Judgment R.J.Bahadur, J. 1. This is a First Appeal by the defendant from the judgment and decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Monghyr, who has given a decree to the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 with the declaration that the property in the suit was the personal property of the plaintiff and it did not fall within the provisions of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act (Bihar Act 1 of 1951), hereinafter referred to as the Act. The plaintiffs case is that he is the Chela of Kesho Dass of Mahalla Chakdewan Motaluke Budhouli, Sheikhpura, in the district of Monghyr. The properties described at the foot of the plaint are his personal properties and are not endowed properties; as such, the Thakurbari, known as Sangat, has no title in it and the properties in the suit are, therefore, not hit by the provisions of the Act. Consequently, the Bihar State Religious Trust Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board, has no right to interfere with the same. The facts as disclosed in the plaint are as follows: One Seba Das was a Nanaksahi Fakir, who had a Gola business at Lakhisarai and he had earned sufficient amount from the said business as also from distributing medicines for various diseases. He had thus acquired substantial properties from his own earning which were his personal properties. Seba Das established his own private temple or Thakurbari at Sheikhpura, which came to be known as Sangat Chakdewan. Seba Das met the expenses of the Sangat from the income from his personal properties. The properties acquired by Seba Das were also recorded in the Survey. On the death of Seba Das his properties devolved on his disciple Kesho Das, who came in possession of the properties which were left by Seba Das. The plaintiff being the disciple of Kesho Das succeeded in his properties. According to the plaintiff, the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act was enacted for looking after the management of the endowed properties, which were the properties in the nature of public trust. The Board issued a notice to the plaintiff to declare the extent and nature of the properties belonging to the said Thakurbari. The plaintiff filed a petition before the Board that the properties were his personal properties and Thakurbari had no properties of its own. The Board issued a notice to the plaintiff to declare the extent and nature of the properties belonging to the said Thakurbari. The plaintiff filed a petition before the Board that the properties were his personal properties and Thakurbari had no properties of its own. The said petition was rejected by the Board and as a shadow had been cast over the title of the plaintiff, he instituted the present suit for a declaration that the properties in suit were his personal properties and the Board had no right to interfere with the management of those properties as the provisions of the Act were not at all attracted. 2. The defence of the Board, who was the main defendant, namely, defendant No. 1, was that the suit was not maintainable and the court had no jurisdiction. Its case, as disclosed in the written statement, was that the defendant has learnt on enquiry that the Asthal of the temple was open to public for worship and was always maintained by public charity, donations and offerings. Whatever the properties were acquired for the Asthal before and after the Survey were out of the offerings and donations received from the public. The properties in the hands of Seba Das and Kesho Dass were not their personal properties nor were they ever acquired by their personal fund or income. Further, its case was that the plaintiff on having received the notice to declare the extent and nature of the properties belonging to the Math or Sangat duly filed returns to the Board from the year 1951 to 1957-58 and did not claim the properties to be his personal properties. As the Thakurbari was a public property and was endowed by the public for the use of the public, the Act was applicable. There was written statement also by the State of Bihar (defendant No. 2) on the same line. 3. The learned Subordinate Judge, who heard the suit, came to the following main conclusions: (a) The returns for the years 1951-52 to 1957-58, Exts. There was written statement also by the State of Bihar (defendant No. 2) on the same line. 3. The learned Subordinate Judge, who heard the suit, came to the following main conclusions: (a) The returns for the years 1951-52 to 1957-58, Exts. A to A(7), were filed by the plaintiff in haste and without knowing the legal position; and in any case the admission in those returns could be shown to be wrong and, therefore, were not binding for the plaintiff for all time in view of the plaintiffs case that they were filed without ascertaining the correct legal position and right of the Board. Undoubtedly, the returns were filed but the plaintiff was not bound by those returns and it was open to him to question the jurisdiction of the Board; (b) The evidence adduced by both sides--oral and documentary showed that the defendant had failed to establish that the properties in the suit appertained to public trust or that the Sangat was a public temple or that the properties in suit were public trust properties or were endowed properties; and (c) The plaintiff had succeeded in establishing that the properties in suit did not belong to any deity or to any public trust but they were his personal properties to which the provisions of the Act did not apply. 