JUDGMENT P. Govinda Nair, J. 1. The relevant prayers in this petition are: "(a) to strike down such of those provisions of the Act, particularly chapter VA of the Act, compelling the employer to pay special contributions to the Employees' State Insurance Fund, as the same is a piece of legislation hit by Arts, 19 and 31 (2) of the Constitution. "(b) to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents not to recover the employees special contributions including the one demanded under Ex. P1 & P. 2" 2. The Act referred to in these prayers is the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 and Chapter VA of that Act was introduced by way of an amendment effected to the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, by the Employees' State Insurance (Amendment) Act, 1951. It is stated in the objects and reasons to the bill Which gave rise to the amending Act that the implementation of the provisions of the Employees' State Insurance Act Region Wise, that is applying it only to certain regions at a time has the consequence of increasing the cost of production in the regions to which the provisions of the Act were applied resulting in the competitive capacity of the employers in that region being affected adversely. Chapter VA is applicable to the Whole of the area to which the Act applies and all the employers in that area are affected by the Act and have to make the special contribution provided by the Act. 3. Counsel for the petitioner did not urge that the impost under Chapter VA is violative of Art.19 or Art.31(2) though that is the ground taken in this petition. He however contended that the impost under Chapter VA is in the nature of a fee and that Parliament has no competence to impose such a fee. When this argument was met by the contention that the impost is a tax, counsel urged that this cannot be treated as a tax because the collections under the Chapter do not find their way to the consolidated fund of the Union of India. This submission cannot stand in view of the categorical pronouncement of the Supreme Court in its decision in Jaora Sugar Mills (P.) Ltd. v The State of Madhya Pradesh and others reported in AIR 1966 S. C. 416. This submission cannot stand in view of the categorical pronouncement of the Supreme Court in its decision in Jaora Sugar Mills (P.) Ltd. v The State of Madhya Pradesh and others reported in AIR 1966 S. C. 416. Their Lordships observed thus: "It is doubtful whether a plea can be raised by a citizen in support of this case that the Central Act is invalid because the moneys raised by it are not dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Part XII generally or particularly the provisions of Art.266. We will, how ever, assume that such a plea can be raised by a citizen for the purpose of this appeal. Even so it is difficult to understand how the Act can be said to be invalid because the cesses recovered under it are not dealt with in the manner provided by the Constitution. The validity of the Act must be judged in the light of the legislative competence of the Legislature which passes the Act and may have to be examined in certain cases by reference to the question as to whether fundamental rights of citizens have been improperly contravened, or other considerations which may be relevant in that behalf Normally, it would be inappropriate and indeed illegitimate to hold an enquiry into the manner in which the funds raised by an Act would be dealt with, when the Court is considering the question about the validity of the Act itself. As we have just indicated, if the taxes or cesses recovered under an Act are not dealt with in the manner prescribed by the Constitution, what remedy a citizen may have and how it can be enforced, are questions on which we express no opinion in this appeal" This Court followed the decision in Rajan Oil Mills, Chovva v. Union of India reported in 1968 KLT 665 . 4. It is clear that if the impost under the Act is otherwise a tax, it Will not cease to be one such by the mere fact that the monies collected pursuant to the provision in the Act do not find their way to the consolidated fund of the Union of India. 4. It is clear that if the impost under the Act is otherwise a tax, it Will not cease to be one such by the mere fact that the monies collected pursuant to the provision in the Act do not find their way to the consolidated fund of the Union of India. The impost satisfies all the requirements of a tax as defined by Latham, Chief Justice in Mathews v The Chicory Marketing Board (Victoria) reported in 60 C. L. R.263, this:- "A tax is a compulsory exaction of money by a public authority for public purposes, enforceable by law and is not a payment for services rendered." This definition has been accepted by the Supreme Court as early as 1954 and reliance has been placed on the definition in the decision in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v Sri. Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri. Shirar Mutt reported in AIR 1954 S. C. 282. We therefore negative this contention. 5. Counsel then urged that the Employee's Stage Insurance Act falls under Entries 23 and or 24 of list III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and that being so, it was contended that Entry 97 in List I of the Seventh Schedule or Art.248 (2) of the Constitution Will not be of any avail as according to counsel the statute being one substantially falling under List III already referred to, it cannot also be brought under the residuary entry, Entry 97, of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Support Was sought to be gained for this contention on the basis of the ruling of the Federal Court in A. L. S. PP. L. Subrahamanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan reported in AIR 1941 Federal Court 47 and also the decision of the Supreme Court in The Second Gift Tax Officer, Mangalore etc. v D.H.Nazareth etc. reported in AIR. 1970 S. C. 999. Neither of these decisions can help the petitioner and a plain reading of the relevant provisions of the Constitution which we consider are Art.248 (2) and Entry 97 of list I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution leaves no doubt in our mind that the legislation is competent. The impost is a tax and such a tax has not been enumerated in any of the Lists II & III of the Constitution. The impost is a tax and such a tax has not been enumerated in any of the Lists II & III of the Constitution. Art.248 (2) of the Constitution is in these terms:- "248 (2) Such power shall include the power of making any law imposing a tax not mentioned in either of those lists." and Entry 97 runs thus:- "97. Any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those Lists. These provisions undoubtedly confer power on the Parliament to impose a tax in relation to any matter not specifically provided for in Lists II & III of the Constitution. Counsel has not been able to point out nor are there any Entries in Lists II and III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution providing for a tax such as that has been imposed by the Employees' State Insurance Act. 6. In the result, We dismiss this petition with costs.