Judgment :- 1. This Civil Revision petition by the plaintiff in a Small Cause Suit is against the order of the Munsiff, Nadapuram, returning the plaint for presentation to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies on the ground that under S.69 (1) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act 1969 (Act 21 of 1969), hereinafter referred to as the Kerala Act, Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 2. The revision petitioner instituted the suit to recover arrears of salary up to 24 31964 at the rate of Rs. 40/- a month as the Manure Depot Agent of the respondent-Co-operative Society in a building of which the revision petitioner was the owner. It is alleged that when a qualified hand was available, the service of the revision petitioner was dispensed with. Therefore, the arrears of salary was claimed against the Co-operative Society. 3. The respondent society contended that there was no agreement to pay any salary to the revision petitioner though the manure depot was conducted in his building, that no amount was, therefore, payable to the revision petitioner and that even if so, a suit was not maintainable as the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies alone was competent to entertian a claim under the Co-operative Societies Act. 4. The suit was instituted on 16 6 1966 and under a judgment dated 3171967 the lower court dismissed it on the ground that under S.51 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act 1932 (Madras Act 6 of 1932), which will hereinafter be referred to as the Madras Act, as the Registrar of Co-operative Societies was alone competent to entertain the claim and that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, As against that dismissal of the suit, the revision petitioner filed CRP. 166 of 1968 to this court. This court by its judgment dated 26th June, 1969 set aside the judgment and remanded the suit to the lower court for trial in accordance with law. This court held that the words "touching the business of the society" occurring in S.51 of the Madras Act would not preclude the revision petitioner to claim his salary as an employee of the society in a suit as the salary due to an employee of the society would not be considered as something "touching the business of the society". This court held that the words "touching the business of the society" occurring in S.51 of the Madras Act would not preclude the revision petitioner to claim his salary as an employee of the society in a suit as the salary due to an employee of the society would not be considered as something "touching the business of the society". The decision of this court was supported by the ruling of the Supreme Court based upon an analogical low which is now reported in Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd., v. M/s. Dalichand Jugraj Jain and others (AIR 1969 Supreme Court 1320). 5. The Munsiff entertained the suit once again, but this time the Munsiff thought that the suit had to be disposed of not under the provisions of the Madras Act, but it was under the provisions of the Kerala Act. So, applying the provisions of S.69 (1) of the Kerala Act, the learned Munsiff held that the civil court has no jurisdictions as the claim falls within a "dispute" as defined in S.2 (1) in which case it is held that the claim would come within the mischief of S.69 (1) (c) which provides that no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceeding in respect of such dispute. Accordingly, the Munsiff directed the plaint to be presented before the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies. The revision petitioner has again filed this petition disputing the finding of court below that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 6. There was no question that if the claim is to be considered under the provisions of S.51 of the Madras Act, the lower court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. But, if the claim is to be considered as one falling within S.69 (1) of the Kerala Act, it would be clear that the, civil court would not have any jurisdiction to entertain the suit. So, we have to consider whether the claim comes with in the mischief of S.69 (1) or not. The relevant portion of S.69 (1) reads: "(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if a dispute arises ................................................. So, we have to consider whether the claim comes with in the mischief of S.69 (1) or not. The relevant portion of S.69 (1) reads: "(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if a dispute arises ................................................. (c) between the society or its committee and any past committee, any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent or past employee or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent, or deceased employee of the society; no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceeding in respect of such dispute". The word "dispute" is defined in S.2 (1) of the Kerala Act as follows: "Dispute" means any matter touching the business, constitution, establishment or management of a society capable of being the subject of litigation and includes a claim in respect of any sum payable to or by a society, whether such claim be admitted or not". 7. There is a contention as to the correct meaning of the word "entertain" which occurs in the above section. The word, "entertain", was interpreted in Khatumal Chanshamdas v. Abdul Qadir Jamaluddin and others (AIR. 1961 Madhya Pradesh 295). That was a case which was decided under Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. A person who was injured in a motor accident instituted a suit on 20 81959 on account of the accident dated 24 81958. While so, a notification was issued under S.110 of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Act authorising a Claim Tribunal to entertain and dispose of the claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, which notification came into effect constituting a Tribunal on 7 81959.On 10-9-1959 the injured party made an application for compensation before the Claim Tribunal. The opposite party contended that the injured had no right to file a petition before the Tribunal as the provision of the Act constituting the Tribunal had no retrospective operation in respect of an accident which occurred long before the notification came into existence. The relevant provisions of the Section under which the notification was issued read that, "no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated by the Claims Tribunal". The relevant provisions of the Section under which the notification was issued read that, "no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated by the Claims Tribunal". On account of this provision, it was contended that the claim by the injured could not be entertained by the Claim Tribunal as the Section had no retrospective effect. It was in that connection that the Interpretation of the word "entertain" was considered in the above decision. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh accepted the meaning of the word 'entertain' as "to receive and take into consideration". But, they held that the Section did not use the words "maintain" or "continue with" and did not say that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to maintain or continue with any question relating to any claim for compensation. Accordingly, it was held that the Claim Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. The relevant portion of the opinion of the Madhya Pradesh High Court is expressed in the following words: "When a statute deprives a person of his right to sue or affect the power of jurisdiction of the Court in enforcing the law as it stands, its retrospective character must be clearly expressed. There is no express provision in S.110-F making it retrospective so as to apply to claims for compensation in respect of accidents occurring before the constitution of the Claims Tribunal. The language of S.110 F is also not such as to compel us to hold that the necessary implication or intendment of that provision is that civil court's jurisdiction for entertaining the claims of compensation in respect of accidents occurring before the constitution of the Tribunal is excluded. S.110-F says that "where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area, no civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question The use of the word "entertain", is significant. That word means. 'to receive and take into consideration'. The plain meaning of the expression "no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain a suit is that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain a suit in its inception. S.110-F does not use the word "maintain" or "continue with" and does not say that no civil Court shall have jurisdiction to maintain or continue with any question relating to any claim for compensation." 8. S.110-F does not use the word "maintain" or "continue with" and does not say that no civil Court shall have jurisdiction to maintain or continue with any question relating to any claim for compensation." 8. Contrary to the above decision, the Supreme Court interpreted the word "entertain" in a later decision reported in M/s. Lakshmiratan Engineering Works Ltd. v. Asst. Commissioner (Judicial) (AIR. 1968 Supreme Court 488).. That was a case where the word "entertain" was considered in connection with S.9 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act read with the Rules made thereunder. The operative portion of the Section is read as follows: "Provided that no appeal against the assessment shall be entertained unless it is accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the amount of tax admitted by the appellant to be due or of such instalment thereof as may have become payable". It was a condition precedent under the Act as well as the Rules that the assessed tax had to be deposited in case an appeal was to be preferred against the order of the assessment. In that connection the word "entertain" which occurs in proviso to S.9 was considered by the Supreme Court. The relevant portion of the opinion is expressed as follows: "In our opinion these cases have taken a correct view of the word 'entertain' which, according to dictionary also means 'admit to consideration'. It would therefore appear that the direction to the court in the proviso to S.9 is that the court shall not proceed to admit to consideration an appeal which is not accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the admitted tax. This will be when the case is taken up by the court for the first time. If one holds that by entertainment is meant the time of admission of appeal, satisfactory proof may be furnished at the time of the admission of the appeal. We. are of opinion that by the word "entertain" here is meant the first occasion on which the court takes up the matter for consideration. It may be at the admission stage or if by the rules of that Tribunal the appeals are automatically admitted, it will be the time of bearing of the appeal." 9. We. are of opinion that by the word "entertain" here is meant the first occasion on which the court takes up the matter for consideration. It may be at the admission stage or if by the rules of that Tribunal the appeals are automatically admitted, it will be the time of bearing of the appeal." 9. So, the above decision is to the effect that by the word "entertain" is meant the occasion on which the court takes up the matter for consideration The Supreme Court's view was quite contrary to the view expressed in AIR 1961 Madhya Pradesh 295 referred to above. I am bound to follow the Supreme Court decision. If so, it would be clear that the word "entertain" which occurs in S.69 (1) of the Kerala Act means that the claim has to be considered when the suit is taken up for consideration on merits. The word "entertain" in effect would be the occasion when the suit was dealt by competent authority for disposal. If that view is to be accepted, the contention that the Kerala Act has no retrospective effect would not be justified, however subject to the fulfilment of other conditions. 10. On a consideration of the Kerala Act, it would be clear that the intention of the legislature was to apply the provisions of this Act not only in future litigations, but also in all the litigations which would be pending on the date of the Act. The Kerala Act came into force on 11-4-1969 when the previous CRP. 166/68 was pending before this Court. S.69(1) begins with the words "Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force". In the same Act, S.100 reads: "No civil or revenue court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of any matter for which provision is made in this Act". There is also a saving clause in S.110 of the Kerala Act. It reads as follows: "The Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1932 (VI of 1932), as in force in the Malabar district referred to in Sub-section (2) S.5 of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956 (Central Act 37 of 1956) and the Travancore-Cochin Co-operative Societies Act, 1951 (X of 1952), are hereby repealed. It reads as follows: "The Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1932 (VI of 1932), as in force in the Malabar district referred to in Sub-section (2) S.5 of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956 (Central Act 37 of 1956) and the Travancore-Cochin Co-operative Societies Act, 1951 (X of 1952), are hereby repealed. (1) all appointments, rules and orders made, notifications and notices issued, and suits and other proceedings instituted, under any of the Acts hereby repealed shall, so far as may be, be deemed to have been respectively made, issued and instituted under this Act." 11. In the light of the foregoing discussions it could be said that the intention of the legislature was to exclude the jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain the claim which arose under, the Kerala Act. S.9 read with S.4 CPC., provides that all courts shall have jurisdiction to entertain a suit of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognisance is either expressly or impliedly barred. If that be so, the retrospective operation is a matter of presumption which arises, in the particular circumstance of each Act. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition) at page 225 holds as follows: "The rule against retrospective operation is a presumption only, and as such it "may be overcome, not only be express words in the Act but also by circumstances sufficiently strong to displace it." And this, like the presumption itself, is in accord with the theoretical intention of Parliament for "allowing the general inexpediency of retrospective legislation, it cannot be pronounced naturally or necessarily unjust. There may be occasions and circumstances involving the safety of the state, or even the conduct of individual subjects, the justice of which, prospective laws made for ordinary occasions and the usual exigencies of society for want of prevention fail to meet, and in which the execution of the law as it stood at the time may involve practical public inconvenience and wrong." 12. The same view is more or less expressed in a decision reported in Attorney General v. Vernazza 1960 Law Reports 965. In that case, under S.51 (1) of the Act of 1925, the High Court made an order that no legal proceedings without the leave of the court should be instituted by one Vernazza. He appealed against this order on 215 1959. Pending the appeal, the Act of 1959 came into force on 14 51959. In that case, under S.51 (1) of the Act of 1925, the High Court made an order that no legal proceedings without the leave of the court should be instituted by one Vernazza. He appealed against this order on 215 1959. Pending the appeal, the Act of 1959 came into force on 14 51959. The Attorney General moved the High Court of Appeal on 2910 59 to vary the order of the High Court by adding an order that any legal proceedings instituted by Vernazza before making of the order should not be continued by him without leave. Accordingly Lord Denning held at page 977 of the above decision, "that even if the 1959 Supreme Court of Judicature Amendment Act did affect substantive rights, it contained clear words to show that Parliament intended it to be retrospective, for it empowered the High Court to make an order that any legal proceeding instituted by the vexatious litigation in any court "before making of the order" shall not be continued by him without leave". It is a necessary implication, therefore, from the language employed that the legislature intended the particular Section to have retrospective operation, and that the court will give such an operation, even though any vested right is sought to be taken away by that retrospective operation of the Act. These principles of the Statutory provisions creating substantive rights or taking away substantive rights are set out at page 939 of a decision reported in Mahadeolal Kanodoi v. Administrator General of West Bengal AIR. 1960 Supreme Court 936. It is as follows: "The first of these is that statutory provisions creating substantive rights or taking away substantive rights are ordinarily prospective; they are retrospective only if by express words or by necessary implication the legislature has made them retrospective; and the retrospective operation will be limited only to the extent to which it has been so made by express words, or necessary implication. The second rule is that the intention of the Legislature has always to be gathered from the words used by it, giving to the words their plain, normal, grammatical meaning. The second rule is that the intention of the Legislature has always to be gathered from the words used by it, giving to the words their plain, normal, grammatical meaning. The third rule is that if in any legislation, the general object of which is to benefit a particular class of persons, any provision is ambiguous so that it is capable of two meanings, one which would preserve the benefit and another which would take it away, the meaning which preserves it should be adopted. The fourth rule is that if the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to an absurdity of inconsistency such interpretation should be discarded and an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose the Legislature may reasonably be considered to have had will be put on the words, if necessary even by modification of the language used". 13. It follows that the effect of S.69 (1) of the Kerala Act would be to take away the substantive right of the revision petitioner because by the expressive words or words by necessary implication the legislature has made the Act retrospective in character. Even otherwise, the Madras Act is saved because of the provisions contained in S.110 of the Kerala Act. S.6 of the General Clause Act can also be attracted in case an Act is repealed and the repeal of the Act is followed by a fresh legislation. S.6 of the General Clauses Act would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests some intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of such a Section. Such incompatibility has to be ascertained from the principles of all the provisions of the new Act. But in this case, the saying clause by itself is an indication that the legislature was to permit the continuation of the provisions of the Madras Act. The provision is in S.110 of the Kerala Act for any proceedings instituted under the Madras Act to be deemed to have been instituted under the Kerala Act. That is an indication for any claim or proceeding which came within the ambit of the Madras Act to be continued as if that claim or proceeding was instituted under the Kerala Act. That is an indication for any claim or proceeding which came within the ambit of the Madras Act to be continued as if that claim or proceeding was instituted under the Kerala Act. Therefore, the present suit instituted when the old Madras Act was in force shall be deemed to have been instituted under the purview of the Kerala Act; if so the revision petitioner has no right to institute the suit before a civil court, but be has to seek his remedy before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. It is admitted that in the instant case the dispute which occurs in S.2 (1) of the Kerala Act is a dispute which is between the society on the one side and its agent on the other as required by S.69 (1) (c) of the Kerala Act. Therefore, the claim comes strictly within the provisions of the Kerala Act. The civil court has, therefore, no jurisdiction. In the result, I find that the learned Munsiff is correct and no interference on his finding is called for in this revision petition. The revision petition is dismissed. However, I make no order as for costs.