JUDGMENT : S. Acharya, J. - The unsuccessful members of the second party in a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure are the Petitioners in this revision. 2. The Court below on a lengthy discussion and consideration of the affidavits and the number of documents on record deemed the question of possession of the disputed lands (excepting plot No. 800 in Khata No. 141) in favour of the first party, opposite party herein, and accordingly declared their possession in respect of those lands, and forbade the members of the second party, the Petitioners herein, to interfere with such possession of the first party until evicted therefrom in due source of law. The second party, thus being aggrieved, preferred this revision. 3. Mr. M.N. Das, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, at the outset contended that some of the affidavits on record filed by both the parties were not sworn to before the Magistrate who was in (sic) over this proceeding and so these affidavits could not and should not have been taken into consideration in the decision of this case, as per the Division Bench decision in Krushna Chandra Naik v. Sk. Makbul and Anr. 36 (1970) C.L.T. 250. He therefore, submitted that this case should be sent back to the Court below for a re-hearing on fresh and proper affidavits, in accordance with the above decision. Mr. Swain, the learned Counsel for the opposite party, opposed the above submission of Mr. Das on the ground that in the present case most of the important and relevant affidavits on record having been sworn to before the Magistrate in seisin over the proceeding, and apart from such legal affidavits there being various other reliable evidence and materials on record, it would not be legally proper and just to remand this case for a fresh hearing and adjudication on the above ground raised by Mr. Das. In support of his above contention he relied on the provisions of Section 167 of the Evidence Act, the relevant portion of which is to the effect that improper admission of evidence by itself shall not be a ground for a new trial or reversal of any decision in any case, if it shall appear to the Court before which such objection is raised that, independently of the evidence objected to and admitted, there was sufficient evidence to justify the decision. 4. 4. On hearing both the parties and on a perusal of the impugned order, I am satisfied that apart from the affidavits sworn before another Magistrate, not concerned with the proceeding, there are sufficient numbers of legal and proper affidavits and other materials on record supporting the respective cases of both the parties. Four out of the seven affidavits filed by the first party and three out of four affidavits filed by the second party are legal and proper affidavits, being sworn to before the concerned Magistrate. It could not be shown as to how consideration of the affidavits before another Magistrate specially influenced the decision of the Court below. These affidavits are very much similar in purport and text to the legal affidavits on record, and they do not have any special significance or bearing in the present case. Obviously therefore, for the above reasons, no case of material prejudice was sought to be made out on behalf of the Petitioners against my proceeding to decide this revision without taking such improper affidavits into consideration. Moreover, these affidavits, when filed, could not have been rejected by the Court, as the point, as now decided by the Division Bench in K.C. Naik?s case, was not free from doubt then. In this view of the matter, merely for admitting such affidavits on record the impugned order cannot be set aside and the case remanded to the trial Court for a re-hearing on fresh affidavits. 5. The disputed lands are in Mouza Udaypur and Totapada, and the same have been specifically described in the schedule attached to the preliminary order issued in this 145 proceeding. The first party in the Court below (opposite party herein) claimed possession over the disputed lands by virtue of their having purchased those lands from one Manindra Kumar Mitra under a registered sale deed dated 25-9-65. Some of the members of the second party i.e., Borne of the Petitioners in this revision, purchased the same lands on 15-6-1966 under a registered sale deed from Sachindra Kumar Mitra, Dhiren Kumar Mitra, Naren Kumar Mitra and Dolly Ray, the first three being the brothers and the last one the sister of the above named Minindra Kumar Mitra. The other members of the second party claimed their right to possess the disputed lands as shareholders or successors-in-interest of those who purchased the lands on 15-6-1966. The other members of the second party claimed their right to possess the disputed lands as shareholders or successors-in-interest of those who purchased the lands on 15-6-1966. The first party claimed possession over the land from the date of their purchase, whereas the second party claimed to be in possession of those lands as Bhagchasis prior to their purchasing the same. Of course both the parties at the outset admitted that they were not interested in plot No. 800 in Khata No. 141, included in the schedule of the disputed lands in the preliminary order. 