the enactment. ( 15 ) BEFORE leaving this point we would consider one more contention of the petitioners viz. that secs. 3 and 4 of the State Act are in conflict with the above quoted provisions of sec. 20 of the Central Act. If a reference is made to sec. 20 it will be found that what it prohibits is staking over of the management or control of the industrial undertaking contemplated by that section. The question is whether sec. 3 provides for staking over of the management or control of the industry in question. We have already referred to the provisions of sec. 3 above. These provisions no where provide for taking over of the management and control of the industry in question. What it provides for is merely a declaration that the industry in question shall be conducted to serve as a measure of preventing unemployment or of unemployment relief. This requirement of conducting the industry to serve as a measure to prevent unemployment is merely an indication of the manner in which the industry should be conducted. It is not tantamount to a taking over or to a control of the management of the industry. We therefore see no conflict between the provisions contained in sec. 20 of the Central Act and the provisions contained in sec. 3 of the State Act. ( 16 ) THUS so far as the point of legislative competency is concerned we find that the petitioners have got no case. We therefore see no conflict between the provisions contained in sec. 20 of the Central Act and the provisions contained in sec. 3 of the State Act. ( 16 ) THUS so far as the point of legislative competency is concerned we find that the petitioners have got no case. ( 17 ) PROCEEDING now to the next point the question which is raised on behalf of the petitioners is that secs. 3 and 4 of the State Act delegate excessive and wide powers in favour of the State Government without fixing any guidelines and therefore both these provisions are vitiated on the ground of excessive delegation as well as on the ground of breach of equality clause contained in Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. In this connection Shri Vakil who appeared on behalf of one of the petitioners drew our attention to the fact that under sec. 3 of the State Act the State Government has got wide powers to choose a particular industry for the purpose of making a declaration that it is a relief undertaking. At the time of making this choice the Government would be getting no guidance either from the provisions of sec. 3 or from any other provisions of the State Act. In this connection it was strenuously contended that if the object of the Act is to provide relief against unemployment or to prevent unemployment all those concerns which are likely to stop their business for want of finance would be entitled to the relief contemplated by the Act but at the time of making its choice for the purpose of issuing a declaration the State Government is not empowered to give relief to those undertakings which are not covered by the several categories contemplated by sec. 3. It was pointed out that for the purpose of making a declaration under sec. 3 the undertaking in question should have been either started or acquired or undertaken by Government or should be one to whom either loan guarantee or assistance is provided by the Government. In other words an a selected for making the declaration under sec. 3 should be one which is either run by the State Government itself or one to whom State Government has provided assistance. In other words an a selected for making the declaration under sec. 3 should be one which is either run by the State Government itself or one to whom State Government has provided assistance. The argument was that even though the undertakings which are neither run nor assisted by the Government are in need of some protection and are in danger of being stopped for want of that protection the legislature does not intend to cover them by the protection which is contemplated by the Act. According to the learned advocates of the petitioners therefore the selection for the purpose of making the declaration contemplated by sec. 3 leaves out other similarly situated undertakings for the only reason that these undertakings have not preferred to avail of State assistance. Thus according to the petitioners the classification contemplated by sec. 3 is discriminatory and irrational and has not got a proper nexus with the object of providing employment or relief against unemployment. ( 18 ) SO far as sec. 4 is concerned the argument was that this section gives very wide and blanket powers to the Government for making discrimination. It was pointed out that sec. 4 is enacted with a view to suspend certain rights liabilities and obligations which have arisen before the undertaking is declared a relief undertaking. 9 It was further pointed out that it also seeks to suspend certain very substantive and valuable rights of labour inasmuch as some of very important labour legislations and the benefits arising therefrom can be suspended by the Government while acting under that section. It was further pointed out that neither sec. 4 nor any of the provisions of the State Act provides for any godliness to the State Government at the time of making selection of the rights which are required to be suspended. It was also contended that in absence of any such guidelines provided by the legislature it would be open to the State Government to pick and choose and to act in an arbitrary manner. As an instance it was pointed out that if there is an undertaking which is either started acquired or taken over by the State Government itself then for such undertakings the State Government would suspend those rights and obligations under sec. 4 which would put the State Government at an undue advantage over the citizen. As an instance it was pointed out that if there is an undertaking which is either started acquired or taken over by the State Government itself then for such undertakings the State Government would suspend those rights and obligations under sec. 4 which would put the State Government at an undue advantage over the citizen. In this connection it was also pointed out that at the time of taking action under sec. 4 of the State Act the State Government would in certain circumstances be required to resort to some classification for making a choice as regards the suspension of the rights in question. Since the Legislature itself has not provided for any classification or guidelines prescribing the principles on which the classification should be made it would be open to the State Government to make classification in an arbitrary manner and therefore also the provisions of sec. 4 would be vitiated. THEREFORE it was contended on behalf of the petitioners that so long as it is not found that the legislature has itself provided some curbs and checks on the action contemplated to be taken by the State Government under sec. 3 and 4 of the Act it should be held that these sections are vitiated not only on account of excessive delegation in favour of the Government but also on account of the situation which enables the State Government to resort to arbitrary discrimination at the time of acting under these sections and thus to infringe the equality clause found in Art. 14 of the Constitution. ( 19 ) IT is apparent from above that the petitioners contention about the vires of sec. 4 rests on the premise that this section violates provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution because it delegates excessive powers in favour of the State Government for the purpose of classifying the rights and liabilities to be suspended under that section. This contention is therefore a part of their general contention that both the secs. 3 and 4 of the State Act should be struck down on the ground of excessive delegation. We shall therefore first consider the position of law on the question of excessive delegation of legislative power. ( 20 ) IT is found that in pre Constitution days the decision given by the Privy Council in R. v. Burah 5 I. A. 178 held the field. We shall therefore first consider the position of law on the question