D. A. DESAI, J. B. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) IN this group of 13 petitions the petitioners have challenged the constitutional validity of secs. 73a and 79a of the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 The petitioners are persons who have either by purchase or by conditional sale or by a transaction peculiar in the tract in which these transactions have taken place described as Valatdan have got certain lands transferred to them and the transferor in each case except in one petition to be presently referred to was a member belonging to scheduled tribe and the lands in dispute being situate in the area originally forming part of Gadhboria State and merged in Nasvadi taluka of Baroda District. The Government of Gujarat by its Notification No. LND 3916-41509-G dated 4th April 1961 issued in exercise of the powers conferred upon it under sec. 73a of the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 declared that the provisions of the said sec. 73a shall be applicable to all those villages in the scheduled areas of the State of Gujarat in which survey settlement under the Bombay Land Revenue Code has not been introduced and to which the provisions of the said sec. 73a have not been made applicable. The Government also by the said notification exempted from the operation of the said sec. 73a all persons not being members of scheduled tribes holding lands in the villages to which the said sec. 73a is declared to be applicable by the said notification. The cumulative effect of the notification would be that the occupancy of land held by the members belonging to scheduled tribes and situate within the area to which the notification was applied could not be transferred without the previous sanction of the Collector as provided for in sec. 73a of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. Between the years 1963 and 1968 the petitioners got transferred to themselves by the aforesaid three modes of transfer different pieces and parcels of land situated in that area and in which the transferors were the members of scheduled tribe. Somewhere in the year 1969-70 the authorities of the Revenue Department took notice of these unlawful transfers and proceeded to serve notices upon the transferees calling upon them to show cause why the transfers which were in contravention of sec. 73a should not be declared null and void and consequential orders be made. Somewhere in the year 1969-70 the authorities of the Revenue Department took notice of these unlawful transfers and proceeded to serve notices upon the transferees calling upon them to show cause why the transfers which were in contravention of sec. 73a should not be declared null and void and consequential orders be made. The petitioners who are transferees of occupancy of land have challenged the notice issued by the Assistant Collector and in some other cases the final order made by the Assistant Collector declaring the transfer of occupancy in favour of the petitioners null and void and restoring the land to the original transferors. ( 2 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 1367 of 1970 there are in all 49 petitioners who are transferors of occupancy of land and the land in the case of each petitioner is situated in Sagbara taluka of Broach District. Sagbara Taluka is in the scheduled area to which notification under sec. 73a has been made applicable and the transfer in each case would therefore be null and void as it was made without obtaining prior sanction of the Collector. The petitioners apprehended that the authorities under the Bombay Land Revenue Code were about to take action declaring the transfer of occupancy null and void in each case and therefore they have approached this Court with a prayer for declaring sec. 73a ultra vires Articles 14 19 and 245 of the Constitution of India. ( 3 ) IN the petitions the validity of impugned notices and orders were challenged on diverse grounds but at the hearing of the petitions Mr. S. B. Majmudar learned advocate who appeared in 11 petitions out of this group of 13 petitions and Mr. C. K. Patel learned advocate who appeared in Special Civil Application No. 790 of 1970 formulated the following propositions for our consideration:- (1) Sec. 73a of the Bombay Land Revenue Code is ultra vires Article 14 as it suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of essential legislative functions by the Legislature to the executive without providing any guidelines for the exercise of power. (2) Sec. 73a is ultra vires Art. 19 (1) (f) as it imposes restrictions upon the fundamental right to acquire hold and dispose of property and cannot be sustained as reasonable. (2) Sec. 73a is ultra vires Art. 19 (1) (f) as it imposes restrictions upon the fundamental right to acquire hold and dispose of property and cannot be sustained as reasonable. (3) Sec. 79a is violative of equal protection clause contained in Art. 14 as it discriminates amongst those who are in unauthorised occupation or wrongful possession of land inter se in that it leaves it open to the Collector at his own sweet will to adopt either the ordinary remedy of Civil Court or the drastic summary remedy under the section and there being no guiding policy or principle it permits him to pick and choose amongst transferees of occupancies in contravention of sec. 73a for the application of more drastic procedure under the said sec. 79a. (4) The Collector is stopped from initiating proceedings for summary eviction on account of unreasonable delay and because of their inaction the petitioners have altered their position to their disadvantage. (5) The inquiry in which the impugned order is made is not held according to statutory procedure prescribed in secs. 192 to 197 and consequently the order is invalid. ( 4 ) ONE or two separate contentions peculiar to the facts of a particular petition have been taken which would be considered after considering the aforementioned grounds. ( 5 ) AT the hearing of the petitions Mr. G. N. Desai learned Government Pleader who appeared for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petitions. Mr. Desai contended that the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 (hereinafter referred to as the Land Revenue Code) being a law providing for modification of the rights of the occupants in an estate is protected from the challenge under Articles 14 19 and 31. it was specifically contended that the provision contained in sec. 73a is immune from the challenge under Articles 14 19 and 31 in view of the provisions contained in Article 31a of the Constitution as sec. 73a will have the effect of modifying the rights of occupant in occupancy and occupancy of unalienated land being estate within the meaning of Art. 31a (1) (a) and as the enactment a measure relating to agrarian reform. 73a will have the effect of modifying the rights of occupant in occupancy and occupancy of unalienated land being estate within the meaning of Art. 31a (1) (a) and as the enactment a measure relating to agrarian reform. In order to test the validity of this ground it must be shown that the Land Revenue Code is a law relating to concerning or connected with agrarian reform and that it falls within one or other sub-clauses of Art 31a (1 ). Art. 31a (1) (a) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13 no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any right therein or the extinguishments or modification of any such rights shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridge any of the rights conferred by Article 14 Article 19 or Article 31. The first proviso to that Article is important but we will refer to it a little while after. In order to attract application of Art. 31a (1) (a) it must be shown that the Land Revenue Code is a law providing for acquisition of any estate by the State or of any right therein or the extinguishments or modification of any such rights. At any rate Mr. Desai fairly conceded that the Land Revenue Code is not a law providing for acquisition by State of any estate or any fights therein nor is it a measure by which rights in the estate are extinguished. But it was contended that it is a law providing for modification of rights in an estate. The question that is posed for consideration is:- whether the occupancy of an unalienated land comes within the meaning of the word estate as used in Art. 31 (1) (a ). We need not dilate upon that aspect because it is concluded by a judgment of the Supreme Court in Shri Ram Narain v. State of Bombay A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 459. It was specifically contended that expression estate in Art. 31a (1) (a) would not take within its sweep the holdings of the occupants who had merely a right of occupancy in specific piece of unalienated land. After considering the definition of the word estate in sec. It was specifically contended that expression estate in Art. 31a (1) (a) would not take within its sweep the holdings of the occupants who had merely a right of occupancy in specific piece of unalienated land. After considering the definition of the word estate in sec. 3 (5) of the Land Revenue Code meaning any interest in land and the aggregate of such interests vested in a person or aggregate of persons capable of holding the same and after further considering the definition of occupant in sec. 3 (16) occupancy in sec. 3 (17) and to occupy land in sec. 3 (18) and occupation in sec. 3 (19) a firm conclusion is reached that the expression estate in the Land Revenue Code applied not only to such estate holders but also to land holders and occupants of unalienated lands. It is not in dispute that the petitioners transferors were occupants of unalienated lands. It was next contended in that case that the Land Revenue Code is not an existing law relating to land tenures and even if the occupants of unalienated land would fall within the definition of the word estate as used in Art. 31a (1) (a) yet in view of the specific meaning assigned to the word estate in Art. 31a (2) the Land Revenue Code must be an existing law relating to land tenures in force to qualify for the protection of Art. 31a. The meaning assigned to the word estate is to the effect that the expression estate shall in relation to any local area have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area and would also include any Jagir inam or muafi or other similar grant and would also include amongst other things any land held under Ryotwari settlement. It has in terms been held in that case that occupancy of unalienated land is one of the varieties of land tenures and the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 comes within the description of existing laws relating to land tenures in force in the State of Bombay within the meaning of Art. 31a (2) (a) It is thus well-settled that the occupancy of unalienated lands is an estate within the meaning of Art. 31a (1) (a ). ( 6 ) IT was however contended that if by the impugned provision a restriction is imposed on right to transfer occupancy recognised in sec. 73 it is not a measure modifying the rights in the estate and would not fall within the meaning of Art. 31a (1) (a ). Mr. Majmudar for the petitioners urged that a mere restriction on the right to transfer an occupancy which is made heritable and transferable under sec. 73 would not amount to modification of the rights of the occupants in the occupancy. Mr. Majmudar made a two fold submission on this point. It was urged that in order that a modification of the rights in the occupancy in the estate would fall within Art. 31a (1) (a) it must be shown that to the extent the right is modified the modified right vests in the State. Alternatively it was urged that mere restriction imposed on the unfettered transferability of the occupancy without the previous sanction of the Collector does not amount to modification of the right in the estate. Sec. 73 of the Land Revenue Code provides that an occupancy shall subject to the provisions contained in sec. 56 and to any conditions lawfully annexed to the tenure and save as otherwise prescribed by law be deemed an heritable and transferable property. Occupancy of unalienated land is thus property and it is both heritable and transferable. By sec. 73a the State Government by a notification published alter satisfying the conditions therein mentioned would declare the provisions of the section applicable; and once the provisions of sec. 73a are made applicable in any tract or village the occupancy in the tract or village after the date of the notification would not be transferable without the previous sanction of the Collector. Therefore once notification under sec. 73a is published unfettered right to transfer an occupancy of the occupant will be severely restricted and it would be subject to previous sanction of the Collector. If any occupancy in an area to which notification under sec. 73a is applied is transferred without the previous sanction of the Collector such occupancy would not be liable to any process of a Court and the transfer would be null and void. If under sec. If any occupancy in an area to which notification under sec. 73a is applied is transferred without the previous sanction of the Collector such occupancy would not be liable to any process of a Court and the transfer would be null and void. If under sec. 73 the occupant has an unrestricted and unfettered right to transfer his occupancy and a stringent restriction is put on the right of the occupant to transfer the occupancy it would undoubtedly be a measure by which right of the occupant in an occupancy which would include right to transfer an occupancy would be modified. In Shri Ram Narains case (supra) referring to the provision contained in sec. 73a it was observed that the provision contained in sec. 73a relating to the powers of the State Government to restrict the right of transfer and the provisions in regard to relinquishments contained in secs. 74 75 and 76 also point to the same conclusion viz. that the occupant holds the land under a tenure and occupancy is a species of land tenures. If the tenure permitted unrestricted right of transfer of occupancy any measure by which a restriction is imposed on its unfettered transferability would unquestionably modify the rights of the occupant in the occupancy. On a parity of reasoning we may point out that while considering the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act by which on the tillers day the tenant in possession subject to some of the conditions therein mentioned became the owner of the land it was contended that such a provision could not be said to modify the rights in the estate. It was observed that the title to the land which was vested originally in the landlord passes to the tenant on the tillers day or the alternative period prescribed in that behalf and this title is defensible only in the event of the tenant failing to appear or making a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land or committing default