6. The disputed lands as admitted by both the parties originally belonged to Bipin Bihari Mitra and his wife Charubhasini Devi in different lots. Bipin Bihari Mitra gifted away some of these lands in favour of his eldest son Manindra Kumar Mitra on 17-2-(sic) Thereafter Bipin Bihari Mitra granted lease of some other property included in the disputed lands in favour of the said Manindra Kumar. The registered sale deed executed by Manindra in favour of the first party was attested by the above named Naren and Saohin, two of the persons who later executed a sale deed in favour of the second party. The Court below found that the rent schedule, after the abolition of the estate, stands in the name of the first party No. 1 or his vendor in respect of Khata Nos. 8, 11, 12, 19, 65 and 195. A number of rent receipts were produced from the custody of the first party. The settlement Parches in respect of Khata Nos. 19 and 61 stand in the name of the vendor of the first party. The A.S. a, in Settlement dispute No. (sic) of 1967, between the first party and some of the members of the second party, ordered the lands in Khata Nos. 3, 8, 11, 12, 19, 20, 21, 65, 69 and 195, in possession of the members of the first party, to be recorded in their names. The Settlement Parcha in respect of Khata No. 61 stands exclusively in the name of the first party?s vendor, who sold away the land under this Khata in favour of the first party, and so the Court below concluded that this land thus came to the possession of the first party. The Settlement Parcha in respect of Khata No. 61 stands exclusively in the name of the first party?s vendor, who sold away the land under this Khata in favour of the first party, and so the Court below concluded that this land thus came to the possession of the first party. The lands covered by Khata No. 29 in Mauza Totapada were given on lease to Manindra Kumar Mitra by Bipin Bihari Mitra, and these lands were not the subject matter of the Court sale in favour of one N. N. Mitra. Apart from the above documentary evidence there are four legal affidavits on record which affirm that it was Manindra, the vendor of the first party, and thereafter the members of the first party themselves who actually have been in possession of the disputed lands 8.11 along. 7. The second party have on record three legal affidavits and some documents filed by them. The Court below on a careful consideration of the documents filed by the first party arrived at the finding that one N.N. Mitra who purchased some of the disputed lands in Court auction sale, sold those lands by a deed of sale in favour of Charubhasini, wife of Bipin Bihari Mitra, for a consideration of Rs. 100/- which amount again he paid to Bipin Bihari Mitra towards satisfaction of a mortgage debt. Thus N.N. Mitra did not get anything in the said deal of purchasing the lands in Court sale and selling them to Charubhasini. Bipin Bihari Mitra, as evidenced by the treasury chalan filed by the second party, used to deposit the land revenue in respect of the lands purchased by Charubhasini, and he, by his own cheques drawn on the Imperial Bank of India, used to make all payments concerning the said lands. Some of the members of the second party as stated above purchased the disputed lands on 15-6-1966 from Sachin Kumar Mitra, Dhiren Kumar Mitra, Naren Kumar Mitra and Dolly Ray, out of whom the above named Saohin and Naren attested the sale deed dated 25-9-1965, executed by their brother Manindra in favour of first party. Some of the members of the second party as stated above purchased the disputed lands on 15-6-1966 from Sachin Kumar Mitra, Dhiren Kumar Mitra, Naren Kumar Mitra and Dolly Ray, out of whom the above named Saohin and Naren attested the sale deed dated 25-9-1965, executed by their brother Manindra in favour of first party. The claim of the second party, that prior to their purchasing the disputed lands they were actually in possession of the same as Bhagchasis, is of course affirmed in a general manner by three persons on affidavit, without disclosing the source and/or the hasis of their knowledge. No particulars or details about such possession are also furnished by them. There is no documentary evidence supporting the second party?s case to that effect. The members of the second party belong to different families and castes and the disputed lands consist of a number of plots situated at different places. The witnesses do not specifically say as to who out of the members of the second party was actually in possession of which particular land and for how many years. Such indefinite affidavits without any details or particulars do not inspire confidence. Apart from the above, there is no other oral or documentary evidence on record, worth mentioning, supporting the case of the second party. On such materials on record I am satisfied that the finding of the Court below that the second party?s claim of possession as Bhagchasis cannot be believed, is justified and correct. The proceeding was initiated on 18-10-1966 i.e., more than a year after the sale of the disputed lands in favour of the first party, and only four months after the sale in favour of some of the members of the second party. If possession of the second party as Bhagchasis is not believed as stated above, then it becomes difficult to believe that they came to possess the said lands immediately after purchasing the same in the middle of June that year, and the members of the first party, who purchased the said lands a year before with the sale deed in their favour attested by two of the vendors of the second party, had not come to possess the lands till then and were mere passive onlookers all that time. There is absolutely no hasis for any such supposition. 8. There is absolutely no hasis for any such supposition. 8. The documentary evidence adduced by the first party, discussed in the preceding paragraphs, appear to be more convincing than those adduced by the second party. Such evidence considered along with the averments on affidavits by as many as four local persons having land in the vicinity which appear to be reliable, would lead one to conclude that the members of the first party were in actual possession of the disputed lands at the relevant time. Mr. Das, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, could not also assail the findings of the Court below on any convincing grounds. On a thorough consideration of all the aspects of the matter as raised by the counsel for both the parties, I am convinced that the conclusion of the Court below is perfectly correct and justified and as such does not brook any interference. The impugned order is accordingly confirmed. 9. There is no merit in this revision which is accordingly dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed