JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra, J. - This application in revision is against an order dated 6-1-1968 setting aside an ex parte decree passed against the opposite parties. The Petitioner as Plaintiff brought Title Suit No. 45 of 1966 on the basis of a registered mortgage bond executed by opp. party No. 1 as Karta of the joint family consisting of himself, his son opp. party No. 2, and his wife opp. party No. 3. Opp. party No. 2 being a minor was represented in the Suit by his father and natural guardian opp. party No. 1. Opp. party No. 1 for self and as guardian for his minor son filed a written statement, the plea taken being essentially a plea of payment. This written statement was adopted by opp. party No. 3. The suit was fixed for hearing to 23-8-1967. As the opp. parties remained absent an ex parte decree was passed against them. Thereafter, an application under Order 9, Rule 13, CPC was filed by opp. party No. 1 on behalf of himself and his minor son, opp. party No. 2. Opp. party No. 3 has also joined in the application. The plea taken was that on the date of hearing opp. party No. 1 fen ill and his wife opp. party no 3 who is a purdanashin lady had to stay away at home to attend on her ailing husband. At the hearing of the application, no evidence was adduced on behalf of the opp. parties. The Petitioner, however, examined the Head Assistant of the Malaria Office, Sambalpur, where opp. party No. 1 works as a peon, to prove that the Latter attended office on the date of hearing. On this evidence, the learned Munsif held that the plea of illness of opp. party No. 1 was false. He felt that in the circumstances, opp. parties 1 and 3 would not have been normally entitled to any relief, but so far as the minor opp. party No. 2 is concerned, the learned Munsif thought that the negligence of his guardian in not attending the Court on the date of hearing constitutes "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, and that consequently so far as the minor opp. party No. 2 is concerned, the ex parte decree passed against him should be set aside. party No. 2 is concerned, the ex parte decree passed against him should be set aside. But the learned Munsif, feeling that the ex parte decree cannot be set aside against the minor alone lest it may lead to inconsistent decrees in future, set aside the ex parte decree passed against all the opp. parties. The correctness of this order is challenged in this prooeeding. 2. Order 9, Rule 13 runs thus: 13(1) In any case in which a decree is passed ex parte against a Defendant, he may apply to the Court by which the decree was passed for an order to Bet it aside ; and if he satisfies the Court that the summons was not duly served, or that there was sufficient cause for his failure to appear when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs payment into Court or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for prooeeding with the suit: Provided that where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against such Defendant only it may be set aside as against all or any of the other Defendants also. Provided further that no such decree shall be set aside merely on the ground of irregularity in service of Summons if the Court is satisfied that the Defendant knew of the date of hearing in sufficient time to enable him to appear and answer the Plaintiff's claim. Explanation : A summons served under Order 5, Rule 15 on an adult male member having an interest adverse to that of the Defendant in the subject matter of the Suit shall not be deemed to have been duly served within the meaning of this rule. (2) The provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply to applications under Sub-rule (1). Where in a suit there is either a minor Plaintiff or a minor Defendant, he must necessarily be represented by a next friend or a guardian-ad-litem, as the case may be. From the very nature of things, the minor himself cannot appear in Court to look after the litigation. Where in a suit there is either a minor Plaintiff or a minor Defendant, he must necessarily be represented by a next friend or a guardian-ad-litem, as the case may be. From the very nature of things, the minor himself cannot appear in Court to look after the litigation. If, in such circumstances, the guardian of the minor remains absent from Court on the date fixed for hearing and the suit is dismissed for default in a case where the minor is the Plaintiff or an ex parte decree is passed against the minor in a case where he is the Defendant, the question arises whether the absence from Court of the guardian alone without anything more is sufficient to constitute "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Order 9, Rule 9 or Rule 13, as the case may be. One : of the earliest cases dealing with this question is Kesho Pershad and Ors. v. Hirday Narain 6 C.L.R. 69, where a mother appearing personally and as guardian of her minor son allowed an ex parte decree to be passed against an of them. In an application filed by them under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, the plea that summons was not duly served on them was not believed. Nonetheless the Court held that there was sufficient cause for the nonappearance of the