Judgement A. MISRA, J. :- Plaintiff is the appellant. He filed the suit for partition of the moveable and immovable properties described in Schedules annexed to the plaint in two equal shares and allot him one share therein. The genealogy of the family given in the plaint, the correctness of which is not seriously disputed, is given below for the sake of convenience of reference : 2. Plaintiff's case, in brief, is as follows : The common ancestor Nityananda left four sons Dayanidhi, Madhab, Fakir and Haribandhu who constituted a joint family possessing immovable properties as well as money and paddy-lending business. Dayanidhi had two sons Balunki, father of the plaintiff and Banian, original defendant No. 1 who was given in adoption to Haribandhu. While the family was joint, Haribandhu Fakir and Balunki died. Some dissensions having occurred, Madhab and Raghunath, son of Fakir separated from the family, both in mess and property, in or about 1917. Therefore, the other two branches of Dayanidhi and Baman continued as joint family with the former as the Karta. On Dayanidhi's death, plaintiff and Baman with his children continued to live jointly but the former being a minor, the latter managed the family and its properties as the Karta. Baman, original defendant No. 1 who was the Karta of this joint family with joint family funds started a cloth shop in the name of one of his sons (defendant No. 2) and a rice mill in the name of his grand son (defendant No. 5), besides embarking upon a paddy purchasing agency business in the name of defendant No. 2. The immoveable properties alleged to have been acquired by Baman as Karta of the joint family are described in Schedule Ka, the moveables in Schedule Kha, the paddy purchasing agency in Schedule Gha and lands acquired in the name of defendants Nos. 2 and 5 in Schedules Uan and Cha. The 'ornaments which plaintiff claims to have belonged to his mother are described in Schedule Ga of the plaint. In all these properties, plaintiff claims to be entitled to Re. -/8/- annas share and has sought partition thereof. 3. After filing written statement, during the pendency of the suit, Baman, original defendant No. 1 expired and was substituted by his legal representatives, the present defendants Nos. 1 and 1/Ka who happen to be his daughter and daughter's son respectively. Defendants Nos. -/8/- annas share and has sought partition thereof. 3. After filing written statement, during the pendency of the suit, Baman, original defendant No. 1 expired and was substituted by his legal representatives, the present defendants Nos. 1 and 1/Ka who happen to be his daughter and daughter's son respectively. Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 are sons of Baman, original defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 5 is the son of defendant No. 2. 4. Defendants Nos. 3 and 4 in their written statements substantially support the case of the plaintiff. Defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 5 and the substituted defendant Nos. 1 and 1/Ka resist the claim of the plaintiff. Their case, in short, is as follows : In 1917, there was a separation between the four branches descended from Nityananda, and as such, there was a complete disruption of the joint family. Plaintiff who was a minor at that time lived under the guardianship of his grand-father Dayanidhi, Baman younger son of Dayanidhi who had been given in adoption to Haribandhu married plaintiff's widowed mother according to the custom prevailing in their community and Dayanidhi being his natural father, he lived in common mess with him and plaintiff not as coparceners but as tenants in common. Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 are sons of Baman through plaintiff's widowed mother whom he had married. Defendant No. 3 having been taken in adoption by Raghunath since his childhood ceased to be a member of the defendant's joint family. After the death of Dayanidhi in 1924, Baman with his children and plaintiff continued to live in common mess for the sake of convenience and the former remained in de facto management of the affairs and properties of both the branches. Defendant No. 1 made some self-acquisitions which are described in Schedule A of his written statement out of his own earnings without assistance of the joint funds and some acquisitions were also made out of the common funds which are described in Schedule B attached to defendant No. 1's written statement. It is stated that the Ka and Kha schedule properties do not constitute joint family properties. Defendant No. 2 was married in a rich family and his wife got a substantial dowry from her father both in the shape of cash and jewellery. Defendant No. 2 was also appointed as Sarbarakar in 1941. It is stated that the Ka and Kha schedule properties do not constitute joint family properties. Defendant No. 2 was married in a rich family and his wife got a substantial dowry from her father both in the shape of cash and jewellery. Defendant No. 2 was also appointed as Sarbarakar in 1941. With the help of his remuneration as Sarbarakar, income from the Sarbarakari lands and funds belonging to his wife, defendant No. 2 undertook sub-agency business in paddy procurement, started a cloth business and a rice mill in the name of his son (defendant No. 5). These ventures having been undertaken by defendant No. 2 without any assistance from the common funds, they exclusively belong to him in which plaintiff or others have no rights. Item 58 of Schedule Ka of the plaint is alleged to have been purchased by defendant No. 2 with his own funds for an amount of Rs. 17,000.00 in which he made further investments of Rs. 30,000.00 in making additions and alterations from out of his own earnings without any aid of the common funds. In this item also, plaintiff cannot claim any interest. So far as items 61 to 86 of the Ka Sch. property are concerned it is stated that they exclusively belong to Baman who had sold them long before the institution of the suit and the loan transactions in Items 1 to 20 in Schedule Kha being already barred by limitation by the date of institution of the suit cannot be the subject-matter of partition. 