ORDER Gyanendra Kumar, J. - This second appeal has been filed by Defendants. The first Appellant, Panna Lal, is tenant-in-chief of the premises in suit, while the second Appellant is his son. The remaining Appellants are subtenants of the first Appellant. Previously Kedar Nath, father of the Plaintiff was the landlord. It is alleged that by a registered family arrangement made in 1960-61, the house in suit was allotted to his minor son, Gyaneshwar Nath Gupta, Plaintiff Respondent. Nevertheless Kedar Nath continued to remain his guardian and the present suit was also tiled by the Plaintiff on 24-2-1967, under the guardianship of his father Kedar Nath, who was also examined as a witness for the Plaintiff on 24-9-1967. Kedar Nath, however, died during the pendency of the suit some time before 6-5-1968. 2. The first and second Appellants carry on business in a portion of the disputed house. The concurrent finding of fact recorded by the two Courts below is that the first Appellant had sublet the remaining portion of the house in suit to Appellants Nos. 3 to 5 separately without the consent of the landlord. 3. It is the admitted case of the parties that as far back as 26-2-1958 the then landlord Kedar Nath served a notice of termination of tenancy of the first Appellant on account of his alleged sub-letting of different portions of the house. This notice was not followed by a suit. On the other hand, on 6-10-1958 Kedar Nath served a second notice on the first Appellant with the same allegations. It was duly replied to by the first Appellant on 7-11-1958 saying that he had sub-let the premises with the consent of the landlord. Again no suit for ejectment of the tenant and his sub-tenants was filed. On 12-11-1959, Kedar Nath sent a third notice to the tenant-in-chief demanding Rs. 1216.31P as arrears of rent within one month. The first Appellant thereupon remitted the amount by money order and on refusal, he deposited the same in the Court of the Munsif West, Allahabad, u/s 7-C of the UP (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. This amount was later on withdrawn by the landlord. On 19-9-1961 Kedar Nath sent a fourth notice, again on the allegation of illegal sub-letting, which was repudiated by the tenant-in-chief by his reply dated 4-10-1961. The landlord again kept quiet and started accepting rent. This amount was later on withdrawn by the landlord. On 19-9-1961 Kedar Nath sent a fourth notice, again on the allegation of illegal sub-letting, which was repudiated by the tenant-in-chief by his reply dated 4-10-1961. The landlord again kept quiet and started accepting rent. The present Plaintiff Gyaneshwar Nath sent a fifth notice dated 4-1-1966 through his laywer terminating the tenancy on the very same allegations that Panna Lal had illegally sub let various portions of the house in question. The notice specifically mentioned that the monthly rent of the house in suit was Rs. 110/-. The notice required the Defendants to vacate and deliver possession of the house to the Plaintiff on the expiry of one month from the date of receipt of the notice failing which the Plaintiff shall be compelled "to file suit for ejectment and damages calculated at the rate of Rs. 10/- per day". From the contents of the Plaintiff's notice it is abundantly clear that he knew the difference between 'rent and damages'. He also realised that the rent was only Rs. 110/- per month while the damages demanded for the use and occupation of the house would come to Rs. 300/- per month (at the rate of Rs. 10/- per day). 4. On 13-1-1966 the first Appellant (Panna Lal) sent a reply repudiating the Plaintiff's allegation of illegal sub-letting. It is noteworthy that in-spite of the service of the aforesaid notice of termination of tenancy, the Plaintiff accepted 'rent' from the first Appellant month after month (commencing Paush Sudi 15 to Magh Sudi 14 Samvat 2023) at the rate of Rs. 110/- per month and granted 13 receipts to Panna Lal, in each one of which it was specifically written that it was 'kiraya' (rent) for such and such month. 5. After continuously realising rent from the tenant-in-chief (Panna Lal) at the contractual rate of Rs. 110/- per month for more than a year, the Plaintiff without serving another notice of termination of the tenancy of the Defendants, filed the instant suit on 24-2-1967 for their ejectment. 5. After continuously realising rent from the tenant-in-chief (Panna Lal) at the contractual rate of Rs. 110/- per month for more than a year, the Plaintiff without serving another notice of termination of the tenancy of the Defendants, filed the instant suit on 24-2-1967 for their ejectment. The suit was contested mainly on the ground that the tenant in chief (Panna Lal) had sub-let different portions of the house to various other Defendants with the consent of the landlord and that in any case, the Plaintiff, having accepted contractual rent from the tenant-in-chief, inspite of the notice of the termination of his tenancy, it amounted to waiver of the notice to quit on the part of the Plaintiff (within the meaning of Section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act, hereinafter called the Act), showing an intention to treat the lease as subsisting or, at any rate, it will be deemed to have been renewed from month to month on account of holding over the premises in suit inspite of the determination of the lease (within the meaning of Section 116 of the Act). 