JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE facts giving rise to this appeal are that the respondent Balram (who is now dead and whose legal representatives have been substituted in his place) and other respondents, namely, Lokman, Mekhram and Udainarayan, who are sons of Balram, instituted a suit for recovery of possession of land khasra No. 138/2 of village Pipariya (Kala) from the defendants-appellants Kallu and Premlal. The plaintiffs case in the plaint was that they were ex-proprietors of the village, that the land was grass land and was in their possession for a long time, that it was reserved by them as their grass land, and that after the abolition of proprietary rights it was settled with them by the order of the Nistar Officer passed on 1st December, 1953 in the rights of an occupancy tenant. It was further alleged that the defendants forcibly took possession of the said land sometime in November, 1960. The plaintiffs, therefore, claimed the relief of possession and msne profits. In answer to the plaintiffs suit, the defendants pleaded that they were in possession of the suit land for the last fifty years and that the plaintiffs were never in possession of the same in any capacity whatsoever. It was also pleaded that the defendants had no knowledge of the order of the Nistar Officer and that the said order, which Was passed behind their back, could not affect their rights. As regards the plaintiffs alleged dispossession in November, 1960, the defendants stated that the same was wholly untrue as the plaintiffs were never in possession and the question of their dispossession in 1960 could not arise. The trial Court decreed the plaintiffs claim for possession and for Rs. 10 as damages. It also directed that the defendants shall be liable to pay pendente lite and post decree damages till the date of delivery of possession at the rate of Rs. 10 per year. This decree was confirmed in appeal by the 1st Additional District Judge, Jabalpur. The defendants have, therefore, come up in second appeal to this Court. ( 2. It also directed that the defendants shall be liable to pay pendente lite and post decree damages till the date of delivery of possession at the rate of Rs. 10 per year. This decree was confirmed in appeal by the 1st Additional District Judge, Jabalpur. The defendants have, therefore, come up in second appeal to this Court. ( 2. ) THE contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants in this appeal is that the order of the Nistar Officer under which the plaintiffs-, respondents claimed title to the suit land was invalid and void as the land was never reserved by them as grass land for their exclusive use before the abolition of proprietary rights. In answer to this contention, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that it was not necessary that the land should have been reserved by the respondents for their exclusive use before it could be settled with them by the Nistar Officer, that the land was in fact so reserved by them and that the order of the Nistar Officer was not open to challenge in the Civil court. ( 3. ) TO appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary first to refer to certain statutory provisions. The settlement of grass land in this case was governed by rules made under section 91 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1950. The relevant rules were made by notification no. 777-XXVIII dated 7th October, 1951. The title of these rules was "rules for the reservation of land to ex-proprietors recorded as Bir Chhota ghas etc. , vesting in the State under the Act. " Rule 1, as originally made, read as follows: "1. Land under these rules shall be reserved in the Central Provinces in the rights of an occupancy tenant, in the merged territories in the rights of a raiyat and in Berar in the rights of an occupant. " Rule 2 dealt with the extent of the area up to which the reservation was permissible. Rule 3 provided for applications to be made by ex-proprietor for reservation of land under the rules. This rule required that the application "shall be made in Form A appended to these rules". The second clause of rule 3, which was added in July, 1954, laid down that applications under rule 3 (1) were to be made on or before the 31st December, 1954. This rule required that the application "shall be made in Form A appended to these rules". The second clause of rule 3, which was added in July, 1954, laid down that applications under rule 3 (1) were to be made on or before the 31st December, 1954. Rule 4 required that the officer to whom the application was made was to satisfy himself of "the correctness of the applicants claim" after an inquiry and then forward the papers to the Deputy Commissioner. Rule 5 prescribed that a proclamation was to issue inviting objections against the application for reservation for the purposes of inquiry envisaged by rule 4. By rule 6, the Deputy commissioner was authorised to pass the order of reservation in favour of the applicant, if he found that