4. Mr. J.C. Sinha, appearing on behalf of the appellant, has in the first place, urged that the trial court having held that the returns were in fact filed by the plaintiff, it was in error in taking the view that the plaintiff was not bound by his own statement which amounted to admission, Learned counsels contention is that there is not a word about the filing of these returns in the plaint and there is no explanation either in his evidence or in the plaint; as such, in view of the admission the onus to prove that the properties in Question were his personal properties was on the plaintiff. Mr. J.C. Sinha conceded that for the aforesaid admission the onus was clearly on the defendant. 5. On behalf of the respondent Mr. Janardan Sinha contended that the statements in the returns did not amount to any admission at all either in law or in fact. Mr. J.C. Sinha conceded that for the aforesaid admission the onus was clearly on the defendant. 5. On behalf of the respondent Mr. Janardan Sinha contended that the statements in the returns did not amount to any admission at all either in law or in fact. His further contention is that even if the statements are taken to be admission, then it was clearly explained by a subsequent petition (Ext. B/1) filed before the Board. 6. We have looked into the returns, which are Exts. A to A(7). There appeared to be misconception in the mind of Mr. J. C. Sinha as he thought that they were filed for different year on different dates. When his attention was drawn to the returns that they were all filed on the same date, namely, on the 16th December, 1958. he did not dispute this position. The returns are for the years 1951-52, 1952-53, 1954-55, 1955-56, 1956-57 and 1957-58. We have been shown certain statements made in these returns. For instance, Ext. A in respect of the year 1957-58 in column No. 6 the statement is: "Mahanth is appointed by means of Chader giving ceremony". In the column meant for the object of trust the statement is: "Pooja-path, rag-bhop, etc." In the column meant for movable and immovable properties of the trust, the statement is: "About 30 bighas (of land). This Sanghat had zamindari-income which vested in the State." Further, the declaration in the return was stated to be true and correct to the information of the declarant, namely, Harikishun Dass, who had signed by his own pen. On these statements we are asked to hold by the appellant that the onus was clearly on the plaintiff and as it was not discharged the suit ought to have failed. The argument raised on behalf of the plaintiff is that the returns for all the years were filed on the 16th December, 1958. as on that date the law, as understood by the plaintiff and every body else, was that all trusts--whether public or private--had to file returns to the Board and, therefore, the returns were accordingly filed. Soon after it was realised that the position was not quite certain in law and a petition was filed on behalf of the plaintiff to the Board on the 4th February. 1959, which is Ext. B(1). Soon after it was realised that the position was not quite certain in law and a petition was filed on behalf of the plaintiff to the Board on the 4th February. 1959, which is Ext. B(1). Therein it was clearly stated that he had sent the accounts in haste without thinking over the matter and when he thought over the matter he learned that he had submitted the accounts out of mistake and he ought not to have submitted them because the properties were his personal properties and he prayed that the notice may be withdrawn. Up to this time there was judgment of the Patna High Court in the case of Ram Saroop Dasji V/s. Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts, ILR 33 Pat 942, but on the 15th April, 1959, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Patna High Court and allowed the appeal of the Mahant, which is reported in AIR 1959 SC 951 , wherein it was held that the Act and its provisions did not apply to private religious trusts. It also set out distinctions between public and private trust or endowment. On the footing of this decision it Ss contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the returns filed before the Board without knowing the correct legal position, which was resolved later on by the aforesaid Supreme Court decision, could not be utilised by the appellant, namely, the defendant, to show that the plaintiff was bound by his own admission and that the onus was, therefore, on the plaintiff to prove his case. It has therefore to be seen on whom, the burden lay to prove whether it was public or private endowment Certain tests have been laid down by various Courts in India, the Privy Council and later by the Supreme Court. Some cases which have been placed before us may be briefly noticed. 7. Before I take up the cases, it will be relevant to mention that Mr. J.C. Sinha contended that the statements in the returns mentioned earlier show unmistakably that the Sangat in question had all the traits of its being a public trust and that it was public endowment, and as such, there was no escape for the plaintiff from the provisions of the Act. In Parma Nand V/s. Nihal Chand, AIR 1938 PC 195. J.C. Sinha contended that the statements in the returns mentioned earlier show unmistakably that the Sangat in question had all the traits of its being a public trust and that it was public endowment, and as such, there was no escape for the plaintiff from the provisions of the Act. In Parma Nand V/s. Nihal Chand, AIR 1938 PC 195. it was said that the fact that the properties had descended from guru (religious preceptor) to chela (religious disciple) did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a property, when acquired by a mahant, lost its secular character and partook its religious character. When a person entered the Udasi order, he severed his connation with the members of his natural family. It followed that neither he nor his natural relative could succeed to the property held by the other. There was however no reason for holding that an Udasi could not acquire private property with his own money or by his own exertions. If he did acquire private property it could not be inherited by his natural relatives, but passed on his death to his spiritual heir including his chela who was recognised as his spiritual son. The descent of the property from a guru to his chela did not warrant the presumption that it was religious property. To constitute a trust "created or existing for a public purpose of a charitable or religious nature" the author or authors of the trust must be ascertained, and the intention to create a trust must be indicated by words or acts with reasonable certainty. Moreover the purpose of the trust, the trust property and the beneficiaries must be indicated so as to enable the Court to administer the trust if required. In the present case there is no document to ascertain the nature of the trust or the endowment and, therefore, it is conceded by counsel for both the parties that we will have to look into the oral testimony of the witnesses to find out the true scope and nature of the present Sangat. In the present case there is no document to ascertain the nature of the trust or the endowment and, therefore, it is conceded by counsel for both the parties that we will have to look into the oral testimony of the witnesses to find out the true scope and nature of the present Sangat. In Ram Saroop Dasjis case, AIR 1959 SC 951 it was observed that the essential distinction in Hindu law between religious endowments which were public and those which were private was that in a public trust the beneficial interest was vested in an uncertain and fluctuating body of persons, either the public at large or some considerable portion of it answering a particular description; in a private trust the beneficiaries were definite and ascertained individuals or who within a definite time could be definitely ascertained. It was further observed that the fact that the uncertain and fluctuating body of persons was a section of the public following a particular religious faith or was only a sect of persons of a certain religious persuasion would not make any difference in the matter and would not make the trust a private trust. Their Lordships then quoted a passage from the Tagore Law Lectures on Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts by Dr. Mukherjea (1952 Edition, pp. 392-396). "In English law charitable trusts are synonymous with public trusts and what is called religious trust is only a form of charitable trust. The beneficiaries in a charitable trust being the general public or a section of the same and not a determinate body of individuals, the remedies for enforcement of charitable trust are somewhat different from those which can be availed of by beneficiaries in a private trust. In English law the Crown as parens patriae is the constitutional protector of all property subject to charitable trusts, such trusts being essentially matters of public concern ..... One fundamental distinction between English and Indian law lies in the fact that there can be religious trust of a private character under Hindu law which is not possible in English law." Similar view was expressed In the case of Deoki Nandan V/s. Murlidhar, AIR 1957 SC 133 . One fundamental distinction between English and Indian law lies in the fact that there can be religious trust of a private character under Hindu law which is not possible in English law." Similar view was expressed In the case of Deoki Nandan V/s. Murlidhar, AIR 1957 SC 133 . It is not necessary to refer to other case for the approach of the question, namely, what are the requirements to be looked into in order to find whether a certain endowment or trust is of public or private character. 8. We will examine the oral evidence hereafter but the submission of Mr. J.C. Sinha that the statements in the returns amounted to admission and, therefore, the onus was on the plaintiff has to be dealt with at this place. The point raised by Mr. J.C. Sinha Is clearly without substance. The onus was undoubtedly on the defendant to prove that the properties in question were held for public purpose and Mr. J.C. Sinha has not been able to show us either in law or on fact that such onus has been discharged, Of course, when evidence has been adduced by both sides, the onus became merely academic and the matter had to be decided one way or the other on the evidence adduced In the case. Although It Is conceded that the question of burden of proving has lost its importance in view oil the fact that both sides led evidence ,let me at this stage dispose of the first point taken by Mr. J.C. Sinha. Undoubtedly, the admission is the best evidence that an opposite party can rely upon and though it is not conclusive, yet it would be decisive of the matter unless it were successfully withdrawn or proved to be erroneous, (See for instance Narayan Bhagwantrao V/s. Gopal Vinayak, AIR 1960 SC 100 ). Mr. J.C. Sinha contends that it should have been proved to be erroneous either in the plaint or on the evidence by the plaintiff himself as he was the person who had made the statement in the return which was clearly an admission. Not having done this it was not open to the plaintiff now to contend that no importance should be attached to the admission. Not having done this it was not open to the plaintiff now to contend that no importance should be attached to the admission. There can be no doubt that an admission is merely a piece of evidence, though it is best evidence; but it can at the same time be explained by direct or circumstantial evidence. Mr. J.C. Sinha was unable to show us any case where his point that the explanation must come from the plaint or from, the evidence of the person who made the admission alone finds support. He has contended that the learned Subordinate Judge was wrong in taking the view on the question of admission as he was misled by a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Ramabai Shriniwas V/s. Government of Bombay, AIR 1941 Bom 144. In that case it was held that an admission by a party in pleading in one suit was not binding on him in another suit. In other words, a party was not bound by his admission in his pleading except for the purpose of the suit in which the pleading was delivered. Our attention has been drawn to the case of Basan Singh V/s. Janki Singh, AIR 1967 SC 341 , wherein the decision in AIR 1941 Bom 144 was explained approving the decision in D. S. Mohite V/s. S. I. Mohite, AIR 1960 Bom 153 . It was laid down that an admission made by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him in a prior suit may be used as evidence against him in other suits. Their Lordships however added that in other suits that admission could not be regarded as conclusive and it was open to the party to show that it was not true. Mr. J.C. Sinhas contention is that neither in the plaint nor in the evidence of P.W. 1 it was so shown to be wrong. 9. Mr. Janardan Sinha on the other hand has contended that the returns undoubtedly show Mahanths signatures but it has to be borne in mind that they were all filed on the same date, namely, 16th December. 1958. for the reason that he was under threat of prosecution by the Board. We have been shown certain orders, which are on the record--marked Ext, E, taken from the order-sheet of the Board in respect of the plaintiffs matter. 1958. for the reason that he was under threat of prosecution by the Board. We have been shown certain orders, which are on the record--marked Ext, E, taken from the order-sheet of the Board in respect of the plaintiffs matter. It appears that on the 30th October, 1958, there is a note in the order-sheet on the application of Hari-kishun Dass filed through his Karpardaj Bhagirath Pandey to furnish returns from 1951-52 to 1957-58. This is the third time petition. He may be allowed prosecution will be filed. "Allowed this till 16-12-58. If he fails to furnish Returns on 16-12-58, as directed, he will be prosecuted." It is said that all the returns were filed by Bhagirath Pandey and were merely signed by the plaintiff. Those returns do not show that there is any statement to the effect that it was a public trust and in view of the earlier petition, Ext B(1) that it was filed in haste and by mistake, that it was clearly explained by the said petition. In my opinion, the point taken on behalf of the plaintiff is correct that it is not necessary that the explanation must come in the pleading or in the evidence of the plaintiff alone on the ground that admission is only piece of evidence though said to be the best evidence. It can, however, be explained and said to be wrong. It has been held in Kishori Lal V/s. Mt. Chaltibai, AIR 1959 SC 504 , that admissions are not conclusive, and unless they constitute estoppel, the maker is at liberty to prove that they are mistaken or are untrue. Relying on the case AIR 1960 SC 100 , Mr. Janardan Sinha has also urged that the plaintiff has satisfactorily shown that the admission made by him was erroneous and did not require any further proof. On the aforesaid authority It has been lastly urged that the decision of this case will not depend upon the admission, which is really not an admission at all, and even if it could be said to be so, it has very weak evidentiary value when it is considered along with the other evidence. On the aforesaid authority It has been lastly urged that the decision of this case will not depend upon the admission, which is really not an admission at all, and even if it could be said to be so, it has very weak evidentiary value when it is considered along with the other evidence. This submission finds support in, Ambika Prasad Thakur V/s. Kamal Singh, (1966) 1 SCR 758 = ( AIR 1966 SC 605 ), where their Lordships had occasion to deal with an admission of one of the defendants, who was interested in the success of the suit and, therefore, it became necessary for him to make an admission, and it was held that the admission appeared to have been made under some suspicious circumstances at the end of the trial and in any case the admission had weak evidentiary value. For these reasons I am of opinion that the point taken by Mr. J.C. Sinha is without substance and must be relected. It is, therefore, obvious that we will have to look into the evidence adduced by both sides. 10. Twenty witnesses were exe-mined on behalf of the plaintiff in support of his case. Certain witnesses, are merely formal, who have proved certain documents. I shall deal with those whose testimonies are relevant for the present purpose. Ramdhari Lal Verma (P.W. 3), who was aged about 70 years, was a private tutor and he coached students in the house of the plaintiff. His testimony is to the effect that all the properties were acquired as personal properties either by the plaintiff or by his ancestor by earning from distribution of medicines. He has stated that these were not public or trust properties and the public had no concern with them. He has further stated that nobody made any offering and the idols of Lord Krishna and Granth Saheb in the house were worshipped by the plaintiff and the public had no concern at all. It was elicited from him in cross-examination that whenever katha was recited in the Math, people gathered. Ram Prasad Sah (P.W. 4) comes from the same village, Sheikhpura, and has stated that the properties were acquired by the plaintiff and by his ancestors by earning and not out of any offering. It was elicited from him in cross-examination that whenever katha was recited in the Math, people gathered. Ram Prasad Sah (P.W. 4) comes from the same village, Sheikhpura, and has stated that the properties were acquired by the plaintiff and by his ancestors by earning and not out of any offering. He accepted that there were idols of Lord Krishna, Shaligram and Hanuman in the house but he asserted that no offering was made by public. In cross-examination he admitted that he had taken prasad and charnamrit on the occasion of festivals. He further stated that invitees only went there. Wasir Yadav (P.W. 5) is also resident of the same village. He is 80 years old. The lands of the plaintiff are near his lands, which are khas or personal properties. It was elicited from him in cross-examination that he was Udasi Vaisnav. He had gone inside the temple for milching cow. Mauzi Yadav (P.W. 6) has also stated that the properties in question were the personal properties of the Mahanth and not public properties and no member of the public came for worship. He further stated that the plaintiff distributed medicine and herbs. He was unable to say when the plaintiff purchased any property. He has been seeing the temple and the lands ever since he attained hosh. Bhatto Sah (P.W. 7) is the Patwari of Hussainabad. He has stated that all the lands were the personal properties of the plaintiff and not public properties. He has proved certain receipts, which do not show the name of any deity or of the plaintiff as Sebait. Similar is the evidence of Ragho Sao (P.W. 8) Rameshwar Mahto (P.W. 9) and Kesho Mandal (P.W. 10). P.W. 8 stated in cross-examination that he never went to the Sangat on any festival and there was no public gathering while P.W. 9 had no occasion to go inside the Sangat or the house of the plaintiff. According to Banwari Pandey (P.W. 11), the properties were the personal properties of the plaintiff and that no member of the public came and made offering or did any puja-path there. He stated that the plaintiffs house was not known as Sangat. Faudi Yadav (P.W. 2) had also deposed on similar lines as the other witnesses. According to Banwari Pandey (P.W. 11), the properties were the personal properties of the plaintiff and that no member of the public came and made offering or did any puja-path there. He stated that the plaintiffs house was not known as Sangat. Faudi Yadav (P.W. 2) had also deposed on similar lines as the other witnesses. It appears from his evidence that he knew Chakdewan Sangat whose Malik was the plaintiff and before him Kesho Das was the Malik. The properties were of the Sangat but the plaintiff looked after those properties. Lastly the plaintiff himself was examined as P.W. 13. The substance of his evidence is that all the lands in the suit were his personal properties. There was idol which he had installed for worshipping and public had absolutely no concern with it. The house in which he lived was not a public temple but was meant for his residence. He denied to have submitted any return to the Board. Further, no part of the properties was gifted or dedicated by any member of the public. It was elicited from him in cross-examination that he was never married nor was his Guru Kesho Das. Since he became disciple he was Vairagi. He belonged to Nanaksahi Panth but was unable to say whether he was Fakir. The entry in the Khatian was correct and his Guru Kesho Das was recorded as Fakir therein. He was not however called Fakir. His house was known as Sangat Chakdean at the Sheikhpura. He denied that he was called Mahanth. Bhagirath Pandey did pairvi in his case and he denied to have filed any return or obtained time from the Board. He also denied that he had mentioned in the return that Mahanth was installed by giving customary chadar. He further asserted that he did not maintain any account of expenses. 11. On the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses the contention on behalf of the appellant is that the cumulative effect of their testimony must lead to the only inference that it was a case of public trust and the plea of the plaintiff could not be sustained. He further asserted that he did not maintain any account of expenses. 11. On the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses the contention on behalf of the appellant is that the cumulative effect of their testimony must lead to the only inference that it was a case of public trust and the plea of the plaintiff could not be sustained. It is difficult to accept this contention as correct as the facts disclosed in the evidence of these witnesses do not conclusively show that it was a case of public trust, even though it had shown that Kesho Das was a Mahanth and the plaintiff was his disciple. That by itself would not make it a public trust. The learned Subordinate Judge took the view, relying on the case of Parmanand V/s. Nihal Chand, 42 Cal WN 1013, that mere acquisition by Mahanth of a property did not lose its secular character and assumed religious one. The descent of a property from Guru to Chela did not warrant the presumption that it was religious property. It was further observed that the defendants had to prove affirmatively that a trust of a public character was imposed upon the property. There is also an observation in the aforesaid case that there was no reason for holding that a Udasi could not acquire private properties with his own money or by his own exertion. If he did acquire privately, it could not be inherited by his natural relatives but passed on his death to his spiritual heir including his Chela. As I have already stated in the earlier part of the judgment, in the instant case there 19 no documentary or oral evidence in support of the fact that the properties were expressly dedicated for the use and benefit of the public. The true test has also been laid down in Mahant Shri Srinivas Ramanuj Das V/s. Surjanarayan Das, AIR 1967 SC 256 . On a review of the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses I am in agreement with the view of the learned Subordinate Judge that it cannot be said that on the evidence of the witnesses for the plaintiff it has been shown that the properties in the suit were public properties. I think, there is ample evidence of reliable character to show that the properties were his private properties and could not be said to be public trust properties. 12. I think, there is ample evidence of reliable character to show that the properties were his private properties and could not be said to be public trust properties. 12. Turning to the evidence led on behalf of the defendants, the Inspector of the Board has been examined as D.W. 1, According to him, Sangat and temple were public and it was nobodys private or personal property. Public went there for worship and made offerings. He also proved the returns filed by the plaintiff, Exts. A series. It has been elicited from him in cross-examination that he had visited the Sangat only once of which he did not remember the date. Curiously, It was 1961 after the suit was filed and that was also in connection with certain enquiry. D.W. 2 is merely a formal witness, who has been examined to prove certain documents. He is a peon of the Board. D.W. 3 is also a formal witness and he has proved certain documents. D.W. 4, is a vegetable vendor of Sheikhpura. According to him, Sangat is coming since 100 years or so, though he is only 30 years old. Festivals, such as Janmastami and Dasahra were held there and public made offerings and the Sangat was run from the income of those offerings. In cross-examination he stated that he went to the Sangat for Darsan almost daily. He denied to have any proceeding under Sec.107 of the Criminal Procedure Code against him but we were shown from a notice issued by the Subdivisional Officer Monghyr Sadar, dated the 13th November, 1963, Ext. 13(a), that he was one of the persons on whom notice for a proceeding under Sec.107 of the Criminal Procedure Code had in fact been issued and the proceeding had been started at the instance of the present plaintiff. It will be convenient to notice here the evidence of Ramdhani Chaudhary (D.W. 6), whose evidence is that the Sangat was in existence since the time of his ancestor. He too is 30 years old and is also one of the persons against whom the proceeding under Sec.107 of the Criminal Procedure Code had been started. He frankly admitted that there was a proceeding against him as also against Kashi Dusadh (D.W. 4) and that he had in fact come to court in connection with the pairvi of the aforesaid 107 case. He frankly admitted that there was a proceeding against him as also against Kashi Dusadh (D.W. 4) and that he had in fact come to court in connection with the pairvi of the aforesaid 107 case. It is said that the reason given by the witness for coming to court is obviously false, as on the date of his examination in court there was no necessity for making a pairvi in the 107 case as no date was fixed. Curiously, this witness also said that he attained his hosh only ten years ago namely, at the age of 20. There can be no doubt that these witnesses have been somehow caught hold of to depose in favour of the Board and obviously they are persons who are neither competent nor such as would inspire confidence, Sitaram Prasad (D.W. 5) is a coolie in a gola of grains in the same village, Sheikh-pura. He knew the Sangat as also the plaintiff, who was the Mahanth but he said that he had never gone there. In cross-examination he stated that Dusadhs did not go there. It has been rightly urged on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent that on his own admission that he never visited the Sangat, he is obviously incompetent to depose any fact. Rameshwar Chaudhary (D.W. 7) is a tailor by profession and comes from the same village, Sheikhpura. According to him, public visited the Sangat for worshipping where there were several idols and festivals were also observed there. He further stated that the properties were neither private nor personal belonging to the Mahanth. He was unable to say the boundary of the Sangat. He has stated various facts, which would obviously show that he has been brought as a witness to make only false statements, as in spite of the fact that he did not know how much lands the plaintiff had, yet he knew that the Mahanth had purchased them and realised rent on behalf of public. Rameshwar Mishra (D.W. 8) has also supported the defendants case that the public made offerings. His cross-examination would show that he had visited the Sangat only twice but he did not know the boundary of the Sangat nor did he know how many Mahallas there were in Sheikhpura. He had no talk with the plaintiff. He had not received any summons to depose, yet he was examined to support the defendants case. His cross-examination would show that he had visited the Sangat only twice but he did not know the boundary of the Sangat nor did he know how many Mahallas there were in Sheikhpura. He had no talk with the plaintiff. He had not received any summons to depose, yet he was examined to support the defendants case. Mani Mo-han Das (D.W. 9) is a Karpardai of another public trust at Monghyr. He claims to have gone to Sheikhpura and had seen the Sangat where he had occasion to stay. He knew the plaintiff who was the Mahanth and there were various idols and the public went there for worship and made offerings. He himself made an offering of four annas when he had gone there in connection with his duty, i.e., May, 1963. He admitted in cross-examination that he had been to the Sangat only once, even though he had gone to Sheikhpura many times. He had no previous acquaintance with the Mahanth. He knew the Inspector of the Board, Lalit Babu, who was present at the time of his deposition outside the court room. He used to visit his place for auditing his account and denied that he had deposed in the case at his instance. Bibhuti Bhushan Sinha (D.W. 10) had also made offerings and had seen people making offerings in the temple of the Sangat. He is a pleaders clerk at Monghyr and it has been elicited from him in cross-examination that his, licence was once cancelled. His son-in-law was then the clerk in the Block Development Officers office at Sheikhpura and, therefore, he had gone to visit Sheikhpura. He too had received no summons. 13. Lalit Kumar Sinha (D.W. 11) is the Inspector of the Board, who had submitted a report in connection with this case as he was deputed to collect oral and documentary evidence. The report is marked Ext D. He had contacted the local people, some Congressmen and also the Block Development Officer and local karamchari during his enquiry. None of these people, whom he had contacted, has been examined in the present case and there is no explanation for their non-examination, especially when such persons, like vegetable vendors, tailor, coolie, toddy seller and Karpardaj have been examined. None of these people, whom he had contacted, has been examined in the present case and there is no explanation for their non-examination, especially when such persons, like vegetable vendors, tailor, coolie, toddy seller and Karpardaj have been examined. If some respectable or responsible persons had been examined to support the defendants case, the evidence of those persons would certainly have Inspired confidence, but, as it is the testimony of the witnesses examined on behalf of the defendants appear to be quite worthless on merit. 14. Hingan Singh (D.W. 12) is a hotel keeper in Sheikhpura. He supports the defendants case but curiously in cross-examination he admitted that he had received no summons and had been called to depose by the Chaprasi. Unit Yadav (D.W. 13) worked in a mill in the same village. He supports the defendants case but curiously in cross-examination he had admitted that he too had received no summons. He came there when he learnt that there was interference in the worship of the temple. According to him, all the five or six temples in Sheikhpura were public temples. He was unable to say the boundary of the Sangat, Kedarnath (D.W. 14) had occasion to go to Sheikhpura as he was married there. He had seen the Sangat whose Mahanth was the plaintiff. He had visited the Sangat 3 or 4 times, which was open to public for worship without any hindrance. He frankly admitted in cross-examination that as he had a talk with the Chaprasi of the Board, he had come to depose. Jogesh Chandra Ghose (D.W. 15) is a Life Insurance agent and had visited Sheikhpura about 20 times. He was unable to say the name of the Mahalla in which the Sangat was located. He had gone to the Sangat alone and had been there for 5 to 7 hours. He was unable to name any person who visited in his presence. He claims to have acquaintance with the plaintiff. Ayodhya Das (D.W. 16) described himself to be a Sadhu. He had gone to the Sangat and knew the plaintiff and had stayed there as Sadhus were given hospitality and bidai. The public made offerings and had access there for worship. He admitted in cross-examination that a Chaprasi of Patna brought him to depose about the facts. He was unable to name the Mahalla in which the Sangat was situated. He had gone to the Sangat and knew the plaintiff and had stayed there as Sadhus were given hospitality and bidai. The public made offerings and had access there for worship. He admitted in cross-examination that a Chaprasi of Patna brought him to depose about the facts. He was unable to name the Mahalla in which the Sangat was situated. The trial Judge, who had the advantage