of excessive delegation of legislative power. ( 20 ) IT is found that in pre Constitution days the decision given by the Privy Council in R. v. Burah 5 I. A. 178 held the field. In that case wide powers of delegation were upheld on the principle that the Legislature when it exercises its will unequivocally and clearly should be presumed to have exercised its judgment as to place person laws and powers and that the result of that judgment is to legislate conditionally as to all things which have been delegated. After the Constitution of India came into force there was a reference to the Supreme Court in Re. The Delhi Laws Act (1951) S. C. R. 1123 where the authorisation of the executive authority over a wide range of subjects was upheld by the Supreme Court for different reasons given by different Judges. This decision has been explained and its ratio has been crystallised in Raj Narain Singh v. The Chairman Patna Administration Committee Patna 1951 S. C. R. 290. Broadly speaking both these cases lay down the following principles: (1) Essential feature of the legislative power is to lay down a policy. This feature cannot be delegated by the Legislature to any other authority. (2) Delegated authority cannot be authorised to do anything which involves a change in the essential policy or the standard laid down by the Legislature and (3) There can be no delegation of power to repeal a law because this power is legislative in character. THESE three principles have resulted in a search for legislative policy and guide lines for the purpose of deciding whether the delegation in question is excessive or not. We find that many cases have been decided by the Supreme Court on the premise that delegation by the Legislature would not be excessive provided the legislative policy is clearly indicated and the guide lines are prescribed in the statute itself. The cases of Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and ors. (1959) S. C R. 427 and Corporation of Calcutta and another v. Liberty Cinema A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 1107 are the instances on the point. The cases of Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and ors. (1959) S. C R. 427 and Corporation of Calcutta and another v. Liberty Cinema A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 1107 are the instances on the point. However this principle is succinctly stated by Gajendragadkar J. (as he then was) in Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. The State of Bombay A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 4 as under:it is now well established by the decisions of this Court that the power of delegation is a constituent clement of the legislative power as a whole and that in modern times when the Legislatures enact laws to meet the challenge of the complex socio economic problems they often find it convenient and necessary to delegate subsidiary or ancillary powers to delegates of their choice for carrying out the policy laid gown by their Acts. The extent to which such delegation is permissible is also now well settled. The Legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function in any case. It must lay down the legislative policy and principle and must afford guidance for carrying out the said policy before it delegates its subsidiary powers in that behalf. As has been observed by Mahajan C. J. in Harishanker Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1955) 1 S. C. R. 380 at page 388 (A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 465 at p. 468):the Legislature cannot delegate its function of laying down legislative policy in respect of a measure and its formulation as a rule of conduct. The Legislature must declare the policy of the law and the legal principles which are to control any given cases and must provide a standard to guide the officials or the body in power to execute the law. THESE observations may of course be read with a note of caution recorded by Subba Rao J. (as then he was) in his dissenting judgment against an attempt to discover a dormant or latent legislative policy to sustain an arbitrary power. These observations of Subba Rao J. held the field a few years later in M/s. Devi Das Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab and others A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1895 wherein the delegation found in sec. These observations of Subba Rao J. held the field a few years later in M/s. Devi Das Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab and others A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1895 wherein the delegation found in sec. 5 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act (46 of 1948) as it originally stood was under challenge and was found excessive for want of proper guidance. But here also it was conceded that the expression of clear legislative policy and guide lines would save the delegation. This is clear from the following observations found at page 1901:the minimum we expect of the Legislature is to lay down in the Act conferring such a power of fixation of rates clear legislative policy of guidelines in that regard. As the Act did not prescribe any such policy it must be held that sec. 5 of the said Act as it stood before the amendment was void. HOWEVER it is found that in Delhi Municipality v. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Delhi A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 1232 the emphasis has changed and two of the Judges of the Supreme Court who have recorded the majority judgment appear to be of the view that consideration of safe guards is not the only approach to test the permissible limits of delegation. Their Lordships have been of the opinion that the proper test to apply is not the existence of safeguards but whether the legislative will to impose the tax is adequately expressed so as to bind those who have to pay the tax. In their Lordships opinion once it is established that the Legislature itself has willed that a particular thing be done and has merely left the execution of it to a chosen instrumentality (provided that it has not parted with its control) there can be no question of excessive delegation. These observations clearly indicate a swing towards the ratio of the original decision given by the Privy Council in pre constitution days in R. v. Burah (supra ). Be that as it may one position which clearly emerges out of the review of all these decisions of the Supreme Court is that no delegation of legislative power can be considered excessive if it is found that the Statute itself contains a clear cut policy statement and Also provides necessary guidelines for the exercise of the power. . Be that as it may one position which clearly emerges out of the review of all these decisions of the Supreme Court is that no delegation of legislative power can be considered excessive if it is found that the Statute itself contains a clear cut policy statement and Also provides necessary guidelines for the exercise of the power. . ( 21 ) AS will be clear from the discussion which follows on the question whether sec. 4 of the State Act delegates excessive and arbitrary powers of classification and legislation on the State Government we are of the opinion that the state itself contains sufficient guidance and a clear statement of legislative policy for the exercise of delegated power and therefore we hold that the provisions of the state Act are not vitiated on account of excessive delegation of legislative powers This question is more elaborately discussed while dealing with the impact of Article 14 on the State Act. We shall therefore now proceed to the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners relating to Art. 14 of the Constitution. ( 22 ) WE have already stated above the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners even with regard to the alleged infringement of the equality clause enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution. Now speaking of this equality clause as contained in Art. 14 it is evident that it does not forbid classification. However the equality clause suggests that the classification must be reasonable