ORDER Singh, J. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying that the order of the Industrial Court passed on September 29, 1967 be quashed and that a writ in the nature of mandamus be issued directing the said Court to implead the Petitioner and Respondents Nos. 4 to 7 as parties in a reference pending in that Court. The relevant facts are that the Motor Karmachari Sangh Dhar, which is a representative union of workers of employees employed by the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation in the Dhar district of the State, referred for arbitration to the Industrial Court an industrial dispute relating to payment of dearness allowance by the Corporation. This reference was made under Section 52 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 and is still pending. The Corporation raised an objection that the representative union of workers of Dhar area which could not represent workers of other areas in the State was not competent to refer the dispute of dearness allowance as it concerned the workers employed by the Corporation in all the areas of the State. The representative unions of workers of Ujjain, Mandsaur, Shivpuri, Khandwa and Barwani then applied to the Industrial Court for being joined as parties. This application was rejected by the said Court on September 29, 1967. The representative union of workers of Ujjain has filed this petition challenging the said order under Article 226 of the Constitution to which the other unions have been joined as Respondents Nos. 4 to 7. The only point raised in this petition is that the Industrial Court acted illegally in the exercise of its jurisdiction in refusing to join the Petitioner and other unions as parties to the reference. The provision of law relied upon in this connection is Rule 57 of the Rules framed under the Act which is worded as follows: Rule 57. In addition to the powers conferred by the Act, a Labour Court, the Industrial Court or a Board shall have the same powers as are vested in Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit in respect of the following matters: (a) xx xx xx (b) Joinder and adding of parties. (c) xx xx xx Rule 57 no doubt enables the Industrial Court to join and add parties. (c) xx xx xx Rule 57 no doubt enables the Industrial Court to join and add parties. But this power is not unlimited, for as is expressly provided in the rule it is the same power which a Civil Court exercises in that respect when trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure. The power of a Civil Court under the Code in the matter of joinder and addition of parties is to be found in Order 1, Rule 10. The first clause of Rule 10 deals with a situation when the suit is instituted through a bona fide mistake in the name of a wrong Plaintiff and the Court finds that substitution or addition of any other person as Plaintiff "is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute." The second clause of Rule 10 enables a Court to add a person as a party "who ought to have been joined" or "whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit." This rule which corresponds to Order 16, Rule 11 of the rules of the Supreme Court in England has been construed in many cases. In Razia Begum v. Anuar Begum AIR 1958 SC 886 the Supreme Court, after referring to the relevant cases, arrived at the following conclusions: (1) That the question of addition of parties under Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is generally not one of initial jurisdiction of the Court, but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case; but in some cases, it may raise controversies as to the power of the Court, in contradistinction to its inherent jurisdiction, or, in other words, of jurisdiction in the limited sense in which it is used in Section 115 of the Code; (2) That in a suit relating to property, in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial Interest, in the subject-matter of the litigation; (3) Where the subject-matter of a litigation, is a declaration as regards status or a legal character, the rule of present or direct interest may be relaxed in a suitable case where the Court is of the opinion that by adding that party, it would be in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy. Reference may also be made to Amon v. Rapheel Tuck and Sons Ltd. (1956) 1 All. E R 273, where Devlin J. (as he then was) carefully analysed the English cases on the question as to when an intervener should be allowed to be joined as a party and observed: The person to be joined must be some one whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party? It is not, of course, merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. It is not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some question involved and has thought of relevant arguments to advance and is afraid that the existing parties may not advance them adequately. That would mean that on the construction of a clause in a common form contract many parties would claim to be heard, and, if there were power to admit any, there is no principle of discretion by which some could be admitted and others refused. That would mean that on the construction of a clause in a common form contract many parties would claim to be heard, and, if there were power to admit any, there is no principle of discretion by which some could be admitted and others refused. The Court might often think it convenient or desirable that some of such persons should be heard so that the Court could be sure that it had found the complete answer, but