in payment of the price thereof as determined by the Tribunal. It cannot be said that the title of the landlord to the land is suspended for any period definite or indefinite. It cannot be said that the title of the landlord to the land is suspended for any period definite or indefinite. It was further observed that such a provision has the effect of modifying landlords right in the estate well within the meaning of those words as used in Art. 31a (1) (a ). Same would be the position where by a provision a restriction is imposed on the right of the occupant to transfer his occupancy without the sanction of the Collector. It cannot be gainsaid that occupancy is a concept and the property in the Occupancy consists in its being heritable and transferable. If a title to property is evidenced by right to transfer property the measure by which that right is restricted would unquestionably indicate that the right in the properly is modified. The restriction in a given case has a tendency to indicate modification of the rights. Therefore we are of the opinion that sec. 73a by which on the issue of a notification thereunder occupancy in the area to which notification applies could not be transferred without the previous sanction of the Collector is a measure by which rights in the estate are modified well within the meaning of Art. 31a (1) (a ). ( 7 ) MR. Majmudar however argued that the measure by which the rights in the estate are modified would not attract the protection of Art. 31a. It was urged that the modification of rights in the estate should only be in the process of acquisition by the State of any estate or any rights thereunder. It was more specifically contended that unless the modified rights vest in the State Art. 31a will not be attracted at all. It was contended that any law relating to acquisition of property must satisfy the requirements of Art 31 and in order to be immune from the challenge of Art. 31 requirements of Art. 31a ought to be satisfied. The submission is that Art. 31 in terms refer to acquisition or requisition of properties and any law which is primarily for acquisition or requisition of property can be immune from the challenge if and only if the conditions for attracting Art. 31 are satisfied It was further urged that before Art. 31a is invoked the law must be for acquisition of estate by the State or any rights therein. It was therefore urged that unless law is primarily a law for acquisition of an estate or any rights therein or the extinguishments or modification of any such rights in the process of acquisition Art. 31a would not be attracted. Even this contention was specifically raised in the aforementioned case and has in terms been negatived. Negativing the contention it was observed that Art. 31a (1) (a) talks of two distinct objects of legislation; one being the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein and the other being the extinguishments or modification of any such rights. If the State acquires an estate or any rights therein that acquisition would have to be a compulsory acquisition within the meaning of Art. 31 (2a) which was also introduced in the Constitution by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act 1965 simultaneously with Art. 31a (1) thereof. There was no provision made for the transfer of the ownership of any property to the State or a Corporation owned or controlled by the State with the result that even though the provisions of the impugned Act (Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act) deprived the landholders of their property they did not amount to a compulsory acquisition of the property by the State. If this part of Art. 31a (1) (a) is thus eliminated what we are left with is whether these provisions of the impugned Act provide for an extinguishments or modification of any rights in the estate. That is a distinct concept altogether and could not be in the process of acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein. Thus acquisition of estate by the State or modification of the rights in the estate are two independent concepts and when one of them is satisfied the measure would qualify for the protection of Art. 31a if other conditions of the said Article are simultaneously satisfied. Therefore if by sec. 73a the rights of the occupants in the occupancy of unalienated land which is an estate within the meaning of Art. 31a (1) (a) are modified obviously Art. 31a (1) (a) would be attracted. Therefore if by sec. 73a the rights of the occupants in the occupancy of unalienated land which is an estate within the meaning of Art. 31a (1) (a) are modified obviously Art. 31a (1) (a) would be attracted. ( 8 ) THE question then is:- whether once it is shown that occupancy of unalienated land is an estate and restriction on transfer of occupancy amounts to modification of the rights in the estate the measure by which it is brought about would qualify for the protection of Art. 31a. If these were the only conditions for attracting Art. 31a there is no gainsaying the fact that these conditions are satisfied. But Mr. Majmudar urged that even if the law by which rights in an estate are modified that in itself would not be sufficient for getting protection of Art. 31a; but it must further be shown that law is a law for agrarian reform. It is by now well settled that in order to qualify for the protection of Art. 31a the law in question must be a measure for agrarian reform. The word estate is so widely defined that it would engulf within its ambit any land not specifically used for the purpose of agriculture or for the purpose ancillary thereto. Undoubtedly if the word estate is literally interpreted it would include even the land which may not be used for the purpose of agriculture or for the purpose ancillary thereto. Art. 31a (1) (a) was introduced by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act 1965 It was specifically brought in to save certain measures of agrarian reform from the challenge of Articles 14 19 and 31. Therefore when validity of certain statutes were examined to find out whether they have qualified for the protection of Art. 31a historical background in which Art. 31a was enacted was kept in view. The amendment was introduced for enabling the State to carry forward its policy of agrarian reform. Therefore when validity of certain statutes were examined to find out whether they have qualified for the protection of Art. 31a historical background in which Art. 31a was enacted was kept in view. The amendment was introduced for enabling the State to carry forward its policy of agrarian reform. If any law would be a law for acquisition of an estate by the State or for extinguishments or modification of any rights therein yet if it is not a law for agrarian reform such a measure would over-reach the object for which Art. 31a was enacted and therefore by judicial interpretation of Art. 31a a further condition is read into the Article that not only the law must be for acquisition of estate by the State or extinguishments or modification of rights therein but it must also be a measure of agrarian reform. In this connection we would refer to k. K. Kochuni v. State of Madras and Kerala A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 1080. After examining the historical background in which Art. 31a came to be introduced in the Constitution the Supreme Court has observed as under:-IT is therefore manifest that the said Article deals with a tenure called estate and provides for its acquisition or the extinguishments or modification of the rights of the land holders in respect of their rights in relation to the estate. The contrary view would enable the State to divest a proprietor of his estate and vest it in another without reference to any agrarian reform. It would also enable the State to compel a proprietor to divide his properties though self acquired between himself and other members of his family or create interest therein in favour of persons other than tenants who had none before. IN Ranjitsingh v. State of Punjab A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 632 the validity of East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act 1948 was upheld on the ground that not only it is a measure modifying the rights in the estate but also it is a measure for agrarian reform. IN Ranjitsingh v. State of Punjab A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 632 the validity of East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act 1948 was upheld on the ground that not only it is a measure modifying the rights in the estate but also it is a measure for agrarian reform. Referring to Kochunis case (supra) it was observed that that was a special case and the same cannot be applied to cases where the general scheme of legislation is definitely agrarian reform and under its provisions something ancillary thereto in the interests of rural economy has to be undertaken to give full effect to the reforms. The provisions of the Act were considered and it was found that the general scheme of the Act was planning of rural areas and the productive utilisation of vacant and waste lands. It was observed that scheme of rural development today envisages not only equitable distribution of Sand so that there is no undue imbalance in society resulting in a landless class on the one hand and a concentration of land in the hands of a few on the other but envisages also the raising of economic standards and bettering rural health and social conditions. It was further observed that if agrarian reforms are to succeed mere distribution of land to the landless is not enough. There must be a proper planning of rural economy and conditions and a body like the Village Panchayat is best designed to promote rural welfare. In other words it was again affirmed that in order to attract the application of Art. 31a over and above the other things the law must be a measure carrying forward the policy of agrarian reform. In Vajravelu v. Special Deputy Collector A. I. R. 1965 S C. 1017 it was further affirmed that Art. 31a (1) (a) should be confined to agrarian reform and not for acquiring property for the purpose of giving it to another which view was first propounded in Kochunis case and reaffirmed in Ranjitsinghs case (supra ). In Vajravelu v. Special Deputy Collector A. I. R. 1965 S C. 1017 it was further affirmed that Art. 31a (1) (a) should be confined to agrarian reform and not for acquiring property for the purpose of giving it to another which view was first propounded in Kochunis case and reaffirmed in Ranjitsinghs case (supra ). Having observed that in order to qualify for the protection under Art. 31a apart from other things law in question should be a law for agrarian reform the Court in that case held that the Land Acquisition (Madras Amendment) Act was void as it was not protected by Art. 31a being not a measure of agrarian reform and was violative of Art. 31. In reaching this conclusion the important fact which weighed with the Court was that under the Amending Act lands can be acquired for housing schemes whether the object is to clear slums or to improve housing facilities in the City for rich or poor. It was observed that however laudable an object underlying the Amending Act may be it was so framed that under the provisions thereof any land big or small waste or fertile owned by rich or poor can be acquired on the ground that it is required for a housing scheme. The housing scheme need not be confined to slum clearance; the wide phraseology used in the Amending Act permits acquisition of land for housing the prosperous section of the community. The important aspect worthy of our notice for the present discussion is that the impugned Act was not considered a measure for agrarian reform looking to the wide phraseology in which it was couched. In this connection we would refer to the Deputy Commissioner and Collector Kamrup v. Durganath Sharma A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 394. In that case constitutional validity of Assam Acquisition of Land for Flood Control and Prevention of Erosion Act 1955 was impugned. It was contended before the Supreme Court that the Act in question is a law providing for the acquisition of estates and is protected by Art. 31a (1) (a ). Negativing this contention it was observed that it is now well settled that Art. 31a (1) (a) envisages only laws concerning agrarian reform. In reaching this conclusion reference was made to Kochunis case Ranjitsinghs case and Vajravelus case. Negativing this contention it was observed that it is now well settled that Art. 31a (1) (a) envisages only laws concerning agrarian reform. In reaching this conclusion reference was made to Kochunis case Ranjitsinghs case and Vajravelus case. After referring to these cases a firm conclusion was reached that Art. 31a (1) (a) envisages only laws concerning agrarian reforms. As the impugned Act in that case was not a law concerning agrarian reforms it was not treated as qualified for the protection under Art. 31a. Therefore it is well settled that a law to be immune from the challenge of Arts. 14 19 and 31 must not only be a law providing for acquisition of an estate or any right therein or extinguishments or modification of the rights therein but it must necessarily be measure of agrarian reform. ( 9 ) IT was very vehemently contended on behalf of the petitioners that Land Revenue Code is not a law connected with concerning or relating to agrarian reform and therefore it would not be immune from the challenge of Arts. 14 19 and 31 and would not be qualified for the protection of Art. 31a. This contention was sought to be repelled by Mr. Desai by putting forth two fold submission. It was urged that the question whether the Land Revenue Code is a law falling within the scope Art. 31a is no more res integra and it is concluded by the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court in Shri Ram Ramnarains case. Mr. Desai urged that notwithstanding the fact that this Court may reach a conclusion that the Land Revenue Code is not a law for agrarian reform yet the question whether it is qualified for the protection under Art. 31a is not open to examination by this Court because that contention has been in terms considered and disposed of in favour of the State by the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court. As a second limb of the argument it was urged that while examining whether Land Revenue Code is a measure of agrarian reform the Court should confine itself to the Amending Act only by which sec. 73a and connected sections were introduced in the Bombay Land Revenue Code. We will separately examine both the submissions. ( 10 ) MR. As a second limb of the argument it was urged that while examining whether Land Revenue Code is a measure of agrarian reform the Court should confine itself to the Amending Act only by which sec. 73a and connected sections were introduced in the Bombay Land Revenue Code. We will separately examine both the submissions. ( 10 ) MR. Desai contended that the question whether the Land Revenue Code is a law relating to modification of the rights in an estate was specifically considered and it was held that it is a law by which rights in an estate are modified and therefore it falls squarely within four corners of Art. 31a (1) (a) and this Court cannot re examine that aspect. In Shri Ram Ramnarains Case (supra) validity of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act (13 of 1956) was challenged. The State contended before the Supreme Court that the impugned Act is a law providing for modification of the rights in an estate and is immune from the challenge under Arts. 14 19 and 31 and is qualified for protection of Art. 31a. The question whether the Land Revenue Code including the provision contained in sec. 73a is a law for modification of the rights in an estate was not specifically considered. But in order to find out whether the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act 1956 was qualified for the protection under Art. 31 Their Lordships examined the definition of the word estate as given in sec. 3 (5) of the Land Revenue Code and the provision contained in the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act 1956 to the effect that the words not defined in that Act and defined in the Land Revenue Code will have the same meaning as given in the Land Revenue Code. By this process having incorporated the definition of the word estate as given in the Land Revenue Code in the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1956 Their Lordships proceeded to find out whether the occupancy of an unalienated land was an estate within the meaning of Art. 31a (1) (a) and whether the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 was an existing law relating to land tenures in force in the State of Bombay within the meaning of Art. 31a (2) (a ). Having held in the affirmative on these two points further question whether the Bombay Land Revenue Code is qualified for the protection of Art. 31a was not considered by Their Lordships nor-was it required to be considered nor the question arose for Their Lordships consideration in that case. In fact having reached the aforementioned conclusion Their Lordships proceeded to find out whether some of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1956 the validity of which was questioned in that case was a law by which rights in an estate were modified or not and having referred to the provisions contained in secs. 32 to 32r and certain other ancillary provisions of the said Act a conclusion was reached that the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1956 was a law providing for modification of rights in an estate and some of its sections were immune from the challenge under Arts. 14 19 and 31 in view of Art. 31a. At no stage Their Lordships decided whether the Land Revenue Code is an Act which qualified for the protection of Art. 31a. Till the decision in the aforementioned case further condition which is now read in Art. 31a namely that over and above satisfying the requirement of Art. 31a the measure must be a measure for agrarian reform was not read in Art. 31a. Therefore there is no substance in the submission that the point that the Bombay Land Revenue Code is protected under Art. 31a is concluded by the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court. ( 11 ) AS a second limb of the argument it was urged that even if it is open to this Court to examine the question whether the Land Revenue Code is a law for agrarian reform qualified for the protection of Art. 31a the Court must confine itself to the provisions contained in the Amending Act only and need not examine the entire scheme of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. The Bombay Land Revenue Code was enacted in the year 1879 It was amended in the year 1901 by Amending Act VI of 1901. By the Amending Act secs. 73a and 79a were introduced in the Land Revenue Code. There were some incidental amendments in secs. 73 and 68. Mr. Desai urged that the Court must keep in view the fact that the petitioners have challenged the validity of secs. By the Amending Act secs. 73a and 79a were introduced in the Land Revenue Code. There were some incidental amendments in secs. 73 and 68. Mr. Desai urged that the Court must keep in view the fact that the petitioners have challenged the validity of secs. 73a and 79a only. It was therefore urged that the Court while examining the challenge must confine itself to the Amending Act and proceed to find out whether the Amending Act was a measure of agrarian reform. It was urged that if only important changes introduced by the Amending Act are those of secs. 73a and 79a there is no gainsaying the fact that they were measures taken for carrying forward the policy of agrarian reform. Mr. Desai urged that if the known policy of the State is to remove intermediaries between the State and the tillers of the land and if in order to reshape the rural economy so as to be beneficial to the weaker member of the society a law was enacted by which those illiterate and backward people are protected from the tentacles of more crafty and greedy money lenders who by their tantrums deprived those people wholly attached to land from their very source of livelihood by depriving them of the land certainly a measure by which a restriction is placed on the transfer of occupancy without permission of the Collector would undoubtedly be a measure of agrarian reform. The Amending Act was put on the Statute Book in the year 1901. The Bombay Land Revenue Code was enacted in the year 1879. We are merely asked to go back by nearly a century or at any rate six to seven decades to find out that the measure was put on the Statute Book for carrying forward the policy of agrarian reform. It is implicit in the argument that as far back as in 1901 the State imbued with an idea of reconstructing rural economy and to carry out agrarian reform enacted measures so as to achieve that purpose. To accept it without further proof in this behalf would appear to be a historical anachronism. But even apart from this if the Amending Act got merged into parent statute it is just and proper that the parent statute should be examined. To accept it without further proof in this behalf would appear to be a historical anachronism. But even apart from this if the Amending Act got merged into parent statute it is just and proper that the parent statute should be examined. It may be that in a given case the Amending Act may be such a sweeping or revolutionary measure that even if the parent Act is free from any challenge it might become necessary for the Court to examine the validity of the Amending Act itself. It is not for a moment suggested that validity of the Amending Act cannot be examined independently of the parent Act which it seeks to amend. But in this case we are called upon to examine the validity of the Amending Act by which few sections were introduced in the Land Revenue Code entirely overlooking the purpose for which Land Revenue Code was enacted. We would presently point out that even if the purpose of the Amending Act itself is examined it is not likely to make any difference in the conclusion. ( 12 ) WE would therefore examine whether the Land Revenue Code is a measure of agrarian reform along with the provisions introduced therein by the Amending Act and also incidentally examine whether the Amending Act standing by itself could be said to be a measure of agrarian reform. ( 13 ) THE preamble and long title of the Act show that it is a measure for consolidating and amending the law relating to Revenue Officers and to the assessment and recovery of Land Revenue and to other matters connected with the Land Revenue Administration. The Act is divided into ( 14 ) CHAPTERS. Chapter 1 is of a preliminary character. Chapter II deals with constitution and powers of Revenue Officers. Chapter III deals with the security to be furnished by the Revenue Officers and the liability of principals and sureties. Chapter IV is omitted. Chapter V deals with land and land revenue. Chapter VI deals with grant use and relinquishment of unalienated land. Chapter VII deals with rights of superior and inferior holders. Chapter VIII deals with survey assessment and settlements of land revenue. Chapter VIII-A deals with the assessment and settlement of land revenue of agricultural land. Chapter IX deals with settlements of boundaries and construction and maintenance of boundary marks. Chapter VI deals with grant use and relinquishment of unalienated land. Chapter VII deals with rights of superior and inferior holders. Chapter VIII deals with survey assessment and settlements of land revenue. Chapter VIII-A deals with the assessment and settlement of land revenue of agricultural land. Chapter IX deals with settlements of boundaries and construction and maintenance of boundary marks. Chapter X deals with the lands within the sites of villages towns and cities. Chapter X-A deals with record of rights. Chapter XI deals with the realization of the land revenue and other revenue demands. Chapter XII deals with procedure of revenue officers. Chapter XIII deals with appeals and revision. Chapter XIV provides for miscellaneous provision. On an overall view apart from a few measures here or there the Land Revenue Code in its entirety deals with assessment settlement levy and collection of land revenue and makes provision for certain things ancillary and incidental thereto. Mr. Desai however specifically referred to Chapter VI and urged that it deals with grant use and relinquishments of unalienated land which has nothing to do with either levy or collection of land revenue. In fact if the provisions contained in Chapter VI are individually examined they provide for disposal of unoccupied land penalty for unauthorised occupation of unoccupied land and liability to pay certain charges. They also provide for forfeiture of occupancy if it is used for a purpose other than agriculture. It authorises the Revenue Officer to levy non-agricultural assessment if the agricultural land is used for a purpose other than agriculture. It also provides for reservation of the right of the Government to mines and mineral products Sec. 72 provides for something akin to escheat whereby the State Government has power to sell and dispose of occupancy of an intestate Hindu Mohammedan or Buddhist occupant. It is in this Chapter that sec. 73a has been introduced. Sec. 73 in this Chapter lays down the extent of the rights of occupant in occupancy in that the occupancy is made both heritable and transferable. By sec. 73a power is conferred upon the State Government to impose restriction on unfettered right of transferability of occupancy in specified tracts or villages. Sec. 76 provides for relinquishment of land described in sec. 51. By sec. 73a power is conferred upon the State Government to impose restriction on unfettered right of transferability of occupancy in specified tracts or villages. Sec. 76 provides for relinquishment of land described in sec. 51. Sec. 79a is introduced in this Chapter to provide for summary eviction of certain persons who are found to be in unauthorised occupation or wrongful possession of land. We must also take notice of sec. 90 by which if an occupancy is liable to be forfeited for non-payment of land revenue persons other than the occupants have been given a right to pay land revenue so as to save forfeiture of occupancy. On a bare perusal of the provisions contained in Chapter VI can it be by any stretch of imagination said to be provision or measures adopted for carrying out the policy of agrarian reform ? In fact the entire Act was enacted for the purpose of streamlining the Revenue Administration of the Bombay Province as far back as 1879 when it must not be overlooked that land revenue formed the bulk of the State revenue. It provided for grant of unoccupied land to persons who are desirous of taking land on condition of paying assessment. The Act is designed to provide an integrated machinery for collection of land revenue and survey of plots and settlement of assessment are also incidental measures for setting up efficient machinery for assessment and collection of land revenue. There are various provisions in the statute making certain persons principally liable for payment of land revenue. A superior holder who would ordinarily be an occupant is made primarily liable for payment of land revenue. If in order to facilitate assessment and collection of land revenue entire hierarchy of revenue officers is set up their powers are defined procedure for collection is prescribed provision for survey and settlement is made and provision for speedy recovery by providing for procedure for recovering arrears of land revenue is introduced we have no doubt in our mind that the Land Revenue Code in its pith and substance was a measure for assessment and collection of land revenue and for making provision incidental and ancillary thereto. The Collector has been described as chief revenue collecting authority. The Collector has been described as chief revenue collecting authority. All these would invariably indicate that the Land Revenue Code in its pith and substance was a law not relating to connected or concerning with agrarian reform but was primarily enacted for the purpose of setting up an efficient revenue collecting agency from the grass root that is Talati to the Commissioner who would be superior officer just below the Government. It is in this Act that sec. 73a has been introduced. If the scheme and policy of Land Revenue Code is examined in its pith and substance it is not a law relating to or connected with or concerning agrarian reform. ( 15 ) ASSUMING for a moment that as the petitioners have impugned the validity of secs. 73a and 79a only and as these two sections have been introduced by the Amending Act VI of 1901 the Court should confine itself merely to the Amending Act for the purpose of deciding whether Amending Act was a measure of agrarian reform. As we have pointed out under sec. 73 subject to the condition attaching to the tenure and save as otherwise prescribed by any law occupancy of unalienated land would be deemed to be heritable and transferable. By this section bulk of rights of the occupant in the occupancy are clearly defined. Sec. 73a carves out an exception to sec. 73. By sec. 73a if the Government issued a notification in respect of any tract or village to which original survey and settlement has not been extended then from the date of the notification the occupancy in the area to which notification applies shall not be transferable without the previous sanction of the Collector. Thus by sec. 73a unfettered right of transferring occupancy could be restricted or modified in areas in respect of which notification is issued as the occupancy in such area could not be transferred without the previous sanction of the Collector. Sec. 73a was thus introduced so as to put a fetter on the right