JUDGMENT A. P. Sen, J. This is an appeal filed by the Plaintiff against the judgment and decree of the Third Additional District Judge, Jabalpur, dated 19th August 1968, dismissing his suit for declaration. The Plaintiff claimed (i) a declaration that he was entitled to pension from the date of his retirement, pensionary benefits like gratuity and other dues specified in the list filed along with the plaint; (ii) in the alternative, if there was some difficulty in payment of pension and gratuity, then, for a declaration that he be paid anticipatory provisional pension and/or gratuity, under Article 922-A of the Civil Service Regulations and under Section 2 (a) of the New Pension Rules, 1951, and (iii) a permanent injunction restraining the State Government of Madhya Pradesh from withholding the payment of pension, gratuity and other dues, which were payable to him. The facts giving rise to the appeal, briefly stated, are that the Plaintiff retired from the post of Sub-Divisional Officer w. e. f. 15th July 1960 and was re-employed on that post from that day, but his services were ultimately terminated w. e. f. 24th April 1962. He applied for his pension and gratuity upon his retirement. The Chief Engineer, Public Works Department (Irriga-tion Branch), at first, accorded sanction for payment of superannuation pension on 17th March 1964, but that sanction was later revoked by him on 20th January 1965, pending the result of a Departmental enquiry started against the Plaintiff on certain charges On 31st August 1966, the Plaintiff commenced the present suit claiming the reliefs indicated above. The State Government resisted the suit mainly on the ground that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. They alternatively pleaded that the question of pension was awaiting the consideration of the Government. Early decision thereon could not be taken, according to them, because fraud and falsification of accounts by the Plaintiff in the Stores of the Irrigation Sub-Division, Jabalpur, were brought to light. The Plaintiff was, accordingly, being prosecuted in Criminal Case Nos. 1042 of 1964 and 20 of 1965, which proceedings were still pending before the Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur. The State Government, accordingly, pleaded that they were fully justified in withholding pension when serious charges of falsification of accounts and fraud were there and the prosecutions were pending. The Plaintiff was, accordingly, being prosecuted in Criminal Case Nos. 1042 of 1964 and 20 of 1965, which proceedings were still pending before the Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur. The State Government, accordingly, pleaded that they were fully justified in withholding pension when serious charges of falsification of accounts and fraud were there and the prosecutions were pending. The learned trial Judge has upheld the Defendant's plea that the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain the suit was barred and he, accordingly, dismissed the Plaintiff's suit. The only question involved in the appeal is, whether the suit is barred by Section 4 of the Pensions Act, (Act No. XXIII of 1871). The word 'pension' has not been defined in the Act anywhere. However, it has been held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that it implies periodical payments of money by Government to the pensioner, [See, Wasif Ali Mirza v. Karnani Industrial Bank LR 58 IA 215. In order to constitute a pension, two essentials are necessary, namely, (i) it must be a periodical payment; and (ii) it must be a grant not in respect of any right, privilege, perquisite or office but on account of past services or present infirmities or as a compassionate allowance, [See, Secretary of State v. Khemchand Jeychand IL R4 Bom. 432 (F B); Bansi Ram v. Narasingha AIR 1914 Cal. 765; Shiv Narain Singh v. Muni Lal AIR 1934 Lah. 881; Yadeo v. Jankidas AIR 1937 Nag. 202; State of M.P. v. Pt. Lalita Shankar 1966 MPLJ 949 and Shri Raj Kumar Bikram Bahadur Singh v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, M.P. 1959 MPLJ 69 ]. It is, therefore, settled law that the word 'pension' signifies a periodical allowance or a stipend granted not in respect of any right, privilege, perquisite or status hut on account of past services or particular merits. In other words, 'pension' is a bounty for past service. So, it follows that pension is a periodical payment of money, which is in the nature of a bounty for certain services rendered in the past. This being the attribute of pension, it is obvious that pension cannot be claimed as of right. Under the provisions of Section 4 of the Pensions Act, a suit relating to pension is barred. So, it follows that pension is a periodical payment of money, which is in the nature of a bounty for certain services rendered in the past. This being the attribute of pension, it is obvious that pension cannot be claimed as of right. Under the provisions of Section 4 of the Pensions Act, a suit relating to pension is barred. The section clearly shows that the pension of a person is not his property and he has no vested right over it. It is given by way of a bounty for past services mainly to assist the pensioner in providing for his daily needs. Section 5 of the Pensions Act provides that for the claim of pension, the remedy lies only by way of a representation to the Collector or Deputy Commissioner of the district or other officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government. In this connection, the provisions of Section 6 of the Pensions Act have also to be noticed. The provisions of the Pensions Act, especially those of Sections 4, 5 and 6, clearly reveal that a claim to pension cannot be enforced in a Court of law and the proper remedy is to make departmental representations. Even if a civil Court, upon receiving a certificate from the Collector or Deputy Commissioner under Section 5 is authorised to try a case, it would have no right to order or decree any suit, the result of which would be to make the Government liable to pay the pension directly or indirectly, [See, Sarat Chandra Das V. Secretary of State for India I L R 38 Cal. 378; Balkrishna Sambhaji v. Dattatraya Mahadev ILR 42 Bom. 257; R.T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State AIR 1937 PC 27; and B. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State AIR 1937 PC 31. One of us (Sen J.) has also taken the same view in Everett Benjamin v. Union of India and another S.A. No. 175 of 1966 decided on 9th January 1968. The decision of Wazir Hasan, J.C. in Nagi Hussain v. Mt. Chhaji Begam AIR 1925 Oudh. 210 is clearly distinguishable on its own facts. That was a dispute between the claimants inter se to a right to pension and, therefore, the suit was not barred under Section 4 of the Pensions Act. The other decision relied upon is equally of no avail to the Plaintiff. Chhaji Begam AIR 1925 Oudh. 210 is clearly distinguishable on its own facts. That was a dispute between the claimants inter se to a right to pension and, therefore, the suit was not barred under Section 4 of the Pensions Act. The other decision relied upon is equally of no avail to the Plaintiff. That decision is S. Gurdip Singh v. Union of India AIR 1962 P&H. 8 which has led to some confusion of thought. While dealing with a claim of pension by retired Government servant under the Army Service Rules, which have statutory force in the erstwhile Patiala State, the learned Judges of the Punjab High Court state that in the circumstances before them, the servant had a legal right to such pension and that the right was enforceable in a Court of law by a suit. They further state that there is a change in the state of affairs with the inauguration of the Constitution. Some of the observations made by the learned Judges are rather widely stated. The very description of pension, in the judgment, is so made to appear as to import the idea of a right, or, at any rate, a reasonable expectation based on equity, if not, on a contract straight and simple. To quote, the learned Judges observe: In the present case, however, it appears that the word 'pension' must be given a meaning of periodical payment by a Government to a person in consideration of past services. This periodical payment in my view must be construed so as to stimulate efforts in the performance of duty by Government servant and therefore in order to achieve this object it may well be suggested that this right must not be made to depend on the arbitrary and uncontrolled whim of the authorities. The law of pensions is, however, basically statutory, but language of the provision in the instant case creating the right to pension does not state that it is a bounty depending on the mere sweet will of the authorities ; nor can I spell out any such necessary intendment from its language...... *** *** *** There is also another aspect of the matter. Dismissal or removal from service has been held to amount to a penalty as it involves loss of benefit already earned in that an officer dismissed or removed does not get pension which he has earned. *** *** *** There is also another aspect of the matter. Dismissal or removal from service has been held to amount to a penalty as it involves loss of benefit already earned in that an officer dismissed or removed does not get pension which he has earned. This line of reasoning has been adopted by the Supreme Court in more cases than one. See for instance, Shyamlal v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 369 and State of Bombay v. Saubhag Chand M. Doshi (S) AIR 1957 SC 892 . If, therefore, in accordance with the law as laid down in Abdul Majid's case AIR 1954 SC 245 an action for salary is competent in civil Courts, I find it somewhat difficult to see why a suit for pensions should on the mere analogy of some rule of English Common Law to be held to be incompetent. The rest of their judgment is, in effect, an argument in support of the theory that a pension was a matter of right and not of the grantor's sweet will and pleasure. They assume that a pension is a contractual incident of service just like salary; if a claim for a salary is justiciableas undoubtedly, it isthey think that claim to pension is equally justiciable. With great respect to the learned Judges, we are unable to agree with their view. In State of M.P. v. Pt. Lalitashankar (supra) Krishnan J., had noticed the conflict of opinion between the Punjab High Court and the other High Courts, in regard to claim for pension accruing after the commencement of the Constitution. Krishnan J. further indicated that the correctness of the view of a learned single Judge of this Court in Mir Mashook Ali v. State of M.P.S.A. No. 442 of 1962, which proceeded on the decision in S. Gurdip Singh v. Union of India (supra) will have to be settled by a larger Bench in an appropriate case. Now, since that question directly arises in the present case, we have no hesitation in overruling that decision as not laying down the correct law. The learned single Judge in Mir Mashook Ali's case failed to notice that the decision of the Punjab High Court in S. Gurdip Singh v. Union of India (supra) arose in a case not under the Pensions Act. In para. The learned single Judge in Mir Mashook Ali's case failed to notice that the decision of the Punjab High Court in S. Gurdip Singh v. Union of India (supra) arose in a case not under the Pensions Act. In para. 20 of the judgment, the learned Judges observe as follows: The other ground, which weighed with the Privy Council, was the Bar contained in Sections 4 and 6, Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871) which as is agreed at the Bar does not apply to the case in hand. The fact that it was considered necessary to enact these two sections also tends to suggest that but for these provisions the right to pension would have been enforceable in the municipal Courts. This decision is clearly distinguishable and rather takes the same view as expressed above. The Plaintiff's claim for gratuity, as laid, is not entertainable for two reasons. In the first place, gratuity is part of pension, and falls within the bar of Section 4 of the Act. Secondly, gratuity is not payable until the delinquent servant is cleared of charges framed in a Departmental Enquiry of the charges framed against him. That precisely is the position here. If the charges are proved, then, no gratuity is payable at all under Rule 9 (2) of Appendix 3 to the Madhya Pradesh New Pension Rules, 1951, which reads as follows: 9 (2) No gratuity or pension may be granted under sections II and III if the Government servant was dismissed or removed for misconduct, insolvency or inefficiency. Compassionate grants may, however, be made under those sections in accordance with Article 355 of the Civil Service Regulations. In our judgment, the present suit was barred under Section 4 of the Pensions Act so far as it relates to pension and gratuity and the Plaintiff cannot claim either as of right or enforce them by means of an action in a Court of law. We are, however, of the view that the learned Judge was not right in assuming that the entire suit pertains to pension and gratuity only. A substantial portion of the Plaintiff's claim, as a matter of fact, related to other matters, such as arrears of travelling allowance, double establishment allowance, special pay, etc. etc. which prima facie do not appear to us, to fall within the term 'pension' as envisaged under the Pensions Act. A substantial portion of the Plaintiff's claim, as a matter of fact, related to other matters, such as arrears of travelling allowance, double establishment allowance, special pay, etc. etc. which prima facie do not appear to us, to fall within the term 'pension' as envisaged under the Pensions Act. That question is, however, not before us directly and we refrain from expressing any view thereon. We feel that the learned trial Judge should now proceed with the trial of the suit in regard to the other items of the claim for whatever they are worth. In the result, the appeal partly succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned trial Judge, in so far as it relates to dismissal of the Plaintiff's suit regarding pension and gratuity is confirmed, but the dismissal of the suit in respect of the remaining part of the claim is set aside, and the learned Judge is directed to proceed with the trial of the Suit to that extent, according to law. The success and failure of the appeal being equally divided, the costs throughout of the appeal and of the Court below till this date shall be borne by the parties as incurred. Appeal allowed