there was no objection to the reservation of rights claimed by the applicant. Form A appended to these Rules, which was a form of application under rule 3, was worded as follows : "i. . . . . . . . . son of. . . . . . . . . ex-proprietor of mouza. . . . . . Settlement No. . . . . . . Patwari Circle No. . . . . . . . . Tahsil /taluq. . . . . . . . . beg to state that the land described below recorded as "bir" grass, "chhota ghas" etc. was reserved by me for my exclusive use and it has vested in the State under section 4 (1) (a) of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Eights (Estates, Mahals, alienated Lands) Act, 1950. " Subsequently, by a notification issued on 4th May, 1955 the first rule was substituted by the following rules, which read as under : "1. An ex-proprietor shall be entitled to apply for reservation of land for his use in accordance with the rules hereinafter laid down from out of such Bir laid, Chhota ghas land, etc. which prior to the vesting thereof in the State was reserved by him for the exclusive use of his cattle. "1-A. The land reserved under these rules shall in the Central Provinces be in the rights of an occupancy tenant, in the merged territories in the rights of a raiyat, and in Berar in the rights of an occupant. " ( 4. "1-A. The land reserved under these rules shall in the Central Provinces be in the rights of an occupancy tenant, in the merged territories in the rights of a raiyat, and in Berar in the rights of an occupant. " ( 4. ) THE question to be decided on a construction of these rules is, whether on 1st December, l953 when the Nistar Officer passed the order in the plaintiffs favour,-it was a condition precedent to the making of an order under these rules that the land ordered to be reserved in the rights of an occupancy tenant in favour of an ex-proprietor should have been such land which was reserved by the ex-proprietor for his exclusive use before the abolition of proprietary rights. ( 5. ) THE unamended rule 1, which I have already quoted, was silent on this point. It did not say what conditions an applicant should have satisfied for getting the reservation of grass land in his favour. Rule 3, however, required that the applicant for obtaining the reservation order had to apply in form A, where he had to state that the land in respect of which the application was made was reserved by him for his exclusive use. Rule 4 enjoined that the officers receiving the applications should have satisfied themselves after an inquiry under rule 5 about the correctness of the applicants claim. Now, unless we read the requirement of the form that the land for which the application was made was reserved by the applicant for his exclusive use as a condition, which was required to be satisfied by the applicant, it is difficult to make out what claim of the applicant was required to be inquired into under rules 4 and 5 by the officers receiving the application. It is also to be noticed that rule 3 used the words that the application "shall be made in Form A. " Now the words "in the form" have been judicially construed and it has been held that where a statute says that a thing shall be in the form prescribed, that means that the form must be strictly and literally followed; [see, Henry v. Armitage (12 Q B D 257.) Strouds Judicial Dictionary Vol. 2 p. 1405]. The words "in the form" are more imperative than the words "in accordance with the form" [see, re Barber, Exp. 2 p. 1405]. The words "in the form" are more imperative than the words "in accordance with the form" [see, re Barber, Exp. Stanford (17 Q B D 269.) Strouds Judicial Dictionary Vol. 2, p. 1386]. The language of rules 1, 4 and 5 being ambiguous as to the nature of the claim which the applicant was required to substantiate, the form appended to the rules read along with rule 3 is a very useful guide for construction. It is accepted law that in case of an ambiguous enactment scheduled form is a legitimate aid to construction; [see, Halsburys Laws of England 3rd Edition Vol. 36, p. 399]. In my opinion, although the old rule 1 was silent about it, the rules read along with Form A meant to lay down that an ex-proprietor should have reserved the Bir, Grass land etc. for his exclusive use before the date of vesting to enable him to get the order of reservation of such land in his favour under the rules in the rights of an occupancy tenant raiyat etc. ( 6. ) THIS construction of these rules is supported by the subsequent amendment of rule 1, which expressly laid down that an ex-proprietor could apply for reservation only for such Bir land Chhota ghas land etc. which prior to the vesting was reserved by him for his exclusive use. It is significant that this amendment was made in 1955 after the expiry of the limitation prescribed under rule 3 for making of the application for reservation of land. Although the amended rule was not in terms retrospective, the very fact that no application could be made after the amendment goes to show that the intention of the rule-making authority was to expose the meaning of the already existing rule and to apply the new rule to the applications previously made. Indeed, the meaning that was made clear by the new rule was already implicit in the old rule and the amendment did not bring about any change in law, but only made express a meaning that was already implicit. Thus, an ex-proprietor whether before of after the making of new rule I was not entitled to an order or reservation in his favour unless the land was reserved by him before the date of vesting for his exclusive use. ( 7. Thus, an ex-proprietor whether before of after the making of new rule I was not entitled to an order or reservation in his favour unless the land was reserved by him before the date of vesting for his exclusive use. ( 7. ) THE next point to be seen in this connection is if the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner (or the Nistar Officer who exercised the same power as the Deputy Commissioner) in making an order of reservation under the rules was-limited one and he had no authority to pass an order of reservation in respect of any land which the ex-proprietor had not reserved for his exclusive use. After receipt of the application along with the papers of inquiry made under rules 4 and 5, the Deputy Commissioner was empowered by rule 6 to make the reservation in favour of the applicant if he found that there was "no objection to the rights claimed by the applicant. " The word "objection" in this rule did not refer to the representation received from third parties under rule 5 opposing the grant of the application, for if that were the meaning, the application could always be defeated by mere filing of an objection by any person. The word "objection" may mean: "act of objecting; that which is or may be presented in opposition; an adverse reason or argument; a reason for objecting or opposing; a feeling of disapproval" [see, Blacks Law Dictionary p. 1222]. In the context of rule 6, the word objection as used therein "adverse reason". It was only when the Deputy Commissioner found no adverse reason to the claim laid by the applicant that he was to proceed to make the reservation and it was immaterial that the adverse reason arose out of the objections filed by third parties or otherwise. The use of the word "finds" in rule 6 also supports this construction. The word "finds" suggests that the rule required application of mind on the part of the Deputy Commissioner to see if the claim laid by the applicant was well founded. Now, if the ex-proprietor had not reserved the land for his exclusive use before the date of vesting, that would be an adverse reason to the grant of claim laid by him in his application and the Deputy commissioner was not empowered by rule 6 to grant such an application. ( 8. Now, if the ex-proprietor had not reserved the land for his exclusive use before the date of vesting, that would be an adverse reason to the grant of claim laid by him in his application and the Deputy commissioner was not empowered by rule 6 to grant such an application. ( 8. ) MY conclusion on the construction of these rules is that the intention of the rule making authority was to empower the Deputy Commissioner only to reserve such grass land to the ex-proprietor to which he was entitled, that is to say, only the grass land which was reserved by him for exclusive use. The exercise of the power in favour of an ex-proprietor applicant depended upon the existence of the jurisdictional fact that the ex-proprietor had reserved the grass land applied for, for his exclusive use before the date of vesting. This limitation on the exercise of the power was not capable of being defeated either by the ex-proprietor alleging falsely or the Deputy Commissioner finding wrongly that the land applied for was reserved by the applicant for his exclusive use. To put it differently just as the Deputy Commissioner could not in the exercise of his power under the rules settle any grass land with the ex- proprietor which was admittedly not reserved by him for his exclusive use, similarly the Deputy Commissioner was not authorised to settle any grass land on a wrong finding that the land was so reserved by the ex-proprietor. In either case, the order made would be beyond his powers and invalid and void. ( 9. ) AS regards the question whether the order of the Deputy Commissioner was liable to be challenged in the civil Court, no provision of law has been brought to my notice which took away the jurisdiction of the civil court or gave immunity to the order of the Deputy Commissioner. In the absence of any such provision, the civil Court will have the undoubted jurisdiction to see if the limited statutory authority conferred on the Deputy Commissioner by the rules had been exceeded or not. In the absence of any such provision, the civil Court will have the undoubted jurisdiction to see if the limited statutory authority conferred on the Deputy Commissioner by the rules had been exceeded or not. Thus, the order of the deputy Commissioner will be open to challenge in the civil Court on the ground that by wrongly deciding the jurisdictional fact regarding the reservation of land by the ex-proprietor the Deputy Commissioner exercised the power of making reservation which he did not possess under the rules, as the land was in fact not reserved by the ex-proprietor before the date of vesting. Any similar order made by the Nistar Officer will also be open to like challenge, as he excised the power of the Deputy Commissioner by delegation, subject to same limitations. ( 10. ) IT has now to be seen whether the suit land was reserved by the plaintiffs for their exclusive use before the date of vesting. Both the parties have led evidence to show chat they were in exclusive possession of the land and it is now to this evidence that reference must be made. ( 11. ) THE learned counsel for the respondents has strongly relied upon ex. P/8, which is a copy of panchasala khasra for the years 1944-45 to 1948-49, and Ex. P/9, which is a copy of panchasala khasra for the years 1949-50 to 1950-51. In both these khasras, the land is shown as Grass in column No. 2 and Balram is mentioned as lumberdar in column No. 3. Column No. 4 meant for showing the person in possession and other columns are left blank. From this, the learned counsel for the respondents wanted me to infer that the land was recorded as reserved by the proprietors for their exclusive use. In my opinion, this contention is not sound having regard to the provisions in the central Provinces Land Records Manual Vol. I, which contained instructions to the Patwaries for the preparation of Khasra. Clause (19) of paragraph 6 of these instructions, which were contained in Chapter V of the Manual, laid down as follows: (xix) Column 6.-It a special jinswar heading has been provided for the crop, it will be shown by this name. If it falls under no special heading, it will be described by the name which it ordinarily bears. Clause (19) of paragraph 6 of these instructions, which were contained in Chapter V of the Manual, laid down as follows: (xix) Column 6.-It a special jinswar heading has been provided for the crop, it will be shown by this name. If it falls under no special heading, it will be described by the name which it ordinarily bears. Land reserved for the growth of grass either for hay or for thatching will be recorded in this column as under a crop and will be described as a grass reserve by the vernacular term in use in the district. Land other than sir land so reserved by the Malguzar will, however, be shown as grass in column 2 of the khasra as unoccupied, and a note made in the remarks column that the land has been so reserved. " The language of this clause goes to show that if the land was reserved by a malguzar as grass, a note had to be made in the remarks column that the land had been so reserved in addition to the land being shown as grass in column no. 2. As in the khasras (Exs. P/8 and P/9) there is no entry of reservation made by the malguzar in the remarks column as required by the aforesaid provision, it cannot be inferred that the khasras show that the land was reserved by the malguzar as grass. In the khasras subsequent to 1952- 53, the names of the plaintiffs do appear in column No. 3 meant for the person in possession, but that entry was made because of the order of reservation made by the Nistar officer on 1st December, 1953 in their favour. If the order itself was invalid and void, the entries made in pursuance to that order will be ineffective to confer any right on the plaintiffs. In my opinion, the Khasras do not show that the plaintiffs had reserved the suit land for their exclusive use before the date of vesting. ( 12. ) THE other evidence relied upon in this connection is Ex. P/7, a judgment dated 23rd July, 1941 in Civil Suit No. 199-A of 1940 of the Court Of additional First Sub-Judge, Second Class, Jabalpur between Pt. Balram v. Chhakodi. ( 12. ) THE other evidence relied upon in this connection is Ex. P/7, a judgment dated 23rd July, 1941 in Civil Suit No. 199-A of 1940 of the Court Of additional First Sub-Judge, Second Class, Jabalpur between Pt. Balram v. Chhakodi. From this judgment it appears that Balram (the plaintiff who died during the pendency of this appeal) had instituted a suit against Chhakodi (the father of defendant Kallu in this suit) for recovery of possession of Khasra no. 138/2 of Patti No. 2 on the allegation that it was encroached upon by chhakodi in the year 1938. Chhakodis contention in that suit was that he was in possession of Khasra No. 138/2 of patti No. 1 in maufi khairati rights. The learned Additional First Sub-Judge did not actually decide whether the land sued upon was in patti No. 2 or patti No. 1 and decreed the suit for possession of khasra No. 138/2 leaving demarcation of the field to be done in execution proceedings. From this judgment it is clear that the defendants father was in possession of khasra No. 138 /2 from 1938. It is admitted by the plaintiffs that the decree passed in accordance