Order.- These are petitions filed under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, one to quash an order passed by the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Tenali in Criminal M.P.No. 470 of 1969 issuing notice under section 250 of the Criminal Procedure Code to show cause why he should not be directed to pay compensation to each of the accused in C.C.No. 1 of 1969 on his file as the accusation made by him against the said accused was found to be false and vexatious, and the other to expunge all the remarks made in the judgment in the said case against him examined as P.W.1 in the case. 2. The petitioner is a retired Chief Engineer of the Southern Railways who has settled in Turumella village in Tenali taluk after his retirement. He was looking after his lands situated in Amartalur village. He had given reports to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tenali and Tahsildar, Tenali stating that the accused had caused obstruction to the drainage channel near his land and requesting them to remove the same. After causing certain enquiries the Tahsildar of Tenali filed a private complaint under sections 430, 432 and 109, Indian Penal Code, against the three accused, of whom A-2 is the father and A-3 is a cooly working under A-1. In support of the prosecution the complainant has examined five witnesses including P.W.1 the present petitioner. The accused in their statements denied their having interfered with the channel and had alleged that some one else had interfered with it. The Court on enquiry found their contention to be true and acquitted them of the charges made against them. While acquitting the accused the Court had made in the judgment certain derogatory remarks against P.W.1. After the acquittal, the Court had also issued a notice under section 250, Criminal Procedure Code, to P.W.1 to show cause why he should not be made to pay compensation to the accused for having made false and vexatious accusations against them. Hence these two petitions are filed by P.W.1 under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code. 3. After the acquittal, the Court had also issued a notice under section 250, Criminal Procedure Code, to P.W.1 to show cause why he should not be made to pay compensation to the accused for having made false and vexatious accusations against them. Hence these two petitions are filed by P.W.1 under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code. 3. The first objection raised with regard to the petition Crl.M.P. No. 1640 of 1969 to quash the proceedings and the notice given to him under section 250, Criminal Procedure Code, is that as it is in the notice stage and no further steps had yet been taken and the party has a right to approach the High Court in case a further order directing him to pay compensation is passed, this petition under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, is not maintainable. For this contention reliance is placed on the decision in Bhagwan Das v. State1, where it was held that where an application made by the accused under section 250, Criminal Procedure Code, has not been decided by the Magistrate before whom it is made, the High Court will not exercise any of its powers either under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code or Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, as the applicant has his remedy in the lower Court and he should seek that remedy in that Court. In Satyanarayana v. State of A. P.2, Satyanarayana Raju, J. (as he then was) held that where a charge appears to be prima facie groundless it is an obvious duty of the High Court to interfere without subjecting a person to the unnecessary harassment of the trial. In Md. Abdul Sattar v. State of Andhra Pradesh3, also it was observed that where the prosecution case itself as stated in the charge-sheet and the evidence adduced clearly leads to the conclusion that there is no case against the accused a further prolongation of the prosecution would amount to harassment and it would be clearly the duty of the High Court to interefere by exercising its inherent powers. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab1, it was pointed out that the High Court will be reluctant to interfere with any proceedings in a Criminal Court in an interlocutory stage, but it is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction to interfere under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, that there may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice as in cases when it mainfestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceedings. In the present case, it is the contention of the petitioner that he was only examined as a witness in the case and the provisions of section 250, Criminal Procedure Code, do not apply to him and the initiation of the proceeding under section 250, Criminal Procedure Code, against him would be without jurisdiction. If this contention is sound, it certainly calls for interference under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, in the interests of justice by quashing the proceedings on the notice issued to him, though no further steps have yet been taken by reason of the notice, as the further proceedings themselves would be without jurisdiction. Section 250, Criminal Procedure Code, reads as follows: “250. (1) If, in any case instituted upon complaint or upon information given to a Police Officer or to a Magistrate, one or more persons is or are accused before a Magistrate of any offence triable by a case is heard discharges or acquits all or any of the accused and is of opinion that the accusation against them or any of them was false and either frivolous or vexatious the Magistrate may by his order of discharge or acquittal, if the person upon whose complaint or information the accusation was made is present, call upon him forthwith to show cause why he should not pay compensation to such accused or to each or any of such accused when there are more than one, or if such person is not present, direct the issue of a summons to him to appear and show cause as aforesaid. (2) The Magistrate shall record and consider any cause which such complaiant or informant may show and if he is satisfied that the accusation was false and either frivolous or vexatious may, for reasons to be recorded direct that compensation