ORDER S.M.N. Raina, J. This is a revision petition under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On a complaint filed by the non-applicant, the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the applicant) and four others were tried on a charge under section 448, Indian Penal Code. The case against them was that on 30-6-1967 they had committed house trespass by entering into the house belonging to non-applicant Savitri Bai and had dispossessed her of the same. The applicant and the other accused adjured their guilt. They were however convicted by the trial Magistrate. The Magistrate further gave a direction under section 522 Criminal Procedure Code that the non applicant shall be restored to possession of the house. The applicant and others preferred an appeal which was allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge Shivpuri, and they were acquitted. But the learned Judge maintained the order relating to delivery of possession of the house to the non-applicant. Being aggrieved by the direction relating to delivery of possession the applicant has come up in revision before this Court. The main contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the order for possession under section 522, Criminal Procedure Code can be passed only in a case of conviction and since the applicant and others were acquitted the order relating to delivery of possession to the non-applicant should have been set aside by the Additional Sessions Judge. On behalf of the non-applicant it has been urged that the appellate Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order under section 522 parsed by the trial Magistrate and as such the order is only revisable by the High Court. He further contended that the mere fact that the applicant was acquitted in appeal is not sufficient to justify interference with the order of the trial Magistrate. Learned counsel for the non-applicant relied on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ramprasad v. State AIR 1958 All. 159 . It was held in that case that the appellate Court cannot while acquitting the accused set aside the order of the trial Court under section 520, Criminal Procedure Code. It was further held that the acquittal of an accused does not necessarily mean that the order as to possession passed by the trial Magistrate should also be set aside. It was held in that case that the appellate Court cannot while acquitting the accused set aside the order of the trial Court under section 520, Criminal Procedure Code. It was further held that the acquittal of an accused does not necessarily mean that the order as to possession passed by the trial Magistrate should also be set aside. The learned counsel for the applicant has on the other hand relied on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sheikh Usman Gani v. Barandeo AIR 1959 Cal. 145 . In that case it was held that as soon as the conviction is set aside the whole basis of the order disappears and therefore it is open to the High Court after the conviction has been set aside to set aside the order under section 522 (1) and to direct restoration of possession to the party who has been dispossessed by the order of the trial Court. The order under sub-section (1) of section 522 can be passed by the trial Court either at the time of conviction or at any time within one month from the date of conviction. Where the order is passed after the conviction it is an independent order and as no appeal is provided against such an order it can only be revised by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. But where the order is passed by the trial Court at the time of conviction it being an order incidental to conviction, the appellate Court, in my view, is competent to set it aside while acquitting the accused in an appeal against conviction in exercise of its powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 423, Criminal Procedure Code. In the Allahabad case referred to above their Lordships were dealing with a case in which the order under section 522, Criminal Procedure Code was passed subsequent to conviction, and, therefore, the observations relating to jurisdiction of the appellate Court appear to relate to a case of this nature only. I, however, agree with the view expressed in that case that an order under section 5 22 passed by the trial Magistrate need not be automatically set aside as a result of the acquittal. It is true that the very foundation of the order under sub-section (1) of section 522 is the conviction in the circumstances specified in the said subsection. It is true that the very foundation of the order under sub-section (1) of section 522 is the conviction in the circumstances specified in the said subsection. But once an order has been passed by the trial Magistrate it is open to the appellate Court to consider the question of possession independently of the question of conviction, and it may allow the order as to possession to stand while acquitting the accused, if it considers it just and proper to do so. Similarly, this Court would not in revision set aside the order under section 522 (1) merely because the accused has been acquitted in appeal. The High Court would interfere with the order only if it considers it just and proper to do so, keeping in view the acquittal of the accused. In the instant case the appellate Court in paragraph observed as under: In view of the aforesaid finding in favour of the complainant the appellate Court maintained the order as to possession although it acquitted the applicant and the other accused on other considerations. The view taken by the appellate Court appears to be perfectly reasonable. The finding of the Court that the house belonged to the non-applicant and was in her possession was not questioned before me. The applicant cannot, therefore, make a grievance of the order of restoration of possession in her favour. There is, therefore, no justification for interference in revision in this case. The petition, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed.