ORDER M.H. Beg, J. - Munnilal Appellant has been convicted for an offence punishable u/s 224 IPC and sentenced to one year's R.I. He was also found guilty of offences punishable Under Sections 147 and 323 read with Section 149 IPC and sentenced to six month's R.I. for each offence under these provisions. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. He was acquitted of the charge for an offence punishable u/s 307 IPC read with Section 149 IPC. 2. According to the prosecution case, Munnilal was wanted at police station Manda, in the district of Allahabad, in connection with a dacoity in 1961. Proceedings Under Sections 87/88 Code of Criminal Procedure had been taken against him as he was absconding. As Munnilal was a resident of village Bhonda, which lay within the limits of police station Karchana, the papers connected with the proceedings Under Sections 87/88 Code of Criminal Procedure had been sent to police station Karchana where Sarju Singh, PW 3, was the Second Officer. The entries made in the General Diary (Ex-Ka 4) of police station Karchana in this connection were known to and proved by the Second Officer. Another entry in the General Diary (Ex. Ka 5) showed that a warrant of attachment had been executed on 5-5-1961 by the Station Officer Prem Narain Misra, of police station Karchana, against the property of Munnilal. On 16-12-1961, Second Officer Sarju Singh, in the company of constable Jalil Beg, PW 2, was investigating a case u/s 457 IPC at village Khain, one Bankeylal PW 1, informed him that Munnilal was seen in village Bhonda so that he could be arrested. Apparently, persons like Bankeylal, PW 1, who were in touch with the police, also knew that Munnilal was wanted by the police. Moreover, when proceedings had been taken Under Sections 87/88 Code of Criminal Procedure it must be a matter of common knowledge in the village that Munnilal, wanted by the police, was evading arrest. Sarju Singh, PW 3, on having received information about the Appellant, proceeded to village Bhonda. He did not know Munnilal from before. But, as Bankeylal, who knew Munnilal from before, told him at village Bhonda that Munnilal was seen proceeding in their direction they hid behind a wall. They came out and arrested Munnilal as he was passing near the wall. Munnilal raised an alarm. He did not know Munnilal from before. But, as Bankeylal, who knew Munnilal from before, told him at village Bhonda that Munnilal was seen proceeding in their direction they hid behind a wall. They came out and arrested Munnilal as he was passing near the wall. Munnilal raised an alarm. A number of villagers came to his help with lathis. One of them, Vishwanath, had a country made pistol. The Second Officer told the villagers that Munnilal had been lawfully taken into custody as he was wanted for an offence u/s 395 IPC and there was a warrant for his arrest. He informed them that he could not, therefore, be released. But the friends of Munnilal beat up the police Officers and Bankeylal with lathis. The police party also used lathis in self defence. Jalil Beg had given a lathi blow to Vishwanath and had deprived him of his pistol. But, the small police party was overwhelmed. Munnilal was released from lawful custody. While running away, Sarju Singh fired his pistol in the air to frighten away the villagers. Munnilal, who had observed that the ammunition of the police officer was exhausted, then instigated his rescuers to chase and beat the police party which was again beaten. Each of the three persons in the police party escaped after sustaining some injuries. Second Officer Sarju Singh sustained as many as 16 simple injuries. Constable Jalil Beg had 10 simple injuries. Bankey Lal had 4 simple injuries. Some injuries were also inflicted on the heads of the police Officers. A first information report was lodged at police station Karchana at 9-15 p.m. on 16-12-1961, at a distance of 7 miles from the place of occurrence, giving out the names of eight accused persons. Some of the details given above are not mentioned in the FIR. But, Sarju Singh, who had lodged the, fairly detailed first information report, was not given any opportunity to explain the omissions. 3. On the above prosecution case, only seven persons could be tried initially as Munnilal was absconding. The seven accused persons were convicted by the court of sessions in sessions trial No. 140 of 1962. One of the convicted persons was acquitted on an appeal to this Court on the ground that his participation among persons who are said to have chased and then beaten the police officers and Bankeylal was not established. The seven accused persons were convicted by the court of sessions in sessions trial No. 140 of 1962. One of the convicted persons was acquitted on an appeal to this Court on the ground that his participation among persons who are said to have chased and then beaten the police officers and Bankeylal was not established. Subsequently, Munnilal was tried and convicted as mentioned above. In his appeal, now before this Court, learned Counsel for the Appellant has confined his argument mainly to a question of law. His contention is that, even if the defence of the Appellant, that he was not there at all, is rejected and the prosecution case, as set out above, is accepted as correct, the Appellant could not be convicted as the Second Officer Sarju Singh was not armed with any right to arrest Munnilal. In other words, the submission was that Munnilal and his rescuers were justified in attacking the police party which had illegally arrested Munnilal. Second Officer Sarju Singh was certainly not shown to have any warrant or order in writing for the arrest of the Appellant in his possession at the time of the arrest of Munnilal. There is no evidence that he was asked to produce it. It is, however, clear that even if he had been asked to produce a warrant of arrest, he could not have produced it as he did not have it with him. 4. Learned Counsel for the Appellant relied strongly upon a Division Bench decision of this Court, in State v. Ram Chandra AIR 1955 Alld 438. There, it was held that, if the arrest of an accused person is illegal for non-compliance of the provisions of Section 56 Code of Criminal Procedure, inasmuch as no order in writing for the arrest of the accused was given by the Superior Officer, the provisions of Section 54(1) Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be called in aid if, in fact, the officer making the arrest did not himself purport to act u/s 54(1) Code of Criminal Procedure and did not himself possess any information which enabled him to act independently. Reliance was also placed on King v. Sridhar AIR 1941 Ran 180 where it was held that a police Officer, who is merely purporting to carry out the order of his superior officers given to him orally, could not lawfully arrest, within the, meaning of Section 225 IPC, because Section 56 Code of Criminal Procedure made it imperative for the superior officer to give the order for arrest in writing to the subordinate officer. 