no one would suggest that it is necessary to hear them for that purpose. The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action, and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. On the wider construction of the rule, I do not understand where the line is to be drawn between a commercial interest in the question involved in the case and a legal one. It is conceded that the line must be drawn somewhere. It is not enough that the intervener should be commercially or indirectly interested in the answer to the question; he must be directly or legally interested in the answer. A person is legally interested in the answer only if he can say that it may lead to a result that will affect him legally-that is by curtailing his legal rights. That will not be the case unless an order may be made in the action which will operate on something in which he is legally interested. Thus a Civil Court cannot normally join an intervener as a party to a suit unless he has a direct interest in the subject-matter of litigation or as Devlin J. put it, unless an order may be made in the suit which will operate on something in which he is legally interested. This rule, as held by the Supreme Court, is relaxed in cases where the subject-matter of litigation is a declaration as regards status or a legal character, but in those cases also before the intervener is added as a party the Court should be of opinion that by joining him it would be in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy. Since the power conferred on the Industrial Court to join and add parties is the same power which a Civil Court exercises in respect of a suit, the limitations upon the exercise of the power contained in Order 1, Rule 10 must also apply to the Industrial Court. Even discarding the test of present and direct interest and taking a liberal view of the powers of the Industrial Court, that Court cannot add an intervener as a party to a proceeding pending before it unless at least the test laid down in conclusion No. (2) in Razia Begum's case is satisfied; in other words, the Court should be of opinion that by joining the intervener it would be in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy. The question then is whether the instant case was such where the addition of the Petitioner union and other unions as parties to the reference would have enabled the Industrial Court to effectually and completely decide the controversy raised in the reference. It may be recalled that the industrial dispute was referred under Section 52 by the representative union of workers of the Dhar area and related to the payment of dearness allowance to the workers. The representative union of workers of Dhar area under the scheme of the Act could only represent the workers of the local area comprising of revenue district of Dhar. Section 2(23) of the Act defines 'local area' as meaning any area notified as a local area for any or all industries and for all or any of the purposes under the Act By notification No. 9954-XVI, dated December 31, 1960, the area comprised in each of the revenue districts of Madhya Pradesh has been notified as a local area in respect of certain industries including the industry of Public Motor Transport for all the purposes of the Act. The provisions for recognition of representative unions are contained in Chapter III. It is clear from Section 13 and the certificate of recognition (see Form C appended to the Rules) issued to a representative union that the recognition is granted in respect of a local area and a union recognised as a representative union for a particular local area cannot represent the workers of a different local area. It is clear from Section 13 and the certificate of recognition (see Form C appended to the Rules) issued to a representative union that the recognition is granted in respect of a local area and a union recognised as a representative union for a particular local area cannot represent the workers of a different local area. Thus, the dispute that was submitted for arbitration under Section 52 by the representative union of Dhar area could relate only to the payment of dearness allowance to the workers employed in the revenue district of Dhar. To this dispute the workers in other local areas were not parties. The award that the Industrial Court would deliver to decide the reference will only determine whether the workers in the local area of Dhar should be granted dearness allowance as demanded by them. The award will not decide whether the workers in other local areas are also entitled to any dearness allowance. Dearness allowance is paid to compensate for the rise in cost of living and to neutralise the rise in prices. Conditions in one local area may be different from conditions in other local areas and, therefore, if workers in one local area are granted or not granted dearness allowance, that does not necessarily mean that the same rule should be applied for the workers in other local areas. The presence of representative unions of workers of local areas other than Dhar as parties to the reference cannot in any way assist the Industrial Court in deciding the dispute which is limited to the workers of the Dhar area. May be that the Court may like to know the position of the industry in other local areas of the State and the representative unions in other local areas may be able to furnish useful information on that matter; but that will only make them useful witnesses and not necessary or proper parties to the reference. We are, therefore, of opinion that the