to such amount not exceeding one half of the amount of fine he is empowered to impose as he may determine be paid by such complainant or informant to the accused or to each of any of them. (2-A) The Magistrate, may by the order directing payment of the compensation under sub-section (2) further order that in default of payment the person ordered to pay such compensation shall suffer simple imprisonment for a period not exceeding thirty days. * * * * *” It is clear from a perusal of the above provision the case must have been instituted upon a complaint or upon information given (1) to a Police Officer or (2) to a Magistrate accusing some persons of having committed certain offences triable by a Magistrate and the case should have ended in an acquittal and in such a case, the Magistrate trying the case should have found that either the complaint or the information given was false and either frivolous or vexatious for him to give the notice to show cause why he should not be made to pay compensation. In this case, P.W.1 to whom notice has now been given was not the complainant who had moved the Court by the filing of the complaint. The complaint was filed by the Tahsildar who was also examined in the case. Therefore no information was directly given by the petitioner to the Magistrate by way of filing of a complaint; What he has done is he has only sent two petitions Exhibits P-2 and P-3 to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tenali. Exhibit P-2 is a letter dated 1st March, 1968, sent by P.W.1 to the Tahsildar, Tenali stating that accused 1 and 2 were causing obstruction to free flow of drainage water from his fields through the channels used for both irrigation and drainage purposes from time immemorial causing inundation in his fields and damage to the standing crops, that they should inspect the site at an early date and issue instructions to the parties concerned to take off the obstruction when the time comes for the discharge of drainage water freely on both sides. This was endorsed and sent to the Revenue Inspector for inspection and report and thereafter there were enquiries made by the Revenue officers. Exhibit P-3 dated 12th March, 1968, is another letter sent by the petitioner to the Tahsildar, saying that the accused were filling up the channel to a further length of about ten yards and early action may be taken to have the channel restored to its original condition. It is after further enquiry that the Tahsildar having been satisfied of the accused having committed an offence under sections 430, 432 and 109, Indian Penal Code, had filed a complaint. Under these circumstances, it has to be seen whether the provisions of section 250, Criminal Procedure Code, are attracted as far as P.W.1 is concerned. Admittedly he did not lay the complaint before the Magistrate, nor did he give any information to a Police Officer of an offence having been committed by the accused resulting in the filing of the charge-sheet by the Police Officer. ‘Complaint’ has been defined in section 4(1)(h), Criminal Procedure Code, as meaning the allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action under this code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence but it does not include the report of a Police Officer. Therefore in this case there has been no “complaint” as such. It is next to be seen whether by reason of the petitions Exhibits P-2 and P-3 sent by P.W.1 he can come under the second limb of the provision which includes the laying of a charge sheet on information given to a Police Officer. Admittedly no information was given to the Police Officer as such by P.W.1 and no charge-sheet was laid in the case. What was laid was a private complaint before the Magistrate by the Tahsildar and not by P.W.1. It was contended relying on a decision in Kaliya Perumal v. Bavaji1, that a man who complains to a Village Magistrate of an offence, knowing that the latter must in the ordinary course of his duty report the substance of the complaint to the police, gives information to the police just as effectively as if he went in person to the Police Station. But, it must be noted here that the information given to the Tahsildar was not in his capacity as a person in authority in order that he may forward the complaint to the police for investigation of an offence being committed or for laying of a charge sheet. The letters addressed to the Tahsildar were so addressed in his capacity as a revenue officer capable of enquiring into the grievances of the petitioner and affording necessary relief himself. What P.W.1 was asking was only the removal of the bund which was causing obstruction to the channel carrying the sullage water from his fields which if not done should ultimately result in inundation in his field and causing damage to the crop and nothing more. The mere fact that he had mentioned in Exhibit P-2 that it is most objectionable to prevent the usage of the channel in a Government poramboke for the discharge of the drainage water under section 430, Indian Penal Code, does not mean that he was asking them to lay a complaint. He was only pointing out the serious nature of the action of the accused and what he was asking was only for the authorities to inspect the site and instruct the parties to remove these obstructions. As pointed out in Bharat Kishore v. Judhistir2, the mere fact that a document in writing contains an allegation that a specific offence has been committed does not necessarily constitute that document a complaint, that the allegation of specific offence must be with a view to action being taken under the Code, i.e., for the prosecution of the offender for having committed the specific offence and it must be made to the Magistrate in his judicial capacity so that he may exercise his powers of taking cognizance of that specific offence and proceed in respect of the person accused, and that where a petition clearly shows that the object of the petition is not that the particular offence should be punished but rather the mention of the particular offence is made with a view to illustrate the kind of conduct which the accused person is supposed to be following and against which the petitioner is seeking protection, such a petition is not a complaint and he is asking the Magistrate in his executive capacity to make an enquiry and protect