JUDGMENT - This is an appeal by the original defendant No.5 against the appellate judgment dated December 31, 1962 of the learned Assistant Judge, Jalgaon Respondents Nos. 1-A to 1-D are the heirs and legal representatives of the original plaintiff. Respondent No.4 is the heir and legal representative of the original defendant No. 3. Respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 5 are respectively defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 4: They have not appeared. 2. On May 8, 1946 the plaintiff granted a lease of an area admeasuring 115 feet x 125 feet out of survey No. 284/1 in Pachora, District Jalgaon to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 for constructing a cinema house thereon by lease deed exh. 54. On December 31, 1948 defendants Nos. 1 and 2 assigned their leasehold rights to defendant No.3 who constructed a cinema house on the said land. He gave the cinema house to defendants Nos. 4 and 5 for running it. On November 22, 1956 defendant No.3 assigned the leasehold rights to defendants Nos. 4 and 5. It appears, defendant No.3 had not paid rent to the plaintiff. Therefore in 1955 the plaintiff filed against defendant No.3 a suit for recovery of arrears of rent. Defendant No.3 thereafter paid up the said arrears. 3. On June 9, 1958 the plaintiff filed against defendants Nos. 1 to 3 the suit from which the present appeal arises in the Court of the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Chalisgaon, for recovery of possession of the suit land alleging that the lease exh. 54 was invalid being in contravention of section 40 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, XXVIII on 947 (hereinafter referred to as the B. A. D. R. Act). The plaintiff contended that defendants Nos. 1 to 3 were therefore in unauthorised or illegal possession of the suit property and were liable to hand over possession to him. 4. The defendants took several contentions, including one that the lease was not void. They also contended that the suit was barred by the law of limitation. 5. Defendants Nos. 4 and 5 were added as party defendants on February 24, 1959. They raised the same contentions as raised by defendants Nos. 1 to 3. They further contended that in any case so far as they were concerned, the suit was time barred. 6. The trial Court decided the above issues against the defendants and decreed the suit. Defendants Nos. 4 and 5 were added as party defendants on February 24, 1959. They raised the same contentions as raised by defendants Nos. 1 to 3. They further contended that in any case so far as they were concerned, the suit was time barred. 6. The trial Court decided the above issues against the defendants and decreed the suit. Defendants Nos. 3 and 5 appealed to the District Court at Jalgaon. In the said appeal the appellants took inter alia the same contentions that they had taken in the trial Court. The learned Assistant Judge who heard the appeal dismissed the same with costs. Against the said decision, defendant No.5 alone has filed the present appeal. 7. The first contention taken before me by Mr. Kotwal on behalf of the appellant is that section 40 of the B. A. D. R. Act was enacted for the benefit of the creditor and not for the benefit of the debtor. The plaintiff was not a "creditor", but was a "debtor". The plaintiff was therefore not entitled to avoid the lease in respect of the suit land. He further contended that in any case the lease was created by the plaintiff and he could not take advantage of his own wrong. 8. Section 40 of the B. A. D. R. Act reads as under: "Notwithstanding any law or contract ..... no alienation of any property belonging to a debtor who is a party to any proceedings under this Act or an award registered under this Act, made by him before all his debts are discharged shall be valid except with the previous sanction of the Court. 9. It is admitted by the parties that the plaintiff was on May 8, 1946 a debtor, that he was a party to a proceeding under the B. A. D. R. Act, and that all his debts were not discharged. It is also admitted that the lease was not created with the previous sanction of the Court. In such circumstances, section 40 clearly lays down that the "alienation of any property" shall be invalid. The section does not say that such alienation shall be voidable at the instance of the creditor. If it had so said, there would have been substance in the contention of Mr. Kotwal. The section makes the alienation invalid, whether anyone wished to avoid it or not. The section does not say that such alienation shall be voidable at the instance of the creditor. If it had so said, there would have been substance in the contention of Mr. Kotwal. The section makes the alienation invalid, whether anyone wished to avoid it or not. Where the alienation is invalid or illegal, there is no question of taking advantage of ones own wrong. This contention must therefore be rejected. 10. There is more substance in the next contention of the appellant. This contention is that the lease exh. 54 is not an "alienation of any property" within the meaning of that expression in section 40 of the B. A. D. R. Act. Unfortunately, the word "alienation" is not defined in the B. A. D. R. Act. Section 28, however, refers to fraudulent “alienations or incumbrances" on the debtors property. The use of the two words in the said section indicates that an "incumbrance" is not included in the word "alienation". On the other hand, section 53 provides that a debtor shall not "hypothecate or sell the standing crops." The marginal note describes this hypothecation or sale by one word "alienation of standing crops" indicating that perhaps hypothecation would be covered by the word "alienation." Marginal notes to the sections are, however, not to be referred to for the purpose of construction, unless they have been inserted with the assent of the Legislature. We have no evidence that in the case of the B. A. D. R Act, marginal notes have been inserted with the assent of the Legislature. We therefore find that we do not derive much help from the B. A. D. R. Act itself in construing whether a lease is an "alienation." 11. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1382 provides that "a lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property." It does not provide that a lease is a transfer of property. It merely provides that it is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property. Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act defines "transfer of property" as meaning an act by which a living person conveys property. In a lease there is no conveyance of property. There is no transfer of ownership. There is only a transfer of a right of enjoyment. The title remains in the lessor. Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act defines "transfer of property" as meaning an act by which a living person conveys property. In a lease there is no conveyance of property. There is no transfer of ownership. There is only a transfer of a right of enjoyment. The title remains in the lessor. We have therefore to see whether this transfer of right of enjoyment of property is an alienation. 