joinder of unions in local areas other than Dhar as parties will not in any way be helpful to the Court in the determination of dispute which is the subject-matter of the pending reference. There is yet another way of looking at the matter. A representative union of workers can submit a dispute for arbitration under Section 52 only after taking recourse to the conciliation proceedings. There is yet another way of looking at the matter. A representative union of workers can submit a dispute for arbitration under Section 52 only after taking recourse to the conciliation proceedings. This is clearly the effect of the three provisos appended to Section 52. Conciliation proceedings are taken under Chapter VIII of the Act and as provided in Section 39 of the Chapter, it is necessary that the party who initiates such a proceeding must have given a notice of change under Section 31. Cumulative effect of these provisions is that before a representative union of workers can refer an industrial dispute under Section 52, it should first give a notice of change under Section 31 and secondly, take recourse to conciliation under Section 39. It is only on completion of these two steps that the union can be entitled to refer a dispute for arbitration to the Industrial Court under Section 52. Now if representative unions of other local areas who have not taken the requisite steps for making a reference under Section 52 are permitted to be joined in the reference made by the union of the Dhar area, that would be permitting them to raise controversies which they themselves cannot raise until they comply with the requirements of the provisos. May be that these unions also can in future raise similar industrial disputes for their respective local areas after going through the requirements of the Act; but the fact remains that at the time when the application for intervention was made those requirements were not complied with and the joinder of these unions would have in effect enlarged the dispute pending in the reference made by the union of Dhar. Power to add parties under Rule 57 cannot be exercised when it has the effect of enlarging the dispute pending in the reference. As aptly stated by Devlin J. in Amon's case, the object of the rule conferring power on a Court to add parties "is not to marry a future action to an existing one, but to ensure that all the necessary parties to the existing one (using necessary in the broad sense of being necessary to effectual and complete adjudication in the existing action) are before the Court. On these considerations also we are of opinion that the Petitioner and other unions could not have been joined as parties to the reference. On these considerations also we are of opinion that the Petitioner and other unions could not have been joined as parties to the reference. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner brought to our notice a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. President, Industrial Court 1970 MPLJ 946 (M. P. No 500 of 1966, decided on the 9th September 1968.). In that case a reference was made by the State Government under Section 51 of the Act to which certain other representative unions who were not originally parties were joined by the Industrial Court and that order was challenged by a petition under Article 226. The learned Judges who decided that case were of the view that some of the questions referred by the State Government were general in nature relating to the employees engaged in the industry as a whole and not limited to the employees of a particular region and in that context they did not hold that the joinder of the unions was improper. They, however, made it clear that the Industrial Court has no power to enlarge the scope of the reference and. they specifically said that that Court could proceed with the reference if it found that it could do so without enlarging the scope of the reference. The special facts of the aforesaid case together with the fact that it was a case arising out of a reference under Section 51 and not under Section 52 make it entirely inapplicable to the instant case. It was also argued that on the objection of the Corporation that the union of Dhar area alone was not entitled to refer the dispute regarding dearness allowance, other unions were necessary parties and their joinder should have been allowed. This argument is also without any substance. The objection of the Corporation has not yet been decided by the Industrial Court but assuming that it is well founded, it is difficult to see how that objection can be met by joining other unions as parties who so far have not taken the steps necessary to refer an industrial dispute under Section 52. The objection of the Corporation is that an industrial dispute relating to dearness allowance can be referred only by all the unions and not by one union alone. The objection of the Corporation is that an industrial dispute relating to dearness allowance can be referred only by all the unions and not by one union alone. This objection, if it is valid, can be met by showing that all the unions have taken the necessary steps for referring an industrial dispute under Section 52 and not merely by adding them as parties to a reference which is initiated by one of the unions representing one local area. We, however, make it clear that we are here expressing no opinion on the tenability of the objection raised by the Corporation. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. The amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the Petitioner.