JUDGMENT : A. Misra, J. - The unsuccessful Plaintiff in partition suit is the Appellant. Plaintiff?s case, in brief, is that one Lochani Sahu left three sons Madhu, Babu and Bhubani Babu was Defendant No. 1 who died during the pendency of this litigation; Defendant No. 2 is his second wife and Defendant No. 3 is his son through her. Bhubani has been impleaded as Defendant No. 7. Madhu left three sons Fagu (Defendant No. 4) Bhagu, deceased father of Defendant Nos. 5 and 6 and Paramananda, the Plaintiff. According to Plaintiff, Defendant No. 1 despairing of be-getting any male issue through his first wife Sara, adopted him on the twenty-first day of his birth and brought him up since then as a member of his family. Sometime after the alleged adoption, Defendant No. 1?s first wife having died, he married Defendant No. 2 through whom, besides two daughters, a Bon (Defendant No. 3) was born. 2. He further states that lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Schedule A and lot No. 3 of Schedule B constitute ancestral properties which have not yet been divided in metes and founds, though the different branches are in separate possession of portions for the sake of convenience. Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Schedule Bare alleged to be joint family acquisitions of Defendant No. 1?s branch, though lot No. 1 has been purchased benami in the name of Defendant No. 2 and Defendant No. 1 has purported to create an invalid gift in her favour in respect of lot No. 2. The movables described in Schedule C are alleged to belong to the joint family of Defendant No. 1?s branch. On these allegations, Plaintiff claims partition in metes and founds and allotment of 1/12th share in the original Schedule A properties and ?th share in lot DOS. 1 and 2 of Schedule B and the movables described in Schedule C. 3. The deceased original Defendant No. 1 and his second wife and son (Defendant Nos. 2 and 3) were the main contesting parties. Defendant Nos. 4 to 7 have generally supported the Plaintiff?s claim, while Defendant No. 8 practically supports the case of Defendant Nos. 1 to 3. Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 plead that Plaintiff is not the adopted son of Defendant No. 1, and as such, has no right to claim a partition. 2 and 3) were the main contesting parties. Defendant Nos. 4 to 7 have generally supported the Plaintiff?s claim, while Defendant No. 8 practically supports the case of Defendant Nos. 1 to 3. Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 plead that Plaintiff is not the adopted son of Defendant No. 1, and as such, has no right to claim a partition. According to them, Plaintiff had been adopted by his maternal uncle Lakhaman Sahu of Mansighpatra on whose death as he became homeless, Defendant No. 1 gave him shelter in his house. Subsequently, at the time of Plaintiff?s marriage, his prospective father-in-law having expressed unwillingness to give his daughter in marriage unless Plaintiff was given some property, Defendant No. 1 executed a gift deed giving him lot No. 3 of Schedule B, but the said gift has not been given effect to as Plaintiff?s wife left his house. So far as the suit properties are concerned, these Defendants allege that the family of Lochani possessed ancestral properties measuring a 105 acre, out of which, in the partition, Lochani?s branch was allotted a 21 acre constituting lot No. 2 of Schedule A of the plaint. Lot No. 1 of Schedule A and lot No. 3 of Schedule B were acquired by the three sons of Lochani. There was a partition in metes and founds among these three sons in which a 21 Bore described in lot No. 2, besides a 003 acre out of lot No. 1 of Schedule A were allotted to Madhu. Madhu?s sons and grandsons Bold the a (sic) acre to Defendant No. 8. As regards lot Nos. I and 2 of Schedule B, it is alleged that they constitute Stridhan of Defendant No. 2, the former having been acquired by her and the latter gifted to her under availed gift by Defendant No. 1. 4. The Court below, on a consideration of the evidence recorded the following findings and negatived the claim of Plaintiff for partition; (1) Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Schedule B are Dot Stridhan properties of Defendant No. 2 but constitute acquisitions by Defendant No. 1 out of joint family earnings of his breach; (2) there was a partition in metes and founds among the three sons of Lochani in which the total extent of property consisting of lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Schedule B are Dot Stridhan properties of Defendant No. 2 but constitute acquisitions by Defendant No. 1 out of joint family earnings of his breach; (2) there was a partition in metes and founds among the three sons of Lochani in which the total extent of property consisting of lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Schedule A including lot No. 3 of Schedule B were divided, and in the said partition, Madhu got to his share O. 21 acre described in lot No. 2 of Schedule A, besides O. 003 acre out of the original A schedule property, while each of the Defendant Nos. 1 and 7 got O. 17 acre to their respective shares; (3) Plaintiff has failed to prove his adoption to Defendant No. I and, (4) the movables described in Schedule C are not available for partition. 