12. The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1961 Ed., states that in law the meaning of the word "alien" is "transfer of ownership of." The meaning of the word "alienate" is given as "transfer ownership of". The meaning of the word "alienation" is given as "transference of ownership". It would therefore appear that the ordinary literary meaning of the word "alienation" implies transfer of ownership, and not merely a transfer of a right of enjoyment. 13. Law Lexicon published by the Madras Law Journal Office states that the word "alienation" is generally applied to absolute conveyances of immovable property. To use the word "alienation" is as much to say as to make a thing another mans or to alter or put the possession of lands or other things from one man to another. "Alienation" imports an actual transfer of title. 14. In the case of Narayan v. Krishnaji1 the question was whether a devise by will was included in the word "alienate" in the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874. Patkar J. observed as follows (p. 1250): "The question, therefore, in the case is whether the word alienate excludes a devise by will. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that the word alienate means to transfer by sale. It is conceded on behalf of the appel1ant that the watandar can make a gift of the watan properly to a watandar of the same watan. If a watandar can alienate the properly by gift inter vivos, he would presumably have the right to alienate by will in favour of a watandar of the same watan. The word alienation, according to Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Vol J, p. 65, means to make a thing another mans. Alienate, according to Whartons Law Lexicon, means, to transfer property. Alienation would, therefore include a devise by gift if the effect of it is to make the property another mans by means of a bequest." 15. The word alienation, according to Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Vol J, p. 65, means to make a thing another mans. Alienate, according to Whartons Law Lexicon, means, to transfer property. Alienation would, therefore include a devise by gift if the effect of it is to make the property another mans by means of a bequest." 15. The word "alienated" is defined by the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, section 2 (20) as meaning "transferred ....wholly or partially to the ownership of any person." The definition of that word in section 2 (2) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 is the same in these enactments the word "alienation" would be transfer of ownership to another person. Section 2(15) of the B. A. D. R. Act provides that "Words and expressions used in this Act, but not defined, have the meanings assigned to them in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, as the case may be." The word "alienation" or any of its grammatical variations is not used in the Code of Civil Procedure. We must therefore turn to the definition of that word in the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 In the case of Haji Abdulla v. Secretary of State,2 the question whether a lease was an "alienation" within the meaning of that word in the Bombay Land Revenue Code arose before a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Chandavarkar and Hayward JJ. In the judgment of Chandavarkar J. it is observed (p. 890): "Therefore, there cannot be any doubt that his kowl is no more than a lease, that Government parted with their rights as lessors in favour of the grantee as a lessee, and imposed upon him certain conditions. None of those conditions brings the contract within the definition of the term alienated village, in clause 19 of section 3 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code." 16. The learned Assistant Judge observes in his judgment that a lease is a transfer of some interest which the lessor has in the property and such transfer is bound to affect the property and the creditors are bound to run the risk of reducing their security. The learned Assistant Judge observes in his judgment that a lease is a transfer of some interest which the lessor has in the property and such transfer is bound to affect the property and the creditors are bound to run the risk of reducing their security. He goes on to observe that the very purpose of section 40 to keep the property of the debtor intact and available for the purpose of discharging of debts would be nullified, unless a lease was interpreted as an "alienation." I regret, I am unable to accept this reasoning." The learned Assistant Judge has stayed in the realm of speculation as to the intention of the Legislature. Lord Watson has said in the case of Salomon v. Salomon & Co.: Salomon & Co. v. Salomon,3 that the "..Intention of the Legislature is a common but very slippery phrase, which popularly understood, may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the Legislature probably would have meant, although there has been an omission to enact it. In a Court of Law or Equity, what the Legislature intended to be done or not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from that which it has chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication. " If the Legislature had intended to include a. lease or any other transfer in the word "alienation", nothing would have been simpler than to say so and to use the words "transfer, sale, mortage or lease" or whatever the Legislature intended to prohibit. It is reasonable to suppose that the Legislature knew the literary meaning of the word "alienation", as also its meaning in the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, the definitions in which were being made applicable by section 2(15) of the B. A. D. R. Act. 17. Mr. Limaye on behalf of the plaintiff made an attempt to argue that in section 40 of the B. A. D, R. Act the word "alienation" was used synonymously with the word "transfer". In view, however, of what I have stated hereinabove, I cannot accept this contention. In my opinion, "alienation" means transfer of ownership of property to another person. The word applies to absolute conveyances of immovable property and imports an actual transfer of title. It does not include a lease. The lease exh. In view, however, of what I have stated hereinabove, I cannot accept this contention. In my opinion, "alienation" means transfer of ownership of property to another person. The word applies to absolute conveyances of immovable property and imports an actual transfer of title. It does not include a lease. The lease exh. 54 therefore is not an "alienation" within the meaning of that word in section 40 of the B. A. D. R. Act and is not invalid. The lease being valid the plaintiff is not entitled to possession on the footing that the defendants are trespassers. This suit must, therefore, fail. [His Lordship after considering the appellants contention regarding limitation, concluded.] 18. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the decrees of the trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court are set aside. The suit of the plaintiff will stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.