Judgment 1. THIS appeal is by the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta, the plaintiff against a decree dismissing their suit filed for recovery of compensation for non-delivery and for wrongful conversion of certain goods consigned to them from Bombay. 2. THE plaintiff's case briefly is that they purchased 19 bales of woolen serge from the Indian Woollen Mills, Bombay and the bales contained 4170 yards of serge. Those bales were delivered by the Mills at Wadi Bunder Station on the then G. I. P. Railway on March 5, 1951 to be delivered to the consignee who is the controller of stores of the plaintiffs at Kidderpore Docks. Thereafter, on May 7, 1951, only 13 bales were received by the consignee and on June 25, 1951 further one bale was received but the remaining five bales remained undelivered. This gave rise to certain correspondence between the plaintiffs and the railway authorities in course of which the Claims superintendent gave the plaintiffs assurance that the mailer was being inquired into and also suggested that the goods might have been lost in transit owing to miming theft. Finally, however, by a letter dated January 28, 1953 the Chief Commercial Superintendent informed the plaintiffs that the aforesaid consignment was lest and that was due to running train theft between Andul and Shalimar stations under the circumstances beyond their control. It was however assorted by the plaintiffs that the loss caused was due to negligence and misconduct and wrongful conversion on the part of the railway administration and its staff. Accordingly, the plaintiff served a notice under sec. 77 of the Railways Act and also a notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure claiming a compensation for Rs. 14,013/5/ -. 3. THE defendant Union of India owning the railways in its written statement denied all material allegations. It also set up a specific case that through inadvertence some of the bales at the time of transhipment at Kharagpur were placed in a wrong wagon which was meant to proceed to Balasore. Those bales however were brought down and all 14 bales on consignment in question were delivered to the parties in due course. It also set up a specific case that through inadvertence some of the bales at the time of transhipment at Kharagpur were placed in a wrong wagon which was meant to proceed to Balasore. Those bales however were brought down and all 14 bales on consignment in question were delivered to the parties in due course. As regards the shortage of 5 bales it is alleged that they were lost due to running tram theft between Andul and Shalimar stations under circumstances beyond the control of the railways and without knowledge of the railway staff and employees and accordingly, they denied the liability to pay the amount of compensation or any part thereof. 4. UPON these respective pleadings several issues were framed on the question of limitation, maintainability of the suit and as to the plaintiff's right to claim the amount as also the validity of notices under section 77 of title Railways Act and 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Two additional issues were however also framed as follows : "4 (a) Whether there was a running train theft as alleged ? 4 (b) Whether there was negligence or misconduct or wrongful conversion as alleged ?" At the trial however, the issues on the question as to the maintainability of the suit or the validity of the notices or the additional issues were not pressed by any of the parties. It was admitted on behalf of the defendant that the plea of running train theft could not be sustained and accordingly, no evidence was adduced. The trial court was thus left with the only issue as to the question of limitation and dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the view that the suit instituted by the plaintiff was barred by limitation both under Articles 30 and 31 of the Limitation Act. The same question of limitation arises in the present appeal for consideration before us. It appears that following two decisions of this court reported in (1) D. H. Railway Co. v. Jetmul A. I. R. 1956 Cal. 390 and (2) Union of India v. Meghraj A. I. R. 1958 Cal. 434, the trial court held that Article 31 of the Act applies and that the goods ought to have been delivered on May 7, 1951 the date on which 13 bales were delivered. v. Jetmul A. I. R. 1956 Cal. 390 and (2) Union of India v. Meghraj A. I. R. 1958 Cal. 434, the trial court held that Article 31 of the Act applies and that the goods ought to have been delivered on May 7, 1951 the date on which 13 bales were delivered. The trial court also noticed two other decisions (3) Joynarayan v. Governor General of India reported in A. I. R. 1951 Cal. 462 and (4) Kanodin v. Union of India reported in 63 C. W. N. 757. It also took the view that even after the letter given by the railway administration on August 26, 1952 with a clear indication that the disputed consignment must have been lost due to running theft, there was no necessity for the petitioner to wait till the final repudiation was made by the railway administration on January 28, 1953. Accordingly, it held even if the plaintiff's version be otherwise accepted, limitation would run at least from the aforesaid date, namely, August 26, 1952. It appears this point is now covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in (5) Boota Mal v. Union of India, reported in A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 1716 and the law as settled by the Supreme Court is stated as follows : "we are therefore of opinion that the answer given by the Full Bench in the case of Amin Chand Bholanath C.A. No. 97 of 1949 d/- 2. 