and intelligible. The classification thus formed must not leave out any person or thing falling within the class thus formed. Leading case on this subject is Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 538 wherein some important propositions are formulated by Das C. J. The following are the relevant propositions for the purpose of these petitions: (1) The classification should satisfy two conditions namely; (I) It must be founded on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (II) The differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. AS stated in Northern India Caterers v. State of Punjab A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1581 when an enactment is challenged on the ground of discrimination the Court must first ascertain the objects sought to be achieved by the Legislature and then apply the above stated two tests. It is held in that case that if these two tests are satisfied then the classification cannot be held to be violative of Art. 14. (2) It must be presumed that Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of people and that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds (3) While good faith and knowledge of existing conditions on the part of Legislature can be presumed this presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reason for subjecting certain classes to hostile discrimination. THE facts of the case under our consideration should therefore be tested by these propositions in order to know whether equality clause Contained in Art. 14 is infringed or not. In this connection we would like to refer to the three questions on the lines suggested in Vajravelus case A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 1017. On facts of the petitions before us these questions would be as under: (1) What is the object of the Act. (2) What are the differences between the industries which are covered by sec. 3 of the Act and those not covered by it and (3) Whether these differences have any reasonable relation to the object of the Act. HAVING these three questions in mind we now proceed to consider the actual provisions of the Act. A bare perusal of sec. 3 shows that it contemplates that class of industry which is either State controlled or state aided. Now the contention of the petitioner is that this Classification is discriminatory because if once it is believed that the object of the Act is to prevent unemployment the umbrella of protection which is sought to be extended by secs. 3 and 4 should cover all industrial concerns which are in danger of being closed down and which are very likely to result in unemployment. However it was contended that sec. 3 and 4 should cover all industrial concerns which are in danger of being closed down and which are very likely to result in unemployment. However it was contended that sec. 3 of the Act gives protection only to State controlled or State financed industries leaving other such industries to their fate. It was therefore argued that this classification which makes distinction between State financed industries and the industries which are not State controlled or State financed is discriminatory in its nature. We find that this contention is not acceptable because for weighty reasons the State is considered a class by itself. This is done in several matters and the reason for being so is that there is an important distinguishing feature between a State undertaking and a Private undertaking. It is obvious that in State under takings what is involved is public interest and public finance. But that is not so in case of a Private undertaking. Wherever public finance is involved it is many a times found necessary to give it a special treatment for the protection of the public interest which is therein involved This principle is found recognised in various Acts including Revenue Recovery Acts Rent Acts and various other socio economic enactments. The principle is so well established that it is not found necessary to refer to case law on this point in details. We may however refer to Baburao Shantaram More v. Bombay Housing Board and another A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 153 and Lachman Dass v. State of Punjab A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 222. Having thus once found that the industrial undertakings where in States interest is involved either directly or indirectly can form a class by itself the next question to be considered is whether this classification has any nexus with the object of the Act. While discussing the question as regards the pith and substance of the Act we have already pointed out that the main object of the State Act is the prevention of unemployment by making temporary provisions for industrial relations and to enable the State Government to conduct or to provide loan guarantee or financial assistance to certain industrial undertakings. Therefore the question is whether when the State Government issues a declaration contemplated by sec. Therefore the question is whether when the State Government issues a declaration contemplated by sec. 3 of the Act covering that class of industrial under takings which is either State controlled or State aided the classification adopted for the purpose serves the above referred main object of the Act or not. In our opinion the answer is too obvious to be elaborated. It is evident that State aid in the form of financial assistance would be given to those undertakings which are in financial trouble for a variety of reasons. If these undertakings are left to their fate the industry would eventually be lost to the nation and even the public finance which is invested in the undertaking with a view to assist it would be put to a serious jeopardy. It is for this reason that the State Government is expected to make a declaration under sec. 3 declaring the undertaking as a relief undertaking. The moment such a declaration is made it becomes obligatory on those who manage the undertaking to Conduct the same to serve as a measure of preventing unemployment. But a mere declaration of this type would not be sufficient because the undertaking would be in such financial stress that it would require some assistance from the State Government with a view to lessen its liability for a temporary period. It is at this stage that the State Government make a further declaration under sec. 4 and suspend certain rights and liabilities for a temporary period. Thus while on one hand sec. 3 contemplates a positive assistance in form of loan guarantee or finance on the other hand sec. 4 provides for a temporary relief so that the undertaking in question would be free from worries of certain liabilities. All these are temporary provisions but during this temporary period the concern in question would be enabled to stand on its legs. If this happens it would necessarily result in the prevention of unemployment. We have therefore no doubt in our mind that the classification which is contemplated by sec. 3 of the Act has a direct nexus with the object with which the State Act was enacted. In our opinion therefore the tests of a reasonable intelligible and valid classification which are given in Dalmiyas case (supra) are clearly satisfied and even the three questions which we have referred to above are satisfactorily answered. 