Judgment :- 1. The petitioner as well as the 1st respondent had made applications before the Regional Transport Authority, Kottayam (the 2nd respondent) for the grant of temporary permits on the route Kottayam - Changanacherry. It would appear that by the time the application came on for hearing before the 2nd respondent on 21-4-1970 the vehicle specified by the 1st respondent in his application had ceased to be available and he therefore offered to furnish another vehicle in its place. Objection was taken by the petitioner that the 1st respondent's application in respect of the vehicle sought to be substituted should be treated as a fresh application and that therefore that application should not be taken up for consideration at the meeting held on 21-4-1970 since the practice of the Regional Transport Authority was to take up for consideration only applications which had been received at least 10 days prior to the date of consideration. The Regional Transport Authority by its proceedings evidenced by Ext. P1, adjourned the subject to its next meeting for consideration of both the applications made by the petitioner as well as by the 1st respondent and while doing so it directed the Secretary of the Regional Transport. Authority to grant to the 1st respondent an interim temporary permit. 2. The 1st respondent preferred an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam challenging the Regional Transport Authority's proceedings evidenced by Ext. P1, and moved an interlocutory application before the Tribunal praying that a direction should be given to the Regional Transport Authority, Kottayam to issue a temporary permit for his bus on the route Kottayam - Changanacherry pending disposal of the appeal. On the said application which was dated 12th May, 1970 the State Transport Appellate Tribunal passed orders on the same day exparte in the following terms: "Heard Advocate. Notice 1st respondent is directed to issue a temporary permit for the bus of the petitioner KLK. 9816, on the route Kottayam Changanacherry, for 4 months or till the disposal of the appeal, whichever is earlier." The petitioner has brought this writ petition seeking to quash Ext. P5 and praying for the issuance of a writ of prohibition restraining the State Transport Appellate Tribunal from taking up and disposing of the appeal petition, evidenced by Ext. P2. 3. P5 and praying for the issuance of a writ of prohibition restraining the State Transport Appellate Tribunal from taking up and disposing of the appeal petition, evidenced by Ext. P2. 3. The petitioner contends that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal has acted completely without jurisdiction in entertaining the appeal evidenced by Ext. P2, and in passing the exparte order evidenced by Ext. P5, granting a temporary permit as if it were exercising the power conferred by S.62 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Counsel appearing for the petitioner urges that no appeal has been provided for under any provision of the Motor Vehicles Act against an order of the Regional Transport Authority adjourning the consideration of an application for the grant of a temporary permit. It is also contended that the 1st respondent could not also have preferred an appeal against the grant to him of an interim temporary permit since he cannot be deemed to be a person aggrieved by that order. On these grounds it is argued that the appeal petition. Ext. P2, was manifestly not maintainable in law and that the Appellate Tribunal has acted without jurisdiction in entertaining that petition and passing orders thereon. In the affidavit filed in support of the original petition as well as in the original petition itself it has been averred that the petitioner entered appearance before the Tribunal through counsel and raised the objection regarding the non-maintainability of the appeal and prayed for expeditious orders being passed vacating Ext. P5 and rejecting the appeal as not maintainable and that this request was not acceded to by the Tribunal. It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing before me for the petitioner that he himself appeared before the Tribunal and made this request on more than one occasion and that although arguments on the preliminary question were heard by the Tribunal for nearly two hours, it declined to pass any orders in the matter. 4. It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing before me for the petitioner that he himself appeared before the Tribunal and made this request on more than one occasion and that although arguments on the preliminary question were heard by the Tribunal for nearly two hours, it declined to pass any orders in the matter. 4. On behalf of the 1st respondent the maintainability of the appeal was sought to be rested on the provision contained in S.64 (1) (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act which provides that any person aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. Counsel appearing for the Ist respondent submitted that it is only on the strength of this provision that he can contend that the appeal petition evidenced by Ext. P2, is maintainable in law. In my opinion, the action taken by the Regional Transport Authority under Ext. P1 cannot by any stretch of imagination be regarded as a proceeding evidencing the refusal by that authority to grant a permit because it is seen from Ext. P1 that the Regional Transport Authority has only adjourned to its next meeting the consideration of the application made by the 1st respondent for the grant of a temporary permit. It is, therefore, clear that the 1st respondent's application for a permit remains undisposed of and there cannot, therefore, be said to have been any refusal by the Regional Transport Authority to grant the permit applied for by him. It is also not possible to bring Ext. P1 within the latter part of S.64 (1) (a) because no Condition is attached under that order to any permit granted to the 1st respondent. When, in fact, the 1st respondent's application for a permit remains undisposed, there can be no question of attaching any condition to the permit granted on that application because the question whether or not a temporary permit should be granted on that application remains yet to be considered. Counsel for the 1st respondent raised a contention that the appeal can be sustained by viewing it as an appeal filed by the 1st respondent against the grant to him of a restricted interim temporary permit. Counsel for the 1st respondent