5. The contesting Defendants have not challenged the finding that lot Nos. 1 an 2 of Schedule B constitute joint family acquisitions of Defendant No. 1?s breach and are not Stridhan of Defendant No. 2. So also, Plaintiff has not challenged the finding about a previous partition in metes and founds having been effected among three sons of Lochani in which each of the sons got the extent of lands, as indicated above and be also does not press his claim, so far as the movables described in Schedule C are concerned. It is conceded before us that in case Plaintiff succeeds in proving his alleged adoption to Defendant No. 1, he will be entitled to ?th share only in lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Schedule B and in O. 17 acre of Schedule A which appertain :to Defendant No. 1?s branch. Therefore, the only point which arises for consideration and urged before us in this appeal relates to the factum and validity of the alleged adoption. 6. Learned Counsel for Appellant assails the correctness of the binding on the question of adoption on the ground that the Court below has not properly appreciated the evidence and purported to disbelieve the witnesses on grounds which are not justifiable. In this case, there is no deed of adoption and Plaintiff relies on the oral testimony and certain circumstances to prove it. In this case, there is no deed of adoption and Plaintiff relies on the oral testimony and certain circumstances to prove it. It is well settled that the fact of an adoption must be proved in the same way as any other fact and the evidence in support of it must be sufficient to satisfy the grave and serious onus that rests upon any person who seeks to displace the natural succession by the alleged adoption. At the same time when there is lapse of a long period between the adoption and its being questioned, every allowance for the absence of direct to prove the fact has to be favourably entertained. Plaintiff relies on the oral testimony of p.ws. 1 to 3, admission of Defendant No. 1 on prior possession and the conduct of Defendant No. 1 in not entering the witness box to deny the adoption. The contesting Defendants rely on the testimony of Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 examined as d.ws. 4 and 6 and Defendant No. 2?s brother examined as d.w. 2, besides the description of Plaintiff in Ex. H in support of their case denying the adoption. 7. Admittedly, Maguni, (p.w. 1) is an agnate and Dhobi and Balaram (p.ws. 2 and 3) are neighbours of Defendant No. 1. These three witnesses claim to have been present at the time of adoption and have deposed to have witnessed the giving and taking of the boy and observance of the necessary formalities on that occasion competency of these witnesses, one of whom is an agnate and the other two are neighbours, to depose to such facts cannot be seriously doubted. Further, p.w. 3 happens to be the Sardar of the caste whose presence on such an occasion cannot be considered improbable. The Court below, however, has doubted their testimony relying on certain discrepancies occurring in their statements. The discrepancies mentioned are in respect of minor details, such as, mention of names of different persons who are said to have attended the function, regarding the reading of the baroscopic on that occasion, etc., importance of such discrepancies in respect of minor details may be relevant as a test of their memory, but in our opinion, they cannot be treated as justifying factors for testing their veracity. On the other hand, if in respect of these minor details their statements are found to be in accord, it may create an impression that being tutored they have given a parrot like narration. Another reason given by the Court below for doubting their testimony is that each of those three witnesses has stated his age to be 67 years, and therefore, a conclusion has been drawn that they must have been tutored. We do not agree that this is a circumstance sufficient to dab them as tutored witnesses. Ordinarily, persons of the class to which p.ws. 1 to 3 belong are not very precise, while giving their age and there seems to be no ostensible purpose in each of them claiming to be 67 years. If they had been really tutored, there was nothing to prevent one or more of them from alarming to be older than 67 years with the object of impressing that by the date of adoption they were sufficiently aged to be invited to the function and participate in it. Therefore, we do not agree with the Court below that on such ground as mentioned above, their veracity can be legitimately doubted. On the other hand, nothing has been elicited nor suggested to show that any of these witnesses are in any way biased in favour of the Plaintiff or adversely disposed towards the Defendants. The witnesses thus are not only competent being an agnate and neighbours, but also separately disinterested. The evidence of such witnesses, in our opinion, should not have been lightly or arbitrarily doubted or discarded. As against this, the oral evidence adduced on the side of contesting Defendants denying adoption is of no significance. D.ws. 4 and 6 are not competent