6. It has already been noticed at the outset that the two Courts below have recorded a finding of fact that the tenant in-chief had not sub-let different portions of the house in suit to the other Defendants, with the consent of the Plaintiff. Therefore, the applicability or otherwise of the above provisions of law alone were canvassed by the learned Counsel for the parties before me--the main controversy resting on the question whether after the service of notice of termination of the lease dated 4-1-1966, the Plaintiff had received various amounts from the tenant-in chief, Panna Lal, by way of 'rent' for the subsequent periods and thereby waived the notice to quit and continued the lease or else renewed the same from month to month or was it that he accepted those amounts from the tenant-in-chief for over a year merely by way of damages for use and occupation, without intending to waive the notice to quit or to renew the tenancy from month to month. 7. In order to appreciate the controversy between the parties it would be desirable to quote the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, the material parts whereof run as under: 113. Waiver of notice to quit. 7. In order to appreciate the controversy between the parties it would be desirable to quote the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, the material parts whereof run as under: 113. Waiver of notice to quit. A notice given u/s 111, Clause (h), is waived, with the express or implied consent of the person to whom it is given, by any act on the part of person giving it showing an intention to treat the lease as subsisting. Illustration (a) A, the lessor, gives B the lessee, notice to quit the property leased. The notice expires. B tenders and A accepts, rent which has become due in respect of the property since the expiration of the notice. The notice is waived. (b)................ Clause (h) of Section 111 Act (which envisages the modes of determination of lease) referred to in Section 113 above says that, inter alia, the lease of immovable property determines "on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit....the property leased, duly given by one party to the other." 116. Effect of holding over. If a lessee or underlessee of property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee and the lessor or his legal representative accepts rent from the lessee or under lessee, or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession, the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the property is leased, as specified in Section 106. 8. The words lease, lessor lessee, premium and 'rent' have been defined in Section 105 of the Act as under: A lease of immoveable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions, to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. The transferor is called the lessor, the transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium and the money, share service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent. 9. The transferor is called the lessor, the transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium and the money, share service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent. 9. The above definition of the term 'rent' does not very much help the solution of the present controversy because once a lease has been determined by means of a notice to quit and the landlord has still accepted money from the lessee for the period subsequent to the expiration of the notice, the question would be one of intention whether by doing so he had waived the notice and had continued the lease or else had renewed it from time to time by accepting the amount as 'rent' or had otherwise acted in a manner leading to an inference of waiver of notice, continuance of tenancy or its renewed from month to month or whether he had accepted the money merely by way of damages for the use and occupation of his premises, but had never intended either to waive the notice or to renew the lease from month to month. Normally, the mere use of the word 'rent' in the receipts granted by the landlord would not be decisive of the fact that it was not accepted by way of damages for use and occupation. The word is flexible enough and may include damages for use and occupation, if the attending circumstances and intention of the lessor show that he understood the legal difference between 'rent' and 'damages' and did not intend to waive the notice to quit nor meant to continue or renew the lease. In this connection I can do no better than to reproduce the words of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Dr. H.S. Rikhy and Others Vs. The New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1962 SC 554 : The use of the word 'rent' is not conclusive of the matter. It may be used in the legal sense of recompense paid by the tenant to the landlord for the exclusive possession of premises occupied by him. It may also be used in the generic sense, without importing the legal significance aforesaid, of compensation for use and occupation.... Hence, the use of the term 'rent' cannot preclude the landlord from pleading there was no relationship of landlord and tenant. 10. It may also be used in the generic sense, without importing the legal significance aforesaid, of compensation for use and occupation.... Hence, the use of the term 'rent' cannot preclude the landlord from pleading there was no relationship of landlord and tenant. 