Judgment 1. THESE four Rules issued under Article 227 of the Constitution arise cut of two orders, both dated 9th April 1964 passed by a Revenue Officer under Section 45 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act correcting the record of rights in respect of Khatian No. 193, J. L. No. 52 of Mouza Chak Bansberia P. S. Magra, District Hooghly and Khatian No. 28, J. L. No. 37, Shibpore P. S. Magra, District Hooghly. 2. CIVIL Rule No. 2902 of 1965 concerns Khatian No. 193 and Civil Rule No. 2904 of 1965 relates to Khatian No. 28. Civil Rules 2903 and 2905 of 1965 are directed against the orders passed by the District Judge, Hooghly dismissing the two appeals preferred by the petitioners before me from the said two orders of the Revenue Officer. The appeals were dismissed by the Appellant Tribunal on the view that the appeals were not maintainable. The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act does not indeed provide an appeal from an order passed under section 45 of the Act and it must, therefore, be held that the appeals were rightly dismissed as not maintainable. Civil Rules Nos. 2903 and 2905 of 1965 are accordingly, discharged but without any order as to costs. The question arising for decision in the other two Rules namely, Civil Rule No. 2902 and 2904 of 1965, concerns the scope of section 45 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, whether the proceedings before the Revenue Officer in these two cases are of the nature contemplated by that section. The facts upon which this question arises are as follows. There had been no determination of the rent payable in respect of the lands involved in these two cases when the record of rights was finally published. Rents were subsequently determined and entered in the record of rights under section 42a of the Act sometime in April 1963. It is stated that the said rents were fixed having regard to the rate of rent paid for lands of similar description and with similar advantage in the vicinity in accordance with the principles laid down in section 42 (1) (ii) of the Act as required by Rule 28a of the rules framed under the Act. It is stated that the said rents were fixed having regard to the rate of rent paid for lands of similar description and with similar advantage in the vicinity in accordance with the principles laid down in section 42 (1) (ii) of the Act as required by Rule 28a of the rules framed under the Act. In November 1963, the Revenue Officer initiated the two proceedings under section 45 of the Act in which the impugned orders have been passed on the ground that it appears from a "mistake list" that the rent of the lands in question had been "assessed as per schedule of Raiyati lands of the mouza which ought to be assessed according to the schedule of non-agricultural tenancies under Rule 28a of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Rules". 3. SECTION 45 under which the impugned orders have been passed is in these terms : "correction of bonafide mistakes in record of rights. Any Revenue Officer specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf may, on an application within one year on his own motion within nine years from the date of certificate of the final publication of the record of rights under sub-section (2) of section 44, correct any entry in such record of rights which he is satisfied has been made owing to a bonafide mistake; provided that no such correction shall be made if an appeal affecting such entry has been presented under sub-section (3) of section 44 or until reasonable notice has been given to the parties concerned to appear and be heard in the matter". 4. CHAPTER V of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act which contains provisions for the preparation of the record of rights includes besides section 45, three other sections, viz., section 42a, section 44 (2a) and section 45a which permit the authorities mentioned therein to correct or revise an entry in the finally published record of rights. Section 42a (1) provides that if the rent payable in respect of any land retained under section 6 (1) of the Act has not been determined before the draft of final publication of the record of rights, the Revenue Officer may at any time determine the rent and enter the rent so determined in the record of rights. As stated earlier, the rents payable for the lands in question were determined under this provision. As stated earlier, the rents payable for the lands in question were determined under this provision. Sub-section (2) of section 42a provides an appeal to the prescribed authority from an order passed by the Revenue Officer under sub-section (1) of that section 44 (2a) lays down that an officer specially empowered by the State Government may within the prescribed period revise an entry in the record finally published after giving the persons interested an opportunity of being heard. Sub-section (3) of section 44 provides an appeal from an order passed under sub-section (2a) to a Tribunal appointed for the purpose of this section. Under section 45a Revenue Officer specially empowered by the State Government may within the prescribed period correct an entry in the record of rights it is necessary to do so in pursuance of an order passed under section 5a of the Act or on account of any amendment made in the Act or the Rules made thereunder. This is thus only a consequential provision and no appeal is provided from an order passed under section 45a. It is clear from the scheme of the sections set out above that it is only a clerical or similar mistake of an apparent character that can be corrected under section 45. The word "bonafide" used to describe the nature of mistake indicates that the mistake contemplated is an error or omission that is patent, correction of which does not involve a decision on any controversial issue. Unlike as in the case of section 44 (2a) or section 42a, the Statute does not provide an appeal from an order made under section 45 and this confirms the view that the mistake that can be corrected under section 45 is of an apparent and innocuous character. A different construction of section 45 enlarging its scope would make it coextensive with section 44 (2a) in which event 45 would be quite superfluous. A statute is not to be construed in a manner that would make it redundant, especially when this is not the only possible manner of construing the provisions. In the two cases before me the Revenue Officer re-determined under section 45 the rents earlier determined under section 42a of the Act on the ground that the basis of the earlier determination was wrong. In the two cases before me the Revenue Officer re-determined under section 45 the rents earlier determined under section 42a of the Act on the ground that the basis of the earlier determination was wrong. The alleged mistake providing the basis of the proceedings initiated by the Revenue Officer does not appear to be so apparent as would justify that authority invoking his powers under section 45. In any event as Mr. Banerjee appearing for the petitioners rightly contended, the section did not permit the Revenue Officer to determine afresh the rent payable for the lands in question in accordance with the provisions of rule 28a of the Rules framed under the Act as the Revenue Officer has done. The entire proceedings in, these two cases must, therefore, be held to be without jurisdiction. It is not necessary to consider whether the mistake alleged could be revised under section 44 (2a) of the Act. These Rules are, therefore, made absolute, orders complained of are set aside and the proceedings initiated by the Revenue Officer under section 45 are quashed. There will be no order as to costs.