with the judgment (Ex. P /7) was not put into execution and possession of land 138/2 was not taken from Chhakodi or his heirs namely, the defendants, in execution proceedings. It is also not disputed that no demarcation of the land was done as was contemplated by the judgment of the Additional First Sub-Judge. The case of the plaintiffs is that chhakodi gave up the land out of Court and delivered possession to them. This case was not earlier set out but is deposed to by Balram (P. W. 1), in the last portion of his cross-examination and in his re-examination. However, the statement to that effect is quite vague. It is not stated therein as to when chhakodi gave possession of the suit land to the plaintiffs. It does not also appear probable that Chhakodi, who had all along contested the earlier suit, quietly gave up possession after the decision more so when the decision itself had left room for further contest in execution proceedings. In my opinion, the evidence of Balram (P. W. 1) is not believable that Chhakodi gave up possession on his own. It does not also appear probable that Chhakodi, who had all along contested the earlier suit, quietly gave up possession after the decision more so when the decision itself had left room for further contest in execution proceedings. In my opinion, the evidence of Balram (P. W. 1) is not believable that Chhakodi gave up possession on his own. The probability is more in favour of the defence version that chhakodi and thereafter his successors continued in possession as the decree (Ex. P /7) was not put into execution. ( 13. ) AS regards other oral evidence, Tikaram (P. W. 2) stated in cross-examination that the land was used for grazing cattle and the cattle of the plaintiffs as also of other persons of the village used to graze on the land. This evidence clearly demolishes the case of reservation of the land for exclusive use of the plaintiffs. ( 14. ) FROM the evidence led in the case, the only conclusion possible is that the land was not reserved by the plaintiffs for their exclusive use before the date of vesting. On this finding, it must be held that the order of the nistar Officer made in the plaintiffs favour was invalid and void, and that the. plaintiffs had no title to the land. ( 15. ) AFTER the order of the Nistar Officer the land continued to be used as before. Even if the defendants were not in possession, the plaintiffs also did not take any exclusive possession. The land continued to be used as grass land by the villagers as before as deposed to by Tikaram (P. W. 2) until it was cultivated by the defendants. The plaintiffs cannot also be taken to be in possession on the theory that possession follows title, because they had no title as the order of the Nistar Officer was invalid. Thus, the plaintiffs had neither title nor possession with them and could not succeed in ejecting the defendants. ( 16. ) THE learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the finding as to possession reached by the first appellate Court was binding in second appeal. Normally, it would be really so. Thus, the plaintiffs had neither title nor possession with them and could not succeed in ejecting the defendants. ( 16. ) THE learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the finding as to possession reached by the first appellate Court was binding in second appeal. Normally, it would be really so. But in the present case, the first appellate Court did not appreciate the legal position that the order of the nistar Officer would be invalid if the plaintiffs had not reserved the land for their exclusive use before the date of vesting. A proprietor may have been in possession of all unoccupied land qua proprietor, but such a notional possession could not amount to reservation of the land for his exclusive use. It appears to me that this distinction was lost sight of by the first appellate Court as is apparent from the following passage from its judgment: "it may be noted here that the land was not cultivable in the early years and in fact it continued to be grass land for a long time, used only for the purpose of grazing cattle. It wag admitted by Tikaram that the cattle of other persons also used to graze on the land. This was quite natural. Therefore even if the cattle of the defendants who had a special advantage in the matter, their lands adjoining the one in suit used to graze on this land it would not make a difference so far as the possession of the plaintiffs is concerned. " The Court below also misread the khasras (Exs. P /8 and P /9) as showing possession of the plaintiffs when in fact the khasras do not record possession of any party. For these reasons, the finding as to possession reached by the first appellate Court is erroneous in law and is not binding in second appeal. ( 17. ) THE appeal is allowed. The judgments and decrees passed by the courts below are set aside and the suit is dismissed. Having regard to the special features of the case, the parties shall bear their costs throughout. Appeal allowed.