minor. This is what the Court observed: It is not to be expected that the Defendants (minor) themselves would have appeared in person, and they had a right to expect that their lawful guardian would take the proper, and what in this case was obviously a necessary, step to protect their interest. By a neglect of duty for which they are not in any way responsible, no one appeared on their behalf when the case was called on. We think it would be contrary to justice to hold that they are responsible for their nonappearance. We think they have a right to say, in the words of the Act, that they have been prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the case was caned on. That being so, whether the summons was served or not, the Court below had power to set, aside these decrees. This view was adopted by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Gadi Neelaveni v. M arappareddigari Narayana Reddi AIR 1920 Mad. That being so, whether the summons was served or not, the Court below had power to set, aside these decrees. This view was adopted by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Gadi Neelaveni v. M arappareddigari Narayana Reddi AIR 1920 Mad. 640, Kathasawmy Chettiar and Another Vs. Ramachandran and Another, and Donthi Venkataratnam and Others Vs. Nagappa and Another. In the last mentioned case, Beasley, C.J. went so far as to say It appears to me therefore that the position in justice is that if there are minor Plaintiffs and Defendants who are represented as they must be by a next friend and the next friend is absent, through whatever cause it may be at the trial, then that fact alone is a sufficient reason for setting aside an ex parte decree passed against minor Defendants or for setting aside an order of dismissal of the suit in the case of minor Plaintiffs. The learned Chief Justice himself in a later decision in Majeti Venkatasurya Subbarayudu Sowcar, being minor by mother and next friend Venkatasurya Satya Parvatamba now declared a major and the guardian discharged Vs. Majeti Bapannarao Sowcar and Others realised that the observations made by him in Donthi Venkataratnam and Others Vs. Nagappa and Another were too wide and would lead to manifest injustice. His Lordship recognized that there must be some limitation to the rule enunciated in Donthi Venkataratnam and Others Vs. Nagappa and Another, and the limitation must be that, where it is shown that the guardian absent himself or herself deliberately in pursuance of a plan in order to obstruct a litigation, or the absence is not bona fide, the minor cannot claim the benefit of that rule. In Ramnathan and another v. Sp. Rm. R.M. Mayyappa Chettiar AIR 1936 Mad. 961, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held following the decision in Nookala Peda Satyam and Another, minor by Guardian Venkamma and Others Vs. Thummalapalli Krishnamurty that the mere absence of a guardian-ad-litem is not by itself a sufficient cause for allowing an application under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. In one of the earliest decisions of the Patna High Court in Indra Deo Narayan Singh v. Matukdhari Singh AIR 1917 Pat. Thummalapalli Krishnamurty that the mere absence of a guardian-ad-litem is not by itself a sufficient cause for allowing an application under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. In one of the earliest decisions of the Patna High Court in Indra Deo Narayan Singh v. Matukdhari Singh AIR 1917 Pat. 700, the Division Bench held that where in a suit by a mortgagee against the members of a Joint Hindu Family one of whom was a minor represented by his father as" guardian, the father failed to put in any defence and an ex parte decree was passed against the minor, the ex parte decree so passed cannot be set aside merely on the ground that the guardian did not appear and put up a defence. A recent Division Bench decision of that Court in Vaidyanath Sahay Vs. Rambadan Singh and Another cited before us was not one relating to an application under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, but is a case brought by a minor after obtaining majority to set aside an ex parte decree passed against him during minority. It was held that if the erstwhile minor succeeded in establishing that his interests were not guarded in the previous litigation by the Court-appointed guardian as a prudent man ought to do, he can legitimately make a grievance of that fact to avoid the consequence of the litigation decided against him during his minority. Their Lordships, however, observed that any kind of negligence would not entitle him to such a course and that the decree can be avoided only on the proof of gross negligence on the part of the guardian even in absence of proof of fraud or collusion. 