of occupant to transfer his occupancy. A mere restriction on the right to transfer occupancy cannot by itself carry out agrarian reform. In its broad perspective the policy of agrarian reform necessitated security of the tillers of the soil against unchecked eviction. Sec. 73a was thus introduced so as to put a fetter on the right of occupant to transfer his occupancy. A mere restriction on the right to transfer occupancy cannot by itself carry out agrarian reform. In its broad perspective the policy of agrarian reform necessitated security of the tillers of the soil against unchecked eviction. It required a certain measure of security against eviction and removal of intermediaries between the bona fide tillers of soil and the State. By merely putting restriction on the transferability of occupancy this purpose could hardly be achieved. It may be that weaker and unwary section of the community was sought to be protected against exploitation by crafty and greedy money-lenders who in defiance of law thrived upon ignorance penury or misery of this section of the society. In order to protect against deprivation of their land the State could restrict the unfettered right of transferability of occupancy by issuing notification under sec. 73a. Such a measure as was rightly urged by Mr. Majmudar for the petitioners instead of being a measure for reconstruction of rural economy or removal of intermediaries was in fact a measure for the protection of weaker section of the society from exploitation by the crafty money-lenders and could be styled as a measure of social reform. Such limited restriction on the unfettered right to transfer occupancy in those areas only wherein original survey and settlement is not introduced subject to previous sanction of the Collector could not by any stretch of imagination be said to be a measure of agrarian reform. Sec. 79a which provides a remedy and forum for summary eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation or unlawful possession of land could by no stretch of imagination be said to be a measure of agrarian reform. Therefore examining the parent Act with the amendment or Amending Act by itself we are not able to accede to the submission of the learned Government Pleader that either the Land Revenue Code along with the amendment or Amending Act is a law relating to concerning or connected with agrarian reform If either the parent Act or Amending Act together or each individually could not be said to be a law relating to agrarian reform obviously it would not qualify for the protection under Art. 31a and would not be immune from the challenge under Arts. 14 19 and 31. 14 19 and 31. ( 16 ) FIRST proviso to Art. 31a (1) reads that where such law is a law made by the Legislature of a State the provisions of this Article shall not apply thereto unless such law having been reserved for the consideration of the President has received his assent. . It was urged that notwithstanding any other contention if the Land Revenue Code or the Amending Act is a law made by the Legislature of a State it would not qualify for protection under Art. 31a unless it was reserved for the consideration of the President and has received the Presidents assent. We must recall that the Land Revenue Code was put on the statute book in the year 1879 and the Amending Act was put on the statute book in 1901. Bombay in those days was not a State as the word is understood since the introduction of the Constitution and there was no President of India. Therefore the law when it was put on the statute book was not a law made by the Legislature of a State within the meaning of the expression in the first proviso and it could not have been reserved for the consideration of the President because there was no President at that time. A wider question was further sought to be argued that the word State in the proviso shall have the same meaning as the meaning given to expression State in Art. 31a (1) (a) and both when given proper and correct interpretation Art. 31a can only be invoked to claim immunity from the challenge under Arts. 14 19 and 31 in respect of the laws which have been enacted after the introduction of the Constitution. In view of the conclusion that we have reached that the impugned provisions are not immune from the challenge under Arts. 14 19 and 31 it is not necessary for us to consider this wider question in this matter. Therefore for the reasons aforementioned the preliminary objection must be negatived. ( 17 ) TURNING to the merits first ground of attack was that sec. 73a is ultra vires Art. 14 as it suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of essential legislative functions by the Legislature to the executive without providing any guidelines for the exercise of power. Therefore for the reasons aforementioned the preliminary objection must be negatived. ( 17 ) TURNING to the merits first ground of attack was that sec. 73a is ultra vires Art. 14 as it suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of essential legislative functions by the Legislature to the executive without providing any guidelines for the exercise of power. Sec. 73a reads as under:-73 A. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing section in any tract or village to which the State Government may by notification published before the introduction therein of an original survey settlement under sec. 103 declare the provisions of this section applicable occupancies shall not after the date of such notification be transferable without the previous sanction of the Collector. (3) The State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette from time to time exempt any part of such tract or village or any person or class of persons from the operation of this section. MR. Majmudar contended that the Legislature in whatever sense that word was understood in the year 1901 has without prescribing any norms or policy or guidelines delegated its functions to the executive. It was urged that there is no guidance in the section as to which village or tract can be selected for the purpose of notification under sec. 73a. It was pointed out that the word village as defined in the Land Revenue Code in sec. 3 (21) includes a town or city and therefore it was urged that if the Government so chose a notification prohibiting unrestricted transferability of occupancy can be issued even in respect of a city like Ahmedabad. It was very vehemently contended that the Government would enjoy arbitrary powers in selection of tracts and villages in respect of which a notification can be issued. It was urged that sub-sec. (2) of sec. 73a further enlargers the scope of delegation under which the Government enjoys unbridled power of exempting any part of such tract or village or any person or class of persons from the operation of sec. 73a. Mr. Desai repelled this contention and urged that sec. 73a is not a piece of delegated legislation but it is a conditional legislation and as the conditions are satisfied the legislation has become absolute. ( 18 ) IT is therefore necessary to find out whether sec. 73a is a piece of conditional legislation or delegated legislation. 73a. Mr. Desai repelled this contention and urged that sec. 73a is not a piece of delegated legislation but it is a conditional legislation and as the conditions are satisfied the legislation has become absolute. ( 18 ) IT is therefore necessary to find out whether sec. 73a is a piece of conditional legislation or delegated legislation. When a law can be said to be conditional legislation or when it can be said to be delegated legislation was considered by practically all Judges comprising the Full Court In re Art. 143 Constitution of India etc. A. I. R. 1951 S. C. 332. Mukherjea J. in this connection observed as under:-IN a conditional legislation the law is full and complete when it leaves the legislative chamber but the operation of the law is made dependent upon the fulfillment of a condition and what is delegated to an outside body is the authority to determine by the exercise of its own judgment whether or not the condition has been fulfilled. AT other place concerning what can be said to be delegated legislation and what can be said to be essential legislative functions it is observed as under:-THE essential legislative function consists in the determination or choosing of the legislative policy and of formally enacting that policy into a binding rule of conduct. It is open to the Legislature to formulate the policy as broadly and with as little or as much details as it thinks proper and it may delegate the rest of the legislative work to a subordinate authority who will work out the details within the frame work of that Policy. . . . . . . . . QUOTING with approval the following passage from A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States 295 U. S. 495. . . . . . . . . . SO long as a policy is laid down and a standard established by statute no constitutional delegation of legislative power is involved in leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the legislation is to apply. A conditional legislation has all along been treated in judicial pronouncements not to be a species of delegated legislation at all. A conditional legislation has all along been treated in judicial pronouncements not to be a species of delegated legislation at all. It is further observed that if in a particular case all the elements of a conditional legislation exist the question does not arise as to whether in leaving the task of determining the condition to an outside authority the Legislature abdicated its essential function in favour of an outsider. What the Court should examine is whether the Legislature while Legislating upon a topic has prescribed condition making operation of law dependent upon it and leaving to the outside authority to decide whether the conditions have been fulfilled or not. In Queen v. Burah 5 I. A. 178 it was observed as under:-THE proper Legislature has exercised its judgment as to place persons laws powers and the results of that judgment has been to legislate conditionally as to those things. The conditions being fulfilled the legislation is now absolute. IT is thus clear that the Legislature cannot part with its essential legislative functions which primarily consist in declaring its policy of legislation and making it a binding rule of conduct. The Legislature may formulate its policy as broadly and with as little or as much details as it thinks proper and the Legislature may as well specify conditions upon which the operation of the law is made dependent. But if while legislating upon a topic the law is full and complete but its operation merely depend upon fulfillment of certain conditions then whether the conditions have been fulfilled or not may be left to an outside authority to determine the same. If that authority determines that the conditions are fulfilled the law will become absolute. In Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 554 at page 566 it has been observed that the distinction between conditional legislation and delegated legislation is this that in the former the delegates power is that of determining when a legislative declared rule of conduct shall become effective; and the latter involves delegation of rule making power which constitutionally may be exercised by the administrative agent. This means that the Legislature having laid down the broad principles of its policy in the legislation can then leave the details to be supplied by the administrative authority. This means that the Legislature having laid down the broad principles of its policy in the legislation can then leave the details to be supplied by the administrative authority. In other words by delegated legislation the delegate completes the legislation by supplying details within the limits prescribed by the statute and in the case of conditional legislation the power of legislation is exercised by the Legislature conditionally leaving to the discretion of an external authority the time and manner of carrying the legislation into effect as also the determination of the area to which it is to extend. Reference was made to Messrs Devi Das v. State of Punjab A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1895. While examining the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act 1948 Their Lordships observed that the principle of excessive delegation was well settled. That decision would be however more apposite while considering whether the section provides any guidance or norm but it is not helpful in determining the question whether a particular legislation is a conditional legislation or delegated legislation. ( 19 ) IT thus appears well settled that the legislation would be a conditional legislation where the law when it leaves legislative chamber is full and complete. The Legislature must be shown to have exercised its judgment as to place persons laws powers and the result of that judgment has been to legislate conditionally and after having so legislated if the Legislature leaves to an outside authority as to when and where the legislation would be operative by prescribing certain conditions and leaving it to the said authority or whether the conditions are satisfied it will be a case of conditional legislation and not delegated legislation. If on the contrary the Legislature leaves to an outside authority to choose the legislative policy and to authorise that authority to enact that policy into a binding rule of conduct it would not only be a case of delegated legislation but slay have to be struck down as abdication of legislative functions. Keeping in view this test we will examine sec. 73a to find out whether it is a piece of conditional legislation or delegated legislation. That would necessitate finding out whether sec. 73a is complete as to place or persons and the powers and whether the law sought to be enacted by sec. 73a was full and complete when enacted. Keeping in view this test we will examine sec. 73a to find out whether it is a piece of conditional legislation or delegated legislation. That would necessitate finding out whether sec. 73a is complete as to place or persons and the powers and whether the law sought to be enacted by sec. 73a was full and complete when enacted. ( 20 ) AS stated earlier sec. 73a carves out an exception to sec. 73. Occupancy of land will be both heritable and transferable subject of course to any conditions lawfully annexed to the tenure and to the provisions contained in sec. 56. and save as otherwise prescribed by law. To this unrestricted transferability of occupancy an exception is carved out by sec. 73a. If the State Government issued a notification in respect of any village or tract under sec. 73a then since the date of the notification 0 occupancy would not be transferable without the previous sanction of the Collector. If a notification is issued under sec. 73a in respect of certain village or tract occupancy of land in that area to which notification applies