J. M. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a revision petition filed by the original defendants under sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 (which will be hereinafter referred to as the Act ). ( 2 ) THE facts leading rise to this revision petition briefly stated are as under:-THE opponents-landlords filed Civil Suit No. 488 of 1962 against the petitioners in the Court of the Civil Judge Junior Division Petlad for recovery of arrears of rent and possession of the suit premises. The suit premises consist of an open land bearing City Tika No. 10/1 and Survey No. 116 and a part of survey No. 123 situate near Kasyabhais Utara in Petlad District Kaira. The opponents case was that they want the suit premises for their personal use and occupation. They required the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for their personal use and occupation. They are doing business in Petlad under the name and style of Harilal Bhikhabhai and Co. They have got business also at Ahmedabad Ranoli Navli etc. They are purchasing goods at Petlad for those businesses and consequently they are required to be stored at Petlad They have also got cars and consequently a garage is necessary for keeping those cars some of which are kept at Petlad. They therefore require the suit premises which consist of an open land for constructing a godown and a garage for the aforesaid purposes and thereby they want to occupy them for themselves ( 3 ) THE petitioners challenged the aforesaid material facts. Their version was that the landlords did not require the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for the aforesaid purposes. They also contended that greater hardship would be caused to them by passing a decree for eviction than the hardship that would be caused to the opponents by refusing to pass a decree for eviction. ( 4 ) ISSUES were framed at Ex. 10 by the trial Court. Issues Nos. 2 and 3 which are material for our purposes were:- (2) Whether plaintiffs prove that they require the suit premises bona fide for their reasonable requirement ? (3) If yes whether greater hardship would be caused to the tenant by passing the decree for possession than to the landlords by refusing the decree for possession for the whole or part of the suit premises? (3) If yes whether greater hardship would be caused to the tenant by passing the decree for possession than to the landlords by refusing the decree for possession for the whole or part of the suit premises? issue No. 2 was decided against the plaintiffs-landlords. In view of that findings the learned trial Judge found that issue No. 3 did not survive. If that question arose for decision the area for one garage may be given to the plaintiffs-landlords as mentioned in para 15 of the judgment. The learned trial Judge in view of his findings dismissed the plaintiffs suit for possession. A decree for arrears of rent was passed. Rs. 141/per year were fixed to be the standard rent for the suit land. ( 5 ) AGAINST that judgment and decree the plaintiffs-landlords filed Appeal No. 289 of 1964 in the District Court at Nadiad. The defendants tenants filed cross-objections. The learned Extra Assistant Judge Nadiad who heard this appeal also recorded a finding that the plaintiffs-landlords did not require the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for their personal use and occupation. The trial Courts finding in that behalf has been confirmed by the learned Extra Assistant Judge. In view of that finding he found that point No. 2. for determination viz. whether greater hardship would be caused to the tenants by passing a decree for eviction than the hardship that would be caused to the landlords by refusing to pass it did not arise. He raised point No. 3 for determination viz. whether the plaintiffs-landlords required the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for erection of a new building? He answered this point for determination in favour of the landlords and decreed the suit for possession and directed the defendants to hand over possession of the suit land to the plaintiffs landlords on or before 30th April 1967 The decree regarding arrears of rent was confirmed. The defendants-tenants were further directed to pay mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 141/per year from the date of the suit till the possession is handed-over. Cross-objections were dismissed with costs. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs in the appeal. ( 6 ) BEING dissatisfied with that judgment and decree the original defendants have preferred the present revision petition to this Court. ( 7 ) MR. 141/per year from the date of the suit till the possession is handed-over. Cross-objections were dismissed with costs. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs in the appeal. ( 6 ) BEING dissatisfied with that judgment and decree the original defendants have preferred the present revision petition to this Court. ( 7 ) MR. C. T. Daru appearing for the petitioners contended that the learned appellate Judge was in error in making out a new case at the appellate stage in regard to seeking a relief for possession under clause 13 (1) (i) of the Act. He urged that the learned trial Judge had correctly construed the plaint and had rightly recorded a finding that the plaintiffs had sought for recovery of possession of the suit premises under clause (g) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. There was no prayer made for recovery of possession of the suit premises under clause (i) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. Both the Courts below have decided against the plaintiffs in regard to the relief sought regarding possession under clause (g) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. It was further contended by Mr. Daru that the fact that the trial Court had raised an issue regarding comparative hardships and parties had led evidence in that behalf was indicative of the position that the plaintiffs were really claiming this relief regarding recovery of possession from the tenants under clause (g) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. No specific issue was raised in the trial Court for seeking any relief under clause (i) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. During the trial no such issue was sought for on behalf of the plaintiffs. It was only at the stage of arguments in the trial Court a feeble attempt was made to seek relief on this ground. It was urged by Mr. Daru that different considerations would arise when one is considering a case under clause (g) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act and when one is considering it under clause (i) Of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. He invited my pointed attention to sub-sec. (3) of sec. 13 of the Act which read:-THE Court may pass the decree on the ground specified in clause (h) or (i) of subsec. 13 (1) of the Act and when one is considering it under clause (i) Of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. He invited my pointed attention to sub-sec. (3) of sec. 13 of the Act which read:-THE Court may pass the decree on the ground specified in clause (h) or (i) of subsec. (i) only in respect of a part of the premises which in its opinion it is necessary to vacate for carrying out the work of repairs or erection. No such issue was raised. No evidence was led on this point as the parties never contemplated that the present case was a case under clause (i) or sec. 13 (1) of the Act. It was a new case sought to be made out finding that the plaintiffs are not likely to succeed to get possession under clause (g) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act and in view of the evidence brought on the record. ( 8 ) IN reply to these arguments Mr. M. C. Shah appearing for the plaintiffs landlords urged that really the present case was a case where the landlords have sought for possession under clause (i) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act and not under clause (g) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. Alternatively he urged that possession was sought on both these grounds and in case the Court finds that the defendants-tenants did not get an opportunity to meet with the case under clause (i) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act the matter should be remanded to the trial Court for. giving an opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence in regard to this issue. It was also urged by him that when the suit premises consist of an open land and the landlords want to use it for his own purposes after constructing a building thereon the case would never fall under clause (g) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act but would fall only under clause (1) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. ( 9 ) IN my opinion the arguments advanced by Mr. Daru are well founded. If we refer to the plaint para 3 it is evident that what was let to the defendants-tenants (originally there was only one defendant. Defendant No. 2 has been added subsequently by the amendment of the plaint) was an open land. ( 9 ) IN my opinion the arguments advanced by Mr. Daru are well founded. If we refer to the plaint para 3 it is evident that what was let to the defendants-tenants (originally there was only one defendant. Defendant No. 2 has been added subsequently by the amendment of the plaint) was an open land. It is stated therein that land has been taken on lease by the defendant for the purposes of his business of selling fuel and charcoal at an annual rent of Rs. 141. 00. In para 4 which is very material for our purposes it is stated that the plaintiffs required that land for their personal use and occupation. Thereafter they give the particulars of their requirement by stating that they are doing business under the name and style of Harilal Bhikhabhai and Co. at Petlad. Besides that business they have got businesses at several places like Ahmedabad Ranoli Navli etc. For the purposes of those businesses they have to purchase goods at Petlad and have to store them. They have also got cars some of which are kept at Petlad. For keeping those cars they require a garage. For storing those goods they require godown and for those purposes i. e. for storing goods and keeping cars in the suit land they want to construct godown and a garage. The space for keeping cars with them is insufficient. The owner of the said premises also makes a demand in respect of those premises. It is thus evident that the averments made in the plaint indicate that the plaintiffs claim possession from the tenant under clause (g) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. There is nothing to indicate therein that they claim possession also under clause (1) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. ( 10 ) SEC. 13 (1) (g) of the Act reads:-13 Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of sec. 15 a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied (g) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust. Clause (i) of sec. Clause (i) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act reads:- (I) that where the premises are land. such land is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the erection of a new building. Sec. 13 (1) mentions several grounds under which the landlord would be entitled to take possession from the tenant. ( 11 ) IT is significant to note that the word premises has been defined in sec. 5 (8) of the Act as under:-IN this Act unless there is anything repugnant to the subject or context premises means (a) any land not being used for agricultural purposes. Admittedly the land in question was not being used for agricultural purposes. It was being used for business purposes. It is thus evident that the word premises would include any land not being used for agricultural purposes. ( 12 ) CLAUSES (b) of sec. 5 (8) of the Act reads:- (B) any building or part of a building let separately (other than a farm building) including (i) the garden grounds garages and outhouses if any appurtenant to such building or part of a building (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of a building (iii) any fittings affixed to such building or para of a building or the more beneficial enjoyment thereof in the instant case we are not concerned with the premises contemplated under clause (b ). We are concerned with the premises contemplated under clause (a) of sec 5 of the Act. ( 13 ) IN clause (g) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act the words used are the premises. The word premises would include open land. It is therefore evident that if the premises consist of land and they are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held. . . they are entitled to recover possession of such premises from the tenant. The words used are for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held. No restricted meaning can be given to the word occupation. One may occupy such land for his own self by using the land in that very condition or may occupy it by constructing a building thereon and occupy that building. Clause (g) of sec. No restricted meaning can be given to the word occupation. One may occupy such land for his own self by using the land in that very condition or may occupy it by constructing a building thereon and occupy that building. Clause (g) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act contemplates recovery of possession by the landlord when the premises are reasonably for whose benefit the premises are held. This ground will be available in both the cases viz. if the premises consist of open land or even if the premises consist of a building. There is one additional ground under clause (i) of sec. 13 (i) of the Act which would be available to the landlord in case the premises are land. For getting possession under that clause he has to prove that such land is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for erection of a new building. It is not necessary for him to prove that he wants a new building to be enacted for occupying by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held. The Legislature has probably mentioned this ground to encourage construction of new buildings on open lands for solving the problem of acute shortage of buildings. There would be different considerations in each case i. e. one considering the case under clause (g) and the other under clause (i ). So far as clause (i) is concerned the tenant will be able to press into service the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 13 of the Act. So far as clause (g) is concerned the Court has to consider the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 13 of the Act. So for as clause (g) is concerned the expression landlord shall not include rent farmer or rent collector. Furthermore in view of the explanation for the purposes of clause (g) of sub-sec. (1) a person would not be deemed to be a landlord unless he has acquired his interest in the premises at a dale prior to the beginning of the tenancy or the first day of January 1954 whichever is later or if the interest has devolved on him by inheritance or succession his predecessor-in-title had acquired the interest at a date prior to the beginning of the tenancy or the first day of January 1964 whichever is later. There is no such restricted meaning given to the word landlord when one has to consider the case of a landlord claiming possession of the leased premises under clause (i) of sec. 13 (i) of the Act. ( 14 ) SEC. 17 of the Act reads:- (1) Where a decree for eviction has been passed by the Court on the ground specified in clause (g) or (i) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 and the premises are not occupied or the work of erection is not commenced within a period of one month from the date the landlord recovers possession or the premises are re-let within one year of the said date to any person other than the original tenant the Court may on the application of the original tenant made within thirteen months of such date order the landlord to place in occupation of the premises on the original terms and conditions and on such order being made the landlord and any person who may be in occupation of the premises shall give vacant possession to the original tenant. (2) Any landlord who recovers possession on the ground specified in clause (g) or (i) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 and keeps the premises unoccupied or does not commence the work of erection without reasonable excuse within the period of one month from the date he recovered possession and any landlord or other person in occupation of the premises who fails to comply with the order of the Court under sub-sec. (i) shall on conviction be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months or with fine or with both. This section also indicates that these two clauses operate in different fields. ( 15 ) MR. Shah for the plaintiffs-landlords invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishnapasuba Rao Kundapur v. Dattatraya A. I. R. 1966 Supreme Court 1924 in support of his arguments. In my opinion that decision does not enunciate any proposition of law which could help the plaintiffs case in this regard. ( 15 ) MR. Shah for the