4. We would lastly refer to a Benoh decision of the Madras High Court in Vaithilinga Naidu, represented by next Friend, Subbammal and Another Vs. Devanai Ammal and Another. The Plaintiffs who were minors through their paternal uncle as next friend 'brought a suit for a declaration that a Court sale of their house was not binding on them. On the date fixed for trial of the suit, the guardian was absent from Court and he had also not taken any steps to get ready for hearing of the suit on that date. Consequently the suit was dismissed for default. On the date fixed for trial of the suit, the guardian was absent from Court and he had also not taken any steps to get ready for hearing of the suit on that date. Consequently the suit was dismissed for default. An application under Order 9, Rule 9, CPC was filed to set aside that order and the trial Court held that there was no sufficient cause for the non-appearance of the Plaintiffs on the date of hearing and dismissed the application. On appeal, the High Court agreed with the finding arrived at by the trial Court. It was, however, argued on behalf of the minor Appellants that on the assumption that the next friend was negligent in so far as he failed to take any steps for hearing of the suit still the suit must be restored to file, as such negligence itself would be sufficient cause within the meaning of Order 9, Rule 9, Code of Civil Procedure. The argument was that where the Plaintiff is a minor and cannot consequently appear himself without a next friend, the negligence of the next friend must be regarded as sufficient cause for the Plaintiff's non-appearance within the meaning of the rule and that otherwise the interests of the minor Plaintiff would be seriously jeopardised. The High Court rejected this contention being of the view that acceptance of such an argument would be that in every case where the Plaintiff is a minor the suit must be restored ipso facto and indeed there would be no purpose in or justification for dismissing such a suit because on this line of reasoning, in no conceivable contingency can be dismissal be maintained. After an exhaustive discussion of the case law on the subject, and a review of the previous decisions of that Court, their Lordships held that. (1) The words "sufficient cause" in Order 9, Rule 9 or Order 9, Rule 13 cannot be construed so as to include cases of negligence or obstruction on the part of the next friend or guardian-ad-litem. The effect of such a construction would be to render the expression "sufficient cause" meaningless as every nonappearance of a next friend or guardian-ad-litem would in that view attract the operation of Order 9, Rule 9 or Order 9, Rule 13. The effect of such a construction would be to render the expression "sufficient cause" meaningless as every nonappearance of a next friend or guardian-ad-litem would in that view attract the operation of Order 9, Rule 9 or Order 9, Rule 13. (2) When the nonappearance of the next friend is bona fide or, in other words, for reasons which would be held to constitute sufficient cause if he were conducting his own suit, Order 9, Rule 9 can certainly be invoked on behalf of the minor for the restoration of his suit. (3) Similarly, if the nonappearance of the next friend is the result of collusion between, him and the Defendant or if the next friend assumes, for whatever reason, an attitude of hostility against the minor Plaintiff and consequently refrains from appearing, that may constitute "sufficient cause" for restoration of the suit. If we may say so with respect, Vaithilinga Naidu, represented by next Friend, Subbammal and Another Vs. Devanai Ammal and Another has laid down the correct law on the subject and we accept the views expressed therein. 5. Coming to the facts of the present case, the father of the minor Respondent who was acting as his guardian in the suit was admittedly absent from Court on the date of hearing. The allegation that be was presented by illness from attending Court has not only not been established but such evidence as the Plaintiff-Appellant produced in Court disproved such a plea. It cannot, therefore, in the circumstances, be said that his absence was bona fide. There is no suggestion much less evidence that the father of the minor was hostile to the minor's interest or that the father had colluded with the Plaintiff-Appellant. His non-appearance in Court must therefore be deemed only to be due either to negligence or it may be that the father guardian thought that he had no valid defense to be put forward either on his own behalf or on behalf of the minor. It would be recalled that the substantial defense put forward on behalf of the father and his minor son in the suit is one of payment of the mortgage dues, and there is nothing to show that there is any documentary evidence to substantiate this plea. It would be recalled that the substantial defense put forward on behalf of the father and his minor son in the suit is one of payment of the mortgage dues, and there is nothing to show that there is any documentary evidence to substantiate this plea. Very likely therefore the father guardian thought that the defence cannot be established and was only trying to protract the litigation by putting forth untenable pleas. Assuming that this is not the motive for nonappearance, the only other cause for non-appearance is negligence which by itself cannot be a ground to set aside the ex parte decree. 6. In the result, therefore, we would allow this application and set aside the order passed by the learned Munsif setting aside the ex parte decree passed against the Respondents. In the circumstances, parties should bear their own costs in this application. G.K. Misra, C.J. 7. I agree. Final Result : Allowed