shall not be transferable without the previous sanction of the Collector which in the absence of the notification would have been transferable without any restriction or fetter. Notification under sec. 73a can be issued only in respect of a tract or a village wherein original survey or settlement is not introduced. The words by notification published before the introduction therein of an original survey settlement under sec. 130 would immediately restrict the power of the State Government to issue notification in respect of any or every area in the State of Bombay or now in the State of Gujarat. Sec. 103 has been deleted but the provisions contained therein have been reenacted in sec. 117b. We will have therefore to read sec. 117b in place of sec. 103 in sec. 73a. Therefore sec. 73a can be brought into operation only in those tracts or villages where original survey and settlement has not been introduced. This has been done for a very valid reason. When a survey settlement is introduced occupancy of each land has to be settled. Boundary of the plot of land has to be specifically demarcated. Its revenue has to be settled and conditions can be annexed to the occupancy. This has been done for a very valid reason. When a survey settlement is introduced occupancy of each land has to be settled. Boundary of the plot of land has to be specifically demarcated. Its revenue has to be settled and conditions can be annexed to the occupancy. When original survey settlement is introduced survey officer will have to examine the question of each plot and parcel of land its boundaries as to who is superior holder and what are the conditions to be annexed to the occupancy. It will have to be determined as to which particular tenure the occupancy in question belongs. At that time the State Government while carrying out survey settlement operation can annex lawful condition to each occupancy making it non-transferable and non-heritable or transferable subject to the previous sanction of the Collector. Till the original survey settlement is introduced in view of sec. 73 and in the absence of any condition being annexed to the occupancy which can be done at the time of original survey settlement the occupancy would be transferable and there would be an unfettered right to transfer. The object sought to be achieved by sec. 73a can as well be achieved in respect of an occupancy of each piece and parcel of land at the time of introduction of original survey settlement. Till such original survey settlement is introduced it would not be possible for the Collector or for that matter any revenue authority to put any restriction on the transferability of occupancy. It is in order to give such power to the Collector to put a restriction on the transferability of occupancy in certain tracts and areas where such protection was necessary that sec. 73a was introduced. As the section provides that a notification under sec. 73a can be issued in respect of any tract or village in which original survey settlement is not introduced the area or operation of the section is clearly demarcated. In that area there might be members of the scheduled caste scheduled tribes and illiterate persons or persons belonging to wild tribes as well as persons belonging to the advanced class educated class and well to do class. In that area there might be members of the scheduled caste scheduled tribes and illiterate persons or persons belonging to wild tribes as well as persons belonging to the advanced class educated class and well to do class. If a notification can be issued in respect of a tract or a village; once such a notification is issued it will equally apply to every class of persons some educated or well to do persons who would not be in need of such protection and need not be covered by such a notification. Therefore under sec. 73a (2) power has been conferred upon the State Government to exempt any part of such tract or village or any person or class of persons from the operation of that section. Thus the section specifies the area in which it can be brought into operation and the person or class of persons in respect of whom it can be brought into operation. The policy behind the legislation is clear and unambiguous which we would presently point out. It is crystal clear that when the law left the legislative chamber it was full and complete and what was left to the delegate was the time and area of its operation and that can always be left to an outside authority who can determine whether the condition is satisfied so as to make the legislation operative. The impugned Act appears to be not a piece of delegated legislation at all. In the words of the Privy Council in King v. Benorilal 72 I. A. 57 it is merely an example of the not uncommon legislative power by which the local application of the provisions of a statute is determined by the judgment of a local administrative body as to its necessity. This being a conditional legislation it cannot be challenged on the ground that it is a delegated legislation and the Legislature is guilty of abdicating its essential legislative functions in favour of the executive. . ( 21 ) ASSUMING for a moment that it is a delegated legislation the next question is whether the law has fixed any norms or provided any guidelines for guidance of the authority to whom the power is delegated. Analysing the section it appears that it can be brought into force by publication of a notification. . ( 21 ) ASSUMING for a moment that it is a delegated legislation the next question is whether the law has fixed any norms or provided any guidelines for guidance of the authority to whom the power is delegated. Analysing the section it appears that it can be brought into force by publication of a notification. It can be brought into operation in a tract or village in which original survey settlement has not been introduced. This will restrict operation of law to only few specified tracts or villages. The power to bring into operation sec. 73a is not conferred on any minor officer of the Government but on the State Government. The section does not impose absolute restriction on the transferability of occupancy but the transferability is subject to the sanction of the Collector. If an occupancy in an area to which notification applies is transferred without the previous sanction of the Collector such transfer is not only void but such occupancy shall not be liable to the process of any Court. Sec. 79a which was simultaneously introduced provides for summary evict on of a person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of the land which is not transferable without previous sanction under sec. 73a or by virtue of any condition lawfully annexed to the tenure under the provisions of sec. 62 67 or 68. It will thus appear that these four sections namely secs. 70 73 73 and 79a fix norms and provide guidelines for operation of the section. In order to find out whether sec. 73a fixes norms or provides guidance it is not necessary to merely confine our attention to sec. 73a alone but the Court must examine the entire scheme of sections which were introduced simultaneously with a view to carrying out certain policy. I order to find out the policy or guidelines we must go back to the time when secs. 73a and 79a were introduced and corresponding amendment was introduced in sec. 70. Assuming that the objects and reasons by themselves may not be looked at to find out the norms or guidelines they can certainly be taken into consideration to find out the conditions prevailing at the time when the law was enacted. 73a and 79a were introduced and corresponding amendment was introduced in sec. 70. Assuming that the objects and reasons by themselves may not be looked at to find out the norms or guidelines they can certainly be taken into consideration to find out the conditions prevailing at the time when the law was enacted. The Statement of Objects and Reasons which the learned Government Pleader furnished to us when Amending Act VI of 1901 was enacted shows that the Government found that in certain tracts in which original survey settlement had not been made the cultivating classes were so imperfectly civilized as to be incapable of protecting their own interests. It was therefore proposed that by an addition to sec. 73 of the Code (Land Revenue Code) the Governor-in-Council when extending the survey settlement to such tracts shall have power to notify certain tracts or villages within which the Collector may in his discretion declare any occupancies to be unalienable without affecting in other respects the heritable rights of the occupant. Therefore as far back as 1901 in certain areas or tracts in which original survey settlement was not introduced the cultivators were found to be so ignorant as to be incapable of protecting their own interest and a protection was sought to be extended to them by putting restriction on the ir right to transfer their occupancy. That was done with a view to protect those ignorant persons against exploitation by crafty and greedy. The conditions at the time when the Amending Act was enacted would show that the State Government was aware of the fact that in certain tracts and villages wherein still original survey settlement was not introduced so as to be able to annex conditions to the occupancy it was necessary to put a restriction on the right to transfer occupancy. With that end in view a measure was enacted. With that end in view a measure was enacted. Therefore looking to the fact that in certain specified areas only the section can be brought into operation the power to select area limited to those tracts or villages in which original survey settlement was not introduced was conferred upon the highest executive such as the State Government and those areas and tracts were such where certain ignorant persons required protection and that it was a partial restriction in that transfer could notwithstanding the operation of the notification be effected with the previous sanction of the Collector the scheme of sections did indicate norms and provide guidance for the exercise of power. In all effort to find out the norms and guidance the Court need not examine the impugned provision standing by itself but can look into the general scheme of legislation also and the condition prevalent when the impugned provision was enacted with reference to Statement of Object and Reasons. In The Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills A-I R 1968 S. C. 1232 upholding the vires of sec. 150 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act it was observed that what form the guidance should take is a matter which cannot be stated in general terms. What guidance should be given and to what extent and whether guidance has been given in a particular case at all depends on a consideration of the provisions of the particular Act with which the Court has to deal including its preamble. The nature of the body to which delegation is made is also a factor to be taken into consideration in determining whether there is sufficient guidance in the matter of delegation. In Raghubir Swarup and others v. State of U. P. A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 909 considering the question of vires of a provision by which power was given to the State Government to extend U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1951 to other areas of the State of Uttar Pradesh to which it was not initially applied it was observed that it cannot be said that this power amounts to excessive delegation for it is well settled that the Legislature may leave it to the executive to apply the provisions of an Act to different geographical areas at different times depending on various consideration. In Basant Kumar v. Eagle Rolling Mills A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 1260 it was contended that sec. 1 (B) of the Employees State Insurance Act 1948 suffers from excessive delegation and was therefore invalid. Negativing this contentions it was observed the sec. 1 (3) by which power was conferred upon the Central Government to bring into operation the Act on such date or dates as the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette appoint and power was further conferred upon the State Government to appoint date or dates for different provisions of the Act for different parts thereof was really not an illustration of delegated legislation at all but was a conditional legislation. Considering therefore the policy underlying the impugned provisions and the authority by which and persons in respect of whom and the area in which it can be brought into operation even if it be held that it was a piece of delegated legislation it cannot be said that it suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative functions nor can the Legislature be said to have abdicated in favour of the executive. The impugned provision and the general scheme of legislation unmistakably discloses the legislative policy underlying the legislation and furnishes enough guidance for the exercise of power conferred on the highest executive namely the State Government. Therefore even if the impugned provision can be described as delegated legislation it is within he permissible limits of delegation. ( 22 ) AT this stage we may notice one submission of Mr. Majmudar. It was urged that looking to the definition of the words occupant occupancy and village it would be open to the State Government to bring within the purview of a notification non-agricultural land in a city also. As we have examined the policy of the legislation and Statement of Objects and Reasons and keeping in view the fact that it can be brought into operation in any area in which original survey settlement has not been introduced we are not impressed by what can be described as horrible imagining of the petitioners in respect of the application of the Act to the cities. It is true as was urged by Mr. Majmudar that original survey settlement under sec. 103 (now under sec. It is true as was urged by Mr. Majmudar that original survey settlement under sec. 103 (now under sec. 117d) may not have been introduced in large cities which became part of the State on merger and a notification under sec. 73a in respect of such cities can be issued by the State Government. We are not inclined to examine this aspect because factual averments are not made on the point whether in such cities original survey settlement was introduced or not under some corresponding provisions of law in force in those States before their merger. Sec. 117d which has replaced sec. 103 provides that the State Government may at any time direct a settlement hereinafter referred to as an original settlement of the land revenue of any land of which a revenue survey has been made under sec. 95. Sec. 117b in the Chapter provides that all settlements of land revenue hereto before made and introduced and in force at the date of commencement of the Bombay Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act 1939 shall be deemed to have been made and introduced in accordance with the provisions of the Chapter and shall notwithstanding anything contained in sec. 117e be deemed to continue to remain in force until the introduction of a revision settlement. There is a clear distinction between original settlement and revision settlement. A notification can be issued under sec. 73a in an area in which original settlement has not been made. It is difficult to conceive that in big cities original settlement was not made. Therefore even though there is some force in the contention that notification under sec. 7. 