10. It is the admitted case of the parties that the house in suit was not subject to the provisions of Section 3 of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act in the sense that the permission of the District Magistrate was not necessary for the institution of the instant suit because it had been found as a fact that the tenant-in-chief (Panna Lal) had sub let different portions of the leased house to other Defendants without the permission of the landlord. That being so, the restriction put by Section 3 of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act on the power of the landlord to institute a suit for ejectment of the tenant and sub tenants did not exist in the present case. If such a restriction had existed then the landlord, inspite of determination of the contractual tenancy of the lessee by means of a notice u/s 106 of the Act, could not have filed a suit for his ejectment without the permission of the District Magistrate. In that event after the determination of his contractual tenancy by means of a notice served by the landlord, the chief occupant would still continue as a 'statutory' tenant and the compensation paid by him for use and occupation of the premises (for the post-notice period) could still be termed as 'rent' in the legal sense. But as stated above, such is not the position here, because once the tenant had sub let various portions of the home to other Defendants without the permission of the landlord, the bar to his ejectment laid down in Section 3 of the UP (Temporary) Control of Kent and Eviction Act was lifted and he did not become a 'statutory tenant' after the contractual tenancy had been terminated by a notice u/s 106 of the Act. 11 Reverting to the vexed question of waiver of the notice and continuance of tenancy of Panna Lal or its renewal from month to month, as alleged by the Appellants, let us first decide as to whether the attending circumstances and conduct of the landlord, after he had served a notice u/s 106 of the Act amounted to waiver of that notice within the meaning of Section 113 of the Act. It is that "a waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. There can be no waiver unless the person against whom the waiver is claimed had full knowledge of his rights and of facts enabling him to take effectual action for the enforcement of such rights." Vide Associated Hotels of India Ltd., Delhi Vs. S.B. Sardar Ranjit Singh, AIR 1968 SC 933 . 12. It has already been observed earlier that in his notice dated 4-1-1966 the landlord had clearly mentioned that the rent of the premises in question was Rs. 110/- p.m. By the said notice he directed the tenant in-chief and his sub-lessees to vacate the premises on the expiry of one month of the date of its service. It was, however, added that if vacant possession was not delivered to the landlord as directed, Pannalal would be liable to pay 'damages for use and occupation' at the rate of Rs. 10/- per day i.e. Rs. 300/- per month. Thus it is abundantly clear that the Plaintiff knew the legal distinction between the word 'rent' and the word 'damages' and their quantum was also different. Still we find that after the expiry of the period of notice, the landlord continued to accept a sum of Rs. 110/- (which was admittedly the amount of 'rent' and not of claimed 'damages') from Panna Lal month after month and described the same as 'kiraya' (rent) in the various receipts which he issued from month to month to the tenant in chief for over a year. That being so the intention of the landlord is quite plain that by accepting different amounts of money from Panna Lal, after the expiry of the term of the notice, for a long period of over a year and specifically describing it as 'rent' in as many as 13 receipts issued for the subsequent period he really intended to waive the notice to quit and thereby continued the tenancy of Panna Lal Defendant. 13. Having made it clear in his aforesaid notice dated 4-1-1966 that on failure to vacate the premises on the expiry of one month, Panna Lal would be liable to pay damages at the enhanced rate of Rs. 10/- per day i.e. Rs. 300/-per month, the fact that the landlord accepted only the amount of contractual rent of Rs. 110/- per month and not Rs. 300/- per month claimed as damages is again indicative of his intention that the money accepted by the landlord for subsequent month was by way of 'rent' and not by way of 'damages'. 14. In this connection it may also be mentioned that on four earlier occasions as well the landlord had determined the tenancy of Panna Lal by giving notices from time to time (as detailed at the outset) and on each occasion he started accepting rent from Panna Lal and then gave him fresh notice of termination of tenancy, thereby waiving the preceding notice. Such repeated conduct is also indicative of the fact that this time also the landlord meant to waive his notice dated 4--1-- 1966, when he restarted accepting rent from Panna Lal from month to month for a period extending over a year. 15. The principal lessee, Panna Lal Defendant, entered the witness-box and deposed that after the receipt of notice of termination of tenancy, he had been continuously paying various sums of money to the Plaintiff from month to month by way of rent and not as damages for use and occupation. On the other hand, on behalf of the Plaintiff, his father Kedar Nath was examined as a witness on 24-9-1967. In cross-examination he deposed that after the expiry of the term of notice the money which he accepted from Panna Lal Defendant, was by way of 'damages for use and occupation' and not as 'rent'. This clearly shows that Kedar Nath knew the difference between 'rent' and 'damages' for use and occupation. He, however, realised the abnormality of his above admission and instantly took a somersault and hurriedly added that he did not know the difference between the words 'kiraya' and 'khisara' i.e. rent and damages. This allegation is obviously wrong because in the notice of termination of the tenancy dated 4-1-1966, a clear distinction was made between rent and damages and their quantum was also mentioned to be different. 