HONNIAH, J. ( 1 ) RFAS. Nos. 41 and 58 of 1963 and RFA. No. 57 of 1966 are the plaintiffs' appeals from the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Bangalore in O. S. Nos. 168, 297 and 295 of 1964. RFA. No. 58 of 1966 is filed by the defendants in O. S. No. 296 of 1964 on the file of the Civil Judge, Bangalore. The appellant in all the four appeals is the same person by name A. Palaniyappa mudaliar. The facts of the cases so far as they are relevant to the question involved in these appeals are very simple. Palaniappa Mudaliar, the plaintiff in O. S. Nos. 168, 297 and 295 of 1964, is the brother-inlaw of the brother or P. T. Kandaswami Mudaliar, the first defendant in these suite. Kandaswami Mudaliar the first defendant is the father of the second defendant Ramaswamy Mudaliar. In O. S. No. 296 of 1964 the abovesaid Kandaswami Mudaliar and Ramaswamy Mudaliar are the plaintiffs and Palaniappa Mudaliar is the defendant. But for convenience, palaniappa Mudaliar will be hereafter referred to as the plaintiff and kandaswami Mudaliar and Ramaswamy Mudaliar will be referred to as defendants. Defendant No. 1 has two younger brothers, viz. , Nanjappa mudaliar and Sengoda Mudaliar. Defendants 1 and 2 have been doing business in cloth in wholesale in Bangalore City for over 25 years under the name and style of 'p. T. Kandaswami Mudaliar' and their turnover lately wos more than about Rs. 20 lakhs per year. This firm, as admitted by the parties, enjoys a great reputation. Nanjappa Mudaliar and Sengoda mudaliar are also doing the same business as that of the defendants in the same locality separately. ( 2 ) PLAINTIFF in the beg'nning was working as a clerk in the firm of defendants for some years till 1-4-1953 on an snnual salary of Rs. 2,000 to rs. 3 000. In the year 1953, he was taken as a working patner of the defendants firm and the partnersh p was registered which came into effect from 1-4-1953 (as per Ext. D-2 dated 22-l-l956 ). The plaintiff according to the terms of the partnership was entitled to 4 annas share in a rupee in the profits and loss of the firm. The first defendant was entitled to 8 annas share and the second defendant to 4 annas share. D-2 dated 22-l-l956 ). The plaintiff according to the terms of the partnership was entitled to 4 annas share in a rupee in the profits and loss of the firm. The first defendant was entitled to 8 annas share and the second defendant to 4 annas share. ( 3 ) THE partnership business went on for about 6 years. Thereafter, misunderstandings arose between the parties. Whatever may be the reason, it is admitted that the plaintiff stopped going to the shop and looking after the affairs of the firm from 10-6-1959. ( 4 ) THE plaintiff's case is that he was the partner of the firm till 12-11-1960, on which date he filed a suit for dissolution of the firm and for accounts. The plaintiff admittedly joined as a partner of the firm of P. T. Sengoda Mudaliar. on 22-8-1959 about two months after he left the firm of the defendants. The new firm he joined belonged to Sengoda Mudaliar, one of the brothers of defendant No. 1 and brother-in-law of the plaintiff. ( 5 ) THE defendants' case is that the plaintiff left the firm voluntarily on 9-6-1959. There is nothing on record to show that the firm was dissolved and reconstituted by the defendants on that day. The defendants intimated the Registrar of Firms under Ext. P-21 dated 28-6-1960 a year later stating that the plaintiff ceased to be a partner from 9-6-1959 and in his place one Sengoda Mudaliar son-in-law of the first defendant had become the partner. ( 6 ) THE plaintiff replied to the notice Ext. D-4 dated 10-6-1960 as per ext. D-5 dated 14-6-1960, repudiating, among other things, that he ceased to be a partner from 9-6-1959. ( 7 ) THE plaintiff was not given his share in the profits and it appeals after exchange of notices, plaintiff asked the defendants to settle his accounts, but nothing seems to have been done. ( 8 ) ON 12-11-1960, plaintiff filed O. S. No. 69 of 1960 in the Court of the District Judge, Bangalore for dissolution of partnership of the firm by name M|s. P. T. Kandaswami Mudaliar of which the plaintiff and defendants were partners and for recovery of Rs. 60,000 being his estimated share in the profits and such other sum he was entitled to on taking accounts. In that suit, at his instance, Mr. 60,000 being his estimated share in the profits and such other sum he was entitled to on taking accounts. In that suit, at his instance, Mr. Biligere Ramachandra rao an Advocate was appointed as receiver, without notice to the defendants. Ext. P-1 is the warrant issued by the Court. The warrant directed the receiver to take possession, control and management of the partnership business and to make an inventory of all the articles found in the premises of the firm. ( 9 ) THE plaintiff, his Counsel Mr. C. R. V. Swamy and the receiver went to the business place of the firm in the evening of 12-11-1960 at about 5-30 or 6 P. M. There are conflicting versions as to what took place in the shop after the plaintiff, his Counsel and the receiver went to the shop. That is the bone of contention between the parties, in these suits. We will refer to the respective stands of the parties at appropriate places. It will suffice here to state the facts. When the receiver wanted to execute the warrant, it appears, some panchayatdars intervened. On their advice and after looking into the accounts here and there, according to the plaintiff he was found entitled to get Rs. 60,000 roughly, being his share of the profits. The defendants appear to have agreed and that as they had no full cash, they paid in cash Rs. 5,000 on that night and passed six cheques, one of which was of the same date for Rs. 5,000 and was cashed on 14-11-1960. The other post-dated cheques each for Rs. 10,000 were realisable on various dates, the last one to be encashed on 31-1-61. Ext P-2 was executed by plaintiff in favour of defendants, setting out therein the manner in which his claim in the suit was settled. The defendants executed Ext. D-29 in favour of the plaintiff stating therein that the claim of the plaintiff in the suit was settled as indicated therein and nothing was due to the plaintiff. They further stated that if the postdated cheques were not honoured on the respective dates, they undertook to hold themselves liable to the plaintiff for the same. The defendants executed Ext. D-29 in favour of the plaintiff stating therein that the claim of the plaintiff in the suit was settled as indicated therein and nothing was due to the plaintiff. They further stated that if the postdated cheques were not honoured on the respective dates, they undertook to hold themselves liable to the plaintiff for the same. ( 10 ) ON the same night, on the reverse of the warrant, Counsel for the plaintiff made a note to the effect that since the parties had settled the suit claim, the warrant need not be executed. Further it is mentioned in the note that the settlement took place in the presence of panchayatdars and the panchayatdars and the parties had attested to evidence the settlement. ( 11 ) ON the basis of this, the receiver made an endorsement to the effect that it was not necessary to execute the warrant, as the claim of the plaintiff itself had been settled. To this endorsement also the plaintiff and the defendants attested. 12-11-1960 was a Saturday and the next day being a Sunday the plaintiff encashed the cheque for Rs. 5,000 on 14-11-60. The receiver returned the warrant on 15-11-60 to which date the case was advanced. In view of the report of the receiver and what had taken place on 12-11-1960, the Counsel for the plaintiff reported to Court that the claim of the plaintiff in the suit had been settled out of Court, with the result the suit was dismissed on 15-11-1960 as per Ext. P-10 the order sheet. ( 12 ) WHILE matters stood there, the defendants caused a Lawyer's notice Ex. D-30 dated 21-11-1860 issued to the plaintiff, repudiating the contract of 12-11-1960, on the ground that the same was vitiated due to threat held out by the plaintiff to close the business and alternatively the contract was entered into by defendants on the promise of the plaintiff looking into accounts and settle the claim within a week. ( 13 ) THE plaintiff replied, as contained in Ext. D-31 dated 30-11-60, denying the allegations made by the defendants. Thereafter, the post dated cheques to be encashed on 30-11-1960, 15th and 31st December, 1960 and 15th and 30th January 1961 each for Rs. 10,000 amounting in all to a sum of Rs. ( 13 ) THE plaintiff replied, as contained in Ext. D-31 dated 30-11-60, denying the allegations made by the defendants. Thereafter, the post dated cheques to be encashed on 30-11-1960, 15th and 31st December, 1960 and 15th and 30th January 1961 each for Rs. 10,000 amounting in all to a sum of Rs. 50,000 were dishonoured on presentation on the respective dates as the defendants intimated the bank not to honour the same. It is on these dishonoured cheques, the plaintiff has filed the three suits on the facts stated above for recovery of Rs. 50,000 being the balance of his share of profits in the business with interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date on which the cheques were dishonoured, as settled between the parties. ( 