3a may take in its sweep the non-agricultural land in a city town or a village but that would be just ancillary to the powers conferred upon the State Government to extend the protection of the section to the areas or tracts in which original survey settlement has not been introduced and where certain illiterate and ignorant weaker section of the society could be granted protection against exploitation. ( 23 ) IN our opinion the impugned provision is a piece of conditional legislation and could not be challenged on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative functions. ( 23 ) IN our opinion the impugned provision is a piece of conditional legislation and could not be challenged on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative functions. We have incidentally only examined the question that even if it could be said to be delegated legislation it cannot be said to be excessive delegation as the norms are fixed and guidance is provided. ( 24 ) IT was also contended that sec. 73a confers uncontrolled arbitrary unbridled and unguided powers on the authorities. While considering whether it is a conditional legislation or a delegated legislation we have meticulously examined sec 73a We have pointed out that the policy underlying the measure is clearly discernible. Mr. Majmudar however urged that two independent kind of uncontrolled and arbitrary power are conferred by the section upon the State Government and on the Collector. It was urged that no guidance is provided to the State Government as to when where and in respect of which class of persons notification under sec. 73a should be issued and no guidance is provided to the Collector in which case he must grant sanction or refuse the same. Over and above what we have observed above that the section provides guidance and the scheme of four sections not only fixes norms but provides guidance we may point out that in order to protect the weaker members of the society in the area in which original survey settlement is not introduced partial restraint is sought to be imposed upon the transferability of occupancy and new power is thus conferred upon the Collector to restrain transfer of occupancy except where it is considered necessary and also to provide for the consequence of transfer contrary to the provision of sec. 73a by making the transfer null and void. After conferring this power and providing for its effect of making transfer made contrary to the provisions of sec. 73a null and void a forum is created for the enforcement of the scheme. The scheme of the section envisages a partial restraint on the right to transfer occupancy. Even if the transfer is effected contrary to the provision the occupancy is not forfeited. There is thus no absolute restraint and no penalty is provided. Further power is conferred upon the State Government to exempt certain class of persons from the operation of the not notification by sub sec. (2 ). Even if the transfer is effected contrary to the provision the occupancy is not forfeited. There is thus no absolute restraint and no penalty is provided. Further power is conferred upon the State Government to exempt certain class of persons from the operation of the not notification by sub sec. (2 ). At this stage we may also refer to Art. 244 of the Constitution. It appears that provisions of 5th Schedule were applied to the administration and control of scheduled areas and scheduled tribes in all States other than Assam. The areas in which notification under sec. 73a is in force are the areas comprised in villages of former Gad-Boriad Estate now forming part of Naswadi Taluka and the areas comprised in former Sagbara Estate now forming part of Broach District. Para 6 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution provides that the President may declare by an order specified areas to be scheduled areas. In exercise of the power the Scheduled Areas (Part A States) Order 1950 was issued on 26th January 1950 Entry (7) in Bombay State is in respect of Sagbara and Valia Mahals and Dediapada Nandod and Jhagadia Taluka in Broach District and entry (8) is in respect of Chhota Udepur Taluka and the villages of Gad Boriad Estate of Nasvadi Taluka in Baroda district. The lands involved in these petitions are situated in former Gad Boriad estate now forming part of Nasvadi Taluka and former Sagbara estate now forming part of Sagbara Mahal in Broach District. Therefore the areas in which the lands involved in these petitions are situated form part of the scheduled areas. In respect of such scheduled areas para 5 of the Fifth Schedule provides that the Governor may make regulations for the peace and good Government of any area in a State for the time being a scheduled area. These regulations may prohibit or restrict the transfer of land by or among members of the scheduled tribes in such area. The impugned notification is made applicable to the members of the scheduled tribe in scheduled area. Even the Constitution makes specific provision for extending protection to the members of the scheduled tribes by restricting their right to transfer land. The object behind the provision was to protect the members of the scheduled tribes against exploitation. They are persons primarily attached to land. They are wholly dependent upon the land. Even the Constitution makes specific provision for extending protection to the members of the scheduled tribes by restricting their right to transfer land. The object behind the provision was to protect the members of the scheduled tribes against exploitation. They are persons primarily attached to land. They are wholly dependent upon the land. If they are made to part with the land they would suffer immense hardship and possibly they would be rendered destitute. In order to extend the protection to such class in respect of the land held by them even the Constitution makes a special provision that the Governor may restrict transfer of land in scheduled areas. Sec. 73a and especially the notification issued thereunder seeks to effectuate the very purpose underlying para 5 of the Fifth Schedule read with Art. 244 of the Constitution of India. Therefore it is crystal clear that the scheme of secs. 70 735 73 and 79a fixes norms and provides guidance for the exercise of power. As to content of power conferred upon the Collector under sec. 73a to grant or refuse sanction for transfer of occupancy we would presently examine the same while examining the constitutional validity of sec. 79a. Suffice it to say at this stage that these sections and especially sec. 73a fix the norms and provide guidance and the power thereby conferred cannot be said to be uncontrolled unbridled or arbitrary and the challenge to the section under Art. 14 cannot be upheld. ( 25 ) SECOND ground of attack was that once a notification under sec. 73a is issued it puts restriction on the right of the occupant to acquirer hold and dispose of property guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution and the restriction could not be said to have been imposed in the interest of general public or for protection of any scheduled tribe. Art. 19 (1) (f) guarantees right to the citizen to acquire hold and dispose of property. We are invited to examine the constitutional validity of sec. 73a as imposing unreasonable restriction on the right to acquire hold and dispose of property at the hands of the petitioners who have acquired the property in flagrant violation of a benevolent statutory provision However the transferors of the present petitioners were occupants and if a restriction on their right to dispose of property is placed by the notification issued under sec. 73a it would certainly be a restriction on their right to dispose of the occupancy which is a property and restriction so imposed must be shown to be in the interest of general public or in the interest of scheduled tribes as provided by sub-art. (5 ). It is open to the State Government to impose reasonable restriction on the exercise of right guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (f) for the protection of the interest of scheduled tribes. While enacting Art. 19 (1) (f) and sub-art. (5) the farmers of the Constitution were aware of Art. 244 and the provision contained in the Fifth Schedule wherein power was conferred upon the Governor not only to apply any Act of Parliament or the Act of the State with certain modifications in scheduled areas but also power was conferred upon the Governor to make regulations for the peace and good government of scheduled areas by prohibiting or restricting the transfer of land by or amongst the members of the scheduled tribes. If such a special power was conferred upon the Governor a measure by which the State Government restricted transfer of land by the members of the scheduled tribes residing in scheduled area in our opinion the restriction imposed by sec. 73a would undoubtedly be one for the protection of the interest of the scheduled tribes. Therefore the challenge to the section under Art. 19 (1) (f) apart from the fact that restriction is both partial and reasonable also on the ground that it is imposed for the protection of the interest of scheduled tribes must be negatived ( 26 ) THE next ground of attack was that see. 79a was violative of equal protection clause contained in Art. 14 as it discriminates amongst those who are in unauthorised occupation or wrongful possession of land inter se in that it leaves it open to the Collector at his own sweet will to adopt either the ordinary remedy of the civil suit or the drastic summary remedy under the section and there being no guiding policy or principle it permits him to pick and choose amongst transferees of occupancy in contravention of see. 73a for the application of more drastic procedure under the section. It was urged that see. 73a for the application of more drastic procedure under the section. It was urged that see. 79a by which jurisdiction is conferred upon the Collector to summarily evict any person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of any land which is not transferable without the previous sanction under see. 73a enables the Collator to apply drastic procedure of summary eviction and simultaneously retains with him power to file a suit in the Civil Court to evict anyone in wrongful possess on of land. The challenge under Art. 14 was that the Collector has two remedies one drastic remedy of summary eviction and the other of filing a suit and these two alternative remedies being open to the Collator he can pick and choose and discrimination is writ large on the section. It was urged that the words may be summarily evicted by the Collator would indicate that it would be open to the Collector in the ease of one person to whom occupancy is transferred in contravention of sec. 73a to have recourse to sec. 79a and in another case it would be open to him to file a civil suit. It was therefore urged that once a statutory authority like the Collector has two options one to follow drastic procedure of summary eviction and the other a recourse to ordinary civil Court with a right to appeal and second appeal it would enable the Collector to discriminate between persons similarly situated namely two persons to whom occupancies have been transferred in contravention of see. 73a. It is undoubtedly true that the mandate of Art. 14 is directed against the State and the State shall not discriminate between different classes of citizens. Rule is that like shall be treated alike. Art. 14 forbids class legislation but does not forbid classification. If the Collector who is a statutory authority and would be in a position to give discriminatory treatment to two persons similarly situated obviously the provision by which the Collator is in a position to discriminate between two persons similarly situated would be violative of Art. 14. The persons who are in unauthorised occupation of land because they are transferees of occupancy in contravention of see. 73a if they form a single class and both are similarly situated they must be treated alike. The question is whether see. The persons who are in unauthorised occupation of land because they are transferees of occupancy in contravention of see. 73a if they form a single class and both are similarly situated they must be treated alike. The question is whether see. 79a leaves open two remedies to the Collector namely one to proceed under see. 79a and the other to have recourse to a civil suit. If it does it was strenuously urged that see. 79a would be violative of Art. 14. Mr. Majmudar urged that if a provision contained in a statute by which more drastic procedure for summary eviction is provided for simultaneously retaining the power to have recourse to the civil Court an authority having absolute power to pick and choose a procedure would he discriminatory and would be violative of Art. 14. Reference was made to Northern India Caterers (Private) Ltd. v. State of Punjab and another A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1581 As sustenance was sought to be drawn in support of the submission made by Mr. Majmudar from the various observations made in this Judgment it would be advantageous to refer to this judgment in some details. The State of Punjab leased a hotel to the petitioners in September 1953 for a period of six years. In the interval some correspondence for the sale of the hotel to the petitioners ensued between the parties. Ultimately when the initial period of lease expired the Government called upon the petitioners to hand over vacant possession on or before January 1 1970 The Estate Officer and Collector. Capital Project Chandigarh served the appellants with a notice alleging that their occupation of the said hotel had become unauthorised after December 31 1959 and called upon them to show cause on or before January 11 1960 as to why an order of eviction should not be passed against them. The petitioners thereupon challenged the notice issued by the Estate Officer and Collector in the High Court. It was contended before the High Court that the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act discriminated between the occupants of public premises and those of private property and also discriminated between the former inter se and therefore infringed their right of equality before law and equal protection of laws under Art. 14 of the Constitution. Some other contentions were also