Judgment :- 1. The only question that is urged before me in this Second Appeal is the claim of defendants to Kudikidappu right in the building in plaint schedule item 1. The building is scheduled as plaint item 2. This question arises in a suit for redemption of Ext. P-1 mortgage. Plaint item 2 building was in existence even on the date of the mortgage, Ext. P-1, of 1123 and even prior to the mortgage the defendants were residing in that building That is mentioned in Ext. P-1 mortgage. What is now claimed is that prior to the mortgage they were living in the property as Kudikidappukars and on redemption their Kudikidappu right will revive and if so the decree for redemption must be passed subject to that right. 2. The only contention urged before the courts below in answer to the claim of the defendants was that the building in the suit property was constructed at a cost of more than Rs. 400/- and therefore it would not be a but within the meaning of Explanation II to S.2 (25) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act 1 of 1964. The commissioner valued the building at Rs. 515. 35, According to the defendants this value was excessive and it ought to have been found to be less than Rs. 400/ . By the time the matter came up for hearing before this Court, Explanation II stood amended. By reason of such amendment a dwelling house would be a but if the cost of construction did not exceed Rs. 750/- though prior to the amendment it would be a but only if the cost of construction did not exceed Rs. 400/-. Therefore on the finding of the court below defendants may be entitled to succeed as the building would come with the definition of but and if so defendants would be Kudikidappukars whose right would revive on redemption. In view of this, certain other answers are urged to the claim of the defendants by the learned counsel for the respondent here. It is these that I am concerned with. 3. According to the learned counsel for the respondent Explanation III to S.2 (25) will not be applicable to a case where the mortgage is not only of the land but also of the land and the building in which the mortgagee was residing prior to the mortgage as kudikidappu. It is these that I am concerned with. 3. According to the learned counsel for the respondent Explanation III to S.2 (25) will not be applicable to a case where the mortgage is not only of the land but also of the land and the building in which the mortgagee was residing prior to the mortgage as kudikidappu. Another contention raised is that the term Kudikidappu in Explanation III has to be understood in the light of the definition in Act 1 of 1964 as originally enacted and not in the light of the definition as subsequently amended. To appreciate this contention it would be better if I extract the relevant definition here S.2 (25) defines the Kudikidappukaran (leaving out Explanations I, IV, V and VI which may not be necessary for the purpose of this case): "(25) "Kudikidappukaran" means a person who has neither homestead nor any land exceeding in extent three cents in any city or major municipality or five cents in any Panchayat area or township, in possession either as owner or as tenant, on which he could erect a homestead and (a) who has been permitted with or without an obligation to pay rent by a person in lawful possession of any land to have the use and occupation of a portion of such land for the purpose of erecting a homestead; or (b) who has been permitted by a person in lawful possession of any land to occupy, with or without an obligation to pay rent, a but belonging to such person and situate in the said land; and "kudikidappu" means the land and the homestead or the but so permitted to be erected or occupied together with the easement attached thereto: Provided that a Person who, on the 16th August, 1968, was in occupation of any land and the homestead thereon, or in occupation of a but belonging to any other person, and who continued to be in such occupation at the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, shall be deemed to be in occupation of such land and homestead or hut, as the case may be, with permission as required under this clause Explanation II. For the purpose of this clause, (a) "hut" means any dwelling house constructed by a person other than the person permitted to occupy it (i) at a cost, at the time of construction, not exceeding seven hundred and fifty rupees; or (ii) which could have at the time of construction yielded a monthly rent not exceeding five rupees, and includes any such dwelling houses re-constructed by the kudikidappukaran in accordance with the provisions of S.79; and (b) "homestead" means, unless the context otherwise requires, any dwelling house erected by the person permitted to have the use and occupation of any land for the purpose of such erection, and includes any such dwelling