14 ) IN reply, the defendants pleaded that the plaintiff was entitled only to a sum of Rs. 35,000 roughly, leas income tax as on June, 1959. The plaintiff brought the receiver along with the warrant to take possession of the shop and to manage the same. The firm being a reputed one they felt that if the receiver took possession, their reputation would suffer and so the defendants being faced with such a situation agreed to the suggestion of the plaintiff that they should agree to the plaintiff's claim for a sum of Rs. 60,000 subject to the accounts being scrutinised within a week thereafter and the correct amount being ascertained. Under these circumetances, they were compelled to agree to the suggestion of the plaintiff and paid Rs. 5,000 cash and cheques for the balance of the amount. To this they a"rced being overawed. helpless and bereft of independent advice In the circumstances, thev pleaded that there was no final settlement on 12-11-1960 of accounts and the alleged settlement was vitiated by fraud misreprospntation and undue influence In the meanwhile, defendants filed O. S. No 1 of 1961 on 2-1-1961 on the file of the District Judge Bangalore which was subsequently re-numbered as o. S. No 296 of 1964 on the file of the Civil Judge, Bangalore for dissolution of Partnership of P. T Kandaswami Mudaliar. taking of accounts of the partnership, for paymert of such amount as may be found due to the plaintiff, and to declare that the settlement as contoined in Ext P-2 and Ext. taking of accounts of the partnership, for paymert of such amount as may be found due to the plaintiff, and to declare that the settlement as contoined in Ext P-2 and Ext. D-29 dated 12-11-1960 was void and not enforceable as having been Pot by fraud, coercion and undue influence and for permanent injunction restraining the plaintiff from encashing the post dated cheques. In the plaint, as it was presented to Court, this is what they have stated:" The plaintiffs submit that the alleged settlement secured under coercion not being valid or enforceable, thev are entitled to a declaration to the effect that the settlement is procured by coercion and undue influence and therefore unenforceable. The plaintiffs submit that if the settlement be disregarded, as thev submit it should be in the circumstances, on the basis of the defendant's case itself that he continued as a partner till the date of the suit and there had been no dissolutoin of partnership, the partnership subsists but for the settlement on 12-11-1960 as alleged by him. "in the year 1963, the defendant made an application for amending their plaint. Their application was allowed and the following was added to para 9 of the original plaint. " The plaintiffs submit that the defendant having left the partnership firm of P. T. Kandaswamy Mudaliar on 9-6-59 and having subsequently joined another firm known as P. T. Sengoda Mudaliar there was an automatic dissolution of the partnership concern of p. T. Kandaswamy Mudaliar. "in the prayer column, in substitution of the prayer for dissolution, this is what they prayed by the amendment:" For taking accounts of the old partnership firm of P. T. Kandaswamy mudaliar as on 9-6-1959 upto which the defendant was a partner and for the determination of the amount if any payable to the defendant on such taking of accounts less amounts already paid to or received by him. "as all these suits raised common questions of law and facts they were tried together by the learned Civil Judge, Bangalore, and by his judgment dated 15th April, 1965, he dismissed the suits of the plaintiff and passed a preliminary decree in O. S No. 296 of 1965 (the suit filed by the defendents) for taking accounts on the basis that the firm was dissolved on 9-6-1959 Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed in these four suits, the plaintiff has preferred these four appeals. ( 15 ) ON the pleadings in the suits filed by the plaintiff the material issues that arose for consideration were whether there was a settlement of the claim of the plantiff aganist the defendants which resulted in a contract between the parties on 12-11-1960 or as pleaded by defendants whether the agreement as contained in Ext. P-2 and D-29, was obtained by the plaintiff by coercion, undue influence fraud and misrepresentation and whether the agreement of that date was entered into by the parties with an understanding that the recount should be taken within a week from that date. In the suit filed by the defendants, the material issues that arese for consideration were whether the suit was maintainable in view the settlement and compromise arrived at on 12-11-1960, whether the firm of P. T Kandaswamy Mudaliar became dissolved on 9-6-1959 and the plaintiff ceased to be a partner thereof, and whether the plaintiff was entitled to get only a sum of about Rs 35, 000 as on 9-6-1959 being his share of profits till that date If the issues that arise for determination in the suits filed by the plaintiff are decided in favour of the plaintiff it would be unnecessary to go into the merits of the suit filed by the defendants. ( 16 ) ALTHOUGH the defendants' case in main was that they entered into an agreement with the plaintiff on 12-11-1960 with an understanding that the account should be looked into within a week from that date, at the time of argument the learned Counsel for the defendants strongly contended that the so called agreement into between the parties on 12-11-1960, was vitiated due to undue influence, fraud, coercion and misrepresentation practised bv the plaint'ff We would rather decide first the question whether the agreement between the parties as contained in Exts. P-2 and D were entered into with an understanding that accounts should be looked into within a wee1" thereafter. The defendants case is that the plaintiff contrary to the agreement did not approach them to settle the accounts between then and on the other hand encashed the cheque dated 1-11-1960 and 14-11-60 and attempted to encash the other eheques subsequently In support of these pleadings the defendants relied upon the statement made by them in their written statement and oral evidence of the second defendant. S 92 of the Evidence Act provides that when the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required bv law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to S 91, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varving addint to, or subtracting from, its terms. Proviso (3) is material for the purpose of this case. That proviso provides that the existence of any separate oral t constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract grant or disposition of property may be proved The contract that was entered into bv the parties is contained in Exts P-2 and D-29. Ext. P-2 reads as follows: " Whereas 1 have filed against Sri P. T. Kandaswamy Mudaliar and Sri K. Ramaswami Mudaliar in O. S. No. 69|60 on the file of the principal District Judge, Bangalore for the recovery of the sum of rs. 60,000 (Rupees sixty thousand only) with Court costs and such other reliefs and on the advice of well wishers and friends, I have received the said sum of Rs. 60,000 (sixty thousand only) in the following manner. By cash Rs. 5,000-00 By cheque No 280484/12-11-60 for Rs. 5,000-00 Do 280485/30-11-60 10,000-00 Do 280486/15-12-60 10,000-00 Do 280487/31-12-60 10,000-00 Do 280489/15- 1-61 10,000-00 Do 280490/31- 1-61 10,000-00 Total receipt Rs. 60,000-00 all on the Canara Banking Corporationn Ltd. , Bangalore-2. in full and final settlement of my claim in this behalf and nothing is due to me. Thus, I have settled my suit claim. Bangalore-2. Sdl. A. Palaniyappa Mudr. 12th Nov. 1960. (on 10 np. receipt stamp) 12-11-60. Sd|. K. R. Rangappa sd|. in Tamil (P. T. Nanjappa Mudr) sd|. 60,000-00 all on the Canara Banking Corporationn Ltd. , Bangalore-2. in full and final settlement of my claim in this behalf and nothing is due to me. Thus, I have settled my suit claim. Bangalore-2. Sdl. A. Palaniyappa Mudr. 12th Nov. 1960. (on 10 np. receipt stamp) 12-11-60. Sd|. K. R. Rangappa sd|. in Tamil (P. T. Nanjappa Mudr) sd|. in Tamil (N. K. Perumal Mudr) sdj. in Tamil (P. Subbaraya) sd ). in Tamil (P. T. Sengoda Mudliar) received copy sd|. P. T. Kandaswami Mudaliar sdf. K. Ramaswamy, 12-11-60. " exhibit D-29 is a document executed by the defendants in fevour of the plaintiff and that reads as follows: " Whereas the plaintiff Sri A. Palaniayyppa Mudaliar had filed a suit in O. S. No. 69 of 1960 on the file of the Principal District Judge, bangalore against us to day, we have issued the following cheques on the Canara Banking Corporation Ltd , Bangalore-2, and a sum of Rs. 5000 (Rupees five thousand) has been paid in cash to the said plaintiff today. By cheque No. 280484/ 12-11-60 for Rs. 5,000-00 do 280485 /30-11-60 10,000-00 do 280486 / 15-12-60 10,000-00 do 280487/31-12-60 10,000-00 do 280489/15- 1-61 10,000-00 do 280490/31- 1-61 10,000-00 Cash paid to-day . . 