raised before the High Court. Some other contentions were also raised before the High Court. On the contention hereinabove mentioned the High Court was of the opinion that the Act substituted the remedy of the Government for eviction as a landlord under the ordinary law that is that by reason of the Act the Government could only resort to the remedy under the Act and not by way of a suit for eviction and that the Act impliedly did away with the Governments right to sue under the Civil Procedure Code in respect of public properties and premises that there was a valid classification between the occupiers of public premises and those of private property and that as the Act was substitutive and not supplemental there was no question of discrimination also between the occupiers of public premises inter se. The petitions having been dismissed the petitioners applied to the Supreme Court. On an overall examination of the Act Their Lordships were of the view that the remedy under the Act was not substitutive but supplemental and the procedure provided in sec. 5 was harsh compared to the procedure followed in an ordinary civil Court. Their Lordships observed as under:-THERE can be no doubt that sec. 5 confers an additional remedy over and above the remedy by way of suit and that by providing two alternative remedies to the Government and in leaving it to the unguided discretion of the Collector to resort to one or the other and to pick and choose some of those in occupation of public properties and premises for the application of the more drastic procedure under sec. 5 that section has lent itself open to the charge of discrimination and as being violative of Art. 14. In this view sec. 5 must be declared to be void. THE minority judgment took the view that if an authority has more than one remedy that in itself would not be offending Art. 14. if the party has a free choice of remedies proceedings and Tribunals for the redress of his grievances it could not be struck down on the ground of unjust discrimination. THE minority judgment took the view that if an authority has more than one remedy that in itself would not be offending Art. 14. if the party has a free choice of remedies proceedings and Tribunals for the redress of his grievances it could not be struck down on the ground of unjust discrimination. But the binding majority view being that if law provides two alternative remedies to the Government and leaves it to the unguided discretion of the Government to resort to one or the other and to pick and choose between some of those similarly situated for the application of the more drastic remedy the section would be open to the challenge under Art. 14. ( 27 ) WE would examine sec. 79a by applying the test prescribed in N. 1. Caterers Ltd. case (supra ). First question would be whether the Collector acting under sec. 79a has two remedies. Sec. 79a was introduced along with sec. 73a. By sec. 73a power was conferred upon the State Government by issue of a notification to put restriction on the right to transfer the occupancy and a duty was cast on the Collector to grant or refuse the sanction. Further duty was cast on the Collector under sec. 79a to summarily evict the person who is in unauthorised occupation of land transfer of which is prohibited under sec. 73a. It is thus a case of power coupled with duty. The expression may be summarily evicted has not the effect of conferring a discretion on the Collector to evict or not to evict even if the conditions for the application of the section are fully satisfied. If power is conferred upon the Collector to grant or refuse the sanction for transfer of occupancy and yet if someone in contravention of sec. 73a without obtaining the sanction of the Collector transfers occupancy and if the occupancy cannot be forfeited in the absence of any such provision and duty is cast upon the Collector to summarily evict such a person in unauthorised occupation of land it cannot be said that even if the condition for application of the section are satisfied the Collector may still refuse to act under sec. 79a. Where power is coupled with duty and if conditions are satisfied there is a duty to act. 79a. Where power is coupled with duty and if conditions are satisfied there is a duty to act. If the Collector fails to act a mandamus can be issued and he can be directed to act By use of the word may discretion is not being conferred upon the Collector that he may refuse to act under sec. 79a even if it is shown that there is a person in occupation of land the occupancy of which was transferred contrary to sec. 73a. If in such circumstances may is read as shall contention that there is discretion left with the Collector to act or not to act cannot be sustained. ( 28 ) BUT we would examine this provision from a slightly wider angle to find out as to whether the Collector has two remedies or not. Mr. Majmudar was at pains to impress upon us that as the occupancy is merely a right recognised by the State of an individual in a piece or parcel of land virtually the State is the owner of all land. It was urged that if the State recognised the occupancy and put restriction on the right to transfer occupancy conferred by sec. 73 anyone who in contravention of sec. 73 obtains transfer of occupancy and enters into possession of land can be evicted by the State by filing a suit. We need not examine the full content of the power of eminent domain or residuary right of the State in a piece of land occupancy of which is granted to an occupant. We will proceed on the assumption that the State can file a suit against a person who is in unauthorised occupation of a piece of land the occupancy of which was transferred to him without the sanction of the Collector and the land is situated in an area to which notification under sec. 73a has been issued and applied. The question is whether the Collector acting under sec. 79a has two remedies open to him. A duty to summarily evict the person is cast on the Collector. The Collector either suo motu or at the instance of some one interested in the land can summarily evict a person who is either in unauthorised occupation or wrongful possession of land which was not transferable without the previous sanction under sec. 73a. Can the Collector instead of proceeding under sec. The Collector either suo motu or at the instance of some one interested in the land can summarily evict a person who is either in unauthorised occupation or wrongful possession of land which was not transferable without the previous sanction under sec. 73a. Can the Collector instead of proceeding under sec. 79a file a suit against the transferee of occupancy without his sanction ? Conceded Mr. Majmudar that the Collector as Collector cannot maintain a suit against the transferee of land in the civil Court. One is left to imagine what nature of suit the Collector can file. Even if the Collector chooses to proceed by resorting to the civil Court the Collector will have to implead the transferor and transferee of the occupancy and pray for a decree that possession of land be taken from the transferee and restored to the transferor. What cause of action the Collector would have cannot even be imagined. Obviously when we reached this conclusion on the submission it became manifestly clear that the Collector cannot maintain a suit in his capacity as Collector. But Mr. Majmudar had a very ingenious argument to offer on this point. It was urged that the Collector may not be able to file a suit but he can act as an agent of the State Government who can always maintain the suit. Assuming without deciding that the Collector as an agent of the State Government can maintain a suit in the civil Court against the transferee of land which was not transferable without his previous sanction under sec. 73a he would not be acting as Collector but in fact it would be the State Government who would be filing the suit. It is immaterial that the State has two remedies namely one to file a suit or to initiate an action under sec. 79a. tender sec. 79a power of summary eviction is conferred upon the Collector and not on the State Government. Once the Collector cannot file the suit against a transferee for want of cause of action obviously the Collector has not got two remedies namely one to proceed under sec. 79a and the other to proceed by way of a civil suit. The provision contained in sec. 79a is not supplemental nor is an alternative remedy. Once the Collector cannot file the suit against a transferee for want of cause of action obviously the Collector has not got two remedies namely one to proceed under sec. 79a and the other to proceed by way of a civil suit. The provision contained in sec. 79a is not supplemental nor is an alternative remedy. In N. I. Caterers Ltd. Case looking to the scheme of the Act a firm conclusion was reached that the Collector had an alternative remedy one by way of suit on title and the other by proceeding under sec. 5 of the impugned Act. When a person is in unauthorised occupation of government premises there is at any rate privity of estate between the Government on one hand and the person in unauthorised occupation of the same. The Government is the owner of the premises and someone is in unauthorised occupation of the premises. Common law remedy of filing a suit on title in such a case always exists and unless by some other act remedy by way of summary eviction is substituted the provision of such other Act would be supplemental and not substitutive and two alternative remedies would come into existence where there would be an option to pick and choose and the element of discrimination would creep in. But when an occupant is in possession of his land as occupant and if transfer of occupancy is restricted and yet in contravention of the restriction he transfers the occupancy without previous sanction of the Collector he can either proceed under sec. 79a or he can as well maintain a civil suit. He would have two remedies-one may be by way of a suit and the other may be by way of summary eviction. But the two remedies to a private party to litigation would not provide a ground for attack under Art. 14. Mandate of Art. 14 is not directed against a private party but it is directed against the State action only. Therefore the summary remedy to a private party for redress of grievance could not be struck down on the ground of alleged unjust discrimination. As stated earlier the Collector has not got two remedies against the transferee. There is a third person intervening between the person in unauthorised occupation and the Collector or the State Government. Therefore the summary remedy to a private party for redress of grievance could not be struck down on the ground of alleged unjust discrimination. As stated earlier the Collector has not got two remedies against the transferee. There is a third person intervening between the person in unauthorised occupation and the Collector or the State Government. In such a situation ratio in N. I. Caterers Ltd. ease would not apply. Similarly the ratio of the three decisions of this High Court to which reference has been made by Mr. Majmudar would not apply. Mr. Majmudar referred to two decisions of the Division Bench consisting of Bhagwati C. J. and myself in Special Civil Application Nos. 422 of 1968 255 of 1969 and 349 of 1959. In the first case vires of sec. 193a of the Gujarat Panchayats Act was challenged and in the other vires of sec. 233 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act was challenged. Following the decision of the Division Bench consisting Bhagwati C. J. and Bakshi J. in Ramanlal Govindram v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation XI G. L. R. 1 these sections were struck down. In Ramanlals case the order of the Municipal Commissioner made under sec. 437a of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act calling upon the petitioner to vacate municipal premises on the ground that he was in unauthorised occupation thereof was challenged. Sec. 437a provides that if the Municipal Commissioner was satisfied that the person authorised to occupy any Municipal premises as tenant or otherwise has committed any of the defaults specified in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (a) or (b) that any person is in unauthorised occupation of any Municipal premises within the meaning of clause (b) read with the Explanation the Municipal Commissioner may by a notice order such person as well as any other person who may be in occupation of the whole or any part of the premises to vacate them within one month of the date of the service of the notice. This provision was examined by the Division Bench to find out whether it provides an exclusive remedy or additional remedy for eviction. The learned Chief Justice first referred to the dictum of Willes J. in Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. This provision was examined by the Division Bench to find out whether it provides an exclusive remedy or additional remedy for eviction. The learned Chief Justice first referred to the dictum of Willes J. in Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford (1859) 6 C. B. (N. S.) 336 at p. 356 which is as under :-THERE are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon statute. One is where there was liability existing at common law and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common law; there unless the statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication exclude the common law remedy the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the statutory remedy. THE second class of cases is where the statute gives the right to sue merely but provides no particular form as remedy there the party can only proceed by action at common law. but there is a third class viz. where a liability not existing at common law is created by the statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. . . . . The remedy provided by the statute must be followed and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to. AFTER considering a few authorities and especially referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in N. I. Caterers Ltd. (supra) it was held that the remedy was supplemental and not an exclusive one and it did not exclude the ordinary remedy of a suit. In sec. 79a there is inherent evidence to show that the remedy therein provided is substitutive and not supplemental. Sec. 79a reads as under:- 79 A. Any person unauthorisedly or wrongfully in possession of any land (a) to the use or occupation of which by reason of any of the provisions of thisact he is not entitled or has ceased to be entitled or (b) which is not transferable without previous sanction under sec. 73r or by virtue of any condition lawfully annexed to the tenure under the provisions of secs. 62 67 or 68. may be summarily evicted by the Collector. 