5. On behalf of the State, my attention was drawn to the conflict of decisions said to exist between the decisions of various High Courts on the question whether Section 54 Code of Criminal Procedure operates independently of the provisions of Section 56 Code of Criminal Procedure or is controlled by it. It was urged for the State that, according to the views expressed by the High Courts of Bombay in Emperor Vs. Keshavlal Harilal, AIR 1937 Bom 56 , of Madras In Re: Mohamed Meera Sahib and Others, AIR 1943 Mad 207 and in Maharani Gurucharan Kaur of Nabha and Another Vs. The Province of Madras and Others, AIR 1942 Mad 539 of Orissa in Gandharba Rath Vs. Aparti Samal, AIR 1960 Ori 33 , of Patna in Jioo Mian and Others Vs. Emperor, AIR 1938 Patna 229 and of Kerala in K. Sulaiman v. State of Kerala AIR 1954 Ker 185, non-compliance with the provisions of Section 56. Code of Criminal Procedure was immaterial where the case was covered by Section 54 Code of Criminal Procedure. It was pointed out that the view of the Division Bench of this Court in Ram Chandra's case (supra) rests on the assumption that the provisions of Section 54 Code of Criminal Procedure were inapplicable to the facts under consideration in that case. Similarly, the decision of Rangoon High Court, in Sridhar's case (supra), could be distinguished on facts. The earlier decision of Mosely, J., in Mohd. Ismail v. Emperor AIR 1936 Ran. 119, relied upon in Sridhar's case (supra), was clearly one of purported deputation of a subordinate officer to arrest. Such deputisation can only take place under and in accordance with Section 56 Code of Criminal Procedure so that no question of taking the aid of Section 54 could arise for supporting such deputisation. The information given in the course of, a purported deputisation was held in Mohd. Such deputisation can only take place under and in accordance with Section 56 Code of Criminal Procedure so that no question of taking the aid of Section 54 could arise for supporting such deputisation. The information given in the course of, a purported deputisation was held in Mohd. Ismail's case (supra), to be insufficient to give the arresting officer an independent power of arrest u/s 54 Code of Criminal Procedure. Another case, AIR 1941 95 (Nagpur) , is also distinguishable inasmuch as the police constable who made the arrest there was not acting independently under any power shown to have been possessed by him u/s 54 Code of Criminal Procedure, but only purported to act under a direction which had to comply with Section 56 Code of Criminal Procedure to be valid. Thus, even the cases relied upon by the Appellant's counsel show that where the police officer can act independently, as in the instant case, Section 56 Code of Criminal Procedure is not really attracted. An oral direction, falling outside Section 56 Code of Criminal Procedure could, in such cases, be treated as redundant and of no legal consequence even if it is there. 6. In considering the powers of arrest given to police officers and others Under Sections 54 to 59 Code of Criminal Procedure for apprehending individuals, falling within various classes dealt with there, it should be borne in mind that there is a presumption against redundancy or duplication of provisions each of which is meant to apply to a different set of facts although there may be cases where the totality of facts in the case may bring it within more than one provision. Each of the provisions from Section 54 to Section 59 Code of Criminal Procedure deals with arrests without warrant. That, however, does not mean that, in every case of arrest without warrant, each or more than one provision could apply simultaneously. The question whether one or more than one provision could apply must necessarily depend upon the facts of each case. 7. The Division Bench decision of this Court in Ram Chandra's case (supra) does not go so far as to lay down that the question of applicability of Section 56 Code of Criminal Procedure necessarily arises whenever a superior officer directs his subordinate officer even orally to arrest an accused person or offender. 7. The Division Bench decision of this Court in Ram Chandra's case (supra) does not go so far as to lay down that the question of applicability of Section 56 Code of Criminal Procedure necessarily arises whenever a superior officer directs his subordinate officer even orally to arrest an accused person or offender. It is only when a police officer incharge of a police station or an investigating officer intends or purports to deputise the subordinate officer that an order in writing specifying the person to be arrested and the reasons for the arrest have to be given in conformity with Section 56(1). If there is no such written order there could be no valid action u/s 56. Of course, the officer making the arrest may purport to rely on that provision and not on Section 54 Code of Criminal Procedure at all. In that case, the police officer concerned must show compliance with Section 56 Code of Criminal Procedure as that is only power relied upon by him. The question of non compliance with Section 56 can only arise in a case where action is or could be purported to be taken under that provision and not under any other provision. 