5. The suit was decreed preliminarily in part by the trial court on the following findings : (1) Defendant No. 2 is not adopted son of Raghunath; (2) Plaintiff, the deceased original defendant No. 1 Baman and defendants Nos. 2 to 5 constituted a joint Hindu family by the date of institution of the present suit; (3) the properties described in Schedule Ka, Uan and Cha besides the money lending transactions described in Items 1 to 20 and the share certificate in Item 21 at the end of Schedule Kha of the plaint constituted joint family properties, while the rest of the suit properties, i.e., the other movables described in Schedule Kha and the properties in Schedules Ga and Gha of the plaint are not joint family assets; (4) plaintiff is entitled to partition and allotment of Re. -/8/- annas share in the aforementioned items found to be joint family properties; (5) among the defendant's inter se the share of the substituted defendant No. 1 is Re. -/½/- anna, defendants Nos. 2 to 5 jointly Re. -/2½/-annas and each of the defendants Nos. 3 and 4 Re. -/2½/- annas. 6. In this appeal, plaintiff-appellant challenges the correctness of the finding of the trial court holding that the properties described in Schedules Kha, Ga and Gha do not constitute joint family assets. Defendant No. 4 who figures as respondent No. 5 in this appeal has filed cross-objection supporting appellant's claim. Defendants Nos. 2 and 5 who figure as respondents Nos. 3 and 6 filed cross objection against the finding of the trial court in bringing into the hotchpot certain items of property, such as, Item 58 of the Ka Schedules and 90.00 acres of land separately acquired by Baman in which they state that plaintiff cannot claim any share. The cross-objection of defendant No. 2, i.e., respondent No. 3 has been rejected by order No. 26 dated 23-4-1965 as it was filed beyond the period of limitation and an application for condonation of delay was disallowed. 7. The finding of the trial court that plaintiff and original defendant No. 1 with his sons constituted a joint family by the date of institution of the suit and that the properties described in Schedules Ka and Gha constitute joint family assets, and as such available for partition has become final and conclusive as no appeal or cross-objection was filed by the legal representatives of original defendant No. 1 and the cross-objection filed by defendant No. 2 who claims some of those items as his separate properties has been rejected as barred by limitation. So also, the finding that Items Nos. 1 to 21 of Schedule Kha constitute joint family assets has not been challenged and has become conclusive. It was claimed in the trial court that the properties described in Schedule Uan belonged to defendant No. 5. That claim was negatived and it was found to constitute joint family assets. This finding also has not been seriously challenged during hearing of this appeal, though a cross-objection was filed on behalf of defendant No. 5. 8. It was claimed in the trial court that the properties described in Schedule Uan belonged to defendant No. 5. That claim was negatived and it was found to constitute joint family assets. This finding also has not been seriously challenged during hearing of this appeal, though a cross-objection was filed on behalf of defendant No. 5. 8. Learned counsel for appellant during hearing of the appeal directed his attack mainly against the finding of the trial court regarding the paddy purchasing agency business described in schedule Gha which was said to have yielded a profit of 6½ lakhs, besides items Nos. 21 to 239 and the items relating to the cloth and iron business included in schedule Kha. As such, we confine our consideration to these items only. 9. Learned counsel for appellant assails the aforementioned findings primarily on two grounds. They are (1) to prove that the aforementioned three items of business constituted joint family ventures to entitle him to a share therein. Thereby it made a wrong approach in appreciating the evidence and came to an incorrect conclusion and (2) on the merits of the evidence, it should have found that the paddy purchasing agency business as well as rice mill and the cloth and iron business were undertaken with joint family funds and carried on as joint family ventures. 10. Learned counsel for contesting respondents, on the other hand, argues that on the evidence it is clearly proved that complete disruption of the family had taken place at the time of partition in 1917 in which contingency even if it is found that there were any joint ventures they can be only in the nature of partnership business and plaintiff's claim of a share on the ground that the properties constitute joint family assets must fail. Secondly, it is urged that the trial court has correctly placed the onus on the plaintiff even if the branches of plaintiff and Baman are found to have continued as members of the joint family and thirdly, on the evidence the trial court has come to a correct finding that the aforesaid three items did not constitute joint family ventures. 11. Before dealing with the other points, it will be convenient to dispose of the first contention advanced by learned counsel for contesting respondents. 11. Before dealing with the other points, it will be convenient to dispose of the first contention advanced by learned counsel for contesting respondents. In advancing this argument, while conceding that the partial decree passed by the trial court in favour of the plaintiff in respect of some of the suit properties on the ground that they constitute joint family properties cannot be interfered with in the absence of an appeal or cross-objection challenging those findings, it is open to the respondents under Order 41, Rule 22, Civil Procedure Code to support the decree appealed from not only on any of the grounds decided in their favour, but also on grounds decided against them even without filing any cross-objection. Reliance is placed on the decisions in AIR 1943 Mad 698 (FB), AIR 1936 All 717 and AIR 1932 Pat 134 in support of the aforementioned contention. According to Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for appellant, respondents are not at liberty even under Order 41, Rule 22 to urge any ground which amounts to attaching the partial decree which has not been challenged by appeal or cross-objection, though it is open to them to urge a ground decided against them by the trial court to support the partial decree. He further contends that the facility provided under Order 41, Rule 22, Civil Procedure Code being alternative and not concurrent, when once the cross-objection filed by respondent has been rejected on the ground of limitation, it is not open to them to avail themselves of the provisions contained in Order 41, Rule 22, Civil Procedure Code and urge similar grounds. In the decision in AIR 1960 SC 1349 , Itakhoolie Tea Estate v. Its Workmen, the divergent views on the interpretation of Order 41, Rule 22, Civil Procedure Code came up for consideration. Their Lordships however, refrained from expressing their preference to one or other of the views and proceeded to decide the case on other grounds. In the present case, this aspect does not assume much importance in the light of the view which we take about the presumption under the Hindu Law relating to business in the name of individual members of the family and also in view of the fact that defendants Nos. In the present case, this aspect does not assume much importance in the light of the view which we take about the presumption under the Hindu Law relating to business in the name of individual members of the family and also in view of the fact that defendants Nos. 2 and 5 in the trial court did not challenge the maintainability of the suit on the ground that even if it was found to be a joint venture, it would amount to a partnership, and as such, only a suit for dissolution or partnership and rendition of accounts will lie. 12. The first point urged by Mr. Mohanty deals with the alleged wrong placing of the onus on the plaintiff. He argues that once it is admitted or found that plaintiff and defendants Nos. 1 to 5 constituted a joint family and the said family possessed assets to provide a nucleus and was also engaged in some business, the presumption will be that any business or venture in the name of any member of the joint family, and in this case defendant No. 2, is joint family business and the onus will be on any individual member who claims the same to prove affirmatively that it is his separate business. In this case, the trial court having found that the two branches constituted and continued as a joint family till institution of the suit, and in view of the incontrovertible evidence that they possessed moveable and immoveable properties besides money and paddy lending business as disclosed by the recitals in Ex. D/1, the trial court should have placed the onus on defendant No. 2 to prove that the paddy purchasing agency, rice mill and cloth and iron business were his separate properties. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the decisions in AIR 1951 All 400 ; AIR 1947 Mad 252; AIR 1937 Nag 237; AIR 1956 Mad 306 and AIR 1961 Andh Pra 247. We do not consider it necessary to deal in detail with these decisions as in our opinion they are not relevant to the point sought to be emphasised by learned counsel for appellant. We do not consider it necessary to deal in detail with these decisions as in our opinion they are not relevant to the point sought to be emphasised by learned counsel for appellant. These cases arose in connection with the liability of sons or other members for debts incurred in the course of a business by a trading family, either where the original business is continued or there has been a subsequent change in the nature of business. They are not relevant in the context of the question as to whether any presumption under the Hindu Law will arise that a business or venture embarked upon by any individual member of the family in his own name would ipso facto constitute a joint family venture. It is true that where it is established or admitted that a Hindu joint family possesses some joint family property which from its nature and relative value may have formed the nucleus for acquisition of other property, the presumption arises that the property acquired in the name of individual members is joint property and the burden rests on the party alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that the same was acquired without the aid of the joint family. However, it is equally well settled that such a presumption does not extend to a business carried on by a member of a joint family. In the decision reported in AIR 1955 SC 799 , Chattanatha v. Ramachamdra, the principle is explained as follows : Under the Hindu law, there is no presumption that a business standing in the name of any member is a joint family one even when that member is the manager of the family and it makes no difference in this respect that the manager is the father of the coparceners. 13. In this case, admittedly, the paddy purchasing agency and the cloth and iron material business were in the name of defendant No. 2, while the rice mill business stood in the name of defendant No. 5. Therefore, the argument of Mr. Mohanty that a presumption will arise in favour of the business being joint and the onus resting on defendant No. 2 or defendant No. 5 to prove affirmatively otherwise cannot be accepted. Therefore, the argument of Mr. Mohanty that a presumption will arise in favour of the business being joint and the onus resting on defendant No. 2 or defendant No. 5 to prove affirmatively otherwise cannot be accepted. In our opinion, the trial court has taken the correct view and placed the onus on the plaintiff to prove that these items were joint family undertaking to sustain his claim for partition and allotment of a share therein. 14 to 17. (After examining the merits of the evidence relating to each of these items the Court proceeded :) 18. In conclusion, for the reasons we agree with the finding of the trial court that plaintiff has failed to prove that the Gha Schedule property or the rice mill constituting Items 211-239 or the cloth and iron business included in Schedule Kha were joint family ventures started and carried on with funds furnished by Baman. Therefore, it has been rightly held that plaintiff is not entitled to a share therein. 19. In the result, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. 20. ACHARYA, J, :- I agree.