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1970 DIGILAW 13 (PAT)

UNION OF INDIA v. RAJENDRA PD. SINGH

1970-01-20

ANWAR AHMAD, R.J.BAHADUR

body1970
This appeal by the Union of India arises out of a suit filed by the respondents for a declaration that the order of termination of his services passed by the Maintenance Inspector (Signal), Dhanbad, contained in the letter (Ext, A) dated the 10th November 1961, was illegal and without jurisdiction as well as for a decree for a sum of Rs.170 against the appellant. 2. Admittedly, the respondent was appointed as a casual fitter on the 5th November 1956 at the rate of Rs. 3-8-0 per day. He continued in service for a period of two years against different casual vacancies. 3. On the case of the respondent, he was taken as a member of the permanent staff on the 1st March 1959 and was also given the Central Pay Commission's Scale of Pay in addition to dearness allowance. The respondent was, thus, enjoying all the privileges of a member of the permanent railway staff with effect from the 2nd March. 1959. He was removed from service with effect from the 16th November 1961 without any notice in contravention of the rules regarding the dismissal of the railway employees. 4. The suit was resisted by the appellant on the ground that the respondent never acquired the status of a member of the permanent or temporary staff under the Railway Administration but was only a casual labourer and, as such, his services were terminated on the completion of the work for which he was employed. According to the appellant, the termination of the respondent's services was legal and proper and there was no contravention of the rules. 5. The learned Munsif came to the conclusion that the respondent never acquired the status of a member of the permanent staff but had qualified himself for the benefit of the Central Pay Commission's Scale of Pay and was entitled to be treated as a temporary employee by virtue of his continuing in service for six months as a casual labourer. He also came to the conclusion that the services of the respondent were rightly terminated in accordance with Rule 149 of the Indian Rail way Establishment Code, hereinafter referred to as the Code. 6. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge affirmed the finding of the learned Munsif that the respondent did qualify himself as a member of the temporary staff. He also came to the conclusion that the services of the respondent were rightly terminated in accordance with Rule 149 of the Indian Rail way Establishment Code, hereinafter referred to as the Code. 6. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge affirmed the finding of the learned Munsif that the respondent did qualify himself as a member of the temporary staff. He also negatived the case of the respondent, as had been done by the learned Munsif, that he was a member of the permanent staff. On the point as to whether the order terminating the services of the respondent due to the expiry of the sanction to the post he was holding without notice to him was illegal, the court of appeal below took a view different from that taken by the trial court and carne to the conclusion that – “the termination of the plaintiff's service was premature." Accordingly, it decreed the respondent's suit in part. Hence the present second appeal. 7. The first point raised by Mr. P. K Bose, learned counsel for the appellant, was that, as the respondent was not a member of the permanent staff and the order of termination of his services does not cast any stigma on him, the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India did not apply to the facts of the present case. According to learned counsel, the court of appeal below was wrong in holding that the respondent's services were illegally terminated because of the non-compliance with the procedure prescribed by Article 311 of the Constitution. This point was not seriously challenged by Mr. Tarakant Jha, learned counsel for the respondent, and in fact, could not have been challenged in view of the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme , Court in (1) Moti Ram Deka and others V. General Manager, North East Frontier Railway and another (A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 600) and (2) Jagdish Mitter V. The Union of India (A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 449). These two decisions were followed by a Bench of this Court in (3) Abdul Sattar V. The Senior Personnel Officer (CR), North Eastern Railway, Gorakhpur, and three others (Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 105 of 1966 decided on the 30th August 1967). These two decisions were followed by a Bench of this Court in (3) Abdul Sattar V. The Senior Personnel Officer (CR), North Eastern Railway, Gorakhpur, and three others (Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 105 of 1966 decided on the 30th August 1967). It was laid down that, in case of simple termination of services of a member of the temporary staff without any stigma on him did not attract the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. For these reasons, the finding arrived at by the learned Subordinate Judge as to the violation of Article 311 of the Constitution cannot be set aside. 8. Mr. Jha has, however, contended that the decree passed by the court of appeal below can be maintained on the other ground, namely, that there has been a violation of Rule 149 of the Code. As I have already stated, the learned Munsif held that this rule had not been violated. The learned Subordinate Judge has not come to a definite conclusion on this point but has held that the dismissal of the respondent's service was premature. According to Mr. Jha, this finding was sufficient for holding that the rule had been violated. It appears to me, however, that the court of appeal below did not fully apply itself to this part of the case as it held that the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution had been violated. Moreover, the finding to the effect that the termination of the respondent's Service was premature does not take into consideration the letter (Ext. A) relied upon by the learned Munsif. The case has, therefore, to go back on remand for a fresh decision on a consideration of the evidence already on record as to whether on the case of the parties and the evidence adduced on their behalf, there has been a violation of Rule 149 of the Code. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the court of appeal below are set aside and the case is sent back to it on remand for a fresh decision in accordance with law and in the light of the Observation made above. The Costs of this appeal will abide the result. Appeal allowed