8. I do not find anything in Ram Chandra's case (supra) to lead me to the conclusion that merely because the Station Officer informs his subordinate officers that they should arrest somebody who is wanted that he purports to take action u/s 56 Code of Criminal Procedure. Such a direction may mean that the superior officer has merely asked other officers to exercise their independent powers of arrest u/s 54 Code of Criminal Procedure with regard to a certain person or certain persons. Giving of all directions is not covered by Section 56 Code of Criminal Procedure at all. The last mentioned section, as emphasised in Ram Chandra's case (supra), relates to a specific direction given to the subordinate officer to carry out a particular duty with regard to a particular accused person quite apart from the power or duty he may have u/s 54 Code of Criminal Procedure. 9. The Division Bench decision of this Court in Ram Chandra's case (supra) turned upon its own rather special facts. 9. The Division Bench decision of this Court in Ram Chandra's case (supra) turned upon its own rather special facts. The question to be decided there was whether the direction or order of a superior officer, given orally to a subordinate police officer, relied upon as the only authority for the arrest under consideration there, could be treated as a "requisition" falling within the ninth head of Section 54 Code of Criminal Procedure, or it was an illegal purported direction u/s 56 Code of Criminal Procedure. It was held to be an illegal purported action and not a "requisition". It should be remembered that a "requisition" need not be from a superior officer and it is generally received in special and emergent situations and often from other police stations. The order of a superior officer purporting to arm a subordinate officer with power to arrest must certainly comply with Section 56 Code of Criminal Procedure in order to be valid. The Division Bench decision does not decide anything more than that. Any observations there going beyond this are obiter dicta. 10. The object of Section 56 Code of Criminal Procedure seems to me to be that a subordinate officer, who may not be authorised to act independently u/s 54 Code of Criminal Procedure, may have the required written order and authority to arrest from his superior officer who has the necessary information. It is meant to deputise the subordinate officer who could, therefore, act for the deputising superior officer. Its object was certainly not to take away powers of arrest without warrant given to police officer in cases covered by Section 54 where deputisation is needed at all and there by, to stultify Section 54 Code of Criminal Procedure. Its purpose could also be to protect those who resist in a bona fide belief that they cannot be arrested. Hence, the need to show the authority when it is asked for. 11. There could be a possible conflict between the effects of Sections 54 and 56 where there is, so to speak, a concurrent field. A direction, which could be a requisition if conditions of the ninth head in Section 54 are satisfied and which could be a purported action u/s 56 if the circumstances in which this provision is meant to be invoked are shown to exist, could lie in what may called an uncertain or disputed territory. A direction, which could be a requisition if conditions of the ninth head in Section 54 are satisfied and which could be a purported action u/s 56 if the circumstances in which this provision is meant to be invoked are shown to exist, could lie in what may called an uncertain or disputed territory. In that event, the question could well arise whether Section 54 or Section 56 applies or which of the two should prevail. But, that is not so here. 12. In the instant case, the statement of the Second Officer Sarju Singh shows that he was really purporting--to act u/s 54 Code of Criminal Procedure. He had only mentioned the additional and redundant direction given by the officer incharge of the police station. I am unable to see how such a direction given by the Station Officer could deprive the Second Officer of power to arrest if he had it already u/s 54 Code of Criminal Procedure. The Second Officer had merely informed the rescuers of the Appellant that a warrant for the arrest of the Appellant existed. This "warrant" was not the order of his superior Officer to him. It was presumably issued by a magistrate so that proceedings Under Sections 87/88 Code of Criminal Procedure had to be taken against the Appellant for evading arrest. The question raised on behalf of the Appellant could, in my opinion, be simply decided on the ground that Section 56 Code of Criminal Procedure did not really apply to the facts of such a case. The only provision applicable here is Section 54. 13. It has also been contended that if the Appellant was rescued by others he could not be said to have committed an offence himself. I am unable to accept this contention also. The Appellant not only called upon persons to rescue him from lawful custody, when he must have known that there was a warrant of arrest against him, but he also directed them to chase the police party and to attack it after he had been released. I see no reason to doubt this evidence which sets out the facts as they are likely to have taken place quite naturally. The very fact that proceedings Under Sections 87/88 Code of Criminal Procedure were taken shows that there was a warrant for the arrest of the Appellant. I see no reason to doubt this evidence which sets out the facts as they are likely to have taken place quite naturally. The very fact that proceedings Under Sections 87/88 Code of Criminal Procedure were taken shows that there was a warrant for the arrest of the Appellant. The statement by Sarju Singh that there was a warrant for the Appellant's arrest was, therefore; not incorrect. No ground for justifying the action of the Appellant or any of his rescuers could be made out. 14. I, therefore, uphold the convictions and sentences of the Appellant and dismiss this appeal. The Appellant was released on bail. He will be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the remaining period of his concurrent sentences. Appeal dismissed.