of hearing the witness and seeing his demeanour, has observed in his evidence that he appeared to be a wandering beggar and was picked up on the road. He had betel leaves in his mouth which he admitted in cross-examination as having been given by some one. The witness did not impress the learned Judge and appeared to have been merely picked up to support the defendants case. Daya Singh (D.W. 17) is obviously an out-sider as his house is away from village Sheikhpura. He too supported the defendants case in substance but curiously he had not received any summons to depose. He did not know how many Mohallas there were in Sheikhpura. Hari Sao (D.W. 18) is a gold and silver dealer of Sheikhpura and he knew the Sangat as also the plaintiff. He too admitted that he had received no summons and the Inspectors peon of the Board had called him to depose. Badri Ram (D.W. 19) and Sita Ram (D.W. 20) have also been examined to support the defendants case. D.W. 19 is a tea shop keeper. He had received no summons. D.W. 20 was serving in a mill and said that the income to the Sangat from offering was substantial, yet he was unable to say what was the income. He admitted that he had no concern with the affairs of the Sangat. He was unable to substantiate his claim that he was in the service of a mill. Dasrath Mahto (D.W.21) comes from another village named Sundarpur but he had seen the Sangat of Sheikhpura. It was elicited from him in cross-examination that he knew Raghunandan Babu of Sundarpore, who is D.W. 1 (Inspector of the Board). He did not know that Raghunandan Babu was the Inspector of the Board. He did not know the names of all the Mahallas of Sheikh-pura. Bhunesar Mahto (D.W. 22) also comes from Sundarpur. He denied that he knew Raghunandan Babu (D.W. 1). It has been urged that both D.Ws. He did not know that Raghunandan Babu was the Inspector of the Board. He did not know the names of all the Mahallas of Sheikh-pura. Bhunesar Mahto (D.W. 22) also comes from Sundarpur. He denied that he knew Raghunandan Babu (D.W. 1). It has been urged that both D.Ws. 21 and 22 come from the same place and even though. D.W. 22 had pretended not to know Raghunandan Babu, yet it was admitted by D.W. 21 that he knew him who was the Inspector of the Board. Umakant Jha (D.W. 23) is a cook and he had been to Sheikhpura and had seen Sangat. He had worshipped and made offering, which was open to the public. He admitted that he had received no summons and he had met the peon of the Board, who had asked him to depose and he had agreed to do so. He denied having known the plaintiff as also that he wanted to be employed under him but he was not so employed. 15. This is all the oral evidence on behalf of the defendants it has been rightly urged by Mr. Janardan Sinha that the entire evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants either taken individually or collectively did not prove anything much less the requirements to show that the properties of the Sangat were in the nature of public trust or a public temple, which were endowed properties, and were not of personal character as claimed by the plaintiff. I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the defendants have not proved that the properties in the suit were public religious endowment or trust, which would attract the provisions of the Act. None of the tests laid down in various cases mentioned in course of the argument has been satisfied in the present case. In my opinion, the learned Judge was right in holding that the plaintiff has succeeded in proving that the properties in the suit did not belong to any deity or public trust and were his personal properties, to which the Act did not apply. 16. It will be convenient at this stage to mention further facts in support of the plaintiffs case that the properties in the suit do not stand in name of any deity or temple. For instance, survey khatian (Ext. 16. It will be convenient at this stage to mention further facts in support of the plaintiffs case that the properties in the suit do not stand in name of any deity or temple. For instance, survey khatian (Ext. 5) is obviously not in the name of any deity as it shows the name of Kesho Das disciple of Mahanth Seba Dass, Fakir Nanaksahi. The plaintiff is recorded in the khatian as the disciple of Kesho Dass. Ext. 6 is the survey khatian in respect of plot No. 775, which shows the name of Kesho Dass. The rent receipts filed on behalf of the plaintiffs, Exts. 1 series, in respect of the properties of the suit, and other properties, show that the rent was paid on behalf of the plaintiff which stood in his name as Mahanth Harikishun Das disciple of Kesho Dass. We have not been shown in any of these receipts that the name of any deity was noted or the plaintiff was described as Sabait. Several sale deeds were also filed on behalf of the plaintiffs (Ext. 2 to 2/o), which are of course not the subject of the properties in the suit. They were merely filed for the purpose of showing that whatever acquisition or purchase was made was not in the name of any deity or Sangat or temple or Guru Granth or idol. Ext. F is the certified copy of the Khatian filed by the defendants, already mentioned earlier. From a perusal of these documents it is quite clear that there is ample evidence to support the testimony of the witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiff. 17. For the reasons expressed above, I am of opinion that the appeal is without merit and must be dismissed with costs Kanhaiyaji, J. 18 I agree.