73r or by virtue of any condition lawfully annexed to the tenure under the provisions of secs. 62 67 or 68. may be summarily evicted by the Collector. THE person who may be sought to be evicted under sec. 79a must be in unauthorised occupation or wrongful possession of any land to the use or occupation of which by reason of any of the provisions of the Act he is not entitled to or has ceased to be entitled to or which was not transferable without previous sanction under section 73 or by virtue of any condition lawfully annexed to the tenure under the provisions of sec. 62 67 or 68. Before one can proceed under sec. 79a to summarily evict a person it must be shown that he is unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of the land and this must be examined in the light of the provisions of the Land Revenue Code. It is not any unauthorised occupation of land by a person who can be summarily evicted under sec. 79a; but his occupation of land must be unauthorised and whether it is authorised or unauthorised must be examined in the light. of the provisions of the Land Revenue Code. He can be said to be unauthorisedly occupying the land if the person is shown not to be entitled to the use or occupation of the land by reason of the provisions of the Land Revenue Code only or which was not transferable without previous sanction under sec. 73a or by virtue of any condition lawfully annexed to the tenure under the provisions of sec. 62 67 or 68. The gist of the matter is that the person sought to be summarily evicted must be first shown to be in unauthorised occupation or wrongful possession and occupation must be unauthorised because he is not entitled to use or occupation of the land because of some specific provisions of the Act or in wrongful possession the possession being in contravention of the Land Revenue Code and specifically if he has come into possession by transfer of land which was not transferable under sec. 73a 62 67 or 68. Therefore only that person can be summarily evicted who has been in possession in contravention of the provisions of the Land Revenue Code only. 73a 62 67 or 68. Therefore only that person can be summarily evicted who has been in possession in contravention of the provisions of the Land Revenue Code only. If possession of land can be said to be unauthorised or unlawful by common law provision certainly no action can be taken under sec. 79a. The various provisions of the Punjab Premises and Fund (Eviction and Rent Recovery) of Rent Act as well as the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act Gujarat Municipalities Act and Gujarat Panchayats Act which were examined in the aforementioned three cases there was a provision in each of these Acts by which a person merely in unauthorised possession and whose possession had not become unauthorised under any of the provisions of the Act but by reference to any other law can be evicted by proceeding under the summary remedy provided in the Act. Therefore it was held that the remedy was supplemental and not substitutive and no guideline was provided. Under sec. 79a the Collector must act within four corners of sec. 79a which not only provided guidelines but for the purpose of the Act the Collector can have recourse only to the procedure prescribed under sec. 79a and could not maintain a civil suit. Therefore viewed from either angle the section has not lent itself open to the charge of discrimination and does not offend Art. 14 and the challenge must be negatived. ( 29 ) IT was next contended that the Collector is stopped from initiating proceedings for summary eviction on account of unreasonable delay and because of their inaction the petitioners have altered their position to their disadvantage. We are called upon to examine this contention at the instance of the petitioners who in flagrant violation of the mandatory provisions of law have entered into possession of land and whose possession on the face of it is unauthorised. We may point out that notification under sec. 73a was issued in 1961. Various transfers of occupancies in favour of the petitioners have been made between 1963 and 1968 It is undoubtedly true that most of these transfers were noted in the record of rights and entries were certified by certain revenue officers. But certification of an entry in the record of rights will not have the effect of validating an otherwise invalid transfer. But certification of an entry in the record of rights will not have the effect of validating an otherwise invalid transfer. That apart we fail to see how the petitioners could justifiably contend that they have altered their position on account of some inaction or delay on the part of the Collector or authorities in the Revenue Department. The petitioners took transfer without obtaining the previous sanction of the Collector. If they at all altered their position they altered before any action was taken by the Revenue authorities. The Government issued notification as far back as 1961. It was published in the Gazette. As the Revenue authorities came across large scale contravention of the notification and provision of sec. 73a the Mamlatdar in order to warn persons residing in the locality again brought to the notice of the persons residing in the locality the said notification. But nothing has been done by the Revenue authorities including the Collector relying on which the petitioners could ever urge that they have altered their position to their disadvantage. If at all they could be said to have altered their position to their disadvantage they did it by taking transfer without obtaining prior sanction of the Collector and nothing was done prior to the transfer by the Collector or the Revenue authorities relying on which the petitioners could be said to have altered their position to their disadvantage. If the contention is based on the doctrine of estoppel we are unable to appreciate it because it is estoppel against the statute which can never be upheld. There is the fore no substance in the contention that the petitioners altered their position to their disadvantage because of the inaction of the Collector or the authorities in the Revenue Department. ( 30 ) INCIDENTALLY the submission that the Assistant Collector took action under sec. 79a after long delay cannot be accepted. As stated earlier the transfers were taken by the petitioners between 1963 and 1968. The transfers were in violation of the mandatory statutory provision. If the petitioners whose possession would be wrongful are now sought to be evicted there is no such delay as would render the exercise of power unreasonable. It is true that any power must be exercised in a reasonable manner and in order that the power is exercised in reasonable manner it must be exercised within reasonable time. If the petitioners whose possession would be wrongful are now sought to be evicted there is no such delay as would render the exercise of power unreasonable. It is true that any power must be exercised in a reasonable manner and in order that the power is exercised in reasonable manner it must be exercised within reasonable time. But assuming that if the transferor could have complained of the transfer being invalid and the transferee being in unauthorised possession was sought to be evicted and the transferor claimed that he be restored possession the limitation would be of 12 years. If such is the period of limitation the exercise of power by the Collector could not be said to be after an unreasonable delay. Therefore also there is no substance in the contention and the contention must be negatived. ( 31 ) IT was lastly urged that the inquiry in which the impugned order is made is not held according to the statutory procedure prescribed in secs. 192 to 197 and consequently the order is invalid. The Assistant Collector in each case before proceeding to pass his order of summary eviction under sec. 79a served each petitioner a notice to show cause why he should not be evicted from the land and where the petitioner chose to object he was heard. But Mr. Majmudar urged that sec. 192 imposes an obligation on the Enquiry Officer to summon witnesses whose presence is desired by a party to a formal or summary inquiry and the Assistant Collector declined to summon witnesses whose presence was desired by the petitioners in some of these petitions. Sec. 192 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code provides that in any formal or summary inquiry if any party desires the attendance of witnesses he shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for parties applying for summonses for witnesses. In Special Civil Application No. 774 of 1970 the Assistant Collector has observed that the petitioners sought permission to examine the Talati Circle Officer of the Gad Boria estate Mamlatdar as well as the Prant Officer and the original occupants with whom the petitioners had entered into transaction. In Special Civil Application No. 774 of 1970 the Assistant Collector has observed that the petitioners sought permission to examine the Talati Circle Officer of the Gad Boria estate Mamlatdar as well as the Prant Officer and the original occupants with whom the petitioners had entered into transaction. This request was negatived by the Assistant Collector observing that the person who has transferred the land accepts the transfer and no useful purpose would be served by examining any Government Officers because certified entry in V. F. VII can be cancelled in the light of the aforesaid legal position. It is undoubtedly true that the petitioners desired to examine some witnesses But it appears that the authority holding inquiry under sec. 192 was satisfied that certain witnesses were sought to be examines to prove a fact which was apparent on the record. It appears that the petitioner wanted to prove that after the land was transferred to him an entry was posted in the record of rights which was certified by the Revenue authorities. That fact is accepted and it has been held that certification of an entry in the record of rights will not have the effect of validating an otherwise invalid transfer. Therefore the petitioners cannot claim any prejudice on account of the rejection of the request to examine certain witnesses. This was the only violation complained of by the petitioners of the rules prescribing procedure for a formal or a summary inquiry. In our opinion there is no denial of reasonable opportunity or the opportunity as envisaged by law to the petitioners in the inquiry and therefore the contention that the inquiry was not held in accordance with the prescribed procedure cannot be accepted. ( 32 ) WE may now refer to the specific contentions in two petitions. ( 33 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 793 of 1970 it was urged that transferor is one Dalsukhbhai Prabhabhai who was not a member of the scheduled tribe and therefore the notification would not apply to him. It was admitted that transferee Ghelabhai Bhagwanbhai is a member of the scheduled tribe. It appears that this contention was not taken before the Assistant Collector who could have examined it on merits. It was admitted that transferee Ghelabhai Bhagwanbhai is a member of the scheduled tribe. It appears that this contention was not taken before the Assistant Collector who could have examined it on merits. A petitioner if he is desirous of challenging the impugned order of the Assistant Collector on the ground that transferor is a person who did not belong to the scheduled tribe and therefore notification was not applicable to him it was incumbent upon him to join transferor as a party to the petition and the specific contention to that effect should have been taken in the petition. There is no contention to that effect in the petition and the transferor is not joined as a party and therefore this contention is not open to the petitioner. ( 34 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 896 of 1970 it was contended that the land in question bearing S. No. 50 of village Ambapur of Taluka Nasvadi was sold by Trikambhai Motibhai on 7-6-68 and neither Trikambhai the transferor nor Ranjitsinh Hathisinh transferee belong to the scheduled tribe and therefore notification under sec. 73a would not apply to them. This contention was taken before the learned Assistant at Collector. He has found as a fact that original transferee was one Chandubhai Chhaganbhai a man belonging to scheduled tribe and Chandubhai transferred the land on 17-3-67 to Trikambhai. If Chandubhai was a member of the scheduled tribe and if he transferred the land on 17-3-67 that is after the issue of the notification under sec. 73a obviously the transfer would be invalid as it was made without previous sanction of the Collector. If the transfer is invalid and the transferor Trikambhai did not acquire any title to the land and therefore when he transferred the land to Ranjitsinh on 17-3-67 he could not transfer what he had not obtained. If the initial transfer was invalid the subsequent transfer for the purpose of sec. 73a read with sec. 79a would be invalid and therefore the learned Assistant Collector was right in taking action under sec. 79a against Ranjitsinh Hathisinh. ( 35 ) WE would next refer to Special Civil Application No. 1367 of 1970. Mr. Vakharia impugned the constitutional validity of sec. 73a on almost identical grounds on which Mr. 73a read with sec. 79a would be invalid and therefore the learned Assistant Collector was right in taking action under sec. 79a against Ranjitsinh Hathisinh. ( 35 ) WE would next refer to Special Civil Application No. 1367 of 1970. Mr. Vakharia impugned the constitutional validity of sec. 73a on almost identical grounds on which Mr. Mamlatdar challenged the same and one or two additional submissions made by him have been considered and disposed of while considering the challenge to sec. 73a as offending Art. 14 and Art. 19 (1) (f ). A specific contention was taken by Mr. Vakharia in this petition that sec. 73a cannot be made applicable to the land involved in the petition as the original survey settlement was made in respect of this land and therefore notification under sec. 73a cannot be issued in respect of this land or would not apply to its land. Mr. Vakharia told us that he does not want to press this contention at this stage and we need not decide the same. ( 36 ) THEREFORE having given our anxious thought to all the contentions raised in all these petitions we are unable to find substance in any of them and therefore these petitions fail and must be dismissed and rule is discharged in each case with no order as to costs. ( 37 ) MR. Majmudar and Mr. C. K. Patel and Mr. Vakharia Advocates for the petitioners in these petitions request for certificate under Art. 133 (1) (c) as the petitions involve a question of wide public importance and as the vires of sec. 73a and 79a has been challenged in these petitions. A question of wide public importance does arise. We therefore grant certificate under Art. 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution. Interim injunction granted in these petitions would continue for a further period of two months from today. .