55,000-00 5,000-00 . . Total payment 60,000-00 in full and final settlement of the plaintiff's claim against us and nothing is due to him in this behalf and nothing is due to us also from the plaintiff in this connection. Thus we have settled this suit claim on the advice of friends and well-wishers of ours. In case the above said cheques are not honoured on the said dates, we hold ourselves liable to the plaintiff for the same. Sd/. P. T. Kandaswami Mudaliar 12-11-60 sd/ K. Ramaswamy. Bangalore-2 (on one 10 np stamp) 12th Nov. 1960. Sd|. N. K. Perumal Mudaliar (in Tamil) sd. P. Subbaraya Mudaliar (in Tamil) sd|. K. R. Rangappa (in tamil) sd|. P. T. Sengoda Mudaliar (in Tamil) sd|. P. T. Nanjappa Mudaliar (in Tamil ). " after the above documents were executed by the parties, the Counsel for the plaintiff who was present there made an endorsement on the reverse of the v/arrant Ext. P-1 as follows: " Since the parties have settled the suit claim, this warrant is not necessary to be executed. P. T. Nanjappa Mudaliar (in Tamil ). " after the above documents were executed by the parties, the Counsel for the plaintiff who was present there made an endorsement on the reverse of the v/arrant Ext. P-1 as follows: " Since the parties have settled the suit claim, this warrant is not necessary to be executed. In token of their settlement, the parties have also attested this endorsement in the presence of the panchayatdars. " sd/. Advocate for Plaff. 12-11-60. " under this endorsement, the parties and the panchayatdars have signed. While returning the warrant, the receiver has made an endorsement stating that it was not necessary to execute the warrant as the suit claim itself was settled by the parties out of Court. Having made such an endorsement, he returned the warrant to the Court on 15-11-1960. As already stated, the Counsel for the plaintiff reported to Court that the suit claim of the parties has been settled out of Court, and therefore, the Court dismissed the suit. The terms of the settlement are unambiguous. The evidence shows that in pursuance of these settlements, the defendants paid a sum of Rs. 5,000 forthwith and gave a cheque of that date for another sum of Rs. 5,000 and for the balance of the amount bf Rs. 50,000 issued post-dated cheques. The agreement entered into between the parties came into force on the very day when the defendants paid the sum of Rs. 5,000 and when the plaintiff encashed the cheque of that date on 14-11-1960. The parties having acted upon this agreement, it is futile for the defendants to contend that there was an oral agreement as pleaded by them. In substance their plea being that the whole of this agreement should not be acted upon until the accounts were looked into by the parties within a week. Oral evidence to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the writing is excluded when there is an actual contract between the parties. In this case there is a contract, and, therefore, in respect of that contract no oral evidence can be adduced by the parties. If there is any stipulation that the contract would not be enforced or that it was not intended to be acted upon until the happening of a condition precedent, oral evidence may be adduced regarding the existence of such a a term. If there is any stipulation that the contract would not be enforced or that it was not intended to be acted upon until the happening of a condition precedent, oral evidence may be adduced regarding the existence of such a a term. In a case where the agreement has come into force forthwith it has been partly acted upon, the parties cannot be allowed to adduce oral evidence against its terms. For in such a case there can be no condition precedent at all. That apart, there is no satisfactory evidence that there was a stipulation between the parties that this contract should not be acted upon until the accounts were looked into by the parties within a week. For the first time this story appears to have been thought of by the defendants when they got issued the notice Ext. D-30 on 21-11-60. At the time of trial, only the second defendant has been examined on behalf of the defendants and except his uncorroborated testimony, there is no other evidence to support the plea of the defendants. The agreement was entered into between the plaintiff and the defendants on 12-11-1960 by which the claim of the plaintiff in his suit was settled as per the terms contained in Exs. P-2 and D-29 and as stated earlier the suit was dismissed on a submission made by the Counsel for the plaintiff that the claim had been settled out of Court. Alter all these happened, this story seems to have been thought of with a view to reopen the settlement that had been arrived at between the parties on 12-11-60. As the evidence is unsatisfactory, we are unable to accept the contention raised on behalf of the defendants in respect of the so called oral agreement. ( 17 ) THE real controversy between the parties as could be gathered from the evidence, though the pleadings in that behalf are very slender, is that Exts. P-2 and D-29 as contended by the defendants were obtained by the plaintiff under threat, coercion, undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation. ( 17 ) THE real controversy between the parties as could be gathered from the evidence, though the pleadings in that behalf are very slender, is that Exts. P-2 and D-29 as contended by the defendants were obtained by the plaintiff under threat, coercion, undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation. In the written statement filed by the defendants in the suits filed by the plaintiff, this is what they have pleaded, after narrating the circumstances under which the plaintiff came to the premises of their shop on the evening of 12-11-1960 along with the Receiver:" While matters stood thus, on 12-11-60 suddenly at about 6 p. m. the plaintiff accompanied by his lawyer Sr. C. R. V. Swamy and sri P. T. Sengoda Mudaliar and Sri P. T. Nanjappa Mudahar and their friends and Sri Biligiri Ramachandra Rao, Advocate since deceased, came to the defendants' business premises and intimated that the plaintiff had instituted suit Nos. O. S. 69 of 60 in the Court of the Principal District Judge, Bangalore, for dissolution of the partnership business of T. T. Kandaswamy Mudaliar and for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 60,000 as being tentatively due to him from the said partnership business. The plaintiff also intimated that he had obtained an exparte order for closure of the defendants' business and for taking possession of the same through late Sri Biligiri Ramachandra rao, who had been appointed a Receiver in the said case and that he had the necessary warrant to take possession of the defendant's business. The defendants protested and stated that the plaintiff was not entitled to the sum of Rs. 60,000 claimed by him and that the accounts disclosed that the plaintiff was entitled to only a sum of Rs. 35,000 roughly subject to income-tax and bad debts as on June 1959. The plaintiff did not heed the said protestations nor did he allow the defendants to go out of their shop premises to have independent advice in the matter and threatened that the Receiver would take immediate possession if they did so. The plaintiff further represented that the only solution out of the impasse was to agree to the suit claim therein, subject to the accounts being scrutinised within a week thereof and the correct amount being ascertained. The plaintiff further insisted that the defendants should immediately pay cash of Rs. The plaintiff further represented that the only solution out of the impasse was to agree to the suit claim therein, subject to the accounts being scrutinised within a week thereof and the correct amount being ascertained. The plaintiff further insisted that the defendants should immediately pay cash of Rs. 5,000 and pass in his favour post-dated cheques for the balance of the amount pending scrutiny of the accounts within a week thereor and tnat in the meantime he would not cash the cheque. The defendants overawed by the said situation and being helpless and bereft of all independent advice had no other option except to agree to the plaintiff's proposal in order to avoid the tnreatened direct consequences held out by the plaintiff. Thereafter the plaintiff produced a receipt as having been prepared by his Auditor and demanded and obtained the defendants' signature thereto. In the circumstances, the defendants submit that there was no free or fair settlement of accounts between the parties. The defendants further submit that the alleged settlement set up by the plaintiff is a false one and is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence. "this is all that the defendants stated by way particulars regarding their case of undue influence, coercion, fraud and misrepresentation. It is not disputed in this case chat the plaintiff accompanied by his Lawyer and the receiver went to the shop premises of the defendants which is situated in Dewan Soorappa lane which is close to Chickpet in Bangalore City. It is in this lane as the evidence discloses that most of the wholesale cloth dealers have their shops. At the time the plaintiff went to the spot even according to the second defendant there were his clerks, the defendant and some customers. It is not disputed that it is one of the busiest commercial localities in Bangalore City. The defendants admittedly had a phone in their shop at that time and their shop is at a distance of 100 yards from Chickpet Police station. There were many wholesale dealers near about the premises and it could fairly be inferred that