raised a contention that the appeal can be sustained by viewing it as an appeal filed by the 1st respondent against the grant to him of a restricted interim temporary permit. This contention also is untenable for the simple reason that quite irrespective of the legality or otherwise of the action taken by the Regional Transport Authority in granting such an interim temporary permit, it is not possible to treat that grant as a grant made on the 1st respondent's application for the reason already mentioned by me that the application still remains undisposed of. The interim temporary permit can therefore be regarded only as a suo mote grant made by the Regional Transport Authority and in such a case it was up to the 1st respondent either to avail himself of the benefit under the grant or to decline it. He cannot be regarded as a person aggrieved by it since he really stands in the character of the recipient of an advantage. I am, therefore, of the view that the appeal petition evidenced by Ext. P2, is not sustainable under S.64 (1) (a) and that being the only provision which is relied on by the 1st respondent, it has to be held that the appeal is incompetent. 5. The jurisdiction of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal is strictly confined to the powers expressly conferred on it by the provisions contained in the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules framed thereunder. In view of my having held that the appeal filed by the 1st respondent is not maintainable under S.64 (1) (a) of the Act the petitioner's prayer for the relief of the issuance of a writ of prohibition from taking and disposing of the appeal petition evidenced by Ext. P2, has to be granted. It also follows as a necessary consequence of the above findings regarding non-maintainability of the appeal that the order Ext P5, passed by the Tribunal, was completely devoid of jurisdiction and deserves to be quashed on that ground. 6. There is also a more serious defect which renders Ext P5 illegal and void. Even if it is to be assumed for the purpose of argument that the appeal evidenced by Ext. 6. There is also a more serious defect which renders Ext P5 illegal and void. Even if it is to be assumed for the purpose of argument that the appeal evidenced by Ext. P2, is a valid appeal, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal has absolutely no jurisdiction or power to grant a temporary permit in the guise of passing an interlocutory order in pending appeal. The grant of a temporary permit is authorised by the Act only if the necessary prerequisite conditions specified in S.62 of the Motor Vehicles Act are present. Even if the powers of an appellate authority are to be regarded as co-extensive with those of the original authority, namely, the Regional Transport Authority, the appellate authority cannot do something which the Regional Transport Authority itself could not have done, namely, to grant a temporary permit without addressing itself to the question of the existence or otherwise of a temporary need. It may be that in a case where the temporary need is either admitted or found to exist and the question is only one of making a choice between the rival applicants there may be jurisdiction in the appellate authority when the matter is pending before it to pass an interlocutory order directing who among the rival contestants should operate on the route during the pendency of the appeal if public . interest requires that there should not be delay or break in the provision of transport facility during the period of pendency of the appeal. But, in a case like the present one where the application for the grant of a temporary permit is pending disposal before the Regional Transport Authority and no finding has been entered by that authority affirming the existence of a temporary need so as to warrant the invocation of the power under S.62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Appellate Authority cannot at that stage make any interlocutory order in the appeal granting a temporary permit in favour of any party. 7. Under the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act the jurisdiction to determine the existence of a temporary need is primarily vested in the Regional Transport Authority and that function should not ordinarily be usurped by the Appellate Authority. 8. 7. Under the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act the jurisdiction to determine the existence of a temporary need is primarily vested in the Regional Transport Authority and that function should not ordinarily be usurped by the Appellate Authority. 8. It is also rot known how the State Transport Appellate Tribunal thought it fit in the present case to pass an exparte order directing the grant of a temporary permit "for 4 months or for the duration of the appeal whichever is earlier" because it should have been perfectly apparent to the Tribunal from a mere reading of Ext. P1 that any such order would have adverse repercussions on the rights and interests of the present writ petitioner who is the rival claimant for the permit before the Regional Transport Authority. To make matters worse, it is certainly not possible to commend the attitude of the Tribunal in not passing expeditious orders on the question of the maintainability of the appeal at least after the writ petitioner had entered appearance before the Tribunal and addressed arguments in substantiation of his objections regarding the maintainability of the appeal and the validity and propriety of the interlocutory order. I am constrained to remark that it is extremely unfortunate that the Tribunal thought it fit to pass such an order as Ext. P5 in the first instance and to maintain it in force even after its attention had been drawn by the party affected to the fact that the appeal itself was incompetent and that the direction given under Ext. P5 for the grant of a temporary permit was in any event not warranted. 9. I allow this writ petition and quash Ext. P5. I also quash the order Ext. P3, dated 5th May 1970, by which the Tribunal has stayed the operation of Ext. P1 in so far as it relates to the consideration of the writ petitioner's application for the grant of temporary permit on the route Kottayam Changanacherry. A writ of prohibition will be issued against the State Transport Appellate Tribunal directing it to forbear from taking up and disposing of Ext. P2 appeal which I have held to be not maintainable in law. The petitioner will get his costs from the 1st respondent.