16. This allegation is obviously wrong because in the notice of termination of the tenancy dated 4-1-1966, a clear distinction was made between rent and damages and their quantum was also mentioned to be different. 16. The Plaintiff and his father Kedar Nath both resided at Allahabad and had the advantage of obtaining legal advice and opinion. In fact ah the five notices of termination of tenancy were served through lawyers who must have told them the difference between 'rent' and 'damages' for use and occupation. As already mentioned the notice in question dated 4-1-1966 actually mentions both these terms and also states the difference in their quantum. Therefore, it cannot be believed for a moment that Kedar Nath did not know the legal difference between the two terms. 17. Kedar Nath conceded that in the receipt Ext. A-19, issued after the termination of tenancy, the amount received from Panna Lal Defendant, was described as 'kiraya', but he said that he had realised the amount by way of damages. He was then put a specific question as to why he had not used the word 'khisara' in the receipt, if he had really accepted the amount by way of damages. Kedar Nath Avoided a direct reply and merely stated that he was accepting various amounts from Panna Lal by way of damages. From the deposition of Kedar Nath himself, it is quite clear that he knew, the distinction between the words 'rent' and 'damages' and inspite of what he deposed on the subject, he really accepted the amount for subsequent months by way of rent and not as damages. 18. The very fact that instead of filing a suit for ejectment soon after the expiry of one month's notice in February, 1966, the Plaintiff waited for over a year to institute the present suit and during this period he chose to accept rent from Panna Lal Defendant, without any reservation or condition, month after month and granted numerous receipts expressly describing the amounts tendered by Panna Lal as 'rent', itself proves that the Plaintiff's intention was to treat the lease as subsisting. This would result in waiver of the notice to quit, as contemplated by Section 113 of the Act. This would result in waiver of the notice to quit, as contemplated by Section 113 of the Act. At any rate in view of the Plaintiff having assented to Panna Lal's continuing in possession on payment of rent for a period of over one year, the lease will be deemed to have been renewed from month to month, within the meaning of Section 116 of the Act. In reaching this conclusion I am fortified by the decision of the Federal Court in AIR 1949 124 (Federal Court) wherein B.K. Mukherjea, J. delivering the majority judgment observed as follows in para 13: What Section 116, TP Act, contemplates is that on one side there should be an offer of taking a renewed or fresh demise evidenced by the; lessee's or sub-lessee's continuing in occupation of the property after his interest has ceased and on the other side there must be a definite assent to this continuance of possession by the landlord expressed by acceptance of rent or otherwise. It can scarely be disputed that the assent of the landlord which is founded on acceptance of rent must be acceptance of rent as such and in clear recognition of the tenancy right asserted by the person who pays it. It was further observed in para 19a: In the first place, the facts clearly show that when the cheques were cashed, it was done without any reservation or condition whatsoever. The protest was not a contemporaneous but a much subsequent event and if the agreement was already complete by acceptance of rent on 23-11-1942, the subsequent conduct of one of the parties cannot alter its legal consequences. In the second place, it seems to me that when money was paid as rent, it did not lie in the mouth of the Plaintiff to say that he would receive the money but not as rent. Similar view was taken by Asthana, J. in Ram Daval v. Jawala Prasad AIR 1966 All 623 . 19. In the second place, it seems to me that when money was paid as rent, it did not lie in the mouth of the Plaintiff to say that he would receive the money but not as rent. Similar view was taken by Asthana, J. in Ram Daval v. Jawala Prasad AIR 1966 All 623 . 19. On the legal questions raised by the parties, therefore, my finding is that the surrounding circumstances of the case and the conduct of the Plaintiff clearly showed that he had waived the notice of termination of the tenancy and had at any rate renewed the same from month to month when without any reservation or condition he continuously accepted various amounts from Panna Lal Defendant, by way of 'rent' over a period of one year, before instituting the present suit. 20. In the result I allow the appeal of the Defendant-Appellants, set aside the decrees of the courts below, with costs throughout.