him against the repetition of such conduct. The present case is in all fours with the facts of the above case as far as the object in sending the petitions is concerned. Moreover he has not moved any Magistrate but only the Tahsildar as a’ revenue officer concerned with the lands in question, for affording him relief by removing the obstruction to the channel. Therefore the provisions of section 250, Criminal Procedure Code, are not satisfied and no notice as such can be issued to him under that provision to show cause why he should not be made to pay compensation to the accused for having given a false and frivolous or vexatious complaint. It was not the case of the accused that the channel was not obstructed, but that it was somebody else who had done it. On the petitions given by P.W. 1 the Revenue authorities appear to have made elaborate enquiries and after satisfying themselves they have laid the complaint. It cannot also be said that it was a frivolous or vexatious complaint. Therefore in the interests of justice it becomes necessary to quash the notice issued under section 250, Criminal Procedure Code, to the petitioner herein. This petition Crl. M.P. No. 1640 of 1969 to quash the notice is allowed and the notice is quashed. 4. The other petition Crl. M.P. No. 1639 of 1969 is also under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, to expunge certain remarks, made by the Magistrate in his judgment, on the ground that they are not based on evidence and are unnecessary and. unwarranted for the disposal of the case. The remarks which are sought to be deleted in the judgment of the lower Court are the following: “(i) P.W. 2 is patently a tool in the hands of P.W.1. (ii). P.W.1. who is unquestionably a versatile man obviously knew the contents of the Revenue Inspector’s report and wanted perhaps to nullify; it and so, the misleading report of the then Tahsildar as per Exhibit P-17 appears to be one sent at the instance of P.W.1. (ii). P.W.1. who is unquestionably a versatile man obviously knew the contents of the Revenue Inspector’s report and wanted perhaps to nullify; it and so, the misleading report of the then Tahsildar as per Exhibit P-17 appears to be one sent at the instance of P.W.1. (iii) I have no doubt in my mind, that in view of the fair admissions made by P.W.5 and the manner in- which the enquiry before the Revenue Inspector took a different turn, after his first report Exhibit P-12, P.W.1 was misleading and misinforming the Revenue Officers by taking advantage of the access he had to them and the confidence they appear to have reposed in him. (iv) The manner in which he achieved his object and his contention before this Court that he is ignorant of the enquiry made by the Revenue Inspector clearly show that he did all this only because he has some personal grudge against A-1 and A-2 who are admitted to be distantly related to him also. (v) It is quite clear that though P.W.1 had knowledge that no sort of damage was likely to be caused to his land and though there was neither crop nor any water in his lands at that time and that rainy season was far off he made a ghost of a imaginary grievance that his lands were likely to be inundated during the rainy season and raised a hue and cry for its immediate removal through the revenue authorities only with a view to falsely implicate the accused in the matter and to harass them. (vi) I find that P.W.1. has set the Criminal law in motion against the accused only to harass them and gratify his own ill-will against A-1 who became the Sarpanch of Thurumalla though he was a resident of Amruthalur. I also find that the reports Exhibit P-2 and P-3 were given by P.W.1 falsely and vexatiously to harass the accused”. It is now not contended that a petition for expunging the remarks does not lie under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, as it will be in the interests of justice to expunge disparaging remarks which are unwarranted and if there was no basis for them in the evidence let in. Judicial pronouncements must undoubtedly be judicious in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve and they should not freely drawn from imagination. Judicial pronouncements must undoubtedly be judicious in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve and they should not freely drawn from imagination. But in assessing the evidence from the conduct of the parties, certain inferences may have to be drawn and certain conclusions may have to be arrived at. These cannot be said to be unwarranted. It may be that from the relationship of parties also certain inferences arise. It cannot be said that the Court is not justified in drawing those inferences. What the Court is not expected to do, as pointed out in State of U.P. v. Md. Naim1, is making sweeping general observations without foundation as in that case against the police about whom the Court had chosen to say, “where every fish barring perhaps a few stinks, it is idle to pick out one or two and say that it stinks. There is not a single lawless group in the whole of the country whose record of crime comes anywhere near the record of that organised unit which is known at the Indian Police Force.” Where a Magistrate merely draws on his imagination or makes wild statements without any basis in the evidence an aggrieved party has a right to have them expunged but where from the evidence let in he draws some inferences to base his conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the accused, that inference cannot be said to be unwarranted. The remarks complained of in this case, extracted above, only show that certain inferences that were warranted were drawn and in the weighing of the evidence these remarks were called for. If those remarks are deleted, there is no basis for finding the accused innocent. Those remarks are necessary to support the conclusion arrived at by the Magistrate. If those conclusions are unwarranted and the Complainant is aggrieved over the order of acquittal passed by the Court, he is at liberty to take it on appeal. There are no no grounds for deleting these remarks. This petition Cr.M.P. No. 1639 of 1969 is therefore liable to be dismissed. 5. In the result Crl. M.P. No. 1639 of 1969 is dismissed and Crl. M.P.No. 1940 of 1569 is allowed. A.B.K. ----- Cr.M.P.No. 1639 dismissed. Cr.M. P.No. 1640 allowed.