3 of the Act has a direct nexus with the object with which the State Act was enacted. In our opinion therefore the tests of a reasonable intelligible and valid classification which are given in Dalmiyas case (supra) are clearly satisfied and even the three questions which we have referred to above are satisfactorily answered. In our opinion therefore sec. 3 of the Act cannot be successfully attacked on the ground that it contemplates unreasonable classification having no nexus with the object of the Act. ( 23 ) THIS takes us to the provisions contained in sec. 4 of the State Act. So far as this section is concerned we have already referred to its provisions and impact of these provisions on various rights and liabilities. If again a reference is made to this section it would be found that clause (a) of sub sec. 1 thereof contemplates four sub-clauses which are relevant for the purpose of deciding this point. Out of these four sub-clauses first three sub-clauses relate to the rights and liabilities arising out of the industrial relations of the undertaking with its workers. Sub-clause (1) contemplates suspension or modifications of the industrial Acts referred to in the Schedule. Sub-clause (ii) contemplates the suspension of all or any of the agreements settlements awards or standing orders made under any of the laws mentioned in the Schedule. Sub-clause (iii) contemplates t hat rights privileges obligations and liabilities of the workers of the undertaking shall determine and enforceable only in accordance with the action taken under sub-clauses (i) and (ii) for the temporary period in question. Now all these sub-clauses give protection to the industrial concern which is covered by the declaration contemplated by sec. 3 thereof from its existing liabilities towards its workers. If this relief is accorded by the notification issued under sec. 4 then the relief undertaking would be relieved from existing pressure of its wage bill and some of its other liabilities to the labour during the period for which the notification under sec. 3 remains in force. Thus sub-clauses (i) (ii) and (iii) contemplates relief from current liabilities. Sub-clause (iv) contemplates relief from the past liabilities incurred by the past management because it contemplates the suspension of the rights privileges obligations or liabilities accrued or incurred before the undertaking was declared a relief undertaking. 3 remains in force. Thus sub-clauses (i) (ii) and (iii) contemplates relief from current liabilities. Sub-clause (iv) contemplates relief from the past liabilities incurred by the past management because it contemplates the suspension of the rights privileges obligations or liabilities accrued or incurred before the undertaking was declared a relief undertaking. The wording of sub-clause (iv) are so wide that they include the rights privileges and liabilities of every body including the labour and the undertaking itself. ( 24 ) NOW it is quite evident from the provisions of sec. 4 that it leaves the choice of selection to the sole discretion of the Government. There would be cases wherein the Government may apply only the provisions contained in sub-clause (i ). There would be cases in which the Government may apply the provisions contained in sub-clause (ii) but there would also be cases on which the Government may not take any action under any of sub-clauses (i) (ii) and (iii) and may take action only under-clause (iv) as is done in this case. Even so far as sub-clause (iv) is concerned the Governments not bound to suspend all rights Privileges obligations and liabilities accrued or incurred before the undertaking was declared a relief undertaking. Government may choose to suspend only certain rights liabilities and privileges under sub-clause (iv ). There is therefore no doubt that the powers conferred by sec. 4 on the Government are very wide. I is also clear that the classification which the Government is likely to adopt at the time of taking action under sec. 4 is entirely at the discretion of the Government. Therefore the question is how far such wide and blanket powers of classification and selection found in sec. 4 would offend the equality principle embodied in Art. 14 of the Constitution and would also suggest an excessive delegation of power. ( 25 ) THERE is an ample authority for the proposition that the mere fact that no classification is made by the statute or that the discretion is left to the Government for making classification at a future date would not lead to the law being struck down. In all such cases court is expected to proceed to inquire whether the statute contains any principle or policy for guiding the discretion to be exercised by the State Government in the matter of selection or classification. In all such cases court is expected to proceed to inquire whether the statute contains any principle or policy for guiding the discretion to be exercised by the State Government in the matter of selection or classification. If no such guiding principles are found then the statute becomes liable to be struck down on the ground that it confers arbitrary and uncontrolled powers on the Government to discriminate between persons and things similarly situated. In such case the discrimination is inherent in the statute itself. But if the guiding principles and the policy of the statute are eloquent from the provisions of the statute itself then the power which is delegated to the State Government is expected to be exercised in accordance with those principles and policy. In a complex society it is not always possible for the Legislature to fore-see every situation at the time of enacting a general law or to envisage every contingency and to provide for each such contingency in the statute. It is therefore many a times found necessary to state the general principle of policy in the statute and to leave the details of its execution to the authority to whom the power is delegated. In this connection we may quote the following observations found in a Division Bench judgment of this Court given in Spl. C. A. No. 760 of 1966:the Government cannot while making a rule dealing with broad categories be expected to provide for all exceptional cases. Or else the rule may become so over-loaded with qualifications and exceptions that it may tumble down of its own weight. It must also be remembered that no classification can be logically complete or accord with a pattern of plumb line precision. No two things are exactly similar; of no two human beings can it be said that their physical characteristics intellectual endowments mental disposition and conduct are uniform. Life is not capable of being divided into water-tight divisions or categories and it is not possible to force the teeming multiplicity and variety of human activity into a procrustean bed of symmetrical rules. Absolute precision and complete symmetry are unattainable and it is as well that it should be so for otherwise life would be mechanical and lose its many-sided variety. Absolute precision and complete symmetry are unattainable and it is as well that it should be so for otherwise life would be mechanical and lose its many-sided variety. In the same judgment it is further observed as under:when the impugned legislative or executive action indicates a policy and brings within its operation those who are similarly situated and it appears that the policy is a result of specific difficulties and the end to which it is directed is not objection-able on the ground that there is arbitrary or hostile discrimination the Court would not overthrow it simply because it is not couched in all-embracing terms or because it comprises exceptional cases where some inequality of treatment may arisethere would however be cases wherein the exercise of the power which is delegated would result in hostile discrimination. If such hostile discrimination is found to be inconsistent with the policy of the enactment then the action taken by the delegate can be struck down as invalid. But that is altogether a different question. A question of this type has been considered in United States in connection with the equality clause. We find that in his book on Constitutional Law professor Willis has made the following observations at page 586 which are very much pertinent to the point under our consideration:perhaps the best view on the subject is that `due process and equality are not violated by the mere conference of unguided power but only by its arbitrary exercise by those upon whom conferred. If this is the correct position the only question that would then arise would be the delegation of legislative power. If a statute declares a definite policy there is a sufficiently definite standard for the rule against the delegation of legislative power and also for equality if the standard is reasonable. If no standard is set up to avoid the violation of equality those exercising the power must act as though they were administering a valid standard. IN Re. Kerala