( 1 ) THIS is a plaintiff's second appeal against the decree passed by the civil Judge, North Kanara, in C. A. No. 221 of 1965, confirming the decree passed by the Munsiff, Bhatkal, in Civil Suit No. 16 of 1958. The plaintiff was appointed as a Secretary of the respondent which is the Village Panchayat at Shirali. On the 31st of October 1955, the Village Panchayat passed a resolution terminating the services of the plaintiff. The Panchayat sought the sanction of the Collector to terminate the services of the plaintiff as per the resolution passed on 31-10-1955. The sanction of the Collector was necessary in view of Rule 24 of the Bombay Village Panchayat Secretaries (Conditions of Services) Rules, 1948, framed under the Bombay Village panchayats Act, 1933. The Collector declined to grant the sanction prayed for. He observed in his order that the panchayat had not acted in accordance with rules and suggested that the new panchayat that was to be elected should take action in accordance with law. Immediately thereafter the panchayat passed a resolution on 7-1-1956 resolving to reinstate the plaintiff, subject to the plaintiff fulfilling certain conditions. That resolution, however, was not given effect to and the plaintiff was not reinstated in service. The panchayat passed another resolution on 12-1-1956 not to give effect to its own earlier resolution of 7-1-1956 to reinstate the plaintiff. ( 2 ) THEREFATER the newly constituted panchayat passed a resolution on 26-1-1956 terminating the services of the plaintiff. The resolution passed by the panchayat was approved by the Collector by his order dated 22-8-56. The resolution of the panchayat was given effect to and the plaintiff was removed from service on 10-9-1956. The present suit has been brought by the plaintiff on 16-4-1958 for a declaration that the termination of the plaintiff's services as well as his suspension are illegal, void and inoperative and for arrears of pay and allowances from 12-4-1955 to 31-12-1955 amounting to Rs. 648-75 and from 1-1-1956 to 31-12-1957 amounting to Rs. 1,824. The grievance of the plaintiff is that the action taken by the panchayat to terminate the services of the plaintiff is in clear violation of Rules 24 and 25 of the Rules referred to above. His further complaint is that the material resolutions have been passed in contravention of the rules and the bye-laws. The panchayat resisted the suit on various grounds. His further complaint is that the material resolutions have been passed in contravention of the rules and the bye-laws. The panchayat resisted the suit on various grounds. The panchayat contended that the termination of the plaintiff's services is in accordance with the rules and the prescribed procedure. The panchayat further took the stand that the suit is barred by limitation, in view of the fact that the suit was not brought within six months of the accrual of the cause of action as required by S. 111 of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1933. ( 3 ) THE learned Munsiff after considering the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the meeting of the panchayat held on 31-10-1955 was irregular. He also came to the conclusion that the order suspending the plaintiff is illegal. The learned Munsiff recorded a finding to the effect that the subsequent resolution of the panchayat dismissing the plaintiff from service is illegal and void. The learned Munsiff, however, dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation under S. 111 of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1933. ( 4 ) THE decree passed by the Munsiff was challenged by the plaintiff in the Court of the Civil Judge, North Kanara. The learned Civil Judge dismissed the plaintiff's appeal affirming the finding of the trial Court that the suit is barred by limitation. ( 5 ) IT is the legality of the decree passed by the learned Civil Judge that is challenged by the plaintiff in this second appeal under S. 100 CPC. ( 6 ) SHRI H. B. Datar, the learned Counsel for the appellant, contended that the finding recorded by the learned Civil Judge that the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation under S. 111 is not in accordance with law. S. 111 of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1933 reads as follows:"111. (1) No action shall lie against any member, officer, servant or agent of a panchayat or a (nyaya panchayat) acting under its direction in respect of anything done in good faith under this Act or any rule or bye-law. S. 111 of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1933 reads as follows:"111. (1) No action shall lie against any member, officer, servant or agent of a panchayat or a (nyaya panchayat) acting under its direction in respect of anything done in good faith under this Act or any rule or bye-law. (2) No action shall be brought against any panchayat or (nyaya panchayat) or any mpmber, officer, servant or agent of such panchayat or (nyava panchayat) acting under its direction for anything done or purporting to have been done under this Act, until the expiration of three months next after notice in writing has been left or delivered at the office of the panchayat or (nyaya panchayat) and also at the residence of the member, officer, servant or agent thereof against whom the action is intended to be brought. The notice shall state the cause of action, the nature of the relief sought, the amount of compensation claimed and the name and place of abode of the person who intends to bring the action. (3) Every such action shall be commenced within six months after the accrual of the cause of action and not afterwards. (4) If any panchayat or (nyaya Panchayat) or person to whom a notice under sub-sec. (2) is given shall, before an action is brought, tender sufficient amends to the plaintiff and pay into Court the amount so tendered, the plaintiff shall not recover more than the amount so tendered. The plaintiff shall also pay all costs incurred by the defen dant after such tender. " ( 7 ) IT is clear from sub-sec. (3) of S. 111 that no action can be brought against the panchayat after six months after the accrual of the cause of action. According to the defendant, the cause of action accrued when the order terminating the services of the plaintiff was served on the plaintiff and given effect to on 10-9-1956. According to the defendant, the suit ought to have been brought within six months from 10-9-1956 as required by s. 111 (3) of the Bombay Village Panchavats Act, 1933. According to the defendant, the cause of action accrued when the order terminating the services of the plaintiff was served on the plaintiff and given effect to on 10-9-1956. According to the defendant, the suit ought to have been brought within six months from 10-9-1956 as required by s. 111 (3) of the Bombay Village Panchavats Act, 1933. Shri H. B. Datar, the learned Counsel for the appellant, however, contended that a suit is required to be brought within six months after the accrual of the cause of action under S. 111 (3) of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1933, only if the suit pertains to an action of the panchayat contemplated under Section 111 (2) of the said Act. Sri Datar relying upon the language of Section 111 (2) submitted that it is only if the action is brought challenging the acts done by the panchayat or purporting to have been done by the panchayat under the Act that a suit has to be brought within a period of six months as required by S. 111 (3 ). Shri Datar submitted that if the act complained of was neither an act done by the panchayat nor an act purported to have been done under the Act, the question of applying the period of limitation prescribed under S. 111 (3) of the Act does not arise. The proposition so put forth by Shri Datar is unexceptionable, having regard to the language of S. 111 (2) and (3) of the Act. Sri Datar further urged that the removal of the plaintiff from service in this case by the panchayat is not anything done under the Act or anything purported to have been done under the Act. Tt is, therefore, necessary to examine as to whether the termination of the services of the plaintiff by the panchayat in this case is one which has been done or purporting to have been done under the Act. ( 8 ) S. 33 of the Bombav Village Panchavats Act, 1933, provides that every panchayat shall appoint a Secretary who shall be a servant of the panchayat. Sub-sec. (1a) of S. 33 provides that the qualifications, powers, duties, remuneration and contritions of service (including disciplinary matters) of such Secretary shall be such as may be prescribed. The government of Bombay framed the Rules called "the Bombay Village panchayat Secretaries (Conditions of Service) Rules. 1948. Sub-sec. (1a) of S. 33 provides that the qualifications, powers, duties, remuneration and contritions of service (including disciplinary matters) of such Secretary shall be such as may be prescribed. The government of Bombay framed the Rules called "the Bombay Village panchayat Secretaries (Conditions of Service) Rules. 1948. " Rule 24 of the said rules empowers the panchayat to impose penalties on the Secretary for good and sufficient reasons. One of the punishments that the panchayat is entitled, under the said rule, to impose is of dismissal which ordinarily disqualifies from future re-employment Proviso to the said rule states that no Secretary shall be removed from office or dismissed, save by the votes of at least two-thirds of the whole number of members of the panchayat and with the previous sanction of the Collector of the District. Rule 25 provides that no Secretary shall be removed or dismissed from his office unless- (i) he is given an intimation in writing regarding- (a) the charge or charges against him; (b) the allegations on which each charge is based; (c) any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders on the case, and (ii) he is given an opportunity- (a) to cross-examine the witnesses against him; and (b) to be heard in person. It is clear from S. 33 read with Rules 24 and 25 that the power to appoint as well as the power to dismiss a Secretary, of the panchayat vests with the panchayat. It is no doubt true that the said power is required to be exercised in the manner provided in Rules 24 and 25. The complaint of the plaintiff is in regard to the manner of the exercise of the power of the panchayat under Rules 24 and 25 It is not disputed, and it cannot be disputed, that the panchayat had the competence to remove the plaintiff from service. Sri H. B. Datar, the learned Counsel for the appellant, submitted that action has been taken in this case to remove the plaintiff from service without strictly following the procedure prescribed in Rule 25, and that as such the removal of the plaintiff from service is not anything done or purporting to have been done under the Act. Sri H. B. Datar, the learned Counsel for the appellant, submitted that action has been taken in this case to remove the plaintiff from service without strictly following the procedure prescribed in Rule 25, and that as such the removal of the plaintiff from service is not anything done or purporting to have been done under the Act. The panchayat in this case purports to exercise its powers to remove the plaintiff from service vested in it under S. 33 read with Rule 24 of the Act. It is contended by Sri Datar that as that action has been taken in violation of the procedure prescribed under Rule 25 that action of the panchayat is not one taken under the act or one purporting to have been taken under the Act. In support of his submission, Sri Datar relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in b. K. Bhandar v. Dhamangaon Municipality, AIR 1966 SC 249 . That was a case arising under the C. P. Municipalities Act, 1922. The expression "anything done or purporting to be done under this Act" occurring in S. 48 of the C. P. Municipalities act, has been construed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. In that case the plaintiff had asked for the refund of the excess tax paid by him to the Municipality. The contention of the plaintiff was that the municipality had no competence to impose tax in excess of the limits provided under the Constitution. The Municipality defended the action relving upon S. 48 of the C. P. Municipalities Act 1922, which reads as follows:"sec. 48. (1) No suit shall be instituted against any committee, or any member, officer or servant thereof or any person acting under the direction of any such committee, member, officer or servant for anything done or purporting to be done under this Act, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing stating the cause of action, the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which he claims, has been, in the case of a committee, delivered or left at its office, and, in the case of any member, officer or servant or person as aforesaid, delivered to him or left at his office or usual place of abode, and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. (2) Every such suit shall be dismissed unless it is instituted within six months from the date of the accrual of the alleged cause of action. "it was contended on behalf of the plaintiff in that case that the bar of limitation prescribed under S. 48 cannot be invoked on the ground that the recovery of tax in excess of the limits provided under the Constitution, is ultra vires. Dealing with the rival contentions of the parties, this is what the Supreme Court has observed in paragraph (24):" (24) It is true, as urged by Mr. Sastri, that it was within the competence of the respondent committee to raise the rate of tax from one anna to four annas per bojha and bale even after the cominf into force of S. 142a of the Govt. of India Act, 1935. The levy of tax at that rate cannot, therefore, be regarded to be beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent so long as the constitutional limit was not exceeded. What is, however, contended on behalf of the appellant is that the action of the committee in compelling it to pay the tax in excess of the amount which was constitutionally recoverable from it in respect of any one year was ultra vires, that thereby the provisions of S. 142a have been transgressed and, therefore, this was a case of utilisation by the committee of the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder for doing something which was prohibited by the Govt. of India act, 1935 and is now, by the Constitution. It is true that the committee had jurisdiction to recover an amount upto the constitutional limit. But it cannot fairly be contended on its behalf that merely because of this, that the recovery by it of an amount in excess of the constitutional limit was only irregular or at the worst illegal. Where power exists to assess and recover a tax upto a particular limit and the assessment or recovery of anything above that amount is prohibited the assessment or recovery of an amount in excess is wholly without jurisdiction and nothing else. To such a case the Statute under which action was purported to be taken can afford no protection. Indeed, to the extent that it affords protection, it would be bad. To such a case the Statute under which action was purported to be taken can afford no protection. Indeed, to the extent that it affords protection, it would be bad. But where, as here, the validity of a provision of statue can be upheld upon a possible construction of that provision it would be the duty of the Court to so construe it as to avoid rendering the provision unconstitutional and eject a construction which will invalidate the provision. " ( 9 ) THE Supreme Court in the above case came to the conclusion that if the Municipality imposes or collects a tax in excels of the limit provided by the Constitution, the action of the Municipality cannot be considered as one purporting to have been taken under the provisions of the Act. Any action taken by the Municipality in contravention of the mandatory provisions of the Constitution prohibiting the Municipality from imposing a tax above a particular limit was held by their Lordships as being an act wholly without jurisdiction and without competence. Such on action, as held by the Supreme Court, is neither ore done under the Act nor purporting to have been done under the Act If there is no prohibition for the lew of the tax and the tax has been imposed by not following the proper procedure, then the action of the Municipality must be regarded as something purporting to be done under the Act. An action which is not prohibited and is within the jurisdiction or competence of the authority, has to be regarded as something purporting to be done under the Act. even if the action is irregular or improper. ( 10 ) SRI K. I. Bhatta, the learned Counsel for the respondent contended that the action of the panchayat removing the plaintiff from service in this case is one which must be regarded as purporting to have been done under the Act. He urged that the panchayat had competence to remove the plaintiff from service under S. 33 of the Bombay Village Panchayats act, 1933, read with Rule 24 of the Bombay Village Panchayat Secretaries (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1948. The requisite resolution with 2/3rds majority was passed and the Collector's approval was also taken. The charges were framed and an enquiry was held. The requisite resolution with 2/3rds majority was passed and the Collector's approval was also taken. The charges were framed and an enquiry was held. The grievance of the plaintiff is only about the irregular or improper exercise of the power by the panchayat. Sri K. I. Bhatta, learned Counsel for the respondent, relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Sita Ram Gael v. Municipal board, AIR 1958 SC 1036 . That was a case in which the plaintiff who was an Overseer employed by the Municipal Board, Kanpur, was dismissed from service. The plaintiff in that suit prayed for a declaration that the order of dismissal was ultra vires, illegal and void and claimed Rs. 10,951 by way of damages for wrongful dismissal. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff in that case that he was dismissed from service without he being given an opportunity of being personally heard by the Board and without giving him a show cause notice against the proposed punishment. The suit was resisted by the Municipal Board, not only on merits but also on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation. The plea of bar of limitation was based on S. 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, which reads as follows:"s. 326 :- (1) No suit shall be instituted against a Board, or against a member, officer or servant of a Board in respect of an act done or purporting to have been done in its or his official capacity, until the expiration of the two months after notice in writing has been, in the case of a Board, left at its office, and in the case of a member, officer or servant, delivered to him or left at his office or place of abode, explicitly stating the cause of action, the nature of the relief sought, the amount of compensation claimed and the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been or and delivered or left. (3) No action such as is described in sub-sec. (1) shall, unless it is an action for the recovery of immoveable property or for a declaration of title thereto, be commenced otherwise than within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action. (3) No action such as is described in sub-sec. (1) shall, unless it is an action for the recovery of immoveable property or for a declaration of title thereto, be commenced otherwise than within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action. "the aforesaid provision is similar to S. 111 of the Bombay Village Panchayats act, 1933. Against the resolution of the Board dismissing the plaintiff in that case from service, an appeal was preferred to the State Government. The suit was filed only after the said appeal was rejected. On merits, the trial Court gave the findings in favour of the plaintiff. But the suit was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by limitation. In appeal, the high Court affirmed the finding of the trial Court that the suit was barred by limitation under S. 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916. The said decision of the High Court was challenged before the Supreme Court. The suit was filed more than six months after the passing of the resolution by the Board dismissing the plaintiff from service. The suit was, however, within six months from the date of the appellate order of the government dismissing the plaintiff's appeal. The principal question for consideration before the Supreme Court was, as to whether the cause of action for the purpose of S. 326 accrued on the date on which the resolution dismissing the plaintiff from service was passed by the Board, or as to whether it accrued on the date on which the appeal against the said resolution was rejected by the State Government. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the cause of action accrued on the date on which the resolution was passed by the Board dismissing the plaintiff from service and that, therefore, the suit filed beyond six months from that day was barred by limitation under S. 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916. It is no doubt true, as urged by Sri H. B. Datar, learned Counsel for the appellant that the question as to whether the action of the Board in that case was one purporting to have been done under the U. P. Municipalities act, 1916 was not considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. It is no doubt true, as urged by Sri H. B. Datar, learned Counsel for the appellant that the question as to whether the action of the Board in that case was one purporting to have been done under the U. P. Municipalities act, 1916 was not considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. As already mentioned, the question which was directly considered by their lordships of the Supreme Court was as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to exclude the time occupied in the disposal of the appeal before the state Government. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to exclude that time. But, it is necessary to note that in that case the trial Court gave the following findings:" (a) that the appellant's substantive appointment was that of an Over-seer and not that of a Drainage Overseer as claimed and the approval of the Superintending Engineer, Public Works Department, Lucknow for his dismissal was not necessary; (b) that the order of dismissal of the appellant was ultra vires on the ground that he was not given an opportunity of being personally heard by the Board; (c) that no notice to show cause against the proposed punishment was issued by the Board; (d) that the order of dismissal was based on certain grounds which were not subject-matter of the charge and that the Chairman of the Board was not competent to try the appellant; (e) that the suit of the appellant was barred by limitation. " ( 11 ) THESE findings given by the trial Court were not reversed by the high Court in appeal In spite of these findings, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the suit brought by the plaintiff challenging his dismissal by the Board was barred by limitation, as the same had been brought more that six months after the passing of the resolution by the Board dismissing the the plaintiff from service. It is reasonable to infer that the Supreme court came to the conclusion that the action of the Municipal Board was one purporting to have been done under the U. P. Munilcipal Act, 1916. It is reasonable to infer that the Supreme court came to the conclusion that the action of the Municipal Board was one purporting to have been done under the U. P. Munilcipal Act, 1916. If the Supreme Court were to draw an inference that the action of the municipality was not one purporting to have been taken under the Act, the Supreme Court would not have come to a conclusion that the suit of the plaintiff was barred by limitation under S,326 of the U. P. Municipalities act, 1916. Relying on this judgment of the Supreme Court, Sri, K. I. Bhatta, learned Counsel for the respondent rightly contended that if an action is taken by an authority which is competent under the statute to dismiss its employee from service, the mere irregular exercise of the said power resulting in wrongful dismissal of the employee cannot take away such actions from the category of actions which may be described as actions purporting to have been done under the Act. The cases of wrongful dismissal by an authority which is competent under the statute to dismiss the employee from service are cases in which the action is taken by the authority either under the powers vested under the Act or in the purported ecercise of the said power If the action taken by the authority is without competence or jurisdiction or is one which is prohibited by law such an action cannot be characterised either as an action taken under the Act or purported to have been taken under the Act. But, if the authority has the competence or jurisdiction to take the action, the mere irregular or improper exercise of the said power or jurisdiction cannot be characterised as an action not purporting to have been taken under the Act. The decision of the Supreme Court in Sita Ram Goel v. Municipal Board must be read as impliedly laying down that if an authority has competence under the act to remove its employee from service, the improper or irregular exercise of the said power resulting in wrongful dismissal of the employee must be regarded as something purporting to have been done under the Act. ( 12 ) IT is not disputed and it cannot be disputed that the panchayat in the present case had the competence and jurisdiction to remove the plaintiff from service The panchayat removed the plaintiff from service by passing the reauisite resolution with 2/3rds majority. The action of the panchayat was approved by the Collector. The action complained of in the present case cannot therefore, be characterised as being either without jurisdiction or without competence. The grievance of the plaintiff amounts to complaining that the action of the panchayat which is well within its jurisdiction and competence, has been taken in an irregular manner. The complaint really is not that the panchayat had no competence or jurisdiction to dismiss or remove the plaintiff from service, but that the exercise of the said jurisdiction or competence is irregular on the ground that the procedure prescribed under Rules 24 and 25 has not been properly followed. As the action is taken by an authority which has the competence to take such an action, the mere irregular exercise of the said power or jurisdiction cannot be regarded as an action not purporting to have been done under the provisions of the Act. The findings of the lower Court in this case are similar in nature to the findings of the trial Court in the case reported in Sita Ram Goel v. Municipal Board. The action of the panchayat in removing the plaintiff from service is one which must be regarded as purporting to have been done under the Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1933. As the plaintiff brought the suit more than six months after the termination of his services, the suit is clearly barred by limitation under S. 111 of the aforesaid act. ( 13 ) FOR the reasons stated above, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their respective costs. --- *** --- .