JUDGMENT 1. - The short point for determination in this second appeal by the plaintiff arising out of a suit for redemption of mortgage in respect of certain agricultural land is whether the suit for possession of the land in question by redemption of mortgage can be decreed after coming into force of the Rajasthan Zamindari & Biswedari Abolition Act, 1959 ? 2. At this stage there is no dispute between the parties that the land in question which comprising of 8 Bighas and 5 Biswas situated in village Jatiana, Tehsil Alwar originally belonged to Amarsingh and Chakmal, ancestors of the plaintiffs Bhavsingh and others. Amarsingh and Chakmal mortgaged it with possession to Kanni, father of the defendant Moosa on 14.9.1899 for Rs. 100/- and the mutation of the land was made in favour of the mortgagee the same day. Bhavsingh and others filed the present suit for redemption of the mortgage on payment of Rs. 100/- , it was pleaded inter alia by the defendants that prior to the mortgage by Amarsingh and Chakmal his father Kanni was occupying this land as a tenant and consequently he is entitled to continue in possession as a tenant even though his mortgagee rights may come to an end. It was also pleaded that the Rajasthan Zamindari and Biswedari Abolition Act, 1959 came into force on 27.2.1959 and that the land in question is Biswedari, the plaintiffs rights in respect of the same came to an end and the land vested in the State free from all encumbrances. Consequently, it was prayed that the suit may be dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file a suit for possession. 3. The Munsif, Alwar dismissed the suit and his decision has been upheld by the District Judge, Alwar on appeal by the plaintiff Bhaysingh Consequently, the plaintiff has come in second appeal to this court. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that as soon as the defendant's father acquired the rights of mortgagee in possession of the land in dispute his right as a tenant in respect of the same came to an end. In support of his contention he has relied upon Dhulilal v. Pannalal - 1963 R L.W. 265. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that as soon as the defendant's father acquired the rights of mortgagee in possession of the land in dispute his right as a tenant in respect of the same came to an end. In support of his contention he has relied upon Dhulilal v. Pannalal - 1963 R L.W. 265. Where it was held that the two relationships namely, (1) of landlord and tenant and (2) of mortgagor and mortgagee could not stand side by side or co-exist and therefore the earlier relationship of landlord and tenant must be held to have been impliedly surrendered when the subsequent one of the mortgagor and mortgagee arose for operation. Admittedly, in the present case there was no express stipulation at the time of entering into the transaction of mortgage that after redemption the relationship of landlord and tenant would revive between the mortgagor and the mortgagee. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, opposed this contention on the ground that the Transfer of Property Act was not in force at the time the mortgage was created in the present case in 1899. This according to me does not make any difference as the general principle that the two relationship, that is, one of landlord and the other of mortgagor and mortgagee in absence of express stipulation cannot co-exist holds good irrespective of the provisions of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. In this view of the matter, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the relationship of the landlord and tenant would revive between the plaintiffs and the defendants on redemption of the mortgage, and it cannot be accepted that the defendant is occupying the land in question as a tenant. 4. This brings me to the consideration of the other co-related question as to the impact of the Zamindari and Biswedari Abolition Act on the right of the plaintiffs to maintain the suit. Section (5) (2) (b) of the said Act clearly provides that the right, title and interest of the Zamindar or Biswedar, and of every person claiming through him, in such estate, including land (cultivable, waste or barren)... .. Section (5) (2) (b) of the said Act clearly provides that the right, title and interest of the Zamindar or Biswedar, and of every person claiming through him, in such estate, including land (cultivable, waste or barren)... .. ...shall cease and be vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances, for the purpose of the State, and every mortgage debt, or charge on any such right, title or interest shall be a charge on the amount of compensation payable to the Zamidar or Biswedar under this Act. Clause (j) further provides that every mortgage with possession existing on such estate or part thereof on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting shall, to the extent of the amount secured on such estate or part be deemed, without prejudice to the rights of the State Government under this section, to have been substituted by a simple mortgage. 5. The aforesaid provisions leave no manner of doubt that the land in question which is admittedly a Biswedari land stood transferred to and vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances on coming into force of the Act and the only right left to the plaintiff, the previous Biswedar was to claim compensation for the same. True it is, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, that the mortgage with possession w ill also be deemed to have been substituted by a simple mortgage and the right of the defendant to remain in possession of the land as a mortgagee with possession also came to an end with the coming into force of the aforesaid Act and as a simple mortgagee his mortgage would be only a charge on the amount of compensation payable to the plaintiff under the Act. But the difficulty in the plaintiff's way is that they have no locus standi to bring a suit for possession of the and in question as their right, title and interest in the land in question as Biswedar stood transferred and vested in the State Government which alone is competent to deal with the land and to evict the defendant, if so advised. The plaintiff's suit at any rate is not maintainable. 6. The result is that this appeal must be dismissed and I accordingly do so. However, in the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs. *******