5. 1956: (S) A. I. R. 1957 Punj. 49) (supra) that "the limitation in such cases states on the expiry of the time fixed between the parties and in the absence of any such agreement the limitation starts on the expiry of reasonable time which is to be decided according to the circumstances of each case", is correct." 5. MR. Dutt, learned advocate for the plaintiff appellants drew our attention to certain other observations given by the Supreme Court in this decision to the effect that: "if the correspondence discloses material which might throw light on the question of determining the reasonable time for the carriage of the goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination, then it may be open to the court to take into account the correspondence. Further if there is anything in the correspondence which has a bearing on the question of reasonable time and the railway and the railway wants to go back on that, to that extent the railway may be estopped from denying that." 6. IT is contended by Mr. Dutt that the correspondence between the parties must be looked into to ascertain reasonable time within which the disputed goods ought to have been delivered. It appears however that the Supreme Court itself furnished illustration in this decision to show the nature of correspondence which may be relevant in considering the question of the reasonable time. In the present case, we do not think that the correspondence between the parties has any bearing to the question of reasonable time for the carriage of goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination. This correspondence reveals that the railway authorities gave assurance to the plaintiffs that the matter was being looked into clearly for the purpose of tracing the goods. But this class of correspondence which commenced with assurance of enquiry for goods and ended merely in refusal to deliver the goods cannot be taken into consideration for ascertaining reasonable time within which goods ought to have been delivered on the authority of the decision of the Supreme Court. This view is also supported by a Bench decision of this court (2) G, C. Dhanraj v. Union of India, reported in 69 C. W. N. 591, where also after considering the decision of the Supreme Court it has been observed that such correspondence between the parties cannot save limitation under Article 31 of the Limitation Act, and this in the present context means that the trial court failed to decide this question correctly. Nevertheless, had it been the only point on the question of limitation, we do not think, there would have been any difficulty for us in making a final decision. Nevertheless, had it been the only point on the question of limitation, we do not think, there would have been any difficulty for us in making a final decision. But it appears that although additional issue on theft was not pressed the trial court also has found that the suit was barred even if Article 30 of the Limitation Act applies on the view that "when the Railway Company stated on 26th August, 1952, that the loss was possibly due to theft in transit, they proved that the same occurred beyond one year from the date of the suit." This, in our view, is totally an erroneous approach to the question. For the purpose of application of Article 30 of the Limitation Act, the onus lies on the railway administration to prove first that the loss was occasioned due to theft in transit and then the date on which such loss occurred. We do not find any materials or evidence on record to show that such loss occurred on a particular date. That being the position, we are unable to accept the decision of the trial court on this aspect of the matter as correct. If the railway administration fails to prove by cogent and clear evidence that the theft occurred on a particular date then clearly no question of limitation would arise and it cannot be held that the plaintiff's suit, if Article 30 of the Act applies, would be barred by limitation. Considering all these it must be held that there has not been a proper decision on this point also. We make it clear, however, that the trial court is to consider as to which of the Articles, in the facts and circumstances of this case, would be applicable. If Article 31 of the Act applies then, clearly, Article 30 of the Act will not apply. But even if any question of application of Article 30 of the Act arises, then also the court will have to come to a proper finding as to the date when such theft, an alleged, occurred for the purpose of limitation. 7. ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is allowed. But even if any question of application of Article 30 of the Act arises, then also the court will have to come to a proper finding as to the date when such theft, an alleged, occurred for the purpose of limitation. 7. ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is allowed. We set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and remit the ease back 10 that court for a fresh decision on the question of limitation in accordance with law and in the light of the observation made above and on the materials on record and on such further or other evidence, both oral and documentary, as may be adduced by the parties. Costs will abide by the result of the suit, hearing fee of this court being assessed at 20 gold mohurs. Let the records go down at once.