to say anything about the alleged adoption as by that date Defendant No. 1 had not married Defendant No. 2 and Defendant No. 3 was not in existence. D.ws. 2 by then bad no relationship with Defendant No. 1, and as such, was not in a position to know whether any adoption was made or not. The only person competent to deny the alleged adoption is Defendant No. 1 who was admittedly alive at the time of trial of the suit. Though in the written statement, the adoption has been denied, Defendant No. 1 has not entered the witness box to pledge his oath against the adoption. The only person competent to deny the alleged adoption is Defendant No. 1 who was admittedly alive at the time of trial of the suit. Though in the written statement, the adoption has been denied, Defendant No. 1 has not entered the witness box to pledge his oath against the adoption. It is argued by learned Counsel for Respondents that Defendant No. 1 being old and ill was unable to attend Court and depose. Though d.w. 6 states that Defendant No. 1 is old and ill, d.w. 4 admits in cross-examination that her husband is not under any medical treatment. Even if he is ill, his evidence being material, Defendants could have examined him on commission, if necessary. No attempt has been made to offer an explanation as to why Defendant No. 1 was not examined either in Court or on commission in spite of the suggestion from the Plaintiff that he was being deliberately with held from the witness box lest the truth might come out. Thus, judging the oral evidence there is direct oral evidence on the side of Plaintiff in proof of the fact of adoption and withholding of Defendant No. 1 from the witness box practically leaves the testimony of p.ws. 1 to 3 unchallenged. 8. In addition to the oral evidence, reliance is sought to be placed by the Plaintiff on the document marked Exts. 1, J and K. Ext. 1 purports to be a printed invitation card alleged to have been issued by Defendant No. 1 on the occasion of the marriage of Defendant No. 3 describing him as his youngest son. Ext. K is the voter?s list, prepared, in 1958 of the wasd in which the parties reside wherein the father?s name of Plaintiff and Defendant No. 3 is mentioned as Babu, t e., Defendant No. 1. No evidence has been adduced to show that Ext. 1 was actually got printed by Defendant No. 1 or on his instructions Defendant No. 3 was described as the youngest son. So also, there is no evidence to show on whose information the father?s name of ?Plaintiff in Ext. K was mentioned as Babu. Neither the person who prepared Ext. Knot the person who printed Ext. 1 has been examined in the suit. In these circumstances, reliance cannot be placed on Exts. So also, there is no evidence to show on whose information the father?s name of ?Plaintiff in Ext. K was mentioned as Babu. Neither the person who prepared Ext. Knot the person who printed Ext. 1 has been examined in the suit. In these circumstances, reliance cannot be placed on Exts. I and K as affording proof of the relationship claimed by the Plaintiff with Defendant No. 1. Therefore, we eliminate these documents from consideration. The next document is Ext. J. It is not disputed that Ext. J is the deposition of Defendant No. 1 in a previous criminal case started on a complaint filed by the Plaintiff. In his evidence there, Defendant No. 1 stated that the complainant in that case, i.e., the present Plaintiff was his son. Learned Counsel for Respondents argues that without confronting Defendant No. 1 with his previous statement, Ext. J should not have been admitted. The previous statement is not sought to be utilised for the purpose of contradiction, but it is sought to be utilised as containing an admission by Defendant No. 1 about his relationship with the Plaintiff. To prove such an admission, it is not necessary to confront Defendant No. 1 with his previous statement. The Court below declined to place reliance on this admission on the ground that it is common knowledge that in many families an uncle (father?s brother) describes his nephew as son and the nephew calls an uncle as father. As such, Defendant No. 1?s reference to Plaintiff as his son in his previous deposition should not be treated as an admission of adoption. As already stated, Defendant No. 1 has not entered the witness box to explain this admission made by him. No evidence has been adduced nor even 6 suggestion made to any witness that it is customary for a paternal uncle to describe his nephew as a son. In our opinion, this admission by Defendant No. 1 in his previous deposition undoubtedly lands considerable support to the oral testimony of p.ws. 1 to 3 that in fact the adoption of Plaintiff by Defendant No. 1 had taken place. As against this, Defendants have sought to rely on the description of the Plaintiff?s father?s name as Madha in Ex. H. Ext. 1 to 3 that in fact the adoption of Plaintiff by Defendant No. 1 had taken place. As against this, Defendants have sought to rely on the description of the Plaintiff?s father?s name as Madha in Ex. H. Ext. H. is the certified copy of a registered deed of gift alleged to have been executed by Defendant No. 1 in favour of Plaintiff purporting to convey lot No. 3 of Schedule B. The Court below has rightly held that this document has not been properly proved and cannot be utilised as a piece of evidence. Defendant No. 1, the executant of the alleged deed of gift has not deposed to have made the gift or executed the document. The original of this document has not been produced and Plaintiff denies to have been aware of any such deed of gift or to be in possession of the original document. Neither the scribe nor the attestors of this document have been examined. There is no evidence to show that such a document was executed with the knowledge of Plaintiff or the original of the same was at any time made over to him. In the written statement of Defendant Nos. 1 to 3, it is stated that this deed of gift was not acted upon. Learned Counsel for Respondents contends that Ext. H being a public? document under Sub-section (2) of Section 74 of the Evidence Act is admissible without proof of its contents and relies on a decision of this Court reported in Kamal Lochan Pujhari v. Mitrabhanu Hiswal 32 (1966) C.L.T. 843. In that case, it was held that a copy of a registered document maintained by the Sub-Registrar in his register is a public document and the same can be proved by a certified copy of the entry. This was so held in the context of admissibility of secondary evidence on the finding that the foundation for leading secondary evidence u/s 65 of the Evidence Act had been properly laid. In this case, no attempt has been made to establish any ground which will entitle the Defendants to lead secondary evidence. This was so held in the context of admissibility of secondary evidence on the finding that the foundation for leading secondary evidence u/s 65 of the Evidence Act had been properly laid. In this case, no attempt has been made to establish any ground which will entitle the Defendants to lead secondary evidence. What, is sought, to be proved by production of the certified copy is not any original entry, but copy of a document, the original of which must be in the custody of either the executant or some other person, in case it is proved to have been made over to the latter by the executant. Such a document is not admissible in evidence by simply producing a certified copy from the registration office without taking any steps for production of the original or laying the foundation for secondary evidence. Thus, on a consideration of the documentary evidence produced by the parties, we find that Ext. J lends considerable support to the testimony of p.ws. 1 to 3 in favour of the adoption, while there is practically nothing on the side of Defendants to the contrary. 9. Lastly, coming to the circumstances it has been urged by learned Counsel for Respondents that the adoption should be disbelieved, as by the date it is said to have taken place, Defendant No. 1's first wife who had given birth to children previously was alive and had not passed the age for procreation. Undoubtedly, this is a circumstance which goes against the probability of Defendant No. 1 having made an adoption at that age. All the same from the evidence, it appears that shortly after the date of the alleged adoption, Defendant No. 1?s first wife expired. The possibility of her being m for some time before her death which might have caused despite in the mind of Defendant No. 1 of ?getting a son cannot be ruled out. It is true that subsequent to the death of the first wife, Defendant No. 1 married Defendant No. 2 and got some children through her. The state of mind of Defendant No. 1 before the death of his first wife has to be visualised. When the possibility of his having despaired of begetting a son cannot be ruled out, this circumstance alone, however strong, in our opinion, is not sufficient to outweigh the direct evidence of disinterested witnesses like p.ws. The state of mind of Defendant No. 1 before the death of his first wife has to be visualised. When the possibility of his having despaired of begetting a son cannot be ruled out, this circumstance alone, however strong, in our opinion, is not sufficient to outweigh the direct evidence of disinterested witnesses like p.ws. 1 to 3 which finds considerable support from Defendant No. 1?s admission in Ext. J that he did not adopt Plaintiff. This conclusion also gets support from another circumstance. Though in the evidence d.ws. 4 and 6 deny Plaintiff having ever lived with them, it has been stated in the written statement that Plaintiff having been rendered homeless at an early age was given shelter in Defendant No. 1?s house where be was brought up and Defendant No. I also got him married. Considering all these circumstances, we accept the evidence adduced on the side of Plaintiff and hold that Plaintiff is the validly adopted son of Defendant No. 1. As such, he is entitled to claim partition, and allotment of a share as prayed for. 1a Hence, we allow the appeal with costs, set aside the judgment and decree of the Court below and direct that the Plaintiff?s suit be decreed preliminarily for partition and allotment of ?th share in lot Nos. 1 and 2 of the properties described in Schedule B and in a 17 acre appertaining to Defendant No. 1?s branch in lot No. 1 of Schedule A. S.K. Ray, J. 10. I agree. Final Result : Allowed