at the time the plaintiff went to the shop along with the receiver and his Counsel, there were number of people nearabout. There were many wholesale dealers near about the premises and it could fairly be inferred that at the time the plaintiff went to the shop along with the receiver and his Counsel, there were number of people nearabout. The second defendant in his deposition has deposed as follows on this question:" On 12-11-60 at about 6-30 p. m when our business was in full swing, 15 persons rushed into our business premises. Plaintiff was one of them. P. T. Sengoda Mudaliar, P. T. Wanjappa Mudaiiar, subbanna Chettar K. R. Rangappa, IN. K. Perumal Mudaliar, Plaintifi's lawyer, Mr. Swamy, plaintiff's Auditor Narayan, late Mr. Buligiri Ramachandra Rao came along with plaintiff to our business premises. Plaintiff threatened me and my father that we should go out of the shop premises and he had obtained orders to seal the premises. We were then confused. Myself and my father asked the plaintiff as to why he was so threatening and as to what the matter was. Plaintiff then said that he had preferred a suit against us for recovering Rs. 60,000 and that he had got appointed a Receiver for closing the business and locking it up. Then we told the plaintiff as to how he could have filed the suit for recovery of Rs. 60,000, when from the accounts he was entitled to only Rs. 35,000. and odd subject to bad debts etc. The plaintiff said that he was not prepared to hear all that and compelled us to pay him Rs. 60,000. Then we told the plaintiff that ours was a big reputed firm and that it was not proper for the plaintiff to have taken such drastic steps and that he may look into the accounts. Plaintiff did not heed to it. The talk and the scuffle went on till mid-night on that day. Plaintiff then said that accounts would be looked into within a week and that for the present he should be paid Rs. 5,000 in cash for Court expenses incurred by him and for the balance of that suit claim, post dated cheques may be given to the extent of Rs. 55,000 and that he would not encash them till accounts were scrutinised. Though we protested he insisted for it. The plaintiff threatened us, compelled us and induced us by misrepresentation and undue influence, took Rs. 55,000 and that he would not encash them till accounts were scrutinised. Though we protested he insisted for it. The plaintiff threatened us, compelled us and induced us by misrepresentation and undue influence, took Rs. 5,000 in cash and six post dated cheques to the extent of Rs. 55,000. "in cross-examination thus is what he has stated Plaintiff came and told us that we should all go out of the shop and the shop was to be sealed: this is the threat referred to by me above as given by the plaintiff'. In his evidence there is nothing to indicate that the plaintiff physically prevented them from going out of the shop for any purpose or sending any of their servants for their help. The threat said to have been given by the plaintiff and as explained by the second defendant is only that the plaintiff asked them to go out of the shop as the shop was to be sealed. The plaintiff has denied the allegation made in the written statement and he has stated that he went to the shop of the defendants with the receiver and his Counsel and when the defendants came to know about the suit filed by him and the appointment of the receiver to take over the business and to run it, the defendants sent for panchayatdars which included P. W. 2 Narayan, an Auditor and P. W. 3 Rangappan, a wholesale merchant and Secretary of the Handloom Dealers Association of which the defendants were members, P, T. Sengoda Mudaliar, and P. T. Nanjappa Mudaliar the two brothers of defendant-1. In the pleadings extracted above, the defendants do not say that the brothers of the first defendant who came to the shop were not on good terms with them, but in the course of his evidence, the second defendant has stated that there was no love last between the first defendant and his brothers because of business rivalry. It is difficult for us to accept this version of the second defendant. If as stated by him, the brothers of the first defendant were not on good terms with them, it is improbable that they would come to the shop of the defendant for any purpose. More so when a partner of that firm had gone there with the receiver to take possession of the business in pursuance of an order of the Court. More so when a partner of that firm had gone there with the receiver to take possession of the business in pursuance of an order of the Court. These persons were not necessary at all for the effective execution of the receiver warrant. It was the receiver who was to execute the warrant. If the plaintiff had accompanied him it is obviously for the purpose of locating the premises and identifying the defendants. A criticism was levelled against the evidence of P. W. 2 Narayan who is an Auditor by the Counsel for the defendants. According to him P. W. 3 K. R. Rangappa wanted to secure business for this witness and in fact secured business to him in some shops. Reliance is placed on the evidence of these two witnesses which is to the effect that Rangappa once took P. W. 2 Narayan to the shop of the defendants when the plaintiff was partner and asked them to give their audit work to him. The evidence of the second defendant is that he did not give any work to P. W. 2 Narayan. But P. W. 2 Narayan's evidence is that he had secured audit work in a number of shops in Dewan Soorappa lane at the instance of Rangappa and on 12-11-1960 he was sitting in one of the adjacent shops when the defendants sent for him and on his going there, he was asked to write Ext. P-2 and D-29 and that he did not take any part in the panchayat that took place between the parties. His evidence shows that he was doing audit work of Sengoda Mudaliar with whom the plaintiff had started a new partnership business after 9-6-1959. Assuming what all defendant-2 has stated is true, it is difficult to reject the evidence of P. W. 2 because he only speaks to his writing Exts. P-2 and D-29. The defendants do not deny his presence nor do they deny the execution of Exts. P-2 and D-29. The other witness examined on behalf of the plaintiff is P. W. 3 Rangappa. His evidence in substance is that the defendants sent for him and after he went to the shop of the defendants he came to know about the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants and of the receiver having come there to take possession of the premises and the business. His evidence in substance is that the defendants sent for him and after he went to the shop of the defendants he came to know about the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants and of the receiver having come there to take possession of the premises and the business. The defendants, according to him, requested him and other panchayatdars to settle the dispute between them and accordingly they looked into the accounts and found that as on 9-6-1959 the plaintiff was entitled to a sum of about Rs. 45,000 and odd, and interest upto date worked out to about Rs. 20,000. According to his evidence, on the" above basis, the plaintiff and the defendants agreed to a settlement whereby the defendants agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 60,000 in full settlement of the claim and the plaintiff agreed to accept the same and in pursuance of this agreement, the plaintiff executed Ext. P-2 and the defendants ext. D-29, and they were attested by the panchayatdars. His evidence further shows that he and other parties signed the endorsement made by the Counsel for the plaintiff on the back of the receiver warrant. The only criticism levelled against this witness is that he is a friend of the plaintiff. This witness had admitted that he is a friend of the plaintiff as well as of the defendants. On the basis of the statement made by this witness that he had taken P. W. 2 to the shop of the defendants to get him audit work and in view of the fact that the defendants did not give any work and also the fact that P. W. 2 was doing the audit work in the shop of Sengoda Mudaliar where the plaintiff was a partner, it is urged on behalf of the defendants that this witness is more friendly towards the plaintiff than towards the defendants. We see no merit in this argument. The second defendant who has given evidence at great length does not even whisper that this witness is hostile to him or is more friendly towards the plaintiff. This witness once was a Treasurer of the handloom Cloth Merchants Association and at the relevant point of time was the Secretary of the Association of which the defendants and many other wholesale merchants were members. In our opinion, he is a disinterested witness. This witness once was a Treasurer of the handloom Cloth Merchants Association and at the relevant point of time was the Secretary of the Association of which the defendants and many other wholesale merchants were members. In our opinion, he is a disinterested witness. Apart from the evidence of this witness, the plaintiff has sworn to the circumstances under which Exts. P-2 and D-29 came to be executed by the parties. If the evidence as now narrated is taken into consideration, it is difficult for any Court to hold that there was any coercion, undue influence, fraud or misrepresentation, practised by the plaintiff. ( 18 ) AS is well known an agreement to settle a dispute amicably would not be invalid unless it is obtained by coercion, undue influence fraud and misrepresentation. As to the question whether the documents exts. P-2 and D-29 were executed by the defendants out of their own free will or as contended by them under coercion , a reference may be made to Ss. 15 to 18 of the Indian Contract Act. In the present case it is said the documents Exts. P-2 and D-29 are said to have been vitiated as aforesaid. The learned trial Judge has found that the defendants were forced and coerced and due to undue influence they executed Exts. P-2 and d-29. He has come to this conclusion not upon any acceptable evidence, but on more surmises and to specifically state his own reasoning, he has based it on the ground "that the second defendant has stated in his evidence that the plaintiff threatened him". He comes to the conclusion that all the ingredients of Ss. 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the Contract Act have been established. We are unable to agree with his reasoning in this case. The real question for determination is whether the execution of the documents Exts. P-2 and D-29 was obtained by coercion, undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation and whether the transaction was itself unfair and unconscionable so as to relieve the defendants from the claim of the plaintiff. In this case the evidence which we have referred to could not support the findings of the learned trial Judge. P-2 and D-29 was obtained by coercion, undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation and whether the transaction was itself unfair and unconscionable so as to relieve the defendants from the claim of the plaintiff. In this case the evidence which we have referred to could not support the findings of the learned trial Judge. The learned trial Judge having quoted the pleadings of the defendants has stated that the defendants were placed in such a situation which the plaintiff took advantage and coerced them to settle as per Exts P-2 and D-29. This finding of the learned Judge is not based upon satisfactory evidence nor is it based upon the inference drawn from the proved circumstances. It cannot be presumed that the defendants were in such a situation that the imaginary threat placed them under the control of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff took advantage of such control to induce them to execute exts. P-2 and D-29, with an understanding that account should be settled within one week. ( 19 ) WE must further point out that the brothers of defendant-1 were also present at the relevant time Although the second defendant has stated that they were not on good terms with them, from the circumstances of this case it could be gathered that they had come there with a view to help the defendants. In the notice Ext. P-30 issued by the defendants nine days after the execution of Exts. P-2 and D-29, the defendants do not say that the first defendant's brothers were not well disposed towards them Only defendant-2 in his evidence says that his uncles were not on good terms Apart from this, their own clerks and other customers were in the shop and it is not as if the defendants had no friends in the locality. The evidence in this case is that defendants' firm is one of the reputed firms for over 25 years, their business turnover being to the extent of twenty laics per year The second defendant himself is an educated man having studied upto intermediate. It is very difficult to believe the version of the defendants that under coercion, undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation the two documents were obtained by them. It is inconceivable that in the situation in which the defendants were, that they would meekly submit to the plaintiff's dictation. It is very difficult to believe the version of the defendants that under coercion, undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation the two documents were obtained by them. It is inconceivable that in the situation in which the defendants were, that they would meekly submit to the plaintiff's dictation. It is not as if that they had no knowledge of litigation in the Courts. Admittedly number of suits had been filed by the firm for the recovery of dues earlier. At the relevant point of time, their Advocate was Mr. Ganesha Rao, who was a very well known senior Advocate of this Court, who himself had a phone. It is impossible to believe the version of the defendants that the plaintiff did not allow them to go out, nor allow them to contact anybody else for nearly six hours. If as stated by the defendants, under threat of the plaintiff, they executed the documents in question, we find no reason why the receiver should sit in the shop till late in the midnight by which time it was reported that the matter had been settled between the parties. Such a long time obviously has been taken with a view to find out a solution for the settlement of the disputes between the parties. It is urged for the defendants that there was no panchayat and even assuming that there was a panchayat, the evidence does not disclose that the panchayatdars went into the real disputes between the parties thoroughly as could be gathered from the evidence of P. W. 3, it appears that the never went into the details of the dispute between the parties, but it could be stated with certainty that they took into consideration the relevant positions and status of the parties and having due regard to the claim of the plaintiff, they must have advised the defendants and the defendants must have voluntarily agreed for that decision. ( 20 ) EVEN otherwise the defendants without reference to any threat or panchayat, would have agreed to the terms as contained in Exts. P-2 and D-29 for more than one reason. ( 20 ) EVEN otherwise the defendants without reference to any threat or panchayat, would have agreed to the terms as contained in Exts. P-2 and D-29 for more than one reason. To repeat, the firm was a very reputed one, the business turnover being in the order of nearly rupees twenty lakhs per year, the outstanding were in the order of about rupees eight lakhs and admittedly that they had a stock of about rupees two lakhs and that they were running the business for over 25 years themselves and with a view to help the plaintiff who was their relative, admitted him as a partner agreeing to pay four annas share in every rupee of profit It is no doubt true, it is only such people get into trouble at the hands of persons whom they brought up and placed them on sound footing in life Bui that is no ground or reason for the defendants to deny the legitimate claim of the plaintiff to which he is entitled in law. In all probability in our opinion, in order to avoid their reputation being affected and in order to get rid of the plaintiff, who proved according to them ungrateful, they must have agreed voluntarily to pay him Rs. 60,000 in full settlement of the claim in the suit that he had filed in the District court and that may be the reason why the two documents Exts. P-2 and d-29 came to be executed between the parties ( 21 ) IF really there was any such threat as stated by the defendants, they would not has kept quiet immediately after the receiver left the shop. They could have approached the Court on 14-11-1960 and could have placed all the materials before the Court. They did not do anything. It is obvious from their own conduct that they felt happy by getting the dispute settled between them and the plaintiff as contained in Exts. P-2 and D-29 and kept quiet It is after the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed, on 21-11-1960, the defendants got issued the notice Ext. D-30 questioning the settlement Wo think they were not properly advised in taking up a stand as stated in Ext. D30 and in the written statement. P-2 and D-29 and kept quiet It is after the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed, on 21-11-1960, the defendants got issued the notice Ext. D-30 questioning the settlement Wo think they were not properly advised in taking up a stand as stated in Ext. D30 and in the written statement. If their first case, namely, that the agreement was subject to the account being settled bet ween the parties within a week is to be accepted, the second part of their case that Exts. P-2 and D-29 were obtained under threat etc. , obviously would be inconsistent and it is impossible to reconcile the two stands that the defendants have taken. ( 22 ) S. 15 of the Indian Contract Act deals with coercion Lawful process of a Court such as the appointment of a receiver cannot be construed as coming within the meaning of S. 15 of the Act. In order that there may be coercion, as is pleaded by the defendants, the threat must be unlawful and it must be shown that it was effected with the intention of coercing the other party to enter into an agreement. Undue influence is defined in S. 16 of the Act. A party pleading undue influence will have to establish that the opposite party had an influence over him because of close relationship, custody or due to other circumstances and by exercising that influence, he took unfair advantage at his cost. In this case the relationship between the parties that existed is one of partners and there is no question that the plaintiff was in a dominating position and in exercise of that position, he obtained an unfair advantage. In deciding the question of undue influence as in most other matters, an overall picture of the case will have to be taken into consideration. ( 23 ) AN argument was addressed in order to show that while in fact the plaintiff was only entitled to get Rs. 35. 000 and odd, by means of obtaining a warrant appointing a receiver for taking over the business and to run the business, the plaintiff obtained an unfair advantage to the extent of Rs. 25. 000. Although the scope of the appeal is not to examine that aspect of the case, in order to know the real position between the parties, we heard at length arguments. 25. 000. Although the scope of the appeal is not to examine that aspect of the case, in order to know the real position between the parties, we heard at length arguments. The learned Counsel for the defendants brought to our notice that the plaintiff hod left the partnership business on 9-6-1959 and by his own conduct subsequently he ceased to be a partner of the firm. It is not necessary to go into the details of the various circumstances brought to our notice. It is no doubt true that he was a working partner of the firm and left the firm on 9-6-1959. The exact reason is not given by either parties We get an indication that misunderstanding appears to have arisen between them and that is the reason why the plaintiff left the firm. Shortly after that he joined the firm of Sengoda Mudaliar as a partner and there admittedly got a considerable profit for the year 1959-60 and thereafter. The defendants also got another partner in place of the plaintiff and thereafter carried on the business without reference to the plaintiff. In these circumstances, it was contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to any profits of the firm after 9-6-1959. Here we may refer to Ss. 40, 41, 42 and 43 of the Partnership act, which deal with dissolution of partnership in general. Although it was urged that the partnership came to an end bv consent of the parties on 9-6-1959, from the circumstances mentioned above, it is difficult in the eye of law to hold that the partnership came to an end on that date. Under Ext. D-2 the partnership deed between the parties, it is stipulated that partnership could be dissolved by any one of the parteners giving six months' notice. No such notice has been given in this case. None of these provisions therefore will come to the aid of the defendants to hold that the partnership came to an end on 9-6-1959. If that be so and if on 9-6-1959 the plaintiff was entitled to get Rs. 35,000 and odd to his share and admittedly the defendants' firm earned an income of about Rs. 53,000 during 1959-60, it cannot be said that the plaintiff got an unfair advantage over the defendants. The plaintiff claimed in his suit Rs. 60. 000. Even assuming that he was entitled to get Rs. 35,000 and odd to his share and admittedly the defendants' firm earned an income of about Rs. 53,000 during 1959-60, it cannot be said that the plaintiff got an unfair advantage over the defendants. The plaintiff claimed in his suit Rs. 60. 000. Even assuming that he was entitled to get Rs. 35,000 on 9-6-1959, more or less he was entitled to get about Rs. 60,000 on 12-11-1960 inclusive of cost which he incurred to file the suit and without taking into account the goodwill of the firm. It cannot, therefore be said that any undue influence was exercised by the plaintiff No ingredient of fraud or misrepresentation is made out in this case. ( 24 ) THE Counsel for the parties have cited number of decisions in support of their respective cases. We propose to deal with only such cases which we find to be relevant to the facts of this case, ( 25 ) AS already mentioned earlier the facts set out by the defendants regarding what took place at the time Exts. P-2 and D-29 came into existence are common to the cases of coercion, undue-influence, fraud, and misrepresentation. It is the contention of the defendants that it would be possible to hold that the settlement contained in Exhibits P-2 and D-29 is vitiated on account of the facts pleaded by them, which according to them give rise to all the four grounds under which they plead the settlement was vitiated. Jt is needless to say that parties who rely on any such invalidating circumstances should clearly set out in the pleadings all the facts in support of their plea. If authority is needed in support of the above proposition, we may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bishundeo Naram v Seogeni Rai, AIR. 1961 SC. 280 in which the Supreme Court observed as follows:" We turn next to the questions of undue influence and coercion now it is to be observed that these have not been separately pleaded. It is true they may overlap in part in some cases but they are separate and separable catteries in law and must be separately pleaded it is also to be observed that no proper particulars have been furnished. It is true they may overlap in part in some cases but they are separate and separable catteries in law and must be separately pleaded it is also to be observed that no proper particulars have been furnished. Now if there is one rule which is bptter established than any other it is that in cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Court ought to take notice, however strong the language in which they are couched may be, and the same applies to undue influence and coercion See order 6 Rule 4 CPC. "as already stated the defendants have not separately pleaded the facts relating to the allegation of coercion, undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation. According to them, the fact that the plaintiff appeared at the business premises of the defendants along with the receiver appointed by the Court in O. S. No. 69 of 1960 and his Advocate, was itself sufficient to establish that the settlement in question was arrived at on account of the coercion practised by the plaintiff on the defendants. On the same fact they seek to prove that there was undue influence poetised by the plaintiff on the defendants. The allegation of fraud and misrepresentation are based on the same fact set out above Even though the defendants have not adhered to the strict rule reliting to the law of pleadings as required by Or. 6 R. 4 CPC , we propose to examine the case of the defendants in order to find out whether in law the allegations made by them have been established. We shall take up the allegation regarding coercion first. S. 15 of the Indian Contract Act defines the expression 'coercion'. It reads, coercion' is the committing or threatening to commit, any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code or the unlawful detaining, or threatening to detain, any property, to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement. S. 15 of the Indian Contract Act defines the expression 'coercion'. It reads, coercion' is the committing or threatening to commit, any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code or the unlawful detaining, or threatening to detain, any property, to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement. In this case it is not made out by the defendants that the plaintiff either committed or threatened to commit any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code Nor can it be stated that the presence of the receiver appointed by the Civil Court with a warrant to take charge of the goods and the business premises of the defendants as per the receiver warrant Ext. P-1, would amount to unlawful detention or a threat to unlawfully detain any property to the prejudice of any person. The receiver was appointed by the Court in exercise of its powers under or. 40, R. 1 of the CPC. , and when the plaintiff was entitled to make an application in order to secure his interests under that provision of law, it cannot be stated that what the receiver would have done pursuant to the warrant would have been an unlawful act within the meaning of s. 15 of the Contract Act had there not been a settlement. The mere fact that the reputation of the defendants could suffer or that for sometime the receiver appointed by the Court would take possession of the goods and the premises, cannot amount to coercion and any settlement or agreement arrived at in such a situation cannot become vitiated. Reference may be made here to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Rameshwar marwari v. Surendranath Das Sarkar, AIR 1926 Cal. 455. In that case a bond for recovery of Rs. 7,662-8-0 was taken from the defendant at a time when there was a case of criminal breach of trust pending against the defendant at the instance of the plaintiff and that it was the case of the defendant that the bond was executed because it was stipulated that if it was bo executed the criminal case would be withdrawn. It was contended that the defendant had executed the said bond not out of his own free will and he did so because there was a criminal prosecution against him. It was contended that the defendant had executed the said bond not out of his own free will and he did so because there was a criminal prosecution against him. Dealing with the above contention, the High Court observed as follows:" Now these facts, even if established, would not bring the case within S. 15 Contract Act which defines coercion. As regards undue influence the contract would be vitiated if it has been induced by undue influence where the relations subsisting between the parties are such that one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other. The relation between a debtor and a creditor is not necessarily one in which the former is to be taken as being situated in such a position that his will is bound to be dominated by the latter. It is however urged that there are facts from which this domination of the will may be justly presumed. We have been referred to certain circumstances for the purpose of coming to the conclusion that the case comes within sub-sec. (3) to S. 16 Contract Act. These circumstances are that although the defendant was only a partner to the extent of 1/3rd share in the business, yet by the bond he acknowledged a liability to the extent of Rs. 18,000 or Rs. 19,000, which, it is stated, is much in excess of the amount for which he was really liable. it has also been stated that the stipulation in the bond for payment of interest on default of payment of any of the instalments as well as other stipulations with regard to stock in trade show that the transaction was an unconscionable one. . . . . . . . The terms of the bond may be considered, to be stringent, but there is no reason to suppose that the bargain was an unconscionable one. I am therefore of opinion that it has not been proved that there was any undue influence in consequence of which the defendant was made to execute this bond. . . . . . . The terms of the bond may be considered, to be stringent, but there is no reason to suppose that the bargain was an unconscionable one. I am therefore of opinion that it has not been proved that there was any undue influence in consequence of which the defendant was made to execute this bond. "it is, therefore, clear that the fact that there was a civil case pending against the defendants for dissolution of the partnership firm and accounts, which admittedly the plaintiff was entitled to get at the hands of the Court, would not be a circumstance amounting to coercion in the eye of law. ( 26 ) MERE compulsion to enter into an agreement which is the result of process of law, cannot also be considered as coercion under the Act. Dealing with a case arising under the Andhra Pradesh Sugar-cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase), Act (45 of 1961) which required the occupier of a factory to buy the sugar-cane when it was offered by the sugar-cane grower, this is what the Supreme Court observed in andhra Sugars Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR. 1968 SC. 599" Now, under Act No. 45 of 1961 and the Rules framed under it, the cane-grower in the factory zone is free to make or not to make an offer of sale of cane to the occupier of the factory. But if he makes "an offer, the occupier of the factory is bound to accept it. The resulting agreement is recorded in writing and is signed by the parties. The consent of the occupier of the factory to the agreement is not caused by coercion undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation 6r mistake. His consent is free as denned in S. 14 of the Indian Contract act though he is obliged by law to enter into the agreement. The compulsion of law is not coercion as denned in S. 15 of the Act. In spite of the compulsion, the agreement is neither void nor voidable. In the eye of the law, the agreement is freely made. The parties are competent to contract. The agreement is made for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object and is not void under any provisions of law. In spite of the compulsion, the agreement is neither void nor voidable. In the eye of the law, the agreement is freely made. The parties are competent to contract. The agreement is made for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object and is not void under any provisions of law. The agreements are enforceable by law and are contracts of sale of sugar-cane as denned in S. 4 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act. "sri K. R. Karanth, learned Advocate for the defendants, relied upon the decision of the Privy Council in Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India ltd. , ILR. 40 Cal. 598 PC. in support of his case that coercion was practised by the plaintiff within the meaning of S. 15 of the Contract Act in order to obtain exts. P-2 and D-29 from the defendants. In that case the following were the facts; on the 15th August, 1902 the defendant Bank which had obtained a decree against the Delhi Cotton Mills obtained attachment against certain other mills at Subzi Mandi and on the 20th August 1902, took possession of them to obtain satisfaction for a sum of Rs. 83,805, the balance then unpaid under decree. The plaintiff contended that he was the sole proprietor of the mills at Subzi Mandi and of their contents. On thus being ousted from the property, he took the course of paying under protest the sum claimed. Having thus freed his property from the attachment, he at once brought a suit claiming a return of the money so paid and damages for the alleged illegal acts of the defendant. The said case was one which fell under S. 72 of the Indian Contract Act which dealt with the liability of a person to whom money was paid by mistake or under coercion. It may be mentioned here that the word 'coercion' used in S. 72 of the Indian Contract Act has not the same restricted meaning it has in S. 15 of the Act. That is clear from a reading of S. 14 of the Act which lays down that consent is said to be free when it is not caused by coercion as defined in S. 15 of the Act. That is clear from a reading of S. 14 of the Act which lays down that consent is said to be free when it is not caused by coercion as defined in S. 15 of the Act. It may, therefore, be taken that the definition of the said expression which appears in S. 15 of the Act is conned for the purpose of examining whether an agreement has been entered into with free consent as denned in S. 14 of the Act. It is, therefore clear that the above decision of the Privy Council is of no assistance to the defendants. The decision in Bansraj Das v. Secretary of State, AIR. 1939 All. 373. is also distinguishable from the present case on the same grounds. That was a case where a suit was filed for recovery of a certain amount realised by way of fine by the Government by proceeding against property jointly belonging both to a father and his son when only the son was liable for the said fine. The father who paid the amount of fine in order to save the joint family property from sale, was held to be entitled to recover the amount under S. 72 of the Indian Contract Act. Hence it does not bear on the point. Reliance was placed by Mr. Karanth on certain decisions of the english Court dealing with 'cases in which it had been held that certain agreements were" void on account of duress. It maty not be safe always to rely on the English decisions to decide the question whether an agreement is vitiated on account of coercion under the Indian contract -Act which has been defined under S. 15 of the Act. It is well known that there are"some essential points of difference between the the Indian law and the English law on the above question. We do not, therefore, propose to deal with the cases of the English Courts. We also find that in the said decisions facts found are not the same as the facts which we have before us in this case. 26. The next question is whether the settlement relied on by the plaintiff is vitiated on account of undue influence'. In Subhas" Chandra pas Mushib v. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib, AIR. 1967 SC. We also find that in the said decisions facts found are not the same as the facts which we have before us in this case. 26. The next question is whether the settlement relied on by the plaintiff is vitiated on account of undue influence'. In Subhas" Chandra pas Mushib v. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib, AIR. 1967 SC. 878 the Supreme Court" has explained the considerations which should weigh with the Court in finding out whether an agreement is vitiated on account of undue influence within the meaning of S. 16 of the Indian Contract Act, as follows: ' Under S. 16 (l) of the Indian Contract Act a contract is said to be induced by undue influence where the relations subsisting between the parties are such that one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other. This shows that the Court trying a case of undue influence must consider two things to start with namely (1) are the relations between the donor and the donee such that the donee is in" a position to dominate the will of the donor and (2) has the donee used that position "to obtain an unfair Advantage over the donor ? " the expressions donor and donee are used in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court because they were dealing with a case of gift. It may however be taken that what the Supreme Court has stated in the above case applies to all cases of agreements. The defendants have not made out in this case that the plaintiff was in a position to dominate the will of the defendants. Except that he had filed a suit for dissolution of the partnership firm and recovery of his share in the assets of the partnership firm and that he had got a receiver appointed, he had done nothing else. There is no noubt, some evidence in this case which proves that the plaintiff stated that he would withdraw the suit if the defendants paid him rs. 60,000. Beyond this it is not shown that the plaintiff did any other thing. It cannot be said always that a creditor or a plaintiff is in a posi tion to dominate the will of a debtor or a defendant. 60,000. Beyond this it is not shown that the plaintiff did any other thing. It cannot be said always that a creditor or a plaintiff is in a posi tion to dominate the will of a debtor or a defendant. It was open to the defendants in this case to have sought independent advice. The defendants were business men carrying on business for nearly 25 years in Bangalore. The talks regarding settlement took place between 6-00 p. m. and 1-00 a. m. as stated by the defendants themselves, and in those circumstances, it is very difficult to held that the plaintiff was able to dominate over the will of the defendants and he made use of that position to obtain as unfair advantage over the defendants. ( 27 ) SRI Karanth further relied upon a decision of the Privy Council in Maneshah Baksh Singh v. Shadi, Lal, ILR. 31 All. 386 PC. to show that there was undue intluence practised by toe plaintiff in this case. We find that the facts obtained in the above decision of the Privy Council are distinguishable from the facts of the present case in the case before the Privy Council the facts were that the defendant, a disqualified proprietor under the oudh Land Revenue Act, 1896, had executed a bond dated 27-1-1876 whereby he agreed to pay within two years to the plaintiff a sum of rs. y,950 and compound interest at the rate or 18 per cent per annum with yearly rests. It was found that there was practically no consideration paid at the time of the execution of the bond whicn was given in renewal of a previous one dated 18-9-1889 the consideration for which was an advance of Rs. 4,000. it was also established in that case that the defendant was a person of extravagant habts and when lis estate was placed under the Court of Wards, at his own instance, in August 1886 his debts were said to have amounted to seven or eight lakhs of rupees. 4,000. it was also established in that case that the defendant was a person of extravagant habts and when lis estate was placed under the Court of Wards, at his own instance, in August 1886 his debts were said to have amounted to seven or eight lakhs of rupees. The bond in suit had been given without the knowledge or consent of the Court after his estate had been taken over it was under those circumstances the Privy Council held mat there was undue innluence because they were satisfied that the borrower had been placed in such a condition or helplessness that the lender was abie to dominate his will and that he used that position to obtain an advantage over the debtor. As already stated we are of opinion that in the present case the defendants have not made out the ingredients which have to be established to hold that the settlement is vitiated on the ground of undue influence. ( 28 ) THE contention ox the defendants the settlement was vitiated on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation, has no basis. It is not established that the plaintiff entered into tne settlement with intent to deceive tne defendants. the plaintiff and tne derendants knew their respective rights and obligations. the deiendants had the custody of the account books. No sort of misrepresentation was made by the plaintiff which induced the defendants to enter into the settlement. In iact there can be no misrepresentation about a fact winch is very well within the knowledge of the parties. A contract cannot be avoided on the ground of misrepresentation if the party whose consent was so caused had the means of knowing the truth (vide exception to 6. 19 of the Contract Act ). The Counsel for the defendants did not cite any authority to show that in the circumstances of the present case, it was possible for the Court to hold that the case of fraud and misrepresentation had been made out. ( 29 ) SUCH being the case, we know of no consideration consistent with justice or with common sense which induces us to hold that the agree ment entered into between the parties was vitiated under any one of the circumstances pleaded by the defendants. ( 29 ) SUCH being the case, we know of no consideration consistent with justice or with common sense which induces us to hold that the agree ment entered into between the parties was vitiated under any one of the circumstances pleaded by the defendants. For the reasons stated above we digree with the findings of the learned Civil Judge; set aside the judgirents and decrees in all the four suits, and allow these appeals. ( 30 ) BEFORE concluding it is necessary to refer to one aspect of the case. We have stated how the plaintiff was brought up by the defendants how they were responsible for setting him up in life on sound basis whatever may be the reason, he parted company with the defendants and joined his brothcr-in-lay as a partner in a rival business His own Incometax assessment Order in respect of his income in the other business for the year 1959-60 was in the order of Rs. 16,000 On the facts of this case, the defendants could have made a counter-claim in restart of the profits made in the rival busmen under S. 16 (2) of the Partnership Act. Whatever may be the reason, now it is too late for them to make a counterclaim in the profits so earned by the plaintiff After the cheque for rs 10,000 was dishonoured, the plaintiff filed the first suit, O. S. 90 of 1960 which was after transfer, numbered as O S 29/ 64 for recovery of that amount and interpst accured till then and obtained an order of attachment before judgment without notice to the defendants the ground that the defendants were about to remove the poods in their shop to Salem andi that if they did so he was not likely to realise the amount from them. Immediately after the notice went to the defendent", they deposited the entire claim in the suit with costs and avoided attachment Within a few davs, he filed another suit in which he again took out an attachment before judement in which the defendants furnished security and avoided attachments. Taking into consideration the status and financial position of the defendants which was known to the plaintiff, it was wrong on his part to have taken such a drastic step He did so probably with a view to humiliate them, otherwise there was no apparent reason to do so. Taking into consideration the status and financial position of the defendants which was known to the plaintiff, it was wrong on his part to have taken such a drastic step He did so probably with a view to humiliate them, otherwise there was no apparent reason to do so. In view of what has been stated above, we think that it is just and equitable to hold that the plaintiff shall not get interest in the principal sum claimed by him in O. S 295 of 1964 from date of suit ( 31 ) FOR the reasons stated above, there shall be a decree in O. S. 295 of 1964 against the defendants for Rs. 10,025 As stated above, the plaintiff will not get current interest on the principal amount. He will get costs in the lower Court, but in this Court, each party to bear his own costs He is at liberty to withdraw the sum in deposit in court. The defendants have no objection to do so. In O. S. 297/64 there shall be a decree against the defendants for a sum of Rs. 20,000 with current interest at 3 per cent per annum from date of suit till today and hereafter at 6 per cent per annum till payment. The plaintiff will get his costs in the trial Court, but in this Court, the parties will bear their own costs. In O. S. 268/64 there shall be a decree against the defendants for a sum of Rs. 23,550 with interest on Rs. 20,000 from the date of suit till today at 3 per cent per annum and hereafter at 6 per cent per annum till payment. The plaintiff will get costs in the lower Court, but in this court each party to bear his own costs ( 32 ) IN view of the above decision, O S 296]64 does not survive and accordingly it is dismissed and each party to bear costs throughout ( 33 ) AT the close of the argument Sri K. R. Karanth appearing for the defendants prayed that three months time may be granted to the defendants to pay the decree amount in each of the above cases. Sri ramachandra Rao appearing for the plaintiff said that the question be decided by the Court in exercise of its discretion. Sri ramachandra Rao appearing for the plaintiff said that the question be decided by the Court in exercise of its discretion. We feel that in the circumstances, it is reasonable to grant three months time to pay the decree amounts. It is ordered accordingly. ( 34 ) IT is brought to our notice that an application under S. 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure by defendants in OS. 295/64 is pending in the lower Court. Both parties state that that application may be dismissed. The lower Court is directed to dismiss the same. --- *** --- .