house reconstructed by the kudikidappukaran in accordance with the provisions of S.79." Explanation III. Where any kudikidappukaran secures any mortgage with possession of the land in which the kudikidappu is situate, his kudikidappu right shall revive on the redemption of the mortgage, provided that he has at the time of redemption no other homestead or any land exceeding three cents in any city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in any Panchayat area or township, in possession either as owner or as a tenant, on which he could erect a homestead." It is mainly on the language of Explanation III that the learned counsel for the respondent relies to meet the case of the appellant. According to him it is only where a kudikidappukaran secures any mortgage with possession of the 'land' in which the kudikidappu is situate that the Explanation will have application. If the mortgage be of the property with the building thereon which comes within the definition of but in Explanation II it will not attract Explanation III as in that case it would be a mortgage not only with possession of 'land' but also with possession of the building thereon. If this contention, is accepted it would follow that there will be no revival of kudikidappu right contemplated under Explanation III if the mortgage is of land including the building in respect of which kudikidappu right is claimed. There will be revival of kudikidappu right only when the mortgage excludes the kudikidappu. Certainly this cannot be the case. If the mortgage does not take in the building claimed as kudikidappu no question of revival of kudikidappu right would arise at all. There will be revival of kudikidappu right only when the mortgage excludes the kudikidappu. Certainly this cannot be the case. If the mortgage does not take in the building claimed as kudikidappu no question of revival of kudikidappu right would arise at all. For revival of kudikidappu right there must have been an earlier extinguishment of such right. Such extinguishment would be by merger of kudikidappu right in the mortgage. Explanation III provides that, in spite of such merger, on redemption the kudikidappu right shall revive. Revival necessarily contemplates an earlier cessation of operation off a right or of a legal relationship. Therefore the provision for revival of the kudikidappu right would be meaningless and otiose if the construction sought to be put on it by the learned counsel for the respondent is accepted. 4. I am also, unable to agree with the learned counsel that the term "land" means the soil and not anything above it. In a technical or legal sense "land" will include all that is above or beneath it. "Technically land signifies everything which may be holden; and the term is defined as comprehending all things of a permanent and substantial nature, and even of an unsubstantial, provided they be permanent." Reynard v. City of Caldwell (55 Idaho 342 42 P. 2d 292, 296). In Black's Law Dictionary in considering the meaning of the term "land" it is said: "Land" includes not only the soil or earth, but also things of a permanent nature affixed thereto or found therein, whether by nature, as water, trees, grass, herbage, other natural or perennial products, growing crops or trees, mineral under the surface, or by the hand of man, as buildings, fixtures, fences, bridges, as well as works constructed for use; of water, such as dikes, canals, etc. Reynard v. City of Caldwell, 55 Idaho 342,42 P. 2d 292; 296; City of Newport News v. Warwick county, 159 va. 571,166 S. E. 570, 580; Morris Plan Bank of Fort North v. Ogden, Tex. Civ. App., 144 S. W. 2d 998,1002; 2B1. Comm. 16,17, Sox v. Miracle, 38 N. D. 458,160 N. W. 716, 719; Wynn v. Margate City, 9 M. J. Misc. 1'324,157A. 565, 566. It embraces not only the surface of the earth, but everything under or over it. Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont. 372.207 P. 993, 997, 24 A. L. R.294; Carnsey Coal Co. Comm. 16,17, Sox v. Miracle, 38 N. D. 458,160 N. W. 716, 719; Wynn v. Margate City, 9 M. J. Misc. 1'324,157A. 565, 566. It embraces not only the surface of the earth, but everything under or over it. Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont. 372.207 P. 993, 997, 24 A. L. R.294; Carnsey Coal Co. v. Mudd, C. C. A. Ala. 28 I P. 183, J84; Jones v. Vermont Asbestos Corporation, 108 Vt. 79,182A, 291, 303; Holloway's Unknown Heirs v, Whatley Tex. Civ. App. 104 S. W. 2d 646, 648. It has in its legal signification an indefinite extent upward and downward. Reynard v. City of Caldwell, 55 Idaho 342, 42P. 2d 292., 296; Bituminous Casualty Corporation v. Walsh & Wells. No. App. 170S. W. 2nd 117,121. It may include a franchise connected with land. Delanoy v. Lowery, 25 Cal. 2d 561,154 P. 2d 674, 679. Land is or includes the solid material of the earth, whatever may be the ingredients of which it is composed, whether soil, rock, or other substance. Civ. Code Cal. 650; Reynard v. City of Caldwell, 55 Idaho 342, 42 P. 2d 292, 296. Philosophically. it seems more correct to say that the woad "land" means, in law, as in the vernacular, the soil or portion of the earth's crust; and to explain or justify the such expressions as that "whoever owns the land owns the buildings above and the minerals below", upon the view, not that these are within the extension of the term "land", but that they are so connected with it that by rules of law they pass by a conveyance of the land. This view makes "land;" though it would allow an instrument speaking of land to operate coextensively with one granting really or real property by either of those terms. But many of the authorities use the expression "land" as including these incidents to the soil. Abbott." It is seen that in many enactments in England the term "'land" was defined as including building. No doubt, this is by statutory definition. But this would indicate that the concept of land as inclusive of building is nothing new. But many of the authorities use the expression "land" as including these incidents to the soil. Abbott." It is seen that in many enactments in England the term "'land" was defined as including building. No doubt, this is by statutory definition. But this would indicate that the concept of land as inclusive of building is nothing new. I need refer only to such definition of 'Land' in the Interpretation Act 1850, Interpretation Act 1889, Conveyance and Law of Property Act 1891, Conveyancing (Scotland) Act 1874, Housing of the Working Classes' Act 1890, Landlord and Tenant (requisition of land) Act 1944 etc. Such definition is seen in Indian statutes too. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act) defines 'land' to include "benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth." Similar definition is found in the Kerala Land Acquisition Act also. 5. It is therefore not difficult to read the term 'land' in Explanation III as not referring to the surface or soil alone but also the buildings, if any, standing thereon. 6. The above construction has also the advantage that it furthers the purpose and the object of the enactment. Certainly the legislature, in enacting a statute of the nature with which I am dealing, could not have contemplated non-revival of Kudikidappu right to a Kudikidappukaran who takes a mortgage of the property in which the kudikidappu is situate along with the kudikidappu while conceding such a right to a kudikidappukaran who takes the mortgage of the land without the building. In fact, as I pointed out earlier, there is no necessity for providing for revival in the case of the latter. 7. In view of what I have stated above, I do not think that there is any merit in the contention that Explanation III will not be applicable by reason that the mortgage is in respect of land and also the building standing thereon. 8. The only other contention is that the term 'kudikidappu' in Explanation III must be read as defined in the Act on the date of its commencement and not in the light of subsequent amendments. 8. The only other contention is that the term 'kudikidappu' in Explanation III must be read as defined in the Act on the date of its commencement and not in the light of subsequent amendments. I do not see the justification in applying the definition in an enactment as it stood at the time the Act came into force ignoring the amendments to the enactment which have come into force from time to time. Certainly it is not the case of the respondent-plaintiff that the definition of kudikidappukaran must be applied with reference to the time at which the person concerned became an occupant of the but so as to qualify him to get kudikidappu right. That would mean that the Act confers kudikidappu right only in cases where kudikidappukars occupied dwelling houses after the commencement of the Act. That certainly is not the case of the respondent and that cannot be the case. It is the Act as it stands when its provisions are sought to be invoked by a Kudikidappukaran that must apply. No doubt, I can see the difficulty in the way of the plaintiff if the definition as amended applies. But that is inevitable. In the light of what I have stated above, it follows that defendants are kudikidappukars and therefore a decree for redemption can be granted only subject to their rights secured under the provisions of Kerala Act 1 of 1964. They will be entitled to all the rights under that Act including the right to fixity in regard to Kudikidappu recognized in S.75 of the Act. The decree for redemption granted by the court below will be modified to the extent indicated above and the Second Appeal is allowed to that extent. But in the circumstances of the case, I direct both parties to suffer costs. Partly allowed.