Education Bill (supra) the Supreme Court has observed that no statute can be discriminatory unless its provisions discriminate (at page 1042 of the report ). ( 26 ) IT is therefore necessary to find out whether the State Act provides any guide lines to the Government for taking action under sec. 4. The question is how and where to find the guidelines from the statute. ( 26 ) IT is therefore necessary to find out whether the State Act provides any guide lines to the Government for taking action under sec. 4. The question is how and where to find the guidelines from the statute. Answer to this question is provided by the Supreme Court in Harishanker Bagla and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 465. In this case the Supreme Court has upheld clause (3) of Cotton Textiles (Control of Movement) Order 1948 observing that discretion there conferred on the delegate had to be exercised in the light of the policy underlying the order. Referring to this case in Govindji Vithaldas and Co. v. Municipal Corporation Ahmedabad 59 B. L. R. 129 Chagla C. J. has observed that if the Court can discover a policy underlying the law and if a discretion is conferred under that law then the Court must hold that the discretion is to be exercised not in an arbitrary manner not in a capricious manner not in an uncontrolled manner but in a manner so as to effectuate the policy of the law. For the purpose of this case we do not find it difficult to discover the policy which is underlying this Act. It is obviously to prevent unemployment and/or to give unemployment relief. This is evident from the preamble and other provisions of the Act. That preamble and the provisions of the Act can be taken into account at the time of finding out the policy underlying the statute cannot be disputed because that principle has been firmly established and recognised in various decisions of the Supreme Court. We therefore do not propose to refer to all those decisions. But we state that it has been recognised in Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. The State of Bombay A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 4 and in Re. Kerala Education Bill (1957) 1959 S. C. R. 995. We therefore do not propose to refer to all those decisions. But we state that it has been recognised in Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. The State of Bombay A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 4 and in Re. Kerala Education Bill (1957) 1959 S. C. R. 995. We find that while the position on the point of excessive delegation as well as on the question whether the equality clause would be offended in cases where classification is left to the discretion of the delegate is summarised by the Supreme Court in Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi 1961 S. C. 1602 wherein the following propositions are found to have been made: (1) If the statute itself or the rule made under it applies unequally to persons or things similarly situated it would be an instance of a direct violation of the constitutional guarantee and the provision of the statute or the rule in question would have to be struck down. (2) The enactment or the rule might not in terms enact a discriminatory rule or law but might enable an unequal or discriminatory treatment to be accorded to persons or things similarly situated. This would happen when the Legislature vests a discretion in an authority be it the Government or an administrative official acting either as an executive officer or even in a quasi-judicial capacity by a legislation which does not lay down any policy or disclose any tangible or intelligible purpose thus clothing the authority with unguided and arbitrary powers enabling it to discriminate. IN such circumstances the very provision of the law which enables or permits the authority to discriminate offends the guarantee of equal protection afforded by (3) The above rule would not apply to cases where the Legislature lays down the policy and indicates the rule or the line of action which should serve as a guidance to the authority. Where such guidance is expressed in the statutory provision conferring the power no question of violation of Art. 14 could arise unless it be that the rules themselves or the policy indicated lay down different rules to be applied to persons or things similarly situated. Where such guidance is expressed in the statutory provision conferring the power no question of violation of Art. 14 could arise unless it be that the rules themselves or the policy indicated lay down different rules to be applied to persons or things similarly situated. Even where such is not the case there might be a transgression by the authority of the limits laid down or an abuse of power but the actual order would be set aside in appropriate proceedings not to much on the ground of a violation of Art. 14 but as really being beyond its powers. (4) It is not however essential for the legislation to comply with the rule as to equal protection that the rules for the guidance of the designated authority which is to exercise the power or which is vested with the discretion should be laid down in express terms in the statutory provision itself. SUCH guidance may thus be obtained from or afforded by (a) the preamble read in the light of the surrounding circumstances which necessitated the legislation taken in conjunction with well-known facts which the Court might take judicial notice or of which it is appraised by evidence before it in the form of affidavits. IN the circumstances indicated under the fourth head just as in the third the law enacted would be valid being neither a case of excessive delegation or abdication of legislative authority viewed from one aspect nor open to objection on the ground of violation of Art. 14 as authorising or permitting discriminatory treatment of persons similarly situated. The particular executive or quasi-judicial act would however be open to challenge on the ground not so much that it is in violation of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Art. 14 because ex concessis that was not permitted by the statute but on the ground of the same being ultra vires as not being sanctioned or authorised by the enactment itself. The situation in such cases would be parallel to the tests to be applied for determining the validity of rules made under statutes which enable the rule making authority to enact subsidiary legislation to carry out the purpose of the Act. The situation in such cases would be parallel to the tests to be applied for determining the validity of rules made under statutes which enable the rule making authority to enact subsidiary legislation to carry out the purpose of the Act. The criteria to be applied to determine the validity of such rules could be appropriately applied to determine the validity of the action under the provisions like the one dealt with under the last two heads. ( 27 ) IT is in light of these principles that we now turn to the statute. We find that at many places it provides for sufficient guidance and checks on the exercise of the power by the State Government while acting under sec. 4. To summarise briefly this would be found as under: (1) Long title and preamble suggests a general policy for the prevention of unemployment. It shows that the real object of this enactment is to render financial assistance to sick industries with a view to relieve unemployment. (2) The declaration contemplated by sec. 3 which forms the basis of the declaration under sec. 4 is required to be issued only if the following conditions are satisfied: (I) Government should find it necessary to make such a declaration. (ii) Government cannot make that declaration with regard to any industry because before making the declaration the industry concerned should be either State controlled or State aided. This puts an obligation of a very onerous nature on the State Government before the action under sec. 3 is taken. (III) The industry is required to be conducted to serve the purpose of preventing unemployment. (iv) The declaration would be only for a limited period contemplated by sub-sec. (2) of sec. 3. (3) Action under sec. 4 cannot be taken if it is not found to serve the main purpose of the Act namely prevention of unemployment. At the time of making classification for the selection of the action to be taken under either of the four sub-clauses of sec. 4 (i) (a) the Government cannot act arbitrarily because the considerations which would guide the Governments action would be to prevent unemployment or to relieve unemployment as far as possible. At the time of making classification for the selection of the action to be taken under either of the four sub-clauses of sec. 4 (i) (a) the Government cannot act arbitrarily because the considerations which would guide the Governments action would be to prevent unemployment or to relieve unemployment as far as possible. THEREFORE if in a particular case the Government finds that the industry cannot stand on its legs without getting some temporary relief in the payment of its huge wage bill) then the Government would issue notifications under any of first three sub-clauses of sec. 1 (i) (a ). But if the Government finds that the payment of the wage bill is not much of a financial problem for the industry and that it is the protection from its creditors which the industry requires then instead of taking action under sub-clauses (i) (ii) (iii) the Government may well take action under sub clause (iv) and suspend all or any of the rights liabilities and obligations under that clause. Whatever action the Government proposes to take under sec. 4 would obviously be guided by one supreme consideration namely that of putting the industry on a sounder footing so that the apprehended unemployment resulting from the closure of the industry can be avoided. It is thus obvious that though in fact it is found that sec. 4 vests very wide powers in the Government not only for the purpose of taking action but also for the purpose of making selection it is quite evident that that power is controlled not only by the express policy enunciated in the long title and preamble but also by the guide lines which are provided by sec. 3. In this connection we cannot ignore the fact that the discretion which sec. 4 leaves is the discretion left to the Government and not to any lessor officer. The fact that the discretion is left to a higher authority is one of the considerations which should weigh with the Court as held by the Supreme Court in A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 896. Thus we find that even sec. 4 cannot be considered either as vesting excessive power of delegation in favour of the Government or as infringing the equality clause contained in Art. 14 of the Constitution. ( 28 ) WE now proceed to the third ground of attack on these provisions. Thus we find that even sec. 4 cannot be considered either as vesting excessive power of delegation in favour of the Government or as infringing the equality clause contained in Art. 14 of the Constitution. ( 28 ) WE now proceed to the third ground of attack on these provisions. It is on the basis that secs. 3 and 4 of the State Act are restrictive of the fundamental rights of the petitioners to hold property as contemplated by Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. Like other fundamental rights contemplated by Art. 19 even this right as regards the property is subject to reasonable restrictions in public interest as provided by sub-Art. (5 ). Therefore the question is whether the restrictions contemplated by sec. 4 are reasonable and whether they are in public interest. It is apparent from the provisions of the Act that the restrictions are contemplated only by sec. 4 thereof and that the notification contemplated by sec. 3 of the State Act is only a precursor of the notification to be issued under sec. 4. It is therefore first necessary to consider the nature of the restrictions contemplated by sec. 4. A bare reference to sec. 4 shows that the only restriction which it contemplates is that of temporary suspension of the rights and liabilities relating to the relief undertaking in question. The petitioners being the creditors of the undertaking their right to recover their dues is suspended under sub-clause (iv ). Shri Vakil contended before us that since under the said sub-clause (iv) even the substantive right itself is suspended the petitioners will not be entitled to claim any interest on their outstanding dues for the period during which notification under sec. 3 remains in force. It is undoubtedly true that sub-clause (iv) is so worded that on plain reading it gives an impression that what is suspended is not only the remedy for the enforcement of the right to hold but also the right itself. But we find that on true construction of this sub-clause the right itself is not suspended but only the remedy for the enforcement of the right is suspended. In our opinion this appears to be the true construction of sub-clause (iv) because if this sub-clause is interpreted as suspending the very existence of the rights covered by the notification issued under sec. In our opinion this appears to be the true construction of sub-clause (iv) because if this sub-clause is interpreted as suspending the very existence of the rights covered by the notification issued under sec. 4 the very object of the statute would be frustrated. This will be evident from the discussion which follows. ( 29 ) IT is evident from the wording of this sub-clause that it contemplates the suspension of any right privilege obligation or liability accrued or incurred in the past. The sub-clause therefore covers within it wide compass even the rights accrued in favour of the relief undertaking itself. Now if this sub-clause is construed as putting a temporary halt to the very existence of the rights covered by notification issued under sec. 4 the result would be that even the rights of the undertaking accrued in the past would have no existence for the temporary period in question. If this happens it would be totally impossible for the undertaking to function at all because it cannot use its machinery or premises for running its industry. This would obviously destroy the very object for achieving which the statute is enacted. ( 30 ) TO take another illustration we may consider a case of hypothecation of its goods in favour of a Bank or any other creditor made before the undertaking is declared a relief undertaking. If sub-clause (iv) is construed as putting temporary stop to the very existence of the rights in question the result would be that for the period during which the undertaking remains a relief undertaking hypothecation would not be in legal existence and the undertaking would be at liberty to sell away the hypothecated goods thus permanently annihilating the rights of the creditors in whose favour the goods are hypothecated. We find that such instances can be multiplied. ( 31 ) IT is thus obvious that the legislature could not have intended to invite such absurd results. We find that the legislature has advisedly used the word suspended and stayed in sub-clause (iv) with reference to rights remedies and proceedings. Suspension is not tantamount to destruction or annihilation. Therefore when the sub-clause speaks about Suspension of a right it only means suspension of its execution or enforcement. The incidents of a right except its executability are there-fore not suspended by the sub-clause. Suspension is not tantamount to destruction or annihilation. Therefore when the sub-clause speaks about Suspension of a right it only means suspension of its execution or enforcement. The incidents of a right except its executability are there-fore not suspended by the sub-clause. ( 32 ) IT was then contended that operation of sub-clause (iv) would result in great hardship as in some cases it may result in financial ruin of a creditor. As instances of such hard cases our attention was drawn to a compensation claim by a widow of a workman or the dues of a petty merchant who is financially hard pressed in his business. It was pointed out that if such dues are suspended for a period of five years during which the notification under sec. 3 can remain in force the restriction would operate very unreasonably