plaintiffs-landlords invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishnapasuba Rao Kundapur v. Dattatraya A. I. R. 1966 Supreme Court 1924 in support of his arguments. In my opinion that decision does not enunciate any proposition of law which could help the plaintiffs case in this regard. The only question before the Supreme Court was whether the subject-matter of the lease was an open plot of land or was a land appurtenant to a building as the building had been constructed in a portion of the land leased by the tenant during the time of the predecessor-in-title of the lessor and subsequently lease was taken of that portion of the land from the lessor. The Supreme Court has observed in this decision:-THE problem in the present case is not whether an open plot of land can be let for residence education business trade or storage but whether an open plot of land only has been let by the landlord to the tenant. ( 16 ) DECISION of the Supreme Court in Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta v. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth. A. I. R. 1964 Supreme Court 1676 throws some light on the problem that is posed before me. A contention was raised in that case that clause (g) will apply only when the landlord bona fide needs to occupy the premises without making any alteration in them i. e. to occupy the identical building which the tenant occupies. That contention was negatived observing that there is no justification to give such a narrow construction either to the word premises or to the word occupies in clause (g) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. ( 17 ) IT was further observed that the provisions of clause (hh) cannot possibly apply to the case where a landlord reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation even if he had to demolish premises and to erect a new building on them. The provisions of clause (hh) apply to cases where the landlord does not require the premises for his own occupation but requires them for erecting a new building which is to be let out to tenants. The provisions of clause (hh) apply to cases where the landlord does not require the premises for his own occupation but requires them for erecting a new building which is to be let out to tenants. It is therefore clear that once the landlord establishes that he bona fide requires the premises for his occupation he is entitled to recover possession of it from tenant in view of the provisions of sub-clause (g) of sec. 13 (1) irrespective of the fact whether he would occupy the premises without making any alteration in them or after making the necessary alterations. ( 18 ) IT is further observed that the occupation of the premises in clause (g) does not necessarily refer to occupation as residence. The owner can occupy a place by making use of it in any manner. In a case like the present if the landlords on getting possession start their work of demolition within the prescribed period they would have occupied the premises in order to erect a building fit for their occupation. ( 19 ) THE ratio of this decision in my opinion lends support to my conclusion. In the instant case the landlords instead of using the open land as it is for the purposes of their business want to use it for storing their materials and for keeping their cars by construction of godown and a garage thereon. It is also one of the modes of use of the land in question. 1 am therefore of opinion that in the instant case the landlords had claimed possession under clause (g) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act and they had not claimed possession under clause (i) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. It is not correct to say that they had claimed possession under clause (i) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act and not under clause (g) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act Looking to the conduct of the parties at the trial it is too late for the plaintiffs-landlords to suggest that they had claimed possession not under clause (g) of sec. 13 (1) but under clause (i) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. It is also not possible to interpret the plaint in the manner that possession was also sought under clause (i) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. 13 (1) but under clause (i) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. It is also not possible to interpret the plaint in the manner that possession was also sought under clause (i) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. The learned trial Judge has in my opinion rightly construed this plaint. The appellate Judge has committed an error in interpreting or construing the plaint and in making out a new case under sec. 13 (1) (i) of the Act ( 20 ) IT need not be emphasised that the plaintiff-landlords would be at liberty to file a fresh suit if so advised to recover possession from the defendants-tenants basing their suit under clause (i) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. It is made clear that in this proceeding the case has been dealt with as if the plaintiffs have claimed possession under sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Act and had not made the claim regarding possession under sec. 13 (1) (i) of the Act. The appellate Courts decree therefore for possession and mesne profits cannot be sustained. . ( 21 ) THE revision petition succeeds. ( 22 ) THE revision petition is allowed. The appellate Courts decree for eviction and mesne profits is reversed and the trial Courts decree viz. dismissing the suit for possession is restored. Taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of the case each party is ordered to bear its own costs throughout. Rule is made absolute. Petition allowed. .