By this revision petition under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, the petitioners have challenged the ap­pellate order of learned District Judge, L. A. D., at Gauhati in an injunction matter. 2. The petitioners' case, inter alia, was that the defendant obtained an ex parte decree on 15-4-50 for eviction from 55 and odd bighas of land and also for arrear of rent against 3 persons, namely, Dina Bandu, Gopi Mohan and Raiendra. The petitioners were not parties in that decree. That they were occupancy tenants in respect of 33 bighas of land covered by that decree and that said ex parte decree was obtained frau­dulently. On these allegations that peti­tioners filed Title Suit 94/66 in the court of the Assistant District Judge, Gauhati, for declaration that the decree dated 15-4-50 in Title Suit No. 75 of 1949 of the Court of Subordinate Judge, L. A. D Gauhati was not binding on and execu­table against the plaintiff-petitioners. They also prayed for declaration that they were occupancy tenants in respect of the land described in the schedule to the plaint and for granting perpetual in­junction restraining the defendant-op­posite party from executing the afore­said decree against the plaintiffs-peti­tioners. The petitioners made an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code for temporary injunction. The learned Assistant District Judge granted ad in­terim injunction which was made abso­lute by his order dated 23-12-67 after hearing both the parties. An appeal was taken from the said order before the learned District Judge, who by his order dated 21-11-68 set aside the order of the learned Assistant District Judge and re­fused injunction. The present revision petition is directed against this order of the District Judge. 3. Mr. B. Islam, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, submits that the learned District Judge was wrong in his finding to the effect that the present case did not attract the provisions of Order 39, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, and by his wrong interpretation of law the learned Dis­trict Judge failed to exercise his juris­diction vested in him in refusing to grant the injunction. The question, therefore, for determination is whether the phrase "other injury of any kind" occurring in Order 39, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code, may include the execution of a lawful decree which has not been set aside by appellate court nor by any other competent court. In the case of Mt. Ladi Agarwallan! v. Keolrai Sethi. AIR 1955 Assam 174, it has been held that a person should not be prevented from executing a decree obtained by him on the ground that it causes injury to the plaintiff. The execution of a decree is in the exercise of a legal right and it cannot be placed on a par with the breach of a contract or injury to pro­perty or the disturbance of other rights vesting in a particular individual. 4. In the case of Hemant Kumar v. Ayodhya Prasad, reported in AIR 1957 Madh B 95, it has been held that no order of injunction can be made under Order 39, Rule 1 or Rule 2 or under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code to restrain decree-holder from executing a decree in his favour so long as it stands, and merely because the plaintiff institutes a suit for a declaration that the decree is not binding on him and that he hopes to succeed in the suit, it cannot be held that the execution of the decree would amount to committing an injury. 5. In the case of Venkanna v. Venkata Rao, reported in AIR 1957 Andh Pra 453 it has been held that "In O. 39. R. 1 (c) (Andhra Amendment), the ex­pression 'cause injury or loss to the plaintiff can only mean to do something wrongful which will result in loss or damage to the plaintiff. It can have no reference to any loss caused by a person pursuing his legitimate remedies. The meaning of the word 'injury' is "wrong­ful action or treatment, harm or damage". It can therefore have relation only to acts of a party which are wrong­ful and not to legitimate acts of persons who pursue the remedies allowed to them by law." 6. I am in respectful agreement with the reasonings given in the above decisions and hold that the injury refer­red to in Order 39, Rule 2, Civil Proce­dure Code would mean injury caused by wrongful action or treatment, harm or damage. I am in respectful agreement with the reasonings given in the above decisions and hold that the injury refer­red to in Order 39, Rule 2, Civil Proce­dure Code would mean injury caused by wrongful action or treatment, harm or damage. In the instant case the decree which is sought to be set aside in the suit was obtained as far back as in 1950 against some persons in respect of land which included the land in the present suit. The execution of the decree in the earlier suit was started in 1953 and the present suit has been brought in 1966. It appears that for long 16 years the present petitioners did not care to contest the decree and they allowed the decree passed in 1950 to stand. Whatever that may be, if an Injunc­tion order is to be passed in the instant suit, the case has to be brought within the scope of Order 39, Rule 2. As ob­served earlier the injury contemplated in the provision of Order 39, Rule 2 would exclude the execution of a law­fully obtained decree. In the eye of law no injury would be caused by the] execution of a lawful decree. 7. Mr. As ob­served earlier the injury contemplated in the provision of Order 39, Rule 2 would exclude the execution of a law­fully obtained decree. In the eye of law no injury would be caused by the] execution of a lawful decree. 7. Mr. Islam referred to the case of Brojendra Kumar Sen Gupta v, Jitendra Chandra Sen, reported in AIR 1960 Assam 111 (SB), wherein it has been held that where certain property has been the subject-matter of a pro­ceeding under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code and the Criminal Court passes an order against the plaintiff petitioner under Section 145 (4) Proviso (2) but the Criminal Court fails to re­store possession to the defendant held to be forcibly and wrongfully disposses­sed as provided for by Section 145 (6), Criminal Procedure Code with the re­sult that the plaintiff is allowed to conti­nue in possession, and within a few days of the order, the plaintiff brings a suit for declaration of title, confirmation of possession and permanent hi junction against the defendant restraining him from taking possession of the property which was the subject-matter of the proceeding under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, mere order of the Magi­strate under Section 145, Criminal Pro­cedure Code, that a party might be treat­ed to be deemed to be in possession did not in any manner affect the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, to grant an injuction restraining the defendant for dispossess­ing the plaintiff, if an appropriate case was made for the exercise of its discre­tion under Order 39 of the Civil Proce­dure Code. 8. In the instant case the oppo­site party has obtained a lawful decree declaring his right, title and interest in the suit land and also for khas posses­sion of the suit land by evicting the defendants in that suit. If such a decree is executed, it cannot be said that any injury would be caused by doing some­thing illegal or wrongful. In the circum­stances, I hold that the present case does not attract Order 39, Rule 2, Civil Proce­dure Code. That apart, the learned District Judge duly considered the facts and circumstances of the case and came to a prima facie conclusion that the peti­tioner might not have bona fide conten­tion in the suit. But that would be a subject-matter of the suit itself. That apart, the learned District Judge duly considered the facts and circumstances of the case and came to a prima facie conclusion that the peti­tioner might not have bona fide conten­tion in the suit. But that would be a subject-matter of the suit itself. On consideration of the facts and circum­stances of the case I am clearly of opin­ion that the petitioners have failed to establish a case for issuing an injunc­tion. Nothing has been pointed to show that the learned District Judge's order is in any way without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or it tantamounts to refusal to exercise jurisdiction. 9. In the result the petition is rejected. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.