as the creditors concerned would be totally ruined. ( 33 ) WE must say that after considering the scheme of the Act we are not impressed even by these contentions. It must again be noted that the State Government has a discretion to make a selection of the rights to be suspended under this sub-clause. This selection is to be made having the object of preventing unemployment in mind. Moreover under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 3 the notification declaring relief can have effect at a time only for twelve months. It can of course be renewed for other such period subject to the maximum total period of five years. Thus at the end of every twelve months the Government can review the position and would suspend only those rights and remedies whose suspension is found necessary for preventing unemployment. Thus there is ample scope in the statute for relieving the hardship of the cases pointed out by Shri Vakil. ( 34 ) HAVING thus examined the nature and scope of the restriction we shall now proceed to consider how far these restrictions are in public interest. ( 35 ) IT cannot be seriously disputed that these restrictions are in public interest This would be evident if we take into consideration the consequences which would ensue if an undertaking covered by sec. 3 is not given protection for a temporary period under sec. 4. So far as we can visualize following consequences are likely to ensue if the protection contemplated by sec. 3 is not given protection for a temporary period under sec. 4. So far as we can visualize following consequences are likely to ensue if the protection contemplated by sec. 4 is not given to the concerned industry: (1)THE industry would run a risk of being closed down and may also be taken up in liquidation or winding up proceedings. This would result in total loss of that industry to the nation which is otherwise struggling to industrialize its economy. (2) The closure would result in unemployment of hundreds of persons with all its chain of consequence such as discontent and frustration and in certain cases this may result even in law and order problems. (3) Unsecured creditors of the undertaking would have very bleak chances of future recovery if such a sick undertaking is left to lurch and is allowed to face the consequences of winding up or liquidation and (4) The public money invested by State in financing the undertaking would be put to serious jeopardy. IT is with a view to avoid all these possible consequences that the restrictions contemplated by sec. 4 are envisaged by the statute. We have therefore no doubt in our mind that these restrictions are in public interest. ( 36 ) THEN the question which arises to be considered with regard to the fundamental right contemplated by Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution is whether these restrictions are reasonable. While considering this question of reasonableness of restrictions it is difficult to avoid the temptation of referring to the following memorable observations of Ayyangar J. in the case of Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 1602 at page 1613;the criteria for determining the degree of restriction on the right to hold property which would be considered reasonable are by no means fixed or static but muse obviously vary from age to age and be related to the adjustment necessary to solve the problems which communities face from time to time. The tests therefore evolved by communities living in sheltered or placid times or laid down in decisions applicable to them can hardly serve as a guide for the solution of the problems of post partition India with its stresses and strains arising out of movements of populations which have had few parallels in history. The tests therefore evolved by communities living in sheltered or placid times or laid down in decisions applicable to them can hardly serve as a guide for the solution of the problems of post partition India with its stresses and strains arising out of movements of populations which have had few parallels in history. If law failed to take account of unusual situations of pressing urgency arising in the country and of the social urges generated by the pattern of thought evolution and of social consciousness which we witness in the second half of this century it would have to be written down as having failed in the very purpose of its existence. Where the Legislature fulfils its purpose and enacts laws which in its wisdom are considered necessary for the solution of what after all is a very human problem the tests of reasonableness have to be viewed in the context of the issues which faced the Legislature. In the construction of such laws and particularly in judging of their validity the Courts have necessarily to approach it from the point of view of furthering the social interest which it is the purpose of the legislation to promote for the Courts are not in these matters functioning as it were in vacuo but as parts of a society which is trying by enacted law to solve its problems and achieve social concord and peaceful adjustment and thus furthering the moral and material progress of the community as a whole. ON similar lines is the following passage from the judgment of Shastri C. J. in State of Madras v. V. G. Rao A. I. R. 1952 S. C. 196 which has been repeatedly cited with approval in many of the subsequent Supreme Court decisions:it is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness wherever prescribed should be applied to each individual statute impugned and no abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby the disproportion of the imposition the prevailing conditions at the time should all enter into the judicial verdict. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby the disproportion of the imposition the prevailing conditions at the time should all enter into the judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable in all the circumstances of a given case it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the Judges participating in the decision should play an important part and the limit to their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self restraint and the sobering reflection that the constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have in authorising the imposition of the restrictions considered them to be reasonable. Thus five tests are supplied by these observations namely (1) Nature of the right infringed. (2) Underlying purpose of the restriction. (3) Extent and urgency of evil sought to be remedied (4) Disproportion of the imposition and (5) Prevailing conditions of time. WE may add the sixth test as provided in N. B. Khare v. The State of Delhi A. I. R. 1950 S. C. 211 namely whether the law is temporary or permanent. Applying these tests to the facts of this case we have no doubt in our mind that all of them are fully satisfied. We have already considered the nature of the right infringed and the underlying purpose of the restrictions contemplated by the Act. Extent and urgency of the evil which these restrictions seek to remedy are too obvious to be emphasised. A nation which is struggling against acute socio economic problems cannot afford to relax its efforts towards industrialisation and prevention of unemployment. If it does so it would be only at its own peril. The State Act is only a modest effort of the society towards that direction. What it seeks to do is only to suspend for a temporary period the enforcement of several rights in larger interest of the society as a whole. If it does so it would be only at its own peril. The State Act is only a modest effort of the society towards that direction. What it seeks to do is only to suspend for a temporary period the enforcement of several rights in larger interest of the society as a whole. It is therefore not open to a citizen who is a part of this society to adopt a fanatic approach to his fundamental rights which are not absolute in their character. Directive principles of the State enumerated in Part IV of our Constitution represent the aspirations of this nation. The Central and State Legislatures of the country have constantly to bear them in mind and though it is true that these principles do not override the justifiable fundamental rights embodied in Part III of the Constitution they none the less provide sufficient guidance and direction as regards the goal which our nation aspires to achieve. As observed by Subba Rao C. J in Golaknath v. State of Punjab A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 1643 these directive principles can reasonably be enforced within the self regulatory machinery provided by part III of our Constitution as to use his own words indeed both parts III and IV of the Constitution form an integrated scheme and is elastic enough to respond to the changing needs of the society. Wherever a fundamental right is infringed there is bound to he some hardship to the concerned citizen however. small the infringement may be. But so long as the infringement is not unreasonable individual hardship must yield to the social necessities because in a modern polity individual has to live in the society of which he is a part and is directly or indirectly benefited by the progress of that society. In this case the restrictions in question are referable to Art. 41 of the Constitution and since we find that these restrictions are reasonable the vires of secs. 3 and 4 of the State Act cannot be successfully challenged. ( 37 ) YET the question is whether in their application these restrictions can be considered reasonable or not. This aspect of the matter is already considered by us in the above discussion where we have pointed out that the action which the State is required to take under sec. ( 37 ) YET the question is whether in their application these restrictions can be considered reasonable or not. This aspect of the matter is already considered by us in the above discussion where we have pointed out that the action which the State is required to take under sec. 4 is completely guided by the policy which is so apparent from the preamble as well as sec. 3 of the Act. Therefore if at any time the State is found to be making any hostile discrimination in applying these restrictions it can be struck down as going outside the ambit of the guide lines provided by the statute. ( 38 ) SHRI Vakil the learned advocate for the petitioners drew our attention to the Supreme Court decisions given in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ranojirao Shinde A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 1053 Kartar Singh and others v. The Chief Engineer Irrigation Punjab A. I. R. 1966 Punjab 362 and unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Application No. 685 of 1968. We find that these decisions have no bearing on the facts of the present case because they proceed on the principle that it is not reasonable to acquire the property of a private individual for the purpose of fattening the State exchequer. So far as this case is concerned the restriction in question is not intended for the purpose of fattening the State exchequer but only for the purpose of seeing to it that a sick industry is put on proper lines and is enabled to run on sound economic conditions. For achieving this object and for preventing unemployment what the State is expected to do is to give positive financial assistance and temporary protection from other claimants. If the State is ultimately successful in achieving these objectives even the creditors whose dues are not secured stand to gain. We are therefore of the opinion that the decisions relied upon by Shri Vakil would not help the petitioners in showing that secs. 3 and 4 of the State Act are putting unreasonable restrictions on the petitioners fundamental right to hold property. ( 39 ) WHAT remains now to be considered is only the last point which is about the validity of the notifications which are issued under secs. 3 and 4. The contention is that these notifications are vitiated as the notification issued under sec. ( 39 ) WHAT remains now to be considered is only the last point which is about the validity of the notifications which are issued under secs. 3 and 4. The contention is that these notifications are vitiated as the notification issued under sec. 3 is beyond the scope of that section and the one issued under sec. 4 is issued without the Government applying its mind. ( 40 ) SO far as the notification which is issued under sec. 3 is concerned the argument was that it does not comply with the condition precedent for the exercise of the powers under sec. 3 inasmuch as the loan guarantee by the State was advanced to the company in the year 1965 while the action of issuing the declaration is taken four years thereafter i. e. in the year 1969. We do not find any substance in this contention because if a reference is made to the provisions of sec. 3 it would be found that it contemplates the issuance of the declaration even in cases where loan guarantee or other financial assistance has been provided in the past. Moreover we find in the record of the case a copy of the Directors report of New Manekchowk Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. for the year ending 31st December 1963 and other relevant documents going to show under what circumstances a loan of Rs. 20 lacs was taken by that company from the Government. This documents show that the said company was not able to make enough profit on account of the fact that its machinery was worn out. The company therefore took a loan of Rs. 20 lacs in the year 1965 from the Government with a view to replace its worn out machinery. It is found that even thereafter the company could not work properly and ultimately the Central Government had to take action under sec. 18a of the Central Act as it was found that the industry was run by the company in a manner which was detrimental to public interest. It is obvious therefore that the loan of 20 lacs rupees was advanced by the State Government in the year 1965 to enable the company to stand on its legs and thereby to prevent unemployment. It is obvious therefore that the loan of 20 lacs rupees was advanced by the State Government in the year 1965 to enable the company to stand on its legs and thereby to prevent unemployment. So even if it is believed that the loan in question should have been provided as a measure of preventing unemployment we find that the condition is satisfied. Under the circumstances it is not possible to believe that the notification issued under sec. 3 is ultra vires the provisions of that section. . ( 41 ) SO far as the notification issued under sec. 4 is concerned there is absolutely nothing in the petition to show that the Government has issued that notification without applying its mind. The Government has of course suspended all rights obligations and liabilities under sub-clause (iv) of sec. 4 (1) (a) but that would be with reference to the facts relating to financial affairs of the New Manekchowk Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. It was for the appellant to rely upon the facts going to show how the Government have not applied their mind at the time of suspending all rights privileges obligations and liabilities under sub-clause (iv) of sec. 4 (1) (a ). The petitioners have not done this. Therefore it is not possible even to attack the validity of the notification issued under sec. 4. In this connection we may refer to the Supreme Court decision given in Ishwarlal Girdharlal Joshi v. State of Gujarat A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 870. Reference to page 875 of the reported decision shows the observation of the Supreme Court that in such cases in which the petitioner has failed to make out the case for non-application of mind it would be better for the Government to leave the petitioner to their burden in view of the legal presumption and the provisions contained in Art. 166 (2) of the Constitution. ( 42 ) IN this view of the matter we hold that both these petitions should fail. Both of them are therefore dismissed with costs. ( 43 ) THE learned advocate for the petitioner in Spl. C